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SUMMARY  
This thesis examines the contractual remedy of specific performance in South African 
law. It looks closely and critically at the discretionary power of the courts to refuse to 
order specific performance. The focus is on the considerations relevant to the exercise 
of the judicial discretion. 
First, it emphasises the tension between the right and the discretion. It is argued that it 
is problematical for our courts to refuse to order specific performance in the exercise of 
their discretion. The underlying difficulty is that the discretion of the court to refuse 
specific performance is fundamentally in conflict with the supposed right of the plaintiff 
to claim specific performance. The thesis investigates the tenability of this open-ended 
discretionary approach to the availability of specific performance as a remedy for breach 
of contract.  
To this end, the thesis examines less complex, more streamlined approaches embodied 
in different international instruments. Comparison between different legal systems is 
also used in order to highlight particular problems in the South African approach, and to 
see whether a better solution may be borrowed from elsewhere.  
An investigation of the availability of this remedy in other legal systems and international 
instruments reveals that the South African approach is incoherent and unduly complex.  
In order to illustrate this point, the thesis examines four of the grounds on which our 
courts have refused to order specific performance. In the first two instances, namely, 
when damages provide adequate relief, and when it will be difficult for the court to 
oversee the execution of the order, we see that the courts gradually attach less or even 
no weight to these factors when deciding whether or not to order specific performance. 
In the third instance, namely, personal service contracts, the courts have at times been 
willing to grant specific performance, but have also refused it in respect of highly 
personal obligations, which is understandable insofar as the law wishes to avoid forced 
labour and sub-standard performances. The analysis of the fourth example, namely, 
undue hardship, demonstrates that the courts continue to take account of the interests 
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of defendants and third parties when deciding whether or not to order specific 
performance.  
This study found that there are certain circumstances in which the courts invariably 
refuse to order specific performance and where the discretionary power that courts have 
to refuse specific performance is actually illusory. It is argued that our law relating to 
specific performance could be discredited if this reality is not reflected in legal doctrine. 
Given this prospect, possible solutions to the problem are evaluated, and an argument 
is made in favour of a simpler concrete approach that recognises more clearly-defined 
rules with regard to when specific performance should be refused in order to provide 
coherency and certainty in the law. 
This study concludes that a limited right to be awarded specific performance may be 
preferable to a right which is subject to an open-ended discretion to refuse it, and that 
an exception-based approach could provide a basis for the simplification of our law 
governing specific performance of contracts.  
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie tesis ondersoek die benadering tot die kontraktuele remedie van spesifieke 
nakoming in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Die diskresionêre bevoegdheid van howe om 
spesifieke nakoming te weier word van nader en krities aanskou. Die fokus is op die 
oorwegings wat ‘n rol speel by die uitoefening van die diskresie. 
Eerstens beklemtoon die tesis die spanning tussen die reg en die regterlike diskresie. 
Daar word aangevoer dat dit problematies is dat ons howe ‘n eis om spesifieke 
nakoming kan weier in die uitoefening van hul diskresie. Die onderliggende probleem is 
dat die hof se diskresie om spesifieke nakoming te weier, fundamenteel in stryd is met 
die sogenaamde reg van die eiser om spesifieke nakoming te eis. Die tesis ondersoek 
die houbaarheid van hierdie onbelemmerde diskresionêre benadering tot die 
beskikbaarheid van spesifieke nakoming as ‘n remedie vir kontrakbreuk.  
Vervolgens ondersoek die tesis die vereenvoudigde benaderings ten opsigte van 
spesifieke nakoming beliggaam in verskillende internasionale instrumente. Vergelyking 
tussen verskillende regstelsels word ook gebruik om spesifieke probleme in die Suid-
Afrikaanse benadering uit te lig, en om vas te stel of daar ‘n beter oplossing van elders 
geleen kan word.  
‘n Ondersoek van die aanwesigheid van hierdie remedie in ander regstelsels en 
internasionale instrumente onthul dat die Suid-Afrikaanse benadering onsamehangend 
en onnodig ingewikkeld is.  
Om hierdie punt te illustreer, ondersoek die tesis vier gronde waarop die remedie tipies 
geweier word. In die eerste twee gevalle, naamlik, wanneer skadevergoeding 
genoegsame regshulp sal verleen en wanneer dit vir die hof moeilik sal wees om toesig 
te hou oor die uitvoering van die bevel, sien ons dat die howe geleidelik minder of selfs 
geen gewig aan hierdie faktore heg wanneer hulle besluit of spesifieke nakoming 
toegestaan moet word nie. In die derde geval, naamlik, dienskontrakte, sien ons dat die 
howe bereid is om in sekere gevalle spesifieke nakoming toe te staan, maar egter nie 
spesifieke nakoming ten opsigte van hoogs persoonlike verpligtinge gelas nie, wat 
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verstaanbaar is tot die mate wat ons reg dwangarbeid en swak prestasies wil vermy. 
Die analise van die vierde grond, naamlik, buitensporige benadeling, toon dat die howe 
voortgaan om die belange van die verweerder en derde partye in ag te neem wanneer 
hulle besluit om spesifieke nakoming te beveel.  
Die studie het bevind dat daar sekere omstandighede is waarin die howe nooit 
spesifieke nakoming toestaan nie en die diskresie eintlik afwesig is. Derhalwe word dit 
aangevoer dat die geldende reg wat betref spesifieke nakoming weerlê kan word indien 
hierdie werklikheid nie in die substantiewe reg weerspieël word nie. Gegewe die 
vooruitsig, word moontlike oplossings ondersoek, en ‘n argument word gemaak ten 
gunste van ‘n eenvoudiger konkrete benadering wat meer duidelik gedefinieerde reëls 
erken met betrekking tot wanneer spesifieke nakoming geweier moet word ten einde 
regsekerheid en eenvormigheid te bevorder.  
Die gevolgtrekking is dat ‘n beperkte aanspraak op spesifieke nakoming meer wenslik is 
as ‘n reg op spesifieke nakoming wat onderhewig is aan die hof se oorheersende 
diskresie om dit te weier, en dat ‘n uitsondering-gebaseerde benadering as ‘n basis kan 
dien vir die vereenvoudiging van ons reg rakende spesifieke nakoming.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 1  Problem identification 
1 1 1  Introduction 
A person who enters into a contract expects the other party to fulfil his obligations under 
that contract. That party may, however, decide not to perform as it is expected of him. 
The question then arises what forms of relief or redress the legal system will offer the 
aggrieved party.1 There are various remedies available to an aggrieved party where 
there has been a breach of contract. In theory, specific performance2 is the most 
appropriate remedy from the point of view of the creditor, who receives what he actually 
                                                 
1
  See generally R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition (1990) 770-782; K Zweigert & H Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law (tr           
T Weir) 3 ed (1998) 470 ff. 
2
  The exact meaning of “specific performance” has been the subject of extensive discussion 
in contract literature, which cannot be consolidated here. While a variety of definitions of 
the term “specific performance” have been suggested, the term will be used here in its 
traditional sense, according to its Latin terminology, performance in forma specifica, to 
refer to the remedy available to compel a defaulting party by an order of court to perform a 
contract literally, i.e. to make the very performance he agreed to make in terms of the 
contract. And for ease of exposition, the term “contract” in this thesis will be used to mean 
a legally-concluded contract; the present study is therefore mainly concerned with 
limitations on the availability of the remedy where the contract is not in any way defective. 
See J W Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (1951) vol 2 § 3089; J J du 
Plessis “Spesifieke nakoming: ‘n regshistoriese herwaardering” (1988) 51 THRHR 349; M 
A Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African 
Law (1989) 12-13, 56; G Lubbe “Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: die 
implikasies van die uitoefening van die regterlike diskresie” in J Smits & G Lubbe (eds) 
Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa (2003) 51 52; A D J van Rensburg, J G Lotz & T van 
Rijn (R D Sharrock) “Contract” in W A Joubert & J A Faris (eds) LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed (2010) 
para 495.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   2 
 
bargained for.3 This ideal, is however, counterbalanced by a number of factors. As Sir 
Guenter Treitel explained some time ago:4 
“First, the enforced performance may be regarded as an undue interference with the 
personal freedom of the debtor. This is particularly true where performance can only be 
rendered by the debtor personally; but even where this is not the case enforced performance 
is often felt to be too strong a measure when the creditor could for most practical purposes 
be put into almost as good a position by an award of a sum of money. Enforced performance 
might, moreover, cause hardship to the debtor which would not be occasioned by an award 
of money, particularly where such an award would be subject to reduction under the 
mitigation rules. Secondly, enforced performance may be thought to impose strains on the 
machinery of the law enforcement which are too severe when balanced against the benefit 
derived by the creditor from enforced performance.” 
For these and related reasons, legal systems generally limit the availability of specific 
performance as a remedy for breach. There are at least three approaches to the 
problem. The first is to accept the general principle that specific performance is 
available in principle, subject to certain exceptions, while the second is to adopt the 
                                                 
3
  This statement requires some clarification, because an order for specific performance 
seldom brings about performance within the time specified in the contract. In this respect, 
such an order would be for less than exact and complete performance. For the loss 
involved in the delay or in other existing non-performance, damages will be awarded along 
with specific performance. Thus, to the extent that it does not bring about exact and 
complete performance, damages in conjunction with specific performance will be ordered. 
See Silverton Estates Co v Bellevue Syndicate 1904 TS 462; J C de Wet & A H van Wyk 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 213; S van der Merwe et al 
Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 333. 
4
  G H Treitel “Remedies for breach of contract” in IECL VII ch 16 (1976) 8. See also            
A Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 3 ed (2004) 472-473. 
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point of departure that specific performance is an exceptional, discretionary remedy. A 
third hybrid approach combines elements of the other two.5  
It is a basic principle of modern civil-law systems that the debtor is obliged to perform 
his contractual obligation and, in the case of a breach, the creditor has the right to 
enforce this duty. The creditor has the right to claim performance of the contract and to 
obtain a judgment ordering the debtor to fulfil it. Monetary damages are only regarded 
as a type of substitute specific performance.6 
The position in the common law is quite different. Specific performance is regarded as 
an exceptional discretionary remedy in common-law jurisdictions.7 The concept that 
contractual obligations, as a rule can be specifically enforced, and that the election is 
with the plaintiff creditor to demand specific performance, is foreign to these systems. 
This point is implicit in the “unsettling”8 theory about liability in contract put forward by 
the American jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, that every contractual obligation resolves 
itself into damages in case of non-performance by the debtor – as discussed below.9 
The essence of the modern common law doctrine is thus that failure to perform / breach 
of contract will be compensated with the value of the expectancy that was created by 
                                                 
5
  Treitel “Remedies for breach of contract” in IECL 8. See also A Cockrell “Breach of 
contract” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law 
in South Africa (1996) 303 325 ff; Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 484-485 A Cockrell 
“Breach of contract” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa (1996) 303 326; S Eiselen “Specific performance and 
special damages” in H L MacQueen & R Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: 
Scots and South African Perspectives (2006) 249 250 ff. 
6
  De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 209; Cockrell 
“Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 326; Zweigert & Kötz 
Comparative Law 479.  
7
  M Chen-Wishart Contract Law 4 ed (2012) 539. 
8
  According to Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 
326. 
9
  See paras 3 2 & 6 3 below. 
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the promise of the other party (i.e. expectation damages); only when awarding damages 
is inadequate will it be in the discretion of the court to grant specific performance.10   
The point of departure in South African contract law is that freely-concluded contracts 
must be honoured (pacta sunt servanda). This suggests that an order for specific 
performance should be regarded as the principal remedy for breach of contract.11 As a 
general rule the creditor is entitled to enforce performance of the contract precisely as it 
was agreed between the parties in the contract.12  
This principle was famously encapsulated as follows in Farmers’ Co-operative Society 
(Reg) v Berry13 by Innes J:  
                                                 
10
  This principle is firmly established in English law – see J Beatson Anson’s Law of Contract 
29 ed (2010) 575; E Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 1099; H G Beale et al 
(eds) Chitty on Contracts I: General Principles 31 ed (2012) 1907, and in American law – 
see § 359(1) of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
(Addendum A 383). See further J M Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts 12: Restitution, 
Specific Performance and Election of Remedies Interim ed (2002) § 1139. 
11
  Even though there may be a theoretical preference for the remedy, a creditor is of course 
not obligated to utilise this remedy, and may rely on other contractual remedies instead. 
See D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 321; 
F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 873. 
12
  See Fick v Woolcott & Ohlsson’s Cape Breweries 1911 AD 214; Woods v Walters 1921 
AD 304; Hesselmann v Koerner 1922 SWA 40; Shill v Milner 1937 AD 101; Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange v Northern Transvaal (Messina) Copper Exploration Co 1945 AD 529. 
Note that specific performance may be claimed as soon as performance of the debtor’s 
obligation resulting from the contract is due, even if no breach has yet occurred. Unlike 
damages and termination, failure to perform is not a requirement for specific performance 
(Joss v Western Barclays Bank Ltd 1990 (1) SA 575 (T)). See also para 2 3 1 2 n 92 
below. 
13
  1912 AD 343. 
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“Prima facie every party to a binding agreement who is ready to carry out his own obligation 
under it has a right to demand from the other party a performance of his undertaking in terms 
of the contract.”14 
The Appellate Division confirmed this position in the leading case of Benson v SA 
Mutual Life Assurance Society.15 However, even though the court described the right to 
specific performance as a cornerstone of our law relating to specific performance,16 in 
the same judgment the court noted that there is a discretion on the part of the court to 
refuse to order specific performance and leave the plaintiff to claim and prove his id 
quod interest.17 
The approach that was adopted by South African courts represents a “fusion” of the 
Roman-Dutch notion that a party to a contract has a right to specific performance 
                                                 
14
  350. The existence of a right to specific performance was decided as long ago as 1882 in 
Cohen v Shires, McHattie and King (1882) 1 SAR 41, and subsequently reaffirmed in a 
number of cases – see eg Thompson v Pullinger (1894) 1 OR 298 301; Woods v Walters 
1921 AD 303 309; Shill v Milner 1937 AD 301 109; BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope 
Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 433. See also para 2 2 3 below. 
15
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A). This decision and its implications are discussed fully below (see 
paras 3 3 & 6 1 2). 
16
  782I-J per Hefer JA. 
17
  782D-G (referring to Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378 per 
De Villiers AJA). See more recently Klimax Manufacturing Ltd v Van Rensburg 2005 (4) 
SA 445 (O) para [10] per Hattingh J: “A plaintiff is always entitled to claim specific 
performance. Assuming he makes out a case, his claim will be granted, subject only to the 
Court’s discretion”; Nkengana v Schnetler [2011] 1 All SA 272 (SCA) para [12] per Griesel 
AJA: “It is settled law that every party to a binding contract who is ready to carry out its 
own obligations under it has a right to demand from the other party, so far as it is possible, 
performance of that other party’s obligations in terms of the contract” and finally, Botha v 
Rich NO 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) para [37] per Nkabinde J: “The starting point is that at 
common law a contracting party is entitled to specific performance in respect of any 
contractual right …” See also para 1 1 4 below. 
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thereof and the English equitable doctrine that this remedy is within the discretion of the 
court.18 As a result of the synthesis of these viewpoints, our courts accept that the right 
to specific performance is not absolute, but subject to a judicial discretion to refuse an 
order for specific performance,19 which entails the reversal of the content of the 
discretion under English law.20 Courts should, however, always be cautious not to 
refuse enforcing contracts.21 To this extent therefore, the civilian approach has 
prevailed.  
Under South African law “[t]here is thus an automatic right to claim, but no automatic 
right to receive specific performance”.22 It has furthermore been suggested that this 
discretion to refuse to order specific performance is warranted since “cases do arise 
where justice demands that a plaintiff be denied his right to performance”.23  
                                                 
18
  Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in H L MacQueen & R Zimmermann 
(eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 252. 
19
  This, according to Botha AJA is irrevocably entrenched in South African law (Associated 
South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 
893 (A) 923). 
20
  G F Lubbe & C M Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary 3 ed (1988) 542; Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South 
Africa 321.  
21
  See Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para [94]. 
22
  A Beck “The coming of age of specific performance” 1987 CILSA 190 195. See also G 
Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance in South African Law” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 95 102. 
23
  Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783D. See also D J 
Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 223-224; Eiselen “Specific 
performance and special damages” in MacQueen & Zimmermann (eds) European 
Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 256. 
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The modern law governing the availability of this remedy has quite correctly been 
described as being rather complicated and “precarious”.24 This is a product of the mixed 
nature of the South African legal system.25 South African courts have accepted a 
reverse discretion to refuse the remedy without recognising the exceptional nature of 
the remedy in English law, and have done so in spite of the fact that English law differs 
considerably from Roman-Dutch law (from which the right to specific performance was 
received).26 In our law the general point of departure remains that specific performance 
is available “as of right”.27 It is problematical for our courts to refuse to order specific 
performance in the exercise of their discretion,28 because the denial of the order has a 
                                                 
24
  See generally Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern 
Cross 330. See also Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in MacQueen & 
Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 252. 
25
  Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 325: “Modern 
South African law regarding the availability of specific performance as a remedy for 
breach represents the outcome of an extremely nuanced process of historical 
development.” See also introductory paragraph of Beck’s 1987 CILSA article, 
commencing with: “The theoretical underpinnings of contract law as well as the 
complications caused by the accidents of history are probably demonstrated uniquely by 
the remedy of specific performance for breach of contract.” See also para 7 1 below. 
26
  Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 785E; Santos 
Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 82E-F. 
27
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
46. See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 542: “As Hefer JA points out in Benson v SA 
Mutual Life Assurance Society, in English law specific performance is an exceptional 
remedy available when damages appear to be inadequate. The theoretical starting point 
in South Africa (like other civil law jurisdictions) is quite different from the English and 
American one. In South Africa reasons must be found for not granting specific 
performance to the party that requests it, with the court exercising an equitable discretion 
to refuse the remedy.” 
28
  See also De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 210-211; Cockrell “Breach of 
contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 328 ff. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   8 
 
substantive effect on the right of the creditor to specific performance of the contract, and 
does not operate at the remedial or procedural level only. As Lubbe correctly explains: 
“The immediate connection between the creditor’s right to the performance and the remedial 
claim to an order for enforcement, means that a refusal to grant a decree for specific 
performance goes beyond a mere denegatio actionis [or “refusal of the action”]. A decision 
rejecting the plaintiff’s request for specific enforcement of his contract deprives the creditor 
not merely of ‘the main advantage which the theoretically valid right is supposed to grant 
him’,29 but also of the very substance of the right, for, according to our courts, the substance 
of the right cannot be separated from the remedial manifestation thereof.30 The notion that 
the exercise of the discretion takes effect merely at the remedial level is therefore 
untenable.”31 
                                                 
29
  Citing D E Friedmann “Good faith and remedies for breach of contract” in J Beatson & D E 
Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 399 406, where Friedmann 
explores to what extent gaps created in English contract law by the lack of good faith 
doctrine are filled by the law of remedies. 
30
  Citing First National Bank of SA Ltd v Lynn 1996 (2) SA 339 (A) 352C-D per Van den 
Heever JA; Brummer v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty) Ltd 1999 (3) SA 389 (SCA) 
411C-D per Nienaber JA, and Headleigh Private Hospital t/a Rand Clinic v Soller & 
Manning 2001 (4) SA 360 (W) 367F-G per Cameron J: “Legal procedures are the 
essential mechanism through which rights in our society are recognised and enforced. In a 
society whose conception of rights derives from a system of legal entitlements an integral 
part of which is the institutional mechanisms established for their enforcement, it seems to 
me to be unrealistic to divorce the underlying right from the entitlement to be compensated 
for its procedural exaction.” See further Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion 
to refuse an order for specific performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) 
Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 103. 
31
  “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in 
South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National 
and Other Perspectives 105, and on 107 the author continues as follows: “In the light of 
the foregoing, it can be contended that the practice of the courts provides the basis for a 
construction whereby, in respect of the so-called remedy of specific performance, judges 
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Furthermore, South African courts relied on English law to give content to this specific 
performance discretion and under the influence of the English approach that an order 
for specific performance is an exceptional remedy, our courts in practice have exercised 
their discretion in such a way that it appeared as if the remedy would not be granted if 
certain circumstances32 were present.33 As a result, 
“The Roman-Dutch right to specific performance, affirmed as part of modern South African 
law, was effectively negated by the courts’ subsequent endorsement of crystallized instances 
– borrowed from English law – in which specific performance should be refused.”34  
                                                                                                                                                             
possess a discretionary power to derogate from the consequences of a contract on 
account of considerations of fairness and reasonableness. On this view a decision to 
refuse an order for specific performance amounts to a judicial re-evaluation of the 
plaintiff’s contention that there is in existence an obligation entitling him to performance by 
the debtor.” See also Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross 328. 
32
  This thesis indicates that in practice, in the compared jurisdictions and international 
instruments, there are a number of similar recognised circumstances in which the remedy 
will not be granted. These circumstances or considerations form the subject matter of 
chapters 3 to 6. 
33
  For instance (Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378H-379A per 
De Villiers AJA): where it would be difficult for the court to supervise the execution of its 
order, where damages would adequately compensate the plaintiff, where the performance 
could readily be obtained elsewhere, or where specific performance would entail rendering 
personal services, or would cause unreasonable hardship to the defendant. See also 
Thompson v Pullinger (1894) 1 OR 298; Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa § 
3113 ff; Beck 1987 CILSA 197; Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract 225-
227; Lubbe & Murray Contract 542-543; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 
210-211, and esp Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 330. See also para 6 
1 1 below. 
34
  Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 329; Benson 
v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 784C.  
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However, the Appellate Division in Benson, emphasised that “any curtailment of the 
court’s discretion inevitably entails an erosion of the plaintiff’s right to performance and 
that there can be no rule, whether it be flexible or inflexible, as to the way in which the 
court’s discretion is to be exercised, which does not affect the plaintiff’s right in some 
way or another”.35 Hefer JA also pointed out that in English law the approach regarding 
the availability of specific performance is fundamentally different: an order for specific 
performance being the exception rather than the rule. Hefer JA reaffirmed that every 
plaintiff has a right according to South African law to demand performance, and that 
there is “neither need nor reason” to continue to follow the English rules of equity as to 
when specific performance should be denied.36 He maintained that although the right to 
specific performance is subject to a judicial discretion, this discretion cannot in any way 
be regulated by rigid rules which would restrict the court’s discretion and erode the right 
to specific performance.37 When considering the nature and extent of this discretion, he 
went on to say:  
“This does not mean that the discretion is in all respects completely unfettered. It remains, 
after all, a judicial discretion and from its very nature arises the requirement that it is not to be 
exercised capriciously, nor upon a wrong principle (Ex parte Neethling [1951 (4) SA 331 (A) 
335]). It is aimed at preventing an injustice – for cases do arise where justice demands that a 
plaintiff be denied his right to performance – and the basic principle thus is that the order 
which the Court makes should not produce an unjust result which will be the case, eg, if, in 
the particular circumstances, the order will operate unduly harshly on the defendant. Another 
principle is that the remedy of specific performance should always be granted or withheld in 
accordance with legal and public policy. (cf De Wet and Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 
4th ed at 189) …”38  
                                                 
35
  783B-C. 
36
  785F. 
37
  782I-783C. 
38
  783C-F. See further Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 330: “The court’s 
discretion to refuse specific performance is regarded as a judicial discretion which, 
although it should be as unfettered as possible, must be exercised in accordance with 
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After Benson, our courts39 have gravitated towards a strict Roman-Dutch approach, 
constantly emphasising a plaintiff’s right to specific performance.40 As a result, South 
African courts frequently assert that they should resist the tendency to develop the 
abovementioned factors, deriving from English law, into rules governing the discretion, 
in order to avoid the limitation of a plaintiff’s right to specific performance.41  
The considerations set out above give rise to a number of questions about the scope of 
the right to specific performance, seeing that it is still not regarded as absolute, but 
subject to a judicial discretion to refuse it.42 How can one accept the claim that a       
plaintiff has a right to specific performance, if that right can be trumped by certain 
considerations within the overriding discretion of the court? The underlying difficulty is 
                                                                                                                                                             
public policy and in such a manner that it does not bring about an unjust result …”;          
Du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 873: “Apart from these inherent 
restrictions no rules can be prescribed to regulate the exercise of the court’s discretion.” 
39
  See eg LMG Construction (City) Pty Ltd v Ranch International Pipelines (Transvaal) (Pty) 
Ltd 1984 (3) SA 861 (W) 880-881. 
40
  Lubbe “Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: die implikasies van die 
uitoefening van die regterlike diskresie” in Smits & Lubbe (eds) Remedies in Zuid-Afrika 
en Europa 58 ff; G Lubbe & J du Plessis “Law of contract” in C G van der Merwe & J E du 
Plessis (eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004) 243 262-263; Lubbe 
“Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in 
South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National 
and Other Perspectives 102 ff; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 330; 
Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 321; Lubbe & Murray 
Contract 545. 
41
  See eg Raik v Raik 1993 (2) SA 617 (W) 626; Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd 
v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 84E-J; Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) SA 
293 (W) paras [17]-[21]; Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Bpk v Mapoe paras [101] ff, 
unreported judgment with case no 4587/2010 delivered on 29 Sep 2010 by the Free State 
Provincial Division of the High Court per Van Zyl J (copy on file with author).  
42
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
126 (as quoted in para 7 1 below). 
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that the discretion to deny the plaintiff’s right to specific performance still seems to 
undermine the right to specific performance.43 It may then be argued that the right to 
specific performance is illusory.44  
It seems that even though the Appellate Division confirmed the position in our law, and 
Benson reaffirmed the primacy of the remedy in current law, there is still uncertainty 
surrounding the availability of this remedy, particularly with reference to the 
considerations relevant to the exercise of the courts’ discretion to refuse an order for 
specific performance. Cockrell argues that the fundamental tension in this area of law 
(as outlined above)45 was not properly addressed by the judgment,46 and that “despite 
trying to re-establish the Roman-Dutch position, the court has simply perpetuated the 
internal incoherence in this area of the law, occasioned by the fusion of the remedy from 
two dissimilar systems of law”.47  
                                                 
43
  Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 330. 
44
  328: “The underlying difficulty was that the ‘discretion’ of the court to refuse specific 
performance was fundamentally at odds with the supposed ‘right’ of the promisee to claim 
specific performance.” 
45
  See also para 7 1 below. 
46
  Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 328, 330. 
47
  For supporting reference, see Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in 
MacQueen & Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African 
Perspectives 252. See also Beck 1987 CILSA 190 and Lubbe “Contractual derogation and 
the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in South African Law” in Smits et 
al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 110-111; 
A Smith “Specific implement” in K Reid & R Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law in 
Scotland II: Obligations (2000) 195 209: “Cockrell nevertheless criticizes the inconsistency 
of three propositions in the Benson judgement: the confirmation of the plaintiff’s right to 
the remedy, the court’s discretion untrammelled by rules, and the inability of the English 
exceptions (though still relevant factors) to limit the South African court’s discretion. The 
discretion he maintains, undermines the right.”  
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It is submitted that the precise nature and extent of the courts’ discretion and the way in 
which it is to be exercised cannot be regarded as fully resolved. The availability of the 
remedy is regulated by an open norm which requires an evaluative consideration of the 
circumstances of the case with reference to considerations of fairness and the broader 
interests of the community.48 Whether an order for specific performance will be refused 
is determined by the facts of each case.49 The question arises, though, whether South 
African courts should follow a more concrete approach, and could possibly be guided by 
certain more clearly-defined rules with regard to when specific performance may be 
refused.  
This study proposes to evaluate the different considerations that could be regarded as 
relevant to the exercise of the courts’ discretion to refuse specific performance in order 
to determine whether such considerations should influence a court to exercise its 
discretion to refuse to order specific performance. This study will examine the way in 
which South African courts have dealt with some of these circumstances and also 
explore the desirability of a more concrete approach regarding the availability of this 
remedy.50 These issues are dealt with in chapters 3 to 6 below. 
The proposed study problem has been investigated by a number of local 
commentators,51 and is also the subject of continuous international debate, especially of 
                                                 
48
  See Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives 99. 
49
  See Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783B per Hefer JA. 
50
  With specific reference to the circumstances identified in Haynes v Kingwilliamstown 
Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378H-379A (see n 33 above). See also para 6 1 1 below. 
51
  See eg Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South 
African Law; Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for 
specific performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in 
Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives.  
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a comparative52 and historical nature.53 However, no recent in-depth South African 
study has investigated whether the products of these debates could benefit the 
development of our law. Before proceeding to problems relating to the specific 
considerations that influence the courts’ discretion, it is useful for purposes of problem 
identification to deal briefly with this broader historical and comparative context.  
1 1 2  Historical and comparative overview54 
The remedy of specific performance is a well-known example of divergence between 
the civil law and the common law.55 It was mentioned earlier that the scope of the 
remedy is more limited in common-law jurisdictions: damages is regarded as the 
                                                 
52
  See eg Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 303; 
Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in MacQueen & Zimmermann (eds) 
European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 249. See also Smith 
“Specific implement” in Reid & Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law in Scotland II 
195; Beck 1987 CILSA 190. 
53
  See eg Du Plessis 1988 THRHR 349; J Oosterhuis Specific Performance in German, 
French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth Century: Specific Performance: German, French 
and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth Century: Remedies in an Age of Fundamental Rights 
and Industrialisation (published) doctoral thesis Vrije University Amsterdam (2011). 
54
  For extensive discussion, see ch 2 below. For a general comparative account of specific 
performance, see G H Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account 
(1988) ch 3 and Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 470-485. See further and more 
recently, V Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law (2009) 
77-113; M Hogg Promises and Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives (2011) 348 ff; E 
McKendrick & I Maxwell “Specific performance in international arbitration” 2013 The 
Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 195. 
55
  Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 781; Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 484; D 
Haas, G Hesen & J Smits “Introduction” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in 
Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 1 2; M Torsello “Remedies for 
breach of contract” in J M Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 2 ed (2012) 
754 762. 
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primary remedy and specific performance is seen as an exceptional remedy, which can 
only be awarded by a court in the exercise of its equitable discretion. Certain specific 
circumstances have been identified where an order for specific performance would not 
be granted.56 These circumstances include: if damages would provide an adequate 
remedy, if performance consists of a personal service, if the order could cause undue 
hardship and if the contract requires constant supervision.57 
Traditionally, equity would only grant specific performance with respect to contracts 
involving movables where the goods were unique in character.58 The reason was that 
the aggrieved party had an adequate remedy in damages in case of breach if he could 
acquire the goods elsewhere.59 English law has been reluctant to recognise the specific 
enforceability of contracts for the sale of ordinary or “non-unique” personal property.60 
The courts in the United States have, however, extended the remedy to buyers of 
generic goods whose need for the actual supply was particularly urgent or who would 
not be able to obtain a satisfactory substitute.61 And there is a growing tendency to 
order specific performance on the basis of the appropriateness of the remedy, rather 
than on the inadequacy of damages.62 Though English courts are slower in accepting 
this view, there are indications that the English courts are moving away from the 
traditional rule that specific performance will not be ordered where damages is an 
                                                 
56
  See generally Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 3 ed (2004) 456-457; 
R Stone The Modern Law of Contract 10 ed (2013) 501-505; H G Beale et al (eds) Chitty 
on Contracts I: General Principles 31 ed (2012) 1917-1933. See also Beck 1987 CILSA 
190 193. 
57
  For a more detailed list, see para 2 3 2 1 below. 
58
  See further para 2 3 2 1 & 3 2 1 2 below. 
59
  See further para 3 2 1 2 below. 
60
  Treitel “Remedies for breach of contract” in IECL VII/16 18. See further paras 2 3 2 1 & 3 
2 1 below. 
61
  This is illustrated by the wording of § 2-716(1) US Uniform Commercial Code (discussed 
in paras 2 3 2 2 & 3 2 1 2 below). 
62
  See para 3 2 1 2 below. 
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adequate remedy.63 It is suggested that this development could be informative in the 
South African context. Such an investigation will be approached carefully, as 
recommended by Lubbe.64  
As mentioned above, the remedy of specific performance assumes an extensive field of 
application in civil-law jurisdictions and is available as of right. However, the majority of 
these jurisdictions recognise certain exceptions to this position.65 These systems 
generally do not retain such an unrestrictive discretion to refuse performance. In his 
doctoral thesis, Oosterhuis focused on the question why exceptions exist to this general 
principle. This research could be informative as to one of the central questions this 
study seeks to answer, namely whether there should be defined exceptions in our law 
as well.66 Oosterhuis points out that during the first decades of the nineteenth century 
German courts accepted certain exceptions to the general principle, because more 
cases occurred, due to the increase in trade and production of generic goods, in which 
damages would appear to be a more appropriate remedy. German states and territories 
underwent mass industrialisation during this period and the remedy of specific 
performance was considered to be inappropriate where a buyer needed timely delivery 
of goods, either for trading purposes or for their use in the industrial production process. 
                                                 
63
  See Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1907 ff. For further discussion, see paras           
2 3 2 1, 3 2 1 2 & 3 4 1 below. 
64
  “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in 
South African law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract law: National and 
Other Perspectives 110. Lubbe cautions against the “the development of a separate 
system of rules at the remedial level [that] would erode the right of a creditor to a 
performance contracted for according to the rules of substantive law”, and create “a 
conflict between substantive law and the equitable remedial regime and [so] introduce the 
division between law and Equity into our law”. 
65
  B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston The German Law of Contract: A Comparative 
Treatise 2 ed (2006) 398-399. 
66
  Besides those already recognised, i.e. impossibility of performance and the insolvency of 
the debtor (see paras 4 8 3, 6 5 2 & 7 2 2 below). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   17 
 
Such a buyer would rather choose to rescind the contract, immediately conclude 
another contract for the same goods and claim damages in the amount of the shortfall 
between the price agreed upon and the market price at the time of default.67 The 
consideration of “appropriateness”, as applied in both civil law and common law 
jurisdictions, will be explored to determine whether it is suitable for adoption in the 
South African context.68 
The basic position in the civil law, that specific performance is considered to be the 
primary remedy for breach of contract, is reflected in a number of prominent jurisdictions 
such as Dutch law and German law.69 The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch or BGB)70 of 1900, which was partly revised in 2002, expressly provides 
the creditor with a substantive right to specific performance.71 Specific performance is 
also the primary remedy for breach under the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek or 
BW),72 even though no single provision in the Code explicitly grants the creditor a 
                                                 
67
  Oosterhuis Specific Performance: German, French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth 
Century 239-241. 
68
  See also n 106 para 1 1 3 1 below. 
69
  At present, specific performance is also acknowledged in the civil-law jurisdictions of 
France and Belgium. See eg Haas, Hesen & Smits “Introduction” in Smits et al (eds) 
Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 1 3; D Haas De 
Grenzen Van Het Recht Op Nakoming doctoral thesis Vrije University Amsterdam (2009) 
19-24; U A Mattei, T Ruskola & A Gidi Schlesinger’s Comparative Law: Cases, Text, 
Materials 7 ed (2009) 879 ff, and for more detailed discussion, H Beale et al Cases, 
Materials and Text on Contract Law (2010) 840 ff; M Smits Efficient Breach and the 
Enforcement of Specific Performance LLM thesis Amsterdam Law School (2014) 28 ff. 
70
  Full text available online at <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/>. 
71
  D Haas “Searching for a basis of specific performance in the Dutch Civil Code” in J 
Hallebeek & H Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The Historical 
Development (2010) 167 172.  
72
  Full text available online at <http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodegeneral.htm>. 
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substantive right to specific performance.73 These systems are close to the South 
African position, and could potentially be the most instructive in evaluating the South 
African approach. 
In Germany, parties to a contract as a matter of course are entitled to demand 
performance of their respective obligations in specie.74 The right to specific performance 
is contained in § 241 of the BGB. It states that the creditor is entitled, on the grounds of 
the creditor-debtor relationship, “to demand performance from the debtor”.75 This 
provision clearly indicates that actual performance of an obligation may be demanded, 
and that a judgment ordering performance in specie may be issued by a court.76 The 
creditor’s claim to the specific enforcement of the contract is regarded as an inherent 
and standard right flowing from the contract.77 The primacy of this remedy is 
demonstrated by the fact that the creditor may only sue for damages where the specific 
enforcement of the contract is no longer possible.78 The emphasis on the enforcement 
of the contract is also reflected in the fact that a creditor has to grant the debtor a period 
of grace or Nachfrist before he can rely on secondary remedies, such as rescission 
and/or damages.79 It is only after the expiry of this period (without result) that the 
creditor is entitled to claim damages instead of performance.80 In other words, a creditor 
                                                 
73
  Haas “Searching for a basis of specific performance in the Dutch Civil Code” in Hallebeek 
& Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The Historical Development 167. 
74
  R Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives (2005) 43. 
75
  Haas “Searching for a basis of specific performance in the Dutch Civil Code” in Hallebeek 
& Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The Historical Development 169. 
76
  Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 472. 
77
  Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 399. 
78
  Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 439-441. See also C Szladits “The concept of 
specific performance in civil law” (1955) 4 Am J Comp L 221. 
79
  Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 400. 
80
  § 281(1) BGB. See also para 2 3 1 1 below. 
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has to claim specific performance first, and only after the debtor’s non-performance, is 
he entitled to claim damages.  
One of the foundational principles of Dutch contract law is that parties to a contract are 
obliged to execute the obligations they have entered into. This principle, the binding 
force of contract, and its twin notion of freedom of contract, are not expressly included in 
the BW, but is implied in Article 6:248(1), which states that a contract has not only the 
judicial effects agreed to by the parties, but also those which according to the nature of 
the contract result from the law, usage or the requirements of reasonableness and 
equity.81  
According to some commentators, the Dutch legislator probably did not include an 
explicit provision granting the creditor a substantive right to specific performance, 
because this right is regarded as an essential feature of the contract itself.82 Hartkamp, 
for example, expresses the view that “[t]he right to specific performance arises directly 
from the obligation; it does not result from breach of contract”.83 The primary position of 
specific performance can thus be ascribed to the maxim of pacta sunt servanda. Its 
primacy is also reflected in the limited number of conditions the creditor has to satisfy to 
obtain an order for specific performance and the few defences the debtor can raise 
against such an action. Furthermore, Dutch law promotes specific performance claims 
by way of the legal requirement of a written notice, whereby the creditor must give the 
debtor a reasonable time to perform, before he can claim damages or rescind the 
contract.84 
                                                 
81
  A S Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 2 rev ed (2011) 34. 
82
  See further text to n 103 para 2 3 1 2 below. 
83
  Haas “Searching for a basis of specific performance in the Dutch Civil Code” in Hallebeek 
& Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The Historical Development 172. 
84
  D Haas & C Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 11-14. Cf for 
German law: text to n 80 above & n 95 para 2 3 1 2 below. 
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Various international restatements of contract law also contain provisions explicitly 
granting the creditor a substantive right to specific performance. Article 46 of the UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),85 Article 7.2.2 of 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Article 9:102 of 
the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), Article III–3:302 of the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR)86 and Article 110 the Common European Sales Law 
(CESL),87  all provide as a rule that the debtor should specifically perform his obligations 
in case of non-performance.88 These provisions could provide valuable insights as to 
the manner in which the South African position can be improved. They also suggest that 
a better convergence of the common- and civil law approaches may be possible.  
The CISG incorporated a largely unrestricted right to require performance,89 mirroring 
the civilian approach, while retaining a reservation in Article 28 regarding the application 
of this remedy in order to facilitate common-law countries in the sense that a court 
which would not require specific performance under national law does not have to do so 
under the CISG.90 This provision appears to address the concerns of both systems, but 
it becomes clear upon further inspection that there is a lack of coherence in the CISG’s 
                                                 
85
  Art 46 (buyer’s right) & Art 62 (seller’s right). See also para 2 3 3 1 below. 
86
  See also para 2 3 3 4 below. 
87
  Art 110 (buyer’s right) & Art 132 (seller’s right). See also para 2 3 3 5 below. 
88
  V Heutger & J Oosterhuis “Specific performance within the hierarchy of remedies in 
European contract law” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: 
National and Other Perspectives (2008) 147 152. See for further information para 2 3 3 
below. 
89
  As outlined in Arts 46 & 62 CISG. 
90
  For more information, see para 2 3 3 1 below. See also M Wethmar-Lemmer “Specific 
performance as a remedy in international sales contracts” (2012) 4 TSAR 700 701; S 
Eiselen “A comparison of the remedies for breach of contract under the CISG and South 
African law” in J Basedow et al (eds) Aufbruch nach Europa – 75 Jahre Max-Planck-
Institut für Privatrecht (2001) also available online at 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/eiselen2.html>.  
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approach to the enforcement of performance. While the need for this provision is 
undeniable in the light of the divergent viewpoints on specific performance as a 
contractual remedy, it is said that it causes uncertainty with regard to the availability of 
specific performance.91 The approach adopted by the CISG raises similar concerns to 
those raised with regard to the position in the South African law, and the reaction to its 
provisions could therefore be instructive.   
The PICC, the PECL, the DCFR and the CESL on the other hand are more in favour of 
specific performance as the primary remedy, and a creditor will most likely obtain an 
order for specific performance under these instruments.92 These instruments have all 
adopted the principle of specific performance, subject to exceptions when performance 
is impossible or disproportionally onerous by reason of legal or practical difficulties, 
when performance is of an exclusively personal character93 or when performance can 
be easily obtained from another source.94 This study proposes to undertake a 
comprehensive assessment of the approaches adopted in the CISG, the PICC, the 
PECL, the DCFR and the CESL, as these instruments contain a similar approach to that 
followed by South African courts, and could provide solutions that are suitable for 
adoption in South Africa. 
 
 
 
                                                 
91
  For more information, see para 2 3 3 1 below. See also C M Venter An Assessment of the 
South African Law Governing Breach of Contract master’s dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (2004) 69. 
92
  Heutger & Oosterhuis “Specific performance within the hierarchy of remedies in European 
contract law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and 
Other Perspectives 152. 
93
  Excluding the CISG & CESL – see para 4 7 n 314 below.   
94
  See para 2 3 3 2 (esp n 244) below. 
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1 1 3  Considerations relevant to the courts’ discretion   
The discretion that the South African courts exercise evidently derives from the English 
law of equity.95 Rules deriving from the English approach were applied in South Africa 
without regard to the fundamentally different approach.96 As indicated earlier, Benson 
affirmed that these rules cannot interfere with the discretion of a South African court to 
refuse specific performance.97 Modern continental jurisdictions that endorse a right to 
specific performance do not usually retain the sort of unrestricted discretion to refuse 
performance, as contemplated by Benson.98 According to Cockrell, South African courts 
presently have a “freewheeling discretion”99 to refuse the remedy. One of the key 
problems that will be addressed is whether such a liberal approach regarding the 
availability of this remedy is sustainable. The attention will now turn to some of the 
typical factors that have been regarded as relevant in refusing specific performance. 
The purpose is to illustrate the difficulties associated with deciding what status to accord 
these factors (or grounds of justification) and to underline the problems which arose in 
our law due to the fact that the general (Roman-Dutch) principle of the aggrieved party’s 
right to choose specific performance was qualified by the adoption of the (English) 
principle of the judicial discretion to refuse the remedy on certain grounds. These 
factors include the adequacy of damages as compensation (or the ready availability of a 
substitute performance), the rendering of personal services, the difficulty of supervising 
                                                 
95
  Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 321. See also Beck 1987 
CILSA 196 ff; Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser Southern Cross 326-
327. 
96
  See para 3 3 below. 
97
  Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 785F-G. 
98
  Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser Southern Cross 330. 
99
  330. Smith (“Specific implement” in Reid & Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law in 
Scotland II 209), describes it as being “untrammelled by rules”. 
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the execution of the order, and the situation where the order would cause undue 
hardship.100  
1 1 3 1  Adequacy of damages 
Specific performance has been denied in situations where money would adequately 
compensate the plaintiff for his loss, for example, where the item could be easily 
repurchased on the open market.101 In Thompson v Pullinger,102 Kotzé CJ, after 
reviewing some of the Roman-Dutch authorities, came to the conclusion that “the right 
of a plaintiff to specific performance of a contract, where the defendant is in a position to 
do so, is beyond doubt”.103 However, in the same judgment Kotzé CJ noted that specific 
performance should not be granted in the case of shares in companies which can daily 
be obtained on the market without difficulty.104  
However, the “adequacy of damages” rule was rejected in Benson.105 It follows that the 
adequacy of monetary damages does not constitute an independent ground on which 
courts will refuse an order for specific performance. The possibility that this should be 
the case only in certain instances, for example, where performance would result in 
wastage or loss, will be investigated. The possible influence of equity becomes relevant 
in this regard. The question arises whether South African law should benefit from 
refusing an order for specific performance when it would cause severe loss that could 
be prevented by awarding damages instead. The so-called “appropriateness” of the 
remedy, as a factor by which courts can be guided, for example, where a buyer has no 
interest in the performance since the contract depended on the timely delivery of the 
                                                 
100
  These grounds of justification form the chapter headings of this thesis. 
101
  See generally P Gross “Specific performance of contracts in South Africa” (1934) 51 SALJ 
347 357-358, and Beck 1987 CILSA 196. 
102
  (1894) 1 OR 298. 
103
  301. 
104
  See dictum quoted in text to n 164 para 3 3 below. 
105
  See further text to nn 170 ff para 3 3 below. 
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goods and he concluded another contract for the same goods and late delivery will 
result in wastage, is considered throughout the thesis.106 
1 1 3 2  Personal service contracts 
A contract involving personal service,107 for example, a contract of employment, has 
rarely been specifically enforced by South African courts.108 The position is especially 
complicated in the case where an employer seeks an order for specific performance 
against his employee,109 because the personal freedom of the employee is 
                                                 
106
  See esp paras 1 2, 3 2, 3 4 1, 5 2 below. For traces of “appropriateness” reasoning in 
South African case law, see South African Harness Works v South African Publishers Ltd 
1915 CPD 43; Unibank Savings and Loans Ltd (formerly Community Bank) v Absa Bank 
Ltd 2000 (4) SA 191 (W); Morettino v Italian Design Experience CC [2000] 4 All SA 158 
(W); Waterval Joint Venture Property Co (Pty) Ltd v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality [2008] 2 All SA 700 (W). See also in this regard Van der Merwe et al 
Contract: General Principles 330: “The court’s discretion to refuse specific performance is 
regarded as a judicial discretion which, although it should be as unfettered as possible, 
must be exercised in accordance with public policy and in such a manner that it does not 
bring about an unjust result, for instance if the granting of an order for specific 
performance would result in wasting a performance.” 
107
  A personal service contract can assume various forms; in the present thesis a distinction 
will be drawn between employment contracts and other service contracts. The latter 
category comprises non-employment contracts, such as agreements to perform a specific 
service that does not entail a continuous personal relationship. See further para 4 2 2 
below. 
108
  See para 4 2 1 below. 
109
  In National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 151 (T) it was 
held that, in principle, an employee is entitled to specific performance, although there may 
be factors which could influence a court to refuse such an order (see further para 4 2 1 1 
below). 
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implicated.110 Our courts in the past would never specifically enforce an employment 
contract by ordering an employee to work for an employer because this would constitute 
forced labour.111 Breaches of this kind were rather compensated by damages. 
In the landmark decision of Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund,112 
the court for the first time ordered specific performance of an obligation to work against 
an employee.113 The Full Bench thereby distanced itself from the view held by many 
South African commentators and case law that specific performance of an obligation to 
work should generally not be granted against an employee.114 There were however, 
special circumstances that swayed the court in favour of granting specific 
performance.115  
This case also persuaded other South African courts to prohibit employees from working 
for other employers for the remainder of their contracts.116 Decisions like Igesund give 
rise to a number of difficulties. For example, the Full Bench failed to consider fully the 
court a quo’s argument that one of the “[c]ompelling reasons not to enforce specific 
performance on the part of an employee [was] a disapproval of forced labour”.117 It also 
                                                 
110
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 331: “It might even be regarded as 
forced labour.” 
111
  See in particular Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (O) discussed fully in para 4 2 1 
2 below. 
112
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C). 
113
  The Full Bench decision and its implications are discussed fully in para 4 2 1 2 below. 
114
  See R H Christie & G B Bradfield Christie’s The Law Of Contract in South Africa 6 ed 
(2011) 550; A J Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 680-681, and the 
valuable contribution by T Naudé “Specific performance against an employee: Santos 
Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund” 2003 SALJ 269. 
115
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 79; and see Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 331-
332. 
116
  See further paras 4 2 1 2 & 4 8 4 below. 
117
  Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 (5) SA 697 (C) 701C per 
Desai J. 
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did not attach much weight to the coach’s argument that the move to a different club 
would enable him to relocate and reunite with his family. Instead it focused on the 
commercial reasons for his repudiation and the cynical nature of the breach.118 
However, it has been argued that courts should refuse specific performance in such a 
case, on the basis that it would cause unfair hardship to the employee.119 It is submitted 
that these views require further consideration and analyisis.120 In this regard, the thesis 
develops themes raised by Naudé and Lubbe in particular. 
1 1 3 3  Supervision of performance 
In many instances, specific performance is denied where courts would be unduly 
burdened with the task of supervising the performance.121 South African courts have 
been reluctant to grant specific performance in respect of obligations arising from 
mandate and contracts for services, for example, where a builder has undertaken to 
build/alter/repair a house or where a lessor is bound to repair the leased property (i.e. 
obligationes faciendi).122   
The lessor’s obligation to afford the lessee commodus usus123 of the leased property 
during the full term of the lease is the classic example referred to in this context. Where 
a lessor’s breach has taken the form of a failure to maintain the leased property in a 
proper condition, the courts have often refused to order the lessor to effect the 
necessary repairs, the reason being that courts would be unduly burdened with the task 
of supervising the performance. The refusal was often justified on the ground that a 
lessee is allowed to effect the necessary repairs himself (after an unsuccessful demand 
to the lessor), and then claim the expense from the lessor or deduct it from the rental. 
                                                 
118
  See text to n 192 para 3 3 & text to n 99 para 4 2 1 2 below. 
119
  See for further discussion para 4 2 1 2 below. 
120
  These and other themes are dealt with fully below in ch 4.  
121
  See generally para 5 1 below. 
122
  See paras 5 1 & 5 5 below. 
123
  See n 13 para 5 1 below. 
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For the same reason, our courts have also been reluctant to specifically enforce building 
contracts. 
However, and predictably, this view has attracted severe criticism.124 The primary basis 
of the criticism is that, in most cases, it is not necessary for the court itself to supervise 
the work. If the lessor (or the builder by way of analogy) has been ordered to effect 
repairs and fails to do so, the lessee may once again approach the court for relief, and 
any court then has the power to deal with such a reluctant defendant. Also, lessees 
often do not have the skills or financial means to effect the repairs themselves.125 These 
criticisms touch on more perplexing problems relating to the notion of contract (since we 
maintain that the contract binds the debtor to the promised performance) which this 
study proposes to explore.126 
1 1 3 4  Undue hardship 
It is settled law that South African courts will refuse to order specific performance where 
it would cause undue hardship to the defaulting party or to third parties.127 This principle 
was confirmed in the leading case of Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality.128 Here 
the court’s discretion to refuse the remedy in cases of hardship was derived from the 
fact that the English courts of chancery refused the remedy where equitable notions 
prevailed.129 In this case the hardship was mostly to third parties and as such the 
consideration was very much an equitable one.130 De Villiers AJA emphasised the 
unbound nature of the court’s discretion131 and pointed out that it is open to a judge ex 
                                                 
124
  See para 5 1 below.  
125
  See especially in this regard the discussion of Mpange v Sithole 2007 (6) SA 578 (W) in 
para 5 5 below.  
126
  This factor is dealt with in detail in ch 5 below. See esp text to n 25 para 5 1 below. 
127
  Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 321. 
128
  1951 (2) SA 371 (A). This decision is discussed fully in ch 6 below. 
129
  See para 6 1 1 below. 
130
  See para 6 1 1 below.  
131
  Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378G. 
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aequo et bono to consider the effect of its order at the time of performance.132 Thus 
some time ago Beck observed that “[i]t is interesting to see that the basis for the 
exercise of the discretion is described as ex aequo et bono; this seems to be no 
different from the workings of a court in equity”.133 
It is immediately apparent that the court refrained from engaging in a process of 
substantive reasoning regarding the considerations relevant to the exercise of its 
discretion.134 This has consistently been the view of our courts.135 However, authors 
such as Lubbe and Cockrell, convincingly argue that considerations of fairness and 
legal policy are the same considerations that underlie and inform the substance of legal 
doctrine.136 The implication is that the law regarding specific performance of contracts 
cannot be separated from the broader debate regarding the relevance of substantive 
considerations of fairness and reasonableness and other policy considerations. Again, it 
is submitted that these views require further reflection.137 In this regard, the thesis 
develops themes raised by Lubbe and Cockrell in particular. 
 
                                                 
132
  381A. 
133
  Beck 1987 CILSA 190 198. 
134
  See Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African 
Law 12; Lubbe “Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: die implikasies van die 
uitoefening van die regterlike diskresie” in Smits & Lubbe (eds) Remedies in Zuid-Afrika 
en Europa 57 ff; “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives 98, 99, 111; Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance 
Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 784C-785E; and see text to nn 347-348 para 4 8 3 below. 
135
  See para 4 8 3 (esp n 354) & para 7 1 (esp n 9) below. 
136
  See Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives 109; Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann 
& Visser (eds) Southern Cross 333. 
137
  See esp paras 4 8, 6 5 & para 7 1 below. 
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1 1 4  Execution of orders for specific performance and the possibility of 
claiming damages in lieu of performance 
A judgment ordering a debtor to perform in accordance with the contract is not of much 
use to the creditor unless the legal system provides the means to make it effective. 
Accordingly we will briefly turn to the question how South African law enforces such a 
judgment.  
In Roman-Dutch law an order for specific performance was enforceable by depriving the 
debtor of his liberty in the practice of civil imprisonment (“burgerlike gyseling”).138 Civil 
imprisonment of a debtor for failure to comply with a court order has, however, been 
abolished in South Africa by statute.139 An order for specific performance is presently 
executed in accordance with the ordinary rules of procedure.140 In modern court practice 
an order ad pecuniam solvendam (to pay a sum of money) will be enforced by 
attachment of the debtor’s property and subsequent sale in execution.141 A debtor who 
refuses to comply with an order ad factum praestandum (to perform an act or refrain 
from performing an act) may be guilty of contempt of court.142 In certain cases the court 
may directly enforce the order by instructing a third party (usually an official) to make 
                                                 
138
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
40-41. 
139
  See s 1 of The Abolition of Civil Imprisonment Act 2 of 1977; and see Joubert General 
Principles of the Law of Contract 227; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 
332. 
140
  A C Cilliers et al Herbstein & Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the High Courts and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa II 5 ed (2009) 1022-1023; Hutchison & Pretorius 
(eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 324. 
141
  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 214; Joubert General Principles of the 
Law of Contract 227; Cilliers et al Herbstein & Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the High 
Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa II 1022, 1053 ff. 
142
  Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 331; Cilliers 
et al Herbstein & Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the High Courts and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa II 1023, 1097 ff. 
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performance to the creditor. For example, the sheriff might be instructed to seize 
movable property of the debtor and deliver it to the creditor; or the registrar of deeds 
might be instructed to sign the documents necessary to effect transfer of immovable 
property to the creditor; or where property is in the possession of a third party, such 
third party might be instructed to deliver it to the creditor.143  
The enforcement of an order for payment of a sum of money seems to be less 
problematic, except, of course, “if no assets can be found for attachment”.144 The 
enforcement of obligations to do or refrain from doing something, on the other hand 
seems to be more challenging. These obligations can be enforced,145 but the 
effectiveness of the enforcement measures in practice in respect of these obligations is 
disputed. The process of enforcement of an obligation to perform might involve 
substantial expense and result in unsatisfactory outcomes and often direct enforcement 
(as described above) of such an order is not possible, for example, where a debtor must 
render a service.146 Considerations such as the human free will and autonomy militate 
against direct enforcement of such obligations.147 Therefore, indirect measures must be 
employed under such circumstances. In such cases compliance would depend on the 
threat of other measures, for example, the prospect of being held in contempt of court if 
the debtor fails to perform the act.148 
                                                 
143
  Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 322; Cilliers et al 
Herbstein & Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal of South Africa II 1023. 
144
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 333. 
145
  The most famous example of the enforcement of an obligatio faciendi is probably National 
Butchery Co v African Merchants Ltd (1907) 21 EDC 57, discussed in para 4 2 2 below. 
See also De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 211, and para 7 2 1 (esp n 25) 
below. 
146
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 332. 
147
  For further discussion, see ch 4 below. 
148
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 332. 
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In South Africa there is no reason to assert that the creditor must be content with 
damages in case of non-compliance with a court order to perform or refrain from 
performing an act. The wilful refusal to comply with a court order renders the debtor 
liable to criminal prosecution for contempt of court; a circumstance which indirectly 
prompts the debtor to perform.149 As indicated, civil imprisonment as an indirect method 
of enforcement is no longer possible.150 Another possible indirect enforcement measure 
is the imposition of a penalty sum. Although this measure has been applied by South 
African courts, it seems that it is not favoured in practice.151 The question that arises is 
how far the claim for specific performance as a matter of right is of practical value when 
it comes to the execution of such a judgment.  
South African courts have often been confronted with the problem of whether a claim for 
payment as a surrogate for specific performance could perhaps be an adequate 
alternative to specific performance.152 As this topic is beyond the scope of the research 
question, it will not be treated as a whole, but the matter deserves some attention. De 
Wet and Van Wyk argue that performance does not have to be specific performance of 
the exact terms agreed upon by the parties, but can also take the form of payment of 
damages as a surrogate for performance. They argue that the party who is in breach 
should be permitted to pay the objective value of performance, instead of rendering the 
performance itself.153 Thus, where the plaintiff elects to claim damages in lieu of specific 
                                                 
149
  Lubbe & Murray Contract 542. 
150
  See text to n 139 above. 
151
  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 214. 
152
  The literature on this debate is vast. A recent valuable and insightful addition is S P Stuart-
Steer “Reconsidering an understanding of damages as a surrogate of specific 
performance in South African law of contract” 2013 Responsa Meridiana 65-97. 
153
  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 196: “In plaas van die werklike prestasie 
kan die waarde daarvan geëis word as surrogaat daarvan.” See further Lubbe & Murray 
Contract 541; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 328-329; Stuart-Steer 
2013 Responsa Meridiana 68 ff. 
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performance his claim is not for his id quod interest, ascertained in the ordinary way.154 
According to Lubbe and Murray “[t]his would not be damages in the ordinary sense at 
all, but amount to specific performance in another form”.155 
In ISEP Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd,156 
the majority of the court held that a claim for damages as surrogate for performance 
does not exist as an independent remedy in South African law as an alternative to 
specific performance, and that where specific performance is refused, the innocent 
party is restricted to an ordinary claim for contractual damages.157 This decision has 
been severely criticised.158  
Ten years later, the Appellate Division in Deloitte Haskins & Sells Consultants (Pty) Ltd 
v Bowthorpe Hellerman Deutsch (Pty) Ltd159 ignored the entire debate; Van Heerden JA 
simply remarked that “it is  trite law that, even if a party to a contract is entitled to resile 
because of the other party’s failure to perform, he is not obliged to do so. He may 
instead claim performance, either in forma specifica (subject to the Court’s discretion) or 
by way of damages in lieu of performance”, which reflects De Wet’s view.160 
                                                 
154
  Receiving compensatory damages for non-performance is not the same as receiving 
performance. Therefore, a claim for damages as compensation for (provable) loss 
suffered as a result of non-performance would still be available. See Stuart-Steer 2013 
Responsa Meridiana 67-68; and see De Wet Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 196.  
155
  Lubbe & Murray Contract 538. See also Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract 
228: “The plaintiff merely seeks performance by way of its monetary equivalent. Until such 
time as the court has made its ward the defendant should be able to disarm this claim by 
rendering specific performance.” 
156
  1981 (4) SA 1 (A). 
157
  7B-9F. 
158
  See Mostert v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 159 (SCA) 186E-F. In 
addition to the authorities cited there by the court, see Stuart-Steer 2013 Responsa 
Meridiana 66 ff.  
159
  1991 (1) SA 525 (A). 
160
  530E. 
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Interestingly, the judge cites Farmers’ Co-operative Society (Reg) v Berry161 as a source 
of authority, even though this decision and the cited passage merely confirms the 
current law, i.e. that the election is with the plaintiff creditor to demand specific 
performance from the debtor, subject to the discretion of the court to refuse the remedy 
in favour of “an award of damages” – which can only be construed as being for 
contractual damages. 
In light of the debate which ensued after Isep, the Supreme Court of Appeal suggested 
in Mostert v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd162 that the issue of damages as 
surrogate for performance as independent remedy may be reconsidered.163 However, 
the position on surrogate damages remains unclear in our law. Eiselen recently 
remarked that “it is worth considering whether there is really any justification for the 
existence of such an independent claim in our law of contract”.164 Both the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s call for the reconsideration of the issue and recent academic 
awareness suggest that there may be room for the development of this remedy in the 
future.165 However, these developments are not considered relevant for purposes of the 
present study problem. 
                                                 
161
  1912 AD 343 350. 
162
  2001 (4) SA 159 (SCA). 
163
  186E-F per Smalberger ADCJ: “it should be noted that the decision has been subjected to 
severe criticism (see De Wet and Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg 5th ed at 212; Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa 1st reissue vol 7 para 45; 
Oelofse 1982 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 61 especially at 63-5; Van Immerzeel & 
Pohl and Another v Samancor Ltd 2001 CLR 32  (SCA) at 45-46 – the relevant part has 
been left out of the report at 2001 (2) SA 90 (SCA) at 96F-G) and its correctness is open 
to doubt. Reconsideration of the majority decision is called for.” 
164
  “Remedies for breach” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 
316. 
165
  See further Stuart-Steer 2013 Responsa Meridiana 94-97, and the recent decision by the 
South Gauteng High Court in Sandown Travel (Pty) Ltd v Cricket South Africa 2013 (2) SA 
502 (GSJ). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   34 
 
1 2  Purpose, motivation and significance of the study 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the South African law regulating the exercise of 
judicial discretion to refuse specific performance, paying special attention to more 
recent developments in a number of foreign jurisdictions and international instruments. 
Where appropriate, reference will also be made to recent historical studies.   
As indicated above, the rules and principles pertaining to this remedy are in many 
respects uncertain. The purpose of this study will be to explore possible solutions to this 
problem using comparative analysis – mainly looking at German and Dutch (civil) law in 
contrast to English and American (common) law. In this regard, the study proposes to 
consolidate and develop the different opinions and ideas that have been expressed by 
local and international commentators.  
According to Cockrell we cannot conclude that specific performance is the most 
appropriate remedy simply because a contract is binding.166 Contracts generally seek to 
give expression to the will of the contracting parties; specific performance could 
undermine this ideal, inasmuch as it forces a party to perform against his will. 
Furthermore, considerations such as economic efficiency, justice and fairness could 
militate against making specific performance the routine remedy for breach of contract. 
These considerations could in fact favour monetary damages as a more appropriate 
remedy.167 The objectives of this research are to determine whether specific 
performance should be the routine remedy for breach of contract in South African law, 
and if so, how the courts’ approach regarding the availability of the remedy can be 
improved, particularly with regard to the manner in which the courts exercise their 
discretion. The possibility will be explored whether a more concrete approach, with 
                                                 
166
  Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 331. 
167
  331. See further for reasons why damages is the preferred remedy in common law, 
Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 472-475; J Beatson et al Anson’s 
Law of Contract 29 ed (2010) 576; E Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 1099; 
Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1905-1906. 
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clearly identified principles to guide courts in the exercise of their discretion, could 
provide a more effective solution.168 Alternatively, there is the possibility that the 
discretion should be done away with in its entirety and that courts should accept certain 
defined exceptions to the right to specific performance.169 
While certain academic articles and chapters have been written about the topic,170 it is 
submitted (as indicated earlier) that it requires further attention, especially with regard to 
the manner in which the courts exercise their discretion and the major factors that are 
relevant to the exercise of the courts’ discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance. Existing works on this particular topic include Lambiris’s Orders of 
Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law, which presents a 
structured explanation of the nature, purpose and function of specific performance in 
South African law. However, this work does not take into account recent international 
developments, such as the innovative solutions adopted in international instruments, 
and is therefore outdated in many respects. More noteworthy is the doctoral thesis of 
Oosterhuis entitled Specific Performance in German, French and Dutch Law in the 
Nineteenth Century: Remedies in an Age of Fundamental Rights and Industrialisation. 
The author concentrates on the limitations to the right of specific performance and 
whether they are justified and thus provides us with foreign research on the topic, which 
is useful when considering the same problems in the South African context. The primary 
motivation behind the present study is the recognition that there is a significant volume 
of international research on the identified problems which has not recently been 
subjected to local analysis.171 It is clear that recent international and historical research 
contains fresh insights on the identified problems, and could therefore benefit the 
                                                 
168
  See para 7 2 1 below. 
169
  See para 7 2 2 below. 
170
  See in particular Lubbe “Contractual Derogation and the Discretion to refuse an order for 
Specific Performance in South African Law” in J M Smits et al Specific Performance in 
Contract law: National and Other Perspectives (2008). 
171
  See eg M Smits Efficient Breach and the Enforcement of Specific Performance LLM thesis 
Amsterdam Law School (2014). 
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development of our law. It is submitted that these developments necessitate the 
reconsideration of the South African position. 
1 3  Chapter analysis 
Chapter 2 begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of the research further, and 
looks at the historical development of the remedy and how different legal systems and 
model instruments approach the remedy. Chapters 3 to 6 describe and evaluate, from a 
comparative perspective, the different considerations that could be regarded as relevant 
in exercising the courts’ discretion to refuse specific performance. The last chapter 
summarises and comments on the findings from the research, and contains suggestions 
for the improvement and reform of the South African law governing specific 
performance of contracts. 
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND 
2 1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical and comparative overview of the 
remedy of specific performance, which will serve as a backdrop to more detailed 
comparative observations in subsequent chapters. The treatment of the historical 
origins of the remedy will be limited, since the subject has been extensively 
researched.1 The comparative overview will first focus on the common law, represented 
by English and American law, and the civil law, represented by German and Dutch law, 
as these jurisdictions are considered to be accurate examples or reflections of the two 
legal traditions. Thereafter it will move to certain international instruments. The issue of 
contractual remedies, especially specific performance, has been of great significance in 
the unification of contract law. Various international instruments of uniform contract law 
contain provisions granting the creditor a substantive right to specific performance. For 
that reason, attention will be paid to some of the most prominent of these instruments, 
namely the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law’s (UNIDROIT) Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, the Principles of European Contract Law, the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference, and the Common European Sales Law. It is submitted 
that a meaningful evaluative analysis of the availability of the remedy of specific 
performance in national legal systems cannot be conducted without having regard to 
international developments in this area of the law. Furthermore, the examination of 
                                                 
1
  See in particular the doctoral thesis of J Oosterhuis Specific Performance: German, 
French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth Century Vrije University Amsterdam (2011). See 
also J W Wessels History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 612 ff; P Gross “Specific 
performance of contracts in South Africa” (1934) 51 SALJ 347; J J du Plessis “Spesifieke 
nakoming: ‘n regshistoriese herwaardering” (1988) 51 THRHR 349; M A Lambiris Orders 
of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law (1989) 27 ff, and 
J Hallebeek & H Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The Historical 
Development (2010). 
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these uniform regulations may reveal gaps and deficiencies in the approaches adopted 
by the different national legal systems and may provide insightful solutions to improve 
applicable rules. These instruments may also serve to demonstrate how a successful 
synthesis of diverging principles can be achieved, and potentially provide valuable 
guidance for the future development of South African law.  
2 2  Historical development 
2 2 1  Specific performance of contracts in Roman law 
During the pre-classical (legis actiones) period a variety of new agreements were 
recognised as creating legally enforceable contractual obligations. Also, the type of 
obligation which was considered to be legally enforceable was expanded.2 This 
development caused administrative difficulties, especially with regard to the 
enforcement of these obligations. The judicial administration depended on a single 
jurisdictional magistrate (praetor), who was assisted by lay judges (iudices).3 Because 
judicial and administrative resources were limited, judgments were executed by way of 
manus iniectio,4 being the standard form of execution in early Roman law enforced by 
the aggrieved party himself, i.e. a form of legal or regulated self-help, which inherently 
led to more complications.5  
                                                 
2
  See J A C Thomas Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 259; H F Jolowicz & B Nicholas 
Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law 3 ed (1972) 279 ff; M Kaser Roman 
Private Law (tr R Dannenbring) 3 ed (1980) 176; R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: 
Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 546-549. 
3
  See Jolowicz & Nicholas Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law 48. 
4
  See Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African 
Law 30. 
5
  Although the threat of physical seizure and private imprisonment was effective to prompt 
performance (i.e. as an indirect form of execution) it was still a serious and harsh 
measure, which often proved to be ineffective if the judgment debtor had no means to 
satisfy his debt and someone else also did not come forward to perform on his behalf.  
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The difficulties imposed by the limited judicial and administrative resources of the 
Roman state and the legis actiones system in general,6 were eventually surmounted by 
the practice during the formulary period, used from the last century of the Republic until 
the end of the classical period, through which every order of a iudex was expressed as 
an order to pay money (condemnatio pecunaria).7 Thus, the aggrieved party could only 
claim the economic value of the debtor’s performance. However, because such an order 
required payment of a sum of money, a relatively scarce commodity during the 
formulary period, the defaulting party often elected to specifically perform his obligations 
prior to litigation. This indirectly encouraged the discharge of obligations by way of 
voluntary specific performance. Even so, specific performance was not recognised as a 
remedy the courts could award. The rights of an aggrieved party were confined to a 
claim for damages. However, it has been suggested that this indicates that specific 
performance was considered to be “the most natural and satisfactory way of discharging 
contractual obligations” even in classical Roman law.8  
                                                                                                                                                             
See further Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South 
African Law 30, and P du Plessis Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman Law 4 ed (2010) 70-
72. 
6
  “The faults in the legis actiones system – its excessive formality, archaic nature, and 
limited effectiveness – made it unsuitable in the long term for a rapidly expanding, 
economically vibrant Rome…” (Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman Law 72). 
7
  See Gaius Institutiones 4 48 & 49: “The condemnatio, in all formulae containing one, is 
framed in terms of valuation in money. Accordingly, even where the suit is for a corporeal 
thing, such as land, a slave, a garment, gold or silver, the iudex condemns the defendant 
not in the actual thing … but in the amount of money at which he values it. The 
condemnatio in a formula may be in terms of a definite or in an indefinite sum of money” 
(tr Poste). See further T Weir “Contracts in Rome and England” (1992) 66 Tulane LR 1615 
1623. 
8
  See further Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South 
African Law 31-32. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   40 
 
 
In discussing classical Roman law, the Roman-Dutch jurist, Voet stated that “a seller 
cannot be absolutely forced into delivery of a thing sold, but is freed by making good the 
damages”.9 On his version, classical Roman law did not provide methods whereby a 
defaulting party could be compelled to perform, and if it were allowed, it would amount 
to expropriation. Even though Voet is not considered to provide a reliable account of 
classical Roman law,10 his view in this regard seems to be accurate.  
This position was departed from in post-classical law, when the formulary system was 
replaced by cognitio extraordinaria. This meant that litigation took place in a single 
proceeding before a magistrate or his deputy.11 Accordingly, the condemnatio pecunaria 
was no longer ordered in all cases and the courts often permitted real execution in 
cases involving obligations to give or transfer ownership (dare).12 However, it seems 
that specific performance was still not regarded as being generally available and 
appropriate in cases of breach of contract,13 certainly not in respect of obligations to do 
(facere). Instead, the party in breach could discharge his contractual obligations by 
paying id quod interest. The rationale for this position was the principle nemo praecise 
                                                 
9
  Commentarius ad Pandectas 19 1 14 (tr Gane); see also 45 1 8.  
10
  Beinart describes his arguments as being “rather specious”. In his opinion, the Dutch 
Romanists “had no real information about the change from the classical position, and 
could not know that the classical system only allowed judgment in money” (B Beinart 
“Roman law in South African practice” (1952) 69 SALJ 145 158).  
11
  Thomas Textbook of Roman Law 119. 
12
  J P Dawson “Specific performance in France and Germany” (1959) 57 Mich LR 495 504; 
W W Buckland A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 3 rev ed (1963) 
669; Oosterhuis Specific Performance: German, French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth 
Century 27. 
13
  See Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African 
Law 33-35; Beinart 1952 SALJ 158. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   41 
 
 
cogi ad factum (“nobody can be compelled to perform an obligation to do”, as opposed 
to an obligation to give).14 
2 2 2  Specific performance of contracts in Roman-Dutch law 
The availability of the remedy in Roman-Dutch law has always been a subject of dispute 
among the Roman-Dutch jurists.15 According to Wessels, there were two schools of 
thought.16 Schorer, in his Aanteekeningen, remarked that “[t]his warmly discussed 
                                                 
14
  The origin of this maxim can be traced to the works of medieval jurists, for example, 
Baldus’ commentary on C 4 49 4 during the fourteenth century (see eg Dawson 1959 Mich 
LR 504, and Oosterhuis Specific Performance: German, French and Dutch Law in the 
Nineteenth Century 32). But some scholars maintain that this maxim was only phrased in 
this manner at the beginning of the seventeenth century by the French jurist, Antoine 
Favre in his Rationalia in Pandectas II ad D 8 5 6 2 (1659) 248 (see eg J Hallebeek “Direct 
enforcement of obligations to do: two local manifestations of the ius commune” in M 
Gubbels & C J H Jansen (eds) Regio: Rechtshistorische Opstellen Aangeboden aan dr. 
P.P.J.L. van Peteghem (2010) 33 34; “Specific performance in obligations to do according 
to early modern Spanish doctrine” in Hallebeek & Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific 
Performance: The Historical Development 57, and H Dondorp “Precise cogi: enforcing 
specific performance in medieval legal scholarship” in Hallebeek & Dondorp (eds) The 
Right to Specific Performance: The Historical Development 21).  
15
  See eg J W Wessels History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 612 ff; R W Lee An 
Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 5 ed (1953) 266; Du Plessis 1988 THRHR 357; J 
Hallebeek & T Merkel “Simon Groenewegen van der Made on the enforcement of 
obligationes faciendi” in J Hallebeek & H Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific 
Performance: The Historical Development (2010) 81 ff. It is important to note that the 
dispute related to the performance of contracts ad faciendum (to perform), as the writers 
were in agreement that contracts ad dandum (to deliver/transfer), could be specifically 
enforced (see Grotius Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid 3 15 6 & 3 2 14; 
Huber Heedensdaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 3 2 9 & 3 2 10; Neostadius Decisiones vonnis 
50; Pothier Traité des Obligations sec 151). 
16
  History of the Roman-Dutch Law 612. 
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question has brought into collision two veteran jurists, Martinus and Bulgarus, to an 
astonishing degree”.17 Martinus was of opinion that a person could be compelled to 
perform an obligatio faciendi, and was supported by Cujacius and Zoesius in this 
regard.18 Bulgarus, on the other hand, supported the classical Roman law position that 
no one could be compelled to perform an obligation to do, and that a person could 
always discharge this obligation by paying id quod interest.19 He was supported by 
Donellus, who in turn, was supported by Grotius.20 However, in a note to Grotius’ 
Inleidinge, Groenewegen states that, according to the law of Holland at that time, a 
person could not discharge his obligation by paying damages, but could be compelled 
by civil imprisonment (burgerlike gijzeling) to fulfil what he had promised.21 He 
emphasised that both obligations to give (dare) and to do (facere), could be specifically 
enforced.22 Huber23 supported this view, while van der Keessel,24 Scheltinga,25 and 
                                                 
17
  Schorer ad Gr 3 3 41 (tr Austen: 440 n 94). 
18
  See Gross 1934 SALJ 349. 
19
  See Oosterhuis Specific Performance: German, French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth 
Century 31. 
20
  Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechts-geleerdheid 3 3 41: “although by natural law a person 
who has promised to do something is bound to do it, if it is in his power, he may 
nevertheless by municipal law release himself by paying the other contracting party or 
acceptor the value of his interest, or the penalty, if any has been agreed upon in default of 
payment” (tr Maasdorp). However, Grotius departs from this view in 3 15 6, where he 
states that if a vendor fails to deliver, the purchaser may demand delivery or damages at 
his option – see Lee An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 266. See also Wessels History 
of the Roman-Dutch Law 612; Gross 1934 SALJ 349. 
21
  Tractatus de Legibus Abrogatis ad Gr 3 3 41. 
22
  In Tractatus de Legibus Abrogatis ad D 42 1 13 1, he states: “Today in all obligations to 
do something, the creditor who is in a position to act, can be compelled to act and he 
cannot discharge himself by paying damages” (tr Beinart). 
23
  Praelectiones bk 3 tit 16. See also Huber’s Heedensdaegse Rechtsgeleerdheyt, in which 
he states (3 2 9 & 3 2 10): “As soon as the parties have come to an agreement they 
cannot recede from the sale; the seller must deliver the article sold and the purchaser 
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Schorer went so far as to say that a person was in fact bound to fulfil his obligation 
according to the ius commune.26 Van Leeuwen27 and Van der Linden28 also endorsed 
Groenewegen’s view. Voet,29 on the other hand, argued that the classical Roman law 
position was the correct one. However, the views of Voet in this regard have been 
interpreted to be a recommendation to return to Roman law and a statement of what the 
position ought to be, rather than an account of the law practiced at that time.30 The view 
of Groenewegen is considered to provide the most accurate account of the Roman-
Dutch position.31 This has been attributed to the fact that he introduced new sources 
into the debate, for example Dutch judicial decisions,32 which other Roman-Dutch jurists 
                                                                                                                                                             
must pay the price, nor can the seller escape delivery and free himself by tendering the id 
quod interest, even if he offered double the price” (tr Gane). 
24
  Theses Selectae 512 (tr Lorenz) citing Neostadius Decisiones vonnis 50 (tr Van Nispen). 
25
  Dictata ad Gr 3 3 41 (tr De Vos & Visagie). 
26
  See Wessels History of Roman-Dutch Law 614-615; Gross 1934 SALJ 350; I C Steyn 
Gijzeling: the historical development of the mode of proceeding in “gijzeling” in the 
provincial court of Holland from 1531 (1939) 30-31; Lee An Introduction to Roman-Dutch 
Law 269. 
27
  Het Roomsch Hollandsch Recht 4 2 13 (tr Kotzé). 
28
  Koopmans Handboek 1 14 7. 
29
  Commentarius ad Pandectas 19 1 14. 
30
  See Wessels History of Roman-Dutch Law 618; R Zimmermann “Roman-Dutch 
jurisprudence and its contribution to European private law” (1992) 66 Tulane LR 1685 
1700; Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African 
Law 36. 
31
  See H Dondorp “Decreeing specific performance: a Roman-Dutch legacy” (2010) 16(1) 
Fundamina 40 46. 
32
  For example Neostadius Decisiones vonnis 50 (tr Van Nispen). See Hallebeek & Merkel 
“Simon Groenewegen van der Made on the enforcement of obligationes faciendi” in 
Hallebeek & Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The Historical 
Development 89. 
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such as Grotius and Voet neglected to consider.33 Therefore, it seems settled that 
specific performance of contracts was in fact possible in Roman-Dutch practice and that 
compliance with such orders could be achieved by way of civil imprisonment.34 The 
rationale for this position was that a debtor who agreed to perform an obligation could 
not discharge himself by paying damages.35 This is in accord with the foundational 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. This principle was developed by the canon lawyers36 
who believed that a well-regulated society was only possible if agreements were 
honoured, and in the end all informal consensual agreements (nuda pacta) were 
generally considered to be enforceable according to the maxim of ex nudo pacto oritur 
actio.37  
                                                 
33
  Hallebeek & Merkel “Simon Groenewegen van der Made on the enforcement of 
obligationes faciendi” in Hallebeek & Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: 
The Historical Development 86-93. 
34
  After an extensive survey of this debate in Cohen v Shires, McHattie and King (1882) 1 
SAR TS 41, Kotzé CJ concluded (at 45) that “[t]he Roman-Dutch law, therefore clearly 
recognizes the right to a specific performance of a contract”. In Wheeldon v Moldenhauer 
1910 EDL 97, Kotzé JP held (at 98) that the remedy of specific performance is “well 
established in our Roman-Dutch law”. In Moffat v Touyz & Co 1918 EDL 316, Kotzé AJP 
confirmed (at 319) that the power to decree specific performance of obligations to do as 
well as obligations to give was clearly established by Roman-Dutch law. See also 
Thompson v Pullinger (1894) 1 OR 301. 
35
  See Hallebeek & Merkel “Simon Groenewegen van der Made on the enforcement of 
obligationes faciendi” in Hallebeek & Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: 
The Historical Development 94. 
36
  See A T von Mehren & J R Gordley The Civil Law System 2 ed (1977) 37; A Jeremy 
“Pacta sunt servanda the influence of Canon Law upon the development of contractual 
obligations” (2000) 144 Christian Law Review 4. 
37
  For a general account of this development, see Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 542-
544, 576-582; Von Mehren & Gordley The Civil Law System 18-38. See also Zimmermann 
1992 Tulane LR 1689-1694; H Wehberg “Pacta sunt servanda” (1959) 53 American 
Journal of International Law 775-786.  
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2 2 3  Reception of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa 
The South African legal system is often described as a mixed legal system,38 i.e. a legal 
system which exhibits characteristics of both the civilian and the English common law 
traditions.39 This is attributed to the fact that South Africa’s legal tradition has been 
shaped both in substance and in methodology by a fusion of influences deriving from 
periods of Dutch and British Colonial occupation of the Cape of Good Hope.40 The 
arrival of the Dutch East India Company in 1652 and the Dutch presence during the 
seventeenth century at the Cape saw the introduction of the Roman-Dutch law of 
Holland into the South African legal system.41 According to Zimmermann, the Roman-
Dutch law which was transplanted to the Cape derives from a unified European 
intellectual tradition, and “what we usually refer to as usus modernus pandectarum [that] 
existed not only in Germany but in the whole of Central and Western Europe”.42 This 
                                                 
38
  See generally V V Palmer “Mixed legal systems” in M Bussani & U Mattei (eds) The 
Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law (2012) 368 ff, and R Zimmermann “Mixed 
legal systems” in J Basedow et al (eds) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European 
Private Law II (2012) 1179-1182. 
39
  See R Zimmermann & D Visser “Introduction: South African Law as a mixed legal system” 
in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South 
Africa (1996) 12 ff. 
40
  See G F Lubbe “Ex Africa semper aliquid novi? – the Mixed Character of Contract Law in 
the New South Africa” in J M Smits (ed) The Contribution of Mixed Legal Systems to 
European Private Law (2001) 51 55.  
41
  For a detailed account of the reception of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa, see E Fagan 
“Roman-Dutch law in its historical context” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 
33 ff. 
42
  See R Zimmermann “Synthesis in South African private law: civil law, common law and 
usus hodiernus pandectarum” (1986) 103 SALJ 259 269. See also R Zimmermann           
“‘Double cross’: comparing Scots and South African law” in R Zimmermann, K Reid & D 
Visser (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and 
Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 1 4-5.  
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remained the case even after the establishment of British rule in 1806 and Roman-
Dutch law was retained as the common law.43 Therefore, South African law is most 
often described as being essentially a Roman-Dutch system influenced by a 
considerable amount of English law.44 
Following the Roman-Dutch approach, modern South African law accepts that a party to 
a contract has a right to specific performance thereof. This principle was recognised at a 
very early stage of the development of South African law and is also well-documented. 
For example, in Cohen v Shires, McHattie and King,45 Kotzé CJ stated that “by the well-
established practice of South Africa, agreeing with the Roman-Dutch law, suits for 
specific performance are matters of daily occurrence”.46 In Thompson v Pullinger,47 
Kotzé CJ, remarked that “the right of a plaintiff to specific performance of a contract, 
where the defendant is in a position to do so, is beyond doubt”.48 Furthermore, the 
                                                 
43
  This was confirmed by the First and Second Charters of Justice of 1827 and 1832. See H 
J Erasmus “Roman law in South Africa today” (1989) 106 SALJ 666 667; Zimmermann 
“‘Double cross’: comparing Scots and South African law” in Zimmermann et al (eds) Mixed 
Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective 5. 
44
  Even though the British occupation did not result in the Roman-Dutch law being replaced, 
it did introduce reform in the law of evidence, procedural law, and large parts of 
commercial law. The structure of the courts and the legal profession were also reshaped 
according to the British model (see F du Bois “Introduction: history, system and sources” 
in C G van der Merwe & J E du Plessis (eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa 
(2004) 1 10 ff; and see K Reid & R Zimmermann “The development of legal doctrine in a 
mixed system” in K Reid & R Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law in Scotland I: 
Introduction and Property (2000) 1 4). 
45
  (1882) 1 SAR TS 41. See also Farmers’ Co-operative Society (Reg) v Berry 1912 AD 343 
350 per Innes J (dictum in text to n 14 para 1 1 1 above); Moffat v Touyz & Co 1918 EDL 
316; Woods v Walters 1921 AD 309. 
46
  (1882) 1 SAR 45. 
47
  (1894) 1 OR 298. 
48
  301. 
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courts often reaffirm the importance of this right.49 In the landmark decision of Benson v 
SA Mutual Life Assurance Society,50 Hefer JA described it as being the “cornerstone of 
our law relating to specific performance”.51 When examining the case law on this matter 
it is also evident that attention is regularly refocused on the Roman-Dutch rule of 
specific performance.52  
2 3   Comparison: specific performance in selected national legal systems and 
international instruments 
2 3 1 Specific performance in modern civil law, exemplified by German law and 
Dutch law 
Unlike Roman law, modern civil-law systems recognise that a contractual obligation 
entitles the creditor to claim performance in specie from the debtor.53 Indeed, it is a 
basic principle of these systems that the debtor is obliged to perform his contractual 
obligation(s) and in the case of non-performance, the creditor has the right to enforce 
                                                 
49
  See Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A); Benson v SA Mutual 
Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A); and see G Lubbe “Contractual derogation 
and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in South African Law” in J 
Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 
(2008) 95 98-99. 
50
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
51
  782I. 
52
  For more recent examples, see Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 
2003 (5) SA 73 (C); Klimax Manufacturing Ltd v Van Rensburg 2005 (4) SA 445 (O); 
Mpange v Sithole 2007 (6) SA 578 (W); Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) 
SA 293 (W); Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Bpk v Mapoe (unreported judgment with case no 
4587/2010 delivered on 29 Sep 2010 by the Free State Provincial Division of the High 
Court per Van Zyl J (copy on file with author)); Botha v Rich NO 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) 
para [37]. 
53
  See U A Mattei, T Ruskola & A Gidi Schlesinger’s Comparative Law: Cases, Text, 
Materials 7 ed (2009) 879 ff. 
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this duty. Thus, in the civil law specific performance is considered to be the primary 
remedy for breach of contract.54   
German and Dutch law can be regarded as typical of the civil-law approach.55 The 
German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) of 1900, of which the law of 
obligations was partly revised in 2002, expressly grants the creditor a substantive right 
to specific performance.56 Specific performance is also the primary remedy for breach of 
contract under the Dutch Civil Code or Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW), even though no single 
provision in the BW explicitly grants the creditor a substantive right to this remedy.57 
2 3 1 1  Specific performance as the primary remedy in German law  
A general revision of the German law of obligations entered into force on 1 January 
2002,58 thereby replacing a complicated regime of statutory and judge-made rules.59 
                                                 
54
  See A Cockrell “Breach of contract” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: 
Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 303 326; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 209. 
55
  See C Szladits “The concept of specific performance in civil law”  (1955) 4 Am J Comp L 
208; G H Treitel “Remedies for breach of contract” in IECL VII ch 16 (1976) 6-16; K 
Zweigert & H Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law (tr T Weir) 3 ed (1998) 472-479; H 
Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (2010) 840 ff; M Torsello 
“Remedies for breach of contract” in J M Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law 2 ed (2012) 754 761-763. 
56
  See § 241 BGB; see also D Haas “Searching for a basis of specific performance in the 
Dutch Civil Code” in J Hallebeek & H Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: 
The Historical Development (2010) 167 172.  
57
  See Haas’s arguments in text to nn 103-104 para 2 3 1 2 below. 
58
  See generally for the background to the reform R Zimmermann The New German Law of 
Obligations: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (2005) 30-35; H Schulte-Nölke The 
New German Law of Obligations: An Introduction (available online at 
<http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/literature/schulte-noelke.htm>); P Schlechtriem “The German 
Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations in the context of Common Principles and 
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Generally, the reform was triggered by the necessity to implement the European 
Consumer Sales Directive.60 The most notable feature of the revised BGB is the 
establishment of a new system of rules regarding breach of contract.61 According to 
Zimmermann, the reform attempted to and succeeded in streamlining and harmonising 
general contract law and consumer contract law, and it effectively moved German 
contract law closer to modern European views.62 
The right to specific performance is traditionally the primary remedy of an aggrieved 
party in German contract law, and this position has been reinforced by the reform.63 
Parties to a contract are entitled as a matter of course to demand performance of their 
respective obligations in specie.64 The right to specific performance is contained in        
§ 241 of the BGB.65 The provisions of the German Civil Code and Code of Civil 
Procedure referred to in this thesis are reproduced in the attached addendum. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Structures of the Law of Obligations in Europe” (2002) Oxford University Comparative Law 
Forum 2; T M J Möllers “European Directives on civil law – shaping a new German Civil 
Code” (2003) 18 Tulane European & Civil Law Forum 1. 
59
  See in detail Schlechtriem above. 
60
  See foreward to B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston The German Law of Contract: A 
Comparative Treatise 2 ed (2006) vii (by G Hirsch). 
61
  For a brief outline of changes brought about by the reform, see A Heldrich & G M Rehm 
“Modernisation of the German law of obligations: harmonisation of civil law and common 
law in the recent reform of the German Civil Code” in N Cohen & E McKendrick (eds) 
Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (2005) 123 125-126. 
62
  See further Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations 1-2. 
63
  See D Coester-Waltjen “The new approach to breach of contract in German law” in N 
Cohen & E McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (2005) 135 
138. 
64
  See Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations 43. 
65
  The relevant provisions of the BGB and ZPO are reproduced in Addendum A (388-401 
below). 
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§ 241 BGB states that the creditor is entitled, by virtue of an obligation, to claim 
performance from the debtor. This provision clearly indicates that actual performance of 
an obligation may be demanded, and that a judgment ordering specific performance 
may be issued by a court.66 The debtor’s duty to perform (Leistungspflicht) “results 
naturally from contracting”.67 The creditor’s corresponding claim to specific performance 
of the contract is regarded as an inherent and standard right flowing from the contract.68  
It is only in highly limited circumstances that the creditor is allowed to claim damages 
(instead of specific performance).69 The emphasis on the enforcement of the contract is 
also reflected in the requirement that a creditor has to grant the debtor a period of grace 
or Nachfrist before he can rely on secondary remedies, such as rescission and/or 
damages.70 It is only after the expiry of this period (without result) that the creditor is 
entitled to claim damages instead of performance.71 Furthermore, the creditor is never 
confined to the remedy of specific performance; § 893(1) of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure or Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) specifically provides that the right of a creditor 
to claim damages instead of (i.e. the equivalent of) performance is not limited by the 
provisions governing the remedy of specific performance.  
As stated above there are, however, certain limited exceptions to the general rule of 
specific performance. First, according to the Roman principle impossibilium nulla 
                                                 
66
  See Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 472. 
67
  M Smits Efficient Breach and the Enforcement of Specific Performance LLM thesis 
Amsterdam Law School (2014) 29. 
68
  See Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 399, and Smits Efficient Breach and the 
Enforcement of Specific Performance 29: “[s]pecific performance is a logical derivative of 
contracts…” 
69
  See Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 439-441. See also Szladits 1955 Am J 
Comp L 221. 
70
  See Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 400. 
71
  See § 281(1) BGB (Addendum A 390).  
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obligatio est (“an obligation for the impossible cannot exist”),72 specific performance 
cannot be claimed when the debtor’s obligation has become impossible.73 This 
exception applies to all types of impossibility, not only to objective, excusing 
impossibility, but also to subjective impossibility, which does not exclude the debtor’s 
liability.74 The revised version of the BGB (in addition to the ZPO in certain instances) 
also makes it clear that the debtor may refuse to perform (i.e. only the duty to perform is 
excluded) insofar as the performance would require an effort which would be grossly 
disproportionate to the interest of the creditor in actual performance,75 as well as in 
cases where the debtor has to render performance in terms of a contract of service 
(Dienstvertrag),76 and performance cannot be reasonably expected from the debtor 
where he is expected to render the performance in person.77 The exceptions to the 
creditor’s right to specific performance do not interfere with his right to claim alternative 
remedies though, provided of course that the requirements for these remedies are 
met.78  
Notwithstanding these exceptions, German law still favours specific performance as the 
primary remedy and the BGB even sets incentives for performance. According to § 285, 
the creditor can claim the substitute which the debtor would receive through the act 
                                                 
72
  Kaser Roman Private Law (tr R Dannenbring) 176. Cf text to n 30 para 7 2 2 below. 
73
  See § 275(1) BGB (Addendum A 389). For further discussion see para 6 3 below. 
74
  See Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations 10, 44; and see esp para 6 3 
below. 
75
  See § 275(2) BGB (Addendum A 389). See further para 6 3 below. 
76
  See further para 4 5 1 below. 
77
  See further para 6 3 below (esp n 107 below). 
78
  See Heldrich & Rehm “Modernisation of the German law of obligations: harmonisation of 
civil law and common law in the recent reform of the German Civil Code” in Cohen & 
McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract 131. 
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making his performance impossible.79 It follows that the creditor can demand that the 
debtor surrenders any substitute performance or compensation received. For example, 
if the debtor who was suppose to deliver certain goods to the creditor sold the goods at 
a better price to another buyer, thereby making it (subjectively) impossible to perform 
his contract with the creditor, the debtor would have to pay the creditor what he received 
from the other buyer (or assign his claim against that buyer)80 on the creditor’s request. 
This regime therefore discourages so-called “efficient breaches”.81  
2 3 1 2  Specific performance as the primary remedy in Dutch law 
The remedy of specific performance (nakoming) is the primary remedy for breach of 
contract in Dutch law.82 One of the leading principles of Dutch contract law is that 
parties to a contract are obliged to execute the obligations they have willingly entered 
into. This principle is not expressly included in the Dutch Civil Code or Burgerlijk 
Wetboek (BW),83 but is implied in Article 6:248(1), which states that a contract has not 
only the legal effects agreed to by the parties, but also those which according to the 
nature of the contract result from the law, usage or the requirements of reasonableness 
and equity (redelijkheid en billijkheid).84 Hartkamp expresses the view that “[t]he right to 
                                                 
79
  See § 285 BGB (Addendum A 391); and see Coester-Waltjen “The new approach to 
breach of contract in German law” in Cohen & McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies 
for Breach of Contract 138.  
80
  See § 285 BGB (Addendum A 391).  
81
  Coester-Waltjen “The new approach to breach of contract in German law” in Cohen & 
McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract 138. See further on the 
theory of efficient breach para 3 4 2 below, and esp reference there to Smits Efficient 
Breach and the Enforcement of Specific Performance, showing that there are indications 
of a change in thinking in the civil law doctrine about “efficient breach”. 
82
  J Hijma & M M Olthof Compendium Nederlands Vermogensrecht 8 ed (2002) nr 331. 
83
  The relevant provisions of the BW are reproduced in Addendum A 401. 
84
  See para 1 1 2 above; A S Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 2 rev ed 
(2011) 34; D Haas & C Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in J Smits et al (eds) 
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specific performance arises directly from the obligation; it does not result from breach of 
contract”.85 The primary position of specific performance can thus be ascribed to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.86 The primacy of specific performance is also reflected 
in the limited number of conditions the creditor has to satisfy to obtain an order for 
specific performance, and the few defences the debtor can raise against such an action, 
in comparison with the wide range of defences that can be raised against a claim for 
damages or rescission. For example, the debtor can raise the defence that he is not 
accountable or responsible for the non-performance (force majeure)87 in response to a 
claim for damages, whereas this defence will not be effective in response to a claim for 
specific performance, though specific performance may no longer be useful.88 
                                                                                                                                                             
Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 11 19-20. 
See also Hijma & Olthof Compendium Nederlands Vermogensrecht nr 88 & nr 300. 
85
  See Haas “Searching for a basis of specific performance in the Dutch Civil Code” in       
Hallebeek & Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The Historical 
Development 172. See also Hijma & Olthof Compendium Nederlands Vermogensrecht nr 
331; Asser/Hijma 5-I Bijzondere Overeenkomsten (2007) nr 373: “Het recht op nakoming 
berust op die overeenkomst – althans op de relevante daaruit voortgevloeide verbintenis – 
zelf; de schuldeiser behoeft niet te stellen of aan te tonen dat sprake is van een 
tekortkoming aan de zijde van zijn wederpartij”. 
86
  As Haas states: “Het recht op nakoming neemt een bijzondere positie in ten opzichte van 
de overige twee remedies, omdat het de meest directe uitdrukkingsvorm is van het 
beginsel dat contractuele afspraken geëerbiedigd moeten worden. Het recht op nakoming 
wordt in Nederland dan ook als de primaire remedie beschouwd. Schadevergoeding en 
ontbinding zijn subsidiaire remedies” (De Grenzen Van Het Recht Op Nakoming doctoral 
thesis Vrije University (2009) 1-2). See also Hijma & Olthof Compendium Nederlands 
Vermogensrecht nr 331. 
87
  Art 6:75 BW (Addendum A 404). 
88
  See D Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A 
Commentary (2002) 342-343 (commentary by J M Smits); Haas & Jansen “Specific 
performance in Dutch law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: 
National and Other Perspectives 12. Compare also para 6 3 below. 
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Furthermore, the debtor can raise the defence that the non-performance is insignificant 
against both a claim for damages in lieu of performance89 and a claim for rescission of 
the contract90 by the creditor. But this defence is not effective against a claim for specific 
performance.91  
When claiming specific performance, the creditor only has to prove that the parties 
concluded a contract and that the debtor’s performance is due.92 Furthermore, Dutch 
law promotes specific performance claims by way of the legal requirement of a written 
notice, whereby the creditor must give the debtor a reasonable time to perform, before 
he can claim damages or rescind the contract.93 It follows that the creditor must first 
place the debtor in default (verzuim) by written notice.94 The creditor hereby draws the 
debtor’s attention to the obligation that is to be performed and provides him with a 
further opportunity to perform in order to be released from his obligation under the 
                                                 
89
  Art 6:87(2) BW (Addendum A 405). 
90
  Art 6:265 BW (Addendum A 405). 
91
  Haas & Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 12. 
92
  This position is very similar to South African law. See in this regard Lubbe “Contractual 
derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in South African 
Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other 
Perspectives 102: “the right to an order for specific performance is independent of the 
existence of a breach of contract by the defendant. It is derived solely from the agreement 
itself. Although a creditor will ordinarily take steps to obtain specific performance upon a 
breach by the debtor, the ‘right’ to an order for performance is juridically speaking not a 
remedy for breach.” See also R H Christie & G B Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract 
in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 545; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 4 ed 
(2012) 328; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa 321; Lambiris 
Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 52-54 and 
the authorities cited there. 
93
  Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-II De Verbintenis in het Algemeen (2009) nr 343. 
94
  This position is very similar to what South African law calls mora ex persona. 
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contract.95 The creditor may only resort to damages or rescission in the event that the 
debtor does not perform upon expiry of the notice period.96 This procedure of 
ingebrekstelling thus demonstrates the primacy of specific performance in the hierarchy 
of contractual remedies in Dutch law.97  
Furthermore, Article 3:296 provides that unless the law, the nature of the obligation or a 
juridical act determines otherwise, the person who is obliged to give, to do or not to do 
something towards another, shall be ordered by the court to carry out this obligation 
upon the demand of the person to whom the obligation is owed. This Article is 
considered to be wide-reaching,98 since it also applies to obligations resulting from the 
law of delict and duties arising from property law and intellectual property law, and not 
only to contractual obligations.99 However, it only gives the creditor a procedural right to 
enforce his right to performance in court.100  
The only reference to a substantive right to specific performance can be found in Book 
7, which deals with specific contracts such as sale and construction contracts.101 It is 
                                                 
95
  This procedure is comparable to the period of grace or Nachfrist under German law – see 
para 2 3 1 1 above. 
96
  Of course, the requirement of a written notice will not be applicable if the parties specified 
a date for performance; non-performance by that date allows the creditor to claim 
damages or terminate instantly (see Haas & Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” 
in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other 
Perspectives 13). 
97
  11-13. 
98
  See Haas “Searching for a basis of specific performance in the Dutch Civil Code” in 
Hallebeek & Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The Historical 
Development 168-169.  
99
  See Hijma & Olthof Compendium Nederlands Vermogensrecht nr 299. 
100
  Nr 88 & nr 331; and see Asser/Hijma 5-I (2007) nr 372: “De rechtsvordering berust op een 
processuele bevoegdheid…” 
101
  See Art 7:21 & Art 7:759(1) BW respectively (Addendum A 405, 407). 
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peculiar that Book 6, which deals with the law of obligations in general, does not grant 
the creditor a substantive right to specific performance, considering that it does contain 
provisions granting the creditor a substantive right to the remedy of damages and the 
right to cancel the contract in case of breach.102 According to Haas, the Dutch legislator 
did not include an explicit provision granting the creditor a substantive right to specific 
performance, because this right is regarded as an essential feature of the contract itself. 
It is surprising that even though Dutch law attaches so much weight to the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda and the concomitant right to specific performance,103 it was not 
considered necessary to reinforce it by creating a statutory basis for it. In his research, 
Haas argues that an explicit statutory provision granting the right to specific 
performance in Book 6 of the BW would improve the coherence of legal remedies in 
Dutch law, and that this would also provide a legal basis for the important pacta sunt 
servanda principle, as well as align Dutch law with other continental European legal 
systems, which entrench a right to specific performance in their Civil Codes.104 
Furthermore, Article 3:299 of the BW provides that an order for specific performance 
may compel the debtor to act or not to act and that the creditor does not have to be 
satisfied with monetary compensation.105 However, as mentioned above, some 
exceptions to the general principle have been recognised in Article 3:296(1) BW.106 For 
example, it is accepted that an order for specific performance will not be granted when 
                                                 
102
  See Art 6:74 & Art 6:265 BW respectively. 
103
  Stolp describes the right to specific performance as the “ruggengraat” of Dutch contract 
law (see M M Stolp Ontbinding, Schadevergoeding en Nakoming: De Remedies Voor 
Wanprestatie in Het Licht van de Beginselen van Subsidiariteit en Proportionaliteit (2007) 
186). 
104
  See D Haas De Grenzen Van Het Recht Op Nakoming doctoral thesis Vrije University 
Amsterdam (2009) 338. Examples of such provisions include Art 1184(2) of the French 
Civil Code and § 241 of the German BGB (see Zweigert & Kötz Introduction to 
Comparative Law 472-479).  
105
  See Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 141. 
106
  See further paras 4 6 & 5 4 below. 
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the obligation is of a highly personal nature.107 Non-performance of these obligations 
would rather be compensated by damages under Dutch law on the basis of the maxim 
nemo praecise cogi ad factum.108 According to Article 6:3 read with Article 3:296(1), a 
claim for specific performance of a natural obligation will also be excluded on the basis 
of the nature of the obligation.109 Furthermore, if performance has become impossible 
an order to perform will not be granted.110 The concept of impossibility under Dutch law 
refers to both objective and subjective impossibility.111 In these cases the creditor will 
have to resort to a claim for damages or rescission, or both of these remedies.112 These 
exceptions clearly resemble those identified under German law. 
It was decided as early as 1956 that the Dutch courts have no discretion to refuse an 
order for specific performance when all the conditions for allowing such a claim have 
been met.113 However, the Dutch Supreme Court held in 2001114 that it is in the courts’ 
discretion to refuse specific performance on the basis of reasonableness and equity.115 
The Supreme Court emphasised that deciding such a claim requires a balancing of the 
                                                 
107
  See further para 4 6 below. 
108
  See Haas & Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 16; Oosterhuis Specific 
Performance: German, French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth Century 460; and see 
para 2 2 1 above.  
109
  See Haas & Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 11 17. See further para 4 
6 below. 
110
  Hijma & Olthof Compendium Nederlands Vermogensrecht nr 88. 
111
  See further para 6 2 3 below. 
112
  See Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 142. 
113
  HR 21 December 1956, NJ 1957, 126 (Meegdes/Meegdes). 
114
  HR 5 January 2001, NJ 2001, 79 (Multi Vastgoed/Nethou). 
115
  This concept is codified in Art 6:248(2) BW. 
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mutual interests of the parties.116 Hence, a court may refuse to enforce a contract where 
the contract will be extremely disadvantageous and unreasonable to the debtor.117 
However, specific performance remains the primary remedy for breach and courts will 
only derogate from this principle in exceptional circumstances.118 
2 3 2  Specific performance in common law: early development 
When considering the availability of specific performance in the common law, it is useful 
to begin with a review of the development of the courts of equity, as it was these courts 
that introduced specific performance into the common law. Their primary function was to 
alleviate hardship by extending remedies that were not available “at law” and to provide 
adequate compensation to the aggrieved party. It follows that a party could only have 
recourse to an equitable remedy if the remedy available “at law” did not provide 
adequate relief.119 This complementary function of equity was embodied in the rule that 
“equity follows the law”. It meant that equity could only interfere when the rules of law 
were insufficient to protect the party’s rights. In fourteenth century England, a set of 
rules for granting specific performance developed and a separation between law and 
equity evolved.120 The Courts of Chancery began to apply equity in deciding matters 
                                                 
116
  HR 5 January 2001, NJ 2001, 79 (Multi Vastgoed/Nethou). See para 6 3 (esp text to n 
142) below. 
117
  See eg HR 16 January 1981, NJ 1981, 312 (X/Y) (cf para 6 3 below). 
118
  See Haas & Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 19-20. See also para 6 3 
below. 
119
  See generally R A Newman Equity and Law: A Comparative Study (1961) 11-20 and more 
specifically, W S Holdsworth A History of English Law (1924) 294 ff; H Potter An Historical 
Introduction to English Law and Its Institutions 3 ed (1948) 578; J Gordley & A T Von 
Mehren An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Private Law: Readings, Cases, 
Materials (2006) 527-528. 
120
  See J B Ames Lectures on Legal History (1913) 247-250; J N Pomeroy Jr A Treatise on 
the Specific Performance of Contracts 3 ed (1926) 32-37.    
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and the Chancellor, in exercising his equitable powers, observed the requirements of 
conscience. Since these requirements varied depending on the Chancellor’s personal 
beliefs, the power to grant specific performance was exercised in a discretionary 
manner.121 This court was described as being a “court of conscience”, rather than of law 
and defendants could be forced to do whatever good conscience required in the 
circumstances.122 Since equity could only interfere when the redress available at law 
was inadequate, the remedy of specific performance acquired an exceptional character, 
with damages being the primary remedy.123 
The early English common law therefore adopted an approach comparable to that of 
classical Roman law. As Sir Edward Fry stated:  
“In like manner the Common Law of England made no attempt actually to enforce the 
performance of contracts but gave the injured party only the right to satisfaction for non-
performance.”124 
The reason for the primacy of damages in the English common law appears to be the 
same as that of Roman law – the English courts, too, were reluctant to compel persons 
to perform acts other than the payment of money.125 Therefore, the only legal right 
afforded to the aggrieved party was a claim for damages, but this remedy proved to be 
                                                 
121
  See Potter An Historical Introduction to English Law and Its Institutions 550 ff. 
122
  See J H Baker The Oxford History of the Laws of England VI (2004) 46-48, 174; An 
Introduction to English Legal History 4 ed (2002) 105-115. See also E A Farnsworth An 
Introduction to the Legal System of the United States 4 ed (2010) 103, and Lumley v 
Wagner (1852) De GM & G 604 619. 
123
  See further para 3 1 below. 
124
  See G R Northcote A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts by Sir Edward 
Fry 6 ed (1921) 4 § 7. 
125
  See E A Farnsworth “Legal remedies for breach of contract” 1970 Colum LR 1145 1151-
1153; Beinart 1952 SALJ 158. 
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inadequate in many circumstances to achieve justice between the parties.126 There 
were some types of contract in which money did not provide adequate compensation 
upon breach.127 For example, damages often could not adequately compensate 
someone for the inability to own a particular piece of land.128 For that reason, the equity 
courts gradually developed rules which in very severe cases tempered the rigid principle 
that claims for specific performance were inadmissible. Under these rules, a plaintiff 
could exceptionally claim specific performance if he could persuade the court that the 
remedies available to him at law, especially damages, were inadequate.129 This 
equitable jurisdiction was unique to the equity courts until section 24 of the Supreme 
Court of Judicature Act 1873, conferred the same jurisdiction to all divisions of the High 
Court.130 The distinction between the jurisdictions of the courts of law and of equity was 
thus abolished, but the remedy of specific performance was one of the additions to the 
substantive law which remained.131 In both England and the United States today all 
courts concurrently apply the rules developed “at law” and “in equity”.132 The principle, 
                                                 
126
  See Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893] 1 Ch 116 per Kay 
LJ 126 (para 3 2 n 6 below). 
127
  Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1907 ff; M P Furmston Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s 
Law of Contract 16 ed (2012) 796-797. 
128
  See W F Walsh A Treatise on Equity (1930) § 60. The idea that a purchaser should be 
able to obtain specific performance of a contract for the sale of land because damages 
are inadequate has often been criticized (see para 3 2 1 1 below). 
129
  Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 480; Farnsworth An Introduction to the Legal System of 
the United States 103. 
130
  See A E Randall Leake on Contracts (1921) 839; Lord Mackay of Clashfern (ed) 
Halsbury’s Laws of England 4 ed reissue vol 16(2) (2003) para 496. See also Warner v 
Murdoch, Murdoch v Warner (1877) 4 Ch D 750 752. 
131
  See J H Baker An Introduction to English Legal History 3 ed (1990) 232; M J Falcón y 
Tella Equity and Law (2008) 67; Farnsworth An Introduction to the Legal System of the 
United States 104-105; J E Martin Hanbury & Martin’s Modern Equity 19 ed (2012) 34-35. 
132
  Falcón y Tella Equity and Law 62; Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 480; Farnsworth An 
Introduction to the Legal System of the United States 104. 
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however, remains that a claim for specific performance is exceptional and even today it 
is constantly emphasised that an order for specific performance of a contract remains in 
the complete discretion of the court.133 
The common-law approach to the remedy of specific performance will now be 
discussed with reference to the position in both English law and American law. These 
two systems follow more or less the same approach to awarding specific performance. 
They depart from the same principle: both systems regard damages as the norm and 
specific performance as the deviation, but there are also some divergences, which 
cannot be ignored. Most authors treat the two systems as one and the same when 
discussing the remedy of specific performance, but many fail to mention the nuanced 
difference in application of the general principle of adequacy of damages.134  
2 3 2 1  Specific performance as a secondary remedy in English law  
According to modern English law, a plaintiff has no right to specific performance except 
so far as the court may see fit to grant it in accordance with settled principles.135 The 
scope of the remedy is much more limited; it is seen as an exceptional remedy for 
breach of contract, which can only be awarded by a court in the exercise of its equitable 
discretion.136 The only obligations specifically enforceable are those aimed at payment 
of an agreed sum of money, but a claim for an agreed sum is distinct from a claim for 
specific performance.137 
                                                 
133
  Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 480. See further para 3 2 below. 
134
  See eg the seminal article by R Pound “The development of American Law and its 
deviation from English law” (1951) 67 LQR 49. See further para 3 2 below. 
135
  See list below. 
136
  See para 3 2 below. 
137
  For England, see Sir John Salmond & J Williams Principles of the Law of Contracts 2 ed 
(1945) 593; G H Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (1988) 
62; E McKendrick Contract Law 8 ed (2009) 349; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 
573. For the US, see J O Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 
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As mentioned above, an important factor in determining whether or not a court will grant 
specific performance of a contract is the existence and adequacy of a remedy at law.138 
The principal remedy afforded by the courts for breach of contract is damages, and 
ordinarily this form of relief is preferred. However, where the legal remedy of damages 
is inadequate, or is insufficient to do complete justice between the parties, it will be in 
the discretion of the court to grant specific performance.139  
This discretion is exercised according to settled rules and principles,140 and specific 
circumstances have been identified where an order for specific performance would not 
be granted. These circumstances are the following.141 
i. Damages provide an adequate remedy;142 
ii. The order could cause severe hardship;143  
iii. The contract requires constant supervision;144  
                                                                                                                                                             
United Nations Convention 4 ed (2009) 297; Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1142. See 
also text to n 199 para 2 3 2 2 below & para 3 2 n 25 below. 
138
  The inadequacy-of-damages criterion is discussed in detail in para 3 2 below. 
139
  See Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1099. 
140
  Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 326. 
141
  These principles were adopted from the work of Sir John Salmond and James Williams: 
Principles of the Law of Contracts 2 ed (1945) 596-600. See generally Peel Treitel’s Law 
of Contract 1099 ff; Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1917 ff.  
142
  In Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co (1874) 9 Ch App 279, Lord 
Selbourne famously declared (at 284) that “the court gives specific performance instead of 
damages, only when it can by that means do more perfect and complete justice”. See also 
Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 90, and para 3 2 below. 
143
  See Patel v Ali [1984] Ch 283 (para 6 2 below). See also H Beale et al Cases, Materials 
and Text on Contract Law (2010) 885-887. This criterion is discussed in detail in ch 6. 
144
  See Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893] 1 Ch 116 (text to n 
39 para 5 2 below); Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd 
[1997] 2 WLR 898 (para 5 2 below). Certain exceptions to this general rule has been 
recognised in practice, eg where the work is reasonably defined, the plaintiff has a 
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iv. Performance consists of a personal service;145  
v. The contract is unconscionable or illegal;146  
vi. The contract is too vague to be enforced;147  
vii. The plaintiff acted unfairly or unconscionably (i.e. has no “clean hands”);148  
viii. Specific performance is impossible;149  
ix. The party in breach would be inadequately protected should the aggrieved party 
consequently be in breach.150  
                                                                                                                                                             
substantial interest in the performance of the contract which cannot be adequately 
compensated by an award of damages, and the land on which the works are to be erected 
is in the possession of the defendant. See in this regard Wolverhampton Corporation v 
Emmons [1901] 1 QB 515; Molyneux v Richard [1906] 1 Ch 34. American courts, on the 
other hand, seem to follow a more liberal approach in this respect, see Jones v Parker 
(1895) 163 Mass. 564. This criterion is discussed in detail in ch 5. 
145
  Discussed in detail in ch 4. 
146
  As in South African law, this remedy obviously presupposes a valid agreement between 
the parties. 
147
  See para 5 2 below. 
148
  See M Chen-Wishart Contract Law 4 ed (2012) 543 and examples mentioned there. 
149
  Cf text to n 125 para 6 3 below. 
150
  It was once maintained that specific performance would not be granted to the aggrieved 
party unless it could also have been ordered against him at the time the contract was 
concluded (more often referred to as the requirement of “mutuality in remedy”). See 
Clifford v Turrel (1841) 1 Y & C Ch Cas 138; Blackett v Bates (1865) 1 Ch App 117 per 
Lord Cranworth LC: “The court does not grant specific performance unless it can give full 
relief to both parties” (meaning the remedy can only be granted if it will secure 
performance by the plaintiff as well as by the defendant). This doctrine was discredited, 
and it is clear from Price v Strange [1978] Ch 337 367, that the plaintiff is only prevented 
from claiming specific performance if the defendant, who is compelled to perform, would 
be inadequately protected if the plaintiff subsequently breaches. Burrows rightly criticises 
the reformulated version of the requirement, because it seems too “pro-defendant”: it 
would have already been concluded that damages will not adequately compensate the 
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In the light of this extensive list of limitations, it may well be asked when specific 
performance will be awarded in the common law.151 Here the most prominent class of 
contracts that will be specifically enforced is the contract for the sale of land. These 
contracts have always been enforced, because the contract gives the purchaser a right 
to a particular piece of land, and monetary compensation would not provide adequate 
relief, due to the specific qualities of the piece of land, which are considered to be 
difficult to quantify.152  
This justification of granting specific performance on the basis that the property is 
unique has, however, been criticised, mainly because it is not the case in every 
agreement to purchase land. The purchaser may, for example, intend to immediately 
resell the property or retain it as a long-term investment, without having a particular 
interest in the unique qualities of the land.153 
In the case of contracts involving movables, equity would traditionally only grant specific 
performance with respect to goods that were unique in character.154 The reasoning 
behind this was that with generic goods, the aggrieved party had an adequate remedy 
                                                                                                                                                             
plaintiff, yet the court is prepared to deny him an admittedly more appropriate and just 
remedy, because of the mere risk that the defendant may not be adequately 
compensated, should the plaintiff fail to perform completely. See A Burrows Remedies for 
Torts and Breach of Contract 3 ed (2004) 491-493; Chen-Wishart Contract Law 546-547; 
Furmston Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract 799. See for American authority, 
G Klass Contract Law in the USA (2010) 216: “most courts have dropped the old 
requirement of mutuality of remedy”. See also comment “Limitations on the availability of 
specific performance” published in (1950) 17(2) U Chi LR 409 415.  
151
  The most recognised of which will be discussed in the following chapters. 
152
  See Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1908-1909. 
153
  See para 3 2 1 1 below. 
154
  See further para 3 2 1 2 below. 
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in damages, because he could acquire the goods elsewhere.155 And with unique goods 
it would be difficult to assess damages as the object, for example an heirloom, could be 
more valuable to the plaintiff than the object’s actual market-related value, or there may 
not even be similar objects in the market to compare the heirloom and estimate a value. 
Ultimately, the amount of damages would be uncertain and speculative, which makes 
damages inadequate.  
However, the enactment of the Sale of Goods Act in 1979 widened the scope of the 
remedy of specific performance. Section 52 gives the court a discretion to order specific 
performance in relation to obligations to deliver “specific or ascertained” goods. The 
discretion is thus no longer limited to cases in which the plaintiff could not get a 
satisfactory substitute because the goods were regarded as unique. A court can also 
order specific performance of a contract for the sale of goods that have been 
ascertained.156 English courts have also granted specific performance in cases of 
“commercial uniqueness”,157 i.e. in cases where the goods were purely generic and thus 
fell outside of the scope of section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.158 For example, if 
obtaining a substitute involves difficulty, it gives the goods a character of commercial 
                                                 
155
  See Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1911. In Cohen v Roche [1927] 1 KB 169, eg, 
the court refused specific performance to a buyer of a set of Hepplewhite chairs because 
they were considered to be “ordinary articles of commerce and of no special value or 
interest”. 
156
  Section 61(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended by s 2(a) of the Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995) defines “specific goods” as goods “identified and agreed on at the 
time a contract of sale is made”. The Act does not define “ascertained”, but it seems to 
mean “identified in accordance with the agreement after the time a contract of sale is 
made” (In Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606 630), or identified in any other way (Thames Sack & 
Bag Co Ltd v Knowles (1918) 88 LJKB 585 588). See also Burrows Remedies for Torts 
and Breach of Contract 459 ff; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 576-577. 
157
  A term coined by G H Treitel – see para 3 2 1 2 n 86 below. 
158
  See further R J Sharpe Injunctions and Specific Performance (1983) 325 and A Burrows 
Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 3 ed (2004) 459 ff. 
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uniqueness, which could influence a court to grant specific performance even though 
the situation is not explicitly covered by section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.159 
It was mentioned earlier that English law has always been reluctant to recognise the 
specific enforceability of contracts for the sale of ordinary personal property.160 
American law, as we will see in the next section, is more disposed to the idea. The 
courts in the United States have extended the remedy of specific performance to buyers 
of generic goods whose need for the actual supply was particularly urgent or who would 
not be able to get a satisfactory substitute161 on the basis of the appropriateness of the 
remedy in the circumstances.162 English courts are slower in accepting this view, but 
there are some indications that they are moving towards such an approach.163 These 
will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.164 
2 3 2 2  Specific performance as a secondary remedy in American law  
American law also departs from the traditional common-law principle that damages is 
the standard and preferred remedy for breach of contract while specific performance is 
an exceptional remedy. In like manner, specific performance is considered to be an 
                                                 
159
  See A S Burrows “Specific performance at the crossroads” (1984) 4 Legal Studies 102 
103; Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1915-1917. See further para 3 2 1 2 below and 
the authorities cited there, esp Sky Petroleum Ltd v VIP Petroleum Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 576; 
Howard E Perry & Co v British Railways Board [1980] 1 WLR 1375 and Thames Valley 
Power Ltd v Total Gas and Power Ltd [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 441. 
160
  See para 1 1 2 above. 
161
  See text to nn 192-194 para 2 3 2 2 below. See also paras 3 2 1 2 & 3 4 1 below. 
162
  See text to n 99 para 3 2 1 2 below. 
163
  The inadequacy-of-damages requirement was strongly challenged in the famous case of 
Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58. See in particular, the speech of Lord Pearce (with whom 
Lord Hudson agreed), who preferred to focus on the question of whether the more 
“appropriate” remedy was that of specific performance (see para 3 2 1 2 below). See also 
Burrows 1984 Legal Studies 102-107.  
164
  See para 3 2 below. 
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equitable remedy,165 which is only available if damages would not provide adequate 
relief.166 Only then will it be in the discretion of the court to grant specific 
performance.167 The system is therefore “not directed at compulsion of promisors to 
prevent breach; rather, it is aimed at relief to promisees to redress breach”.168 As 
indicated in the previous section, it seems that US courts are more readily prepared to 
grant specific performance as a remedy for breach, even though they depart from the 
same principle that specific performance is considered the exception rather than the 
rule. Farnsworth, for example, maintains that the modern approach in American law is 
to compare remedies to determine which is more effective in protecting the aggrieved 
party’s interest. “The concept of adequacy has thus tended to become relative, and the 
comparison more often leads to granting equitable relief than was historically the 
case.”169 
However, the adequacy of damages remains the definitive factor.170 Subsection 1 of § 
359 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts171 specifically 
                                                 
165
  See G R Northcote A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts by Sir Edward 
Fry 6 ed (1921) § 3; J Pomeroy Jr A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts 3 
ed (1926) §§ 1-3; W H E Jaeger Williston on Contracts 3 ed (1968) vol 11 § 1418. See 
also Klein v Shell Oil Co 386 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1967). 
166
  See E A Farnsworth Contracts 3 ed (1999) 773. 
167
  See Lee v Crane 120 So. 2d 702, 703 (1960). Although certain kinds of contracts (such as 
contracts for the sale of land) are as a general rule specifically enforced, courts do not feel 
bound by traditional categories and will sometimes exercise their discretion to deny 
specific performance of an agreement that would normally be specifically enforceable – 
see eg Paddock v Davenport 107 NC 710 (1890) where specific performance of a contract 
for the sale of an interest in land (trees standing on the defendant’s land were sold to 
plaintiff, who bought them with a view to their severance from the soil) was denied on the 
ground that damages would adequately compensate the plaintiff.  
168
  See Farnsworth 1970 Colum LR 1147. 
169
  Farnsworth Contracts 773. See eg paras 3 2 1 2 & 3 4 1 below. 
170
  J M Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 6 ed (2009) 556.  
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provides that specific performance will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to 
protect the expectation interest of the injured party. Thus, where the aggrieved party 
can acquire a satisfactory equivalent of what he contracted for from some other source, 
specific performance will most likely be denied.172  
As in English law,173 the rule was that specific performance of a contract for the sale of 
ordinary goods was not available because damages, based on the market price, would 
enable the buyer to purchase substitute goods, thereby providing him with an adequate 
remedy.174 However, the continued demand by scholars for the expansion of the 
availability of specific performance necessitated reform and eventually resulted in the 
enactment of the Uniform Sales Act 1906, which was effective in most American 
jurisdictions by the 1920’s.175 It determined in § 68 that “[w]here the seller has broken a 
contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods, a court having the powers of a court of 
equity may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the buyer, by its judgment of decree 
direct that the contract be performed specifically, without giving the seller the option of 
retaining the goods on payment of damages…” 
This provision reflects the initial intent of the legislature to liberalise the rules regarding 
the granting of the remedy, by providing a wide discretion to the courts to order specific 
performance.176 It was succeeded by § 2-716(1) of the US Uniform Commercial 
                                                                                                                                                             
171
  Official text with comments is accessible via Westlaw International. The provisions of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts referred to in this thesis are reproduced in   
Addendum A 382-385 (official comments & illustrations excluded). 
172
  For further discussion see para 3 2 below. 
173
  Compare discussion of s 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 above. 
174
  See Farnsworth 1970 Colum LR 1154-1155. 
175
  See H Greenberg “Specific performance under section 2-716 of the UCC” (1982) 87 
Commercial Law Journal 583 595. 
176
  In Hunt Foods Inc v O’Disho 36. 98 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Cal.1951), the court stated (270) 
that the legislature “unquestionably had in mind the liberalization of the law regarding 
specific performance of contracts for the sale of chattels”. See M Handler “Specific 
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Code,177 which states that: “[s]pecific performance may be decreed where the goods 
are unique or in other proper circumstances”.178 This provision only deals with the 
situations in which a buyer is entitled to enforce performance, while § 2-709 of the UCC 
(discussed below) covers situations in which a seller is entitled to claim the price. The 
term “may” in § 2-716(1) indicates that the buyer does not have the right to claim 
specific performance, but rather that it is within the court’s discretion to grant specific 
performance. The scope of this discretionary power is further extended in the UCC by 
the inclusion of the phrase “other proper circumstances”. Here, the legislature has left it 
to the courts to determine the circumstances in which specific performance would be a 
proper remedy.179 Clearly, this provision departs from the more circumscribed rule 
under § 68 of the Uniform Sales Act and further extends the availability of specific 
performance as a remedy for breach of contracts for sale of goods in the United 
States.180 
As indicated, § 2-716(1) of the UCC refers to “uniqueness” as an example of a situation 
where specific performance may be granted.181 The case law that followed the 
enactment of this provision reveals that the courts have interpreted the term “unique” 
                                                                                                                                                             
performance under section 2-716(1) of the Uniform Commercial UCC – What other proper 
circumstances?” (1971) 33 U Pitt LR 243 245; E Axelrod “Specific performance of 
contracts for sales of goods” (1982) 7 Vermont Law Review 249 254. 
177
  Replacing the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts in relation to 
the sale of goods/moveable property. Official text with comments accessible via Westlaw 
International. The provisions of the UCC referred to in this thesis are reproduced in 
Addendum A 385-388. 
178
  On the background and drafting of this provision, see Axelrod 1982 Vermont Law Review 
249-272 and Greenberg 1982 Commercial Law Journal 583-599. 
179
  Handler 1971 U Pitt LR 243. 
180
  See Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 554. See also text to nn 100 ff para 3 2 1 2 
below. 
181
  See A T Kronman “Specific performance” (1978) 45 U Chi LR 351 355-365. See further 
para 3 2 1 2 below. 
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rather widely.182 Goods may be unique in nature, or they may be unique because of 
surrounding circumstances.183 Traditionally, heirlooms, works of art and antiques were 
regarded as unique. Recently however, a broader meaning has been introduced by 
including output184 and requirements185 contracts as unique when they involve a 
particular source or market.186 Courts also interpret uniqueness based on the 
circumstances under which the contract is to be performed. Thus, goods that are not 
considered to be unique per se may be considered so for the purposes of enforcing the 
specific contract.187 This is very similar to the concept of “commercial uniqueness” that 
have prompted English courts to enforce contracts in situations where it was difficult to 
find substitute goods in the market due to surrounding circumstances. 
The phrase “other proper circumstances” refers to situations where it is within the 
court’s discretion to allow specific performance based on the facts of the case.188 These 
                                                 
182
  See Greenberg 1982 Commercial Law Journal 595-596. See further para 3 2 1 2 below. 
183
  See para 3 2 1 2 below. 
184
  An output contract is a contract in which a producer agrees to sell its entire production to 
the buyer, who in turn agrees to purchase the entire output, whatever that is. For 
examples, see Feld v Henry S Levy & Sons Inc 335 N.E.2d 320 (NY 1975); Technical 
Assistance International Inc v United States 150 F.3d 1369 (US Court of Appeals 1998). 
185
  A requirements contract is a contract in which one party agrees to supply as much of a 
good or service as is required by the other party, and in exchange the other party 
expressly or implicitly promises that it will obtain its goods or services exclusively from the 
first party. For examples, see J Gordley (ed) The Enforceability of Promises in European 
Contract Law (2001) 193 ff. See also para 3 2 1 2 n 101 below. 
186
  See Farnsworth Contracts 773; Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 555; § 2-716 
UCC, cmt 2. See further para 3 2 1 2 below. 
187
  § 2-716 UCC, cmt 2 clearly states that uniqueness should be determined having regard to 
the circumstances surrounding the contract. By stating this rule, the UCC incorporates 
what was practiced by US courts for a long time. See Greenberg 1982 Commercial Law 
Journal 596-599. See further para 3 2 1 2 below. 
188
  See Handler 1971 U Pitt LR 249. See also para 3 2 1 2 below. 
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situations are determined on the basis of the possibility of replacing the goods.189 This 
means that “other proper circumstances” also include situations where it is not easy to 
find substitute goods in the market. For example, in 1973, when the price of cotton 
increased significantly, a US court ordered specific performance of a contract for the 
sale of cotton because substitute goods could not be obtained.190  US courts have also 
granted specific performance of contracts for the supply of fuel when the price of fuel 
increased drastically, making it very expensive to obtain a substitute.191 It is important to 
note however, that the degree to which it is possible to replace the goods is not the only 
factor the courts consider in this regard. The quality of substitute goods is also taken 
into consideration.192 It may be possible to find goods of the same kind in the market, 
but courts have granted specific performance because the quality of the replacement 
goods was inferior.193 In such a case, it is considered unfair to award damages and not 
specific performance.194  
The seller’s right to payment of the price, on the other hand, is governed by § 2-709 of 
the UCC.195 The seller has the right to receive the price when goods are accepted and 
received by the buyer, and when goods perish after the risk of loss has passed to the 
                                                 
189
  See J M Catalano “More fiction than fact: the perceived differences in the application of 
specific performance under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods” (1997) 71 Tulane LR 1807 1825. See also para 3 2 1 2 
below. 
190
  See Bolin Farms v American Cotton Shippers Association 370 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D. La. 
1974); Greenberg 1982 Commercial Law Journal 583. 
191
  See Eastern Airlines Inc v Gulf Oil Corp 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Greenberg 
1982 Commercial Law Journal 583. 
192
  See S Walt “For specific performance under the United Nations Sales Convention” (1999) 
26 Texas International Law Journal 211 218. 
193
  See Copylease Corp of America v Memorex Corp 408 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
194
  See Walt 1999 Texas International Law Journal 225; Catalano 1997 Tulane LR 1828. 
195
  See Addendum A 386 below. 
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buyer.196 In the case of goods that are not delivered, the seller can require performance 
if he is unable to resell the goods after a reasonable effort or when it is clear from the 
circumstances that efforts to resell will yield no result.197 The term “specific 
performance” is not used in the provisions regarding the payment of the price.198 This 
reflects the fact that payment of the price by the buyer is not seen as specific 
performance in common-law systems.199 It should be noted that the situation is different 
in civil law, where performance of the obligation to pay the contractual price is seen as 
specific performance.200  
Even though US courts follow a more liberal approach, specific performance remains a 
subsidiary remedy. Apart from the adequacy of damages criterion, there are also certain 
defined cases when the remedy of specific performance will not be available. Most of 
which resemble those identified under the English law.201 It is accepted that a court will 
not grant specific performance to enforce a contract unless the terms of the contract are 
certain, if it would burden the enforcement or supervision of the contract, if the contract 
involves an obligation to provide a personal service or if specific enforcement of the 
contract will lead to unfairness.202 Thus, the discretion of US courts to grant specific 
performance is also exercised according to settled rules.203 Furthermore, based on the 
                                                 
196
  See E A Peters “Remedies for breach of contract relating to the sale of goods under the 
Uniform Commercial UCC: a roadmap for article 2” (1963) 73 Yale LJ 199 241. 
197
  See Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention 297-298.  
198
  See § 2-709 UCC. 
199
  See Dawson 1959 Mich LR 496. 
200
  501. Compare also South African law: n 7 para 5 1 below, and distinction between 
monetary and non-monetary obligations drawn by certain international instruments in para 
2 3 3 below.  
201
  See para 3 2 below. 
202
  See Farnsworth Contracts 778-783. See further para 5 3 below. 
203
  The mutuality principle has also been discredited under American law, because it was 
based on the notion that a party in breach should not be compelled to perform without the 
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same arguments advanced under English law, contracts to convey land are singled out 
for special treatment and are considered to be specifically enforceable. The reasons for 
allowing specific performance in such instances are also criticised though.204  
2 3 3  Specific performance in various international instruments 
As mentioned earlier, the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG), the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), 
the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR) and the Common European Sales Law (CESL), all determine that 
the debtor should specifically perform his obligations in case of breach.205 What follows 
is a more comprehensive analysis of their relevant provisions. 
2 3 3 1  Specific performance under the CISG 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is a 
multilateral treaty that provides for a uniform international sales law.206 As of July 2014 it 
                                                                                                                                                             
assurance that the agreed exchange will be rendered in return, which could be 
accomplished by requiring security instead. See American Law Institute’s Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 363, cmt c. See also Ames Lectures on Legal History 370. 
However, it was stated in Morad v Silva 117 N.E.2d 290 (Mass. 1954) that “even under 
the rule which rejects the mutuality principle specific performance may be refused ‘if a 
substantial part of the agreed exchange … is not well secured’”. The principle has also 
been reformulated, and it still only applies to the extent that the plaintiff’s performance 
cannot be secured.  
204
  See Farnsworth Contracts 776. See also para 3 2 1 1 below. 
205
  See para 1 1 2 above. See also V Heutger & J Oosterhuis “Specific performance within 
the hierarchy of remedies in European contract law” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 147 152. 
206
  The relevant provisions of the CISG are reproduced in Addendum A 407. The complete 
UN document is available online via the UNCITRAL website at 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf>. 
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has 81 contracting parties (excluding South Africa).207 It was developed by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and was signed in Vienna 
in 1980.208 It only came into force eight years later, on 1 January 1988, after being 
ratified by eleven countries.209 It applies to all international sales contracts where the 
seller and the buyer maintain their places of business in different states,210 unless of 
course the parties expressly opted out of its application.211 It thus allows international 
contracting parties to avoid choice of law issues.212 
The CISG has been criticised for its failure to facilitate the development of a uniform set 
of rules to govern international sale of goods transactions.213 The provisions on specific 
                                                 
207
  The list of parties to the CISG can be accessed on the UNCITRAL website at 
<http://uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html>. 
208
  See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 11 April 
1980 International Legal Materials 668. 
209
  See S Kröll et al (eds) The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods: Commentary (2011) v. 
210
  Art 1(1) CISG. The CISG excludes consumer sales (Art 2(a)); see U Magnus “CISG vs. 
CESL” in U Magnus (ed) CISG vs. Regional Sales Law Unification: With a Focus on the 
New Common European Sales Law (2012) 97 98 n 5 “The CISG covers however 
consumer sales which the seller could not recognize as such as well as sales where the 
consumer sells to a professional buyer.” 
211
  See Art 6 CISG. For treatment of the Art 6 opt-out requirements by the US Federal Courts, 
see M McQuillen “The development of a Federal CISG Common Law in U.S. courts: 
patterns of interpretation and citation” (2006-2007) 61 University of Miami Law Review 
509 518-520. 
212
  For details on the background and the development of the CISG, see N Boghossian “A 
comparative study of specific performance provisions in the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods” 1999/2000 Pace Review of the Convention 
on Contracts for International Sale of Goods 7-14. See also Kröll et al (eds) The United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Commentary 4-5. 
213
  See generally V G Curran “The Interpretive Challenge to Uniformity by C Witz” (1995) 15 
Journal of Law and Commerce 175-199; J E Bailey “Facing the truth: Seeing the 
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performance, in particular, have attracted a great deal of academic comment and 
criticism.214 The CISG incorporated a largely unrestricted right to claim specific 
performance, mirroring the civilian approach to a large extent,215 while retaining a 
proviso in Article 28 regarding the application of this remedy in order to facilitate 
common-law countries.216  
Articles 46 (buyer’s right) and 62 (seller’s right) contain the general provisions regarding 
specific performance. In principle, the CISG entitles an aggrieved party to demand 
performance from the defaulting party and authorises judicial enforcement of contractual 
obligations.217 The rationale behind these provisions is to promote the pacta sunt 
                                                                                                                                                             
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as an obstacle to a uniform 
law of international sales” (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 273-317; P 
Hackney “Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods achieving 
uniformity?” (2001) 61 Louisiana Law Review 473-486. 
214
  Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention  
289. 
215
  See Kröll et al (eds) The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods: Commentary 370 687. 
216
  See A H Kastely “The right to require performance in international sales: towards an 
international interpretation of the Vienna Convention” (1988) 63 Washington Law Review 
607 625; I Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods 3 ed (2010) 459-460; 470 (by M Müller-Chen). For details of the negotiations 
leading up to the compromise, see Boghossian 1999/2000 Pace Review of the 
Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods 10-11.  
217
  L Chengwei Remedies for Non-performance – Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT 
Principles and PECL (2007) 31-33 (also available online at 
<http://www.jus.uio.no/sisu/remedies_for_non_performance_perspectives_from_cisg_upic
c_and_pecl.chengwei_liu/landscape.a5.pdf>). 
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servanda principle. Notably, this principle was not stated in a specific provision, as the 
drafters considered it to be self-evident.218  
However, in terms of Article 28, the judicial willingness under the CISG to order specific 
performance may vary according to the substantive law of the forum in which an 
aggrieved party seeks specific performance, i.e. the lex fori.219 This provision expressly 
instructs a court to treat an action for specific performance as it would under its own 
law.220 This creates serious doubt as to whether the CISG has in this context effected 
real harmonisation. Therefore, this provision in particular has attracted a great deal of 
criticism.221 It appears to address the concerns of both common- and civil-law systems, 
but it creates uncertainty in the CISG’s approach to the enforcement of performance, 
because contracting parties will be unsure whether specific performance will be 
available in a given transaction if an action can be brought in two or more places, one 
recognising specific performance as the primary remedy and the other recognising it 
                                                 
218
  See O Lando “CISG and its followers: a proposal to adopt some International Principles of 
Contract Law” (2005) 53 Am J Comp L 379 388; Boghossian 1999/2000 Pace Review of 
the Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods 22-24. 
219
  See S Herman “Specific performance: a comparative analysis” (2003) 7(1) Edin LR 5 6. 
220
  See M Müller-Chen “Art 28” in Schwenzer (ed) Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods 469-470: “The wording of Article 28 (‘braucht nicht’, ‘not 
bound to’) gives the court some flexibility. Based on Article 28, it can reject the action for 
performance, but does not have to, even if it would do so according its own law in a 
specific case. The CISG itself does not reveal how this discretionary scope is to be 
utilized. That would also be incompatible with the nature of this provision as a rule for 
conflicts of laws. Instead, it is a matter for the lex fori to decide whether room for discretion 
and evaluation exists and to what extent the cognizant adjudicative panels are permitted 
to use it…” 
221
  See eg Kastely 1988 Washington Law Review 627 ff; M Wethmar-Lemmer “Specific 
performance as a remedy in international sales contracts” (2012) 4 TSAR 700 707 ff. 
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only exceptionally.222 This clearly undermines the spirit of uniformity223 underlying the 
CISG.224 While the need for such a provision is undeniable in the light of the divergent 
viewpoints on specific performance as a contractual remedy, it clearly causes 
uncertainty regarding the availability of specific performance as a remedy for breach.225 
Therefore, it has been suggested that the provisions regulating the availability of 
specific performance, more specifically Article 28, should be revised.226  
However, several commentators have argued that the variable effect of this provision is 
tempered by the custom in international trade in terms of which plaintiffs prefer to claim 
damages rather than specific performance.227 Lando (more convincingly) argues that 
                                                 
222
  See Boghossian 1999/2000 Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for International 
Sale of Goods 73-76; B Zeller CISG and the Unification of International Trade Law (2007) 
55; Kröll et al (eds) The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods: Commentary 372.  
223
  Uniformity is a goal expressly stated in Art 7(1) CISG: “In the interpretation of this 
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.” 
224
  See J Erauw & H M Flechtner “Remedies under the CISG and limits to their uniform 
character” in P Sarecevic & P Volken (eds) The International Sale of Goods Revisited 
(2001) 35 54-55. 
225
  See C M Venter An Assessment of the South African Law Governing Breach of Contract 
master’s dissertation Stellenbosch University (2004) 68-69; J Fitzgerald “CISG, specific 
performance, and the civil law of Louisiana and Quebec” (1997) 16 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 291. 
226
  See eg Venter An Assessment of the South African Law Governing Breach of Contract 
68-69. 
227
  See Kröll et al (eds) The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods: Commentary 372. See also J Felemegas “The right to require specific 
performance: a comparison between provisions of the CISG regarding the right to require 
specific performance and the counterpart provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles” in J 
Felemegas (ed) An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations 
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this compromise was in fact unnecessary and gives an alternative solution that appears 
to be feasible. According to him, civil-law countries could have admitted that specific 
performance should be restricted to situations for which the remedy is needed in 
practice, while common-law countries could have admitted that there are situations in 
which specific performance should be a right which a court would have to grant.228 An 
alternative provision (assuming that Article 28 requires revision) would then state that 
every creditor has a right to specific performance, subject to certain exceptions, where 
the remedy is not considered necessary. This approach would be in line with the PICC 
and the PECL, both of which are considered to be more successful in their treatment of 
the remedy.229 Lando’s solution seems feasible, especially when one considers the 
experiences of other comparable instruments. It obviates the need to resort to the 
(often) complex rules of private international law and would result in the application of a 
single rule embodied in an independent and impartial convention.  
2 3 3 2  Specific performance under the PICC 
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) is considered 
to be one of the most important “soft law” instruments in the field of international trade 
law. The PICC were prepared by the Governing Council of the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and were first published in 1994.230 The 
scope of the PICC is stated in paragraph 1 of the Preamble, according to which they 
“set forth general rules for international commercial contracts”. Since their first 
                                                                                                                                                             
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law 
(2007) 148-149. 
228
  See O Lando “Non-performance (breach) of contracts” in A Hartkamp et al (eds) Towards 
a European Civil Code 4 ed (2011) 681 687; C M Bianca & M J Bonell Commentary on the 
International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (1987) 236-237. 
229
  See paras 2 3 3 6, 3 4 3 & 6 4 2 below. 
230
  For details on the background and the development of the PICC, see S Vogenauer & J 
Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (PICC) (2009) 3-12. 
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publication, the PICC have proved to be a serious alternative to national contract laws in 
international disputes decided by arbitral tribunals, such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). Also, they have been accepted as a model for reforming the laws on 
international contracts by major exporting and importing countries such as China. The 
employment of the PICC as a model for legislative reform has perhaps even become 
their most important role.231 The success of the PICC prompted the UNIDROIT to 
prepare a second enlarged edition which was published in 2004.232 A marginally 
amended third edition was published in 2010,233 and contains new sections on illegality, 
restitution in case of failed contracts, conditions and plurality of parties.234 
The foundational principles of the PICC are freedom of contract, pacta sunt servanda, 
party autonomy, the observance of good faith and fair dealing, informality, openness to 
commercial usages, and the policy to keep the contract alive wherever possible.235 The 
PICC specifically states in Article 1.3 that “[a] contract validly entered into is binding 
upon the parties. It can only be modified or terminated in accordance with its terms or 
                                                 
231
  Vogenauer & Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles 17 68-77. 
See also J Kleinheisterkamp “UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(PICC)” in J Basedow et al (eds) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law 
II (2012) 1727, 1730. 
232
  M J Bonell An International Restatement of Contract Law: the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts 3 ed (2005) 6. The UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 2004 is available online at  
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprincipl
es2004-e.pdf>. 
233
  The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010 is available online 
at <http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/blackletter2010-
english.pdf>.  
234
  The sections on the right to performance (Arts 7.2.1-7.2.5) were left unchanged. The 
relevant provisions of the PICC 2010 are reproduced in Addendum A 410. 
235
  Vogenauer & Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 15. 
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by agreement or as otherwise provided in these Principles”. In this regard it differs from 
the other instruments under review, because the principle of pacta sunt servanda is 
explicitly entrenched.236  
In doing so, the PICC accepts as a general rule that every party has the right to require 
performance of any obligation owed to him.237 The PICC distinguish between the right to 
require performance of a monetary obligation238 and the right to require performance of 
a non-monetary obligation.239 Article 7.2.1 provides that a creditor is always entitled to 
require payment of an agreed sum of money. The term “monetary obligation” refers to 
every obligation to make payment, i.e. the obligation to pay the contractual price as well 
as any secondary obligations to pay a monetary amount, for example interest or 
damages. The currency in which payment is to be made also does not affect the 
application of Article 7.2.1. This right to claim payment obviously only arises when 
performance becomes due. The only exception that applies to this right is if the seller is 
required to resell goods which the buyer did not accept or pay for in terms of a certain 
usage or practice.240  
Article 7.2.2 gives an aggrieved party the right to specific performance of non-monetary 
obligations. Specific performance is considered to be the basic right of every creditor, 
and does not fall within the discretionary powers of a court. The court must order 
specific performance, unless one of the exceptions provided by Article 7.2.2 applies.  
The right to performance only arises when performance becomes due and the debtor 
does not perform. The term “non-performance” is broadly defined in Article 7.1.1, and 
includes situations where the debtor has not performed at all, has provided a partial or 
                                                 
236
  Compare text to nn 265-266 (PECL) below. 
237
  Vogenauer & Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 784-785 (by Schelhaas). 
238
  See Art 7.2.1 PICC (Addendum A 415). 
239
  See Art 7.2.2 PICC (Addendum A 415). 
240
  See Art 1.9 PICC (Addendum A 411). 
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defective performance, or has tendered defective performance which has been validly 
rejected by the creditor. The rather wide formulation of Article 7.2.2 (“an obligation other 
than one to pay money”) probably suggests that it also covers negative obligations, 
such as those contained in contracts in restraint of trade.241 
As stated earlier, the PICC recognises certain exceptions to the creditor’s general right 
to specific performance. This was done to facilitate both the civil-law as well as the 
common-law systems and to achieve some sort of compromise between the diverging 
viewpoints on specific performance.242  
Article 7.2.2 lists five exceptions. Although the list is exhaustive, it covers a variety of 
situations, since it uses open-ended terminology such as “unreasonably burdensome” 
and “reasonably obtaining from another source”. The PICC even endorses the theory of 
“efficient breach”243 in Article 7.2.2(c) by denying specific performance if performance 
can be reasonably obtained from another source. This accords with the common-law 
position.244 It follows that the creditor is prevented from claiming specific performance, 
when (a) performance is impossible in law or in fact; (b) performance or, where relevant, 
enforcement is unreasonably burdensome or expensive;245 (c) the party entitled to 
performance may reasonably obtain performance from another source; (d) performance 
is of an exclusively personal character;246 or (e) the party entitled to performance does 
not require performance within a reasonable time after it has, or ought to have, become 
aware of the non-performance.  
                                                 
241
  Vogenauer & Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 787. 
242
  125. 
243
  Discussed in more detail in para 3 2 below. 
244
  See references to Arts 9:102(2)(d) PECL (esp text to n 264) & III–3:302(5) DCFR (esp text 
to n 278) & 132(2) CESL (n 293) below. See also para 3 4 3 (esp text to n 248) below. 
245
  See further para 6 4 2 below. 
246
  See further para 4 7 below. 
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The practical effect of the operation of one of these exceptions is that the aggrieved 
party would have to be satisfied with damages247 and/or termination of the contract.248 
However, the burden of proof in relation to these exceptions rests on the defaulting 
party. They should therefore not be regarded as negative requirements that must be 
met before the remedy of specific performance would be available to the aggrieved 
party.249 
2 3 3 3  Specific performance under the PECL 
The PECL is a set of model rules that were prepared by the Commission on European 
Contract Law (“Lando Commission”). The final part of the PECL was completed in 
2002.250 The PECL are based on the concept of a uniform European contract law 
system, and are intended to serve as a model for the judicial and legislative 
development of contract law in Europe.251 In the broader sense, the PECL is described 
as being a “set of general rules which are designed to provide maximum flexibility and 
thus accommodate future development in legal thinking in the field of contract law”.252 
The PECL were inspired by the CISG of 1980, however, they are a so-called “soft law”, 
comparable to the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law of Contract, which 
                                                 
247
  See Art 7.4.1 PICC (Addendum A 417). See also Art 9:103 PECL (text to n 268 below). 
248
  See Art 7.3.1 PICC (Addendum A 417). 
249
  Vogenauer & Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 787. 
250
  For details on the background and the development of the PECL, see preface to O Lando 
& H Beale (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II (2000). The 
Principles of European Contract Law 2002 (Parts I, II, and III) are available online at 
<www.lexmercatoria.org>. 
251
  See Art 1:101(1) PECL. See also Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract 
Law and Dutch Law: A Commentary 5. 
252
  See Lando & Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II 27. 
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is supposed to restate the common law of the United States.253 Therefore, the PECL is 
not considered to be legally binding. As Smits states, “the term ‘soft law’ is a blanket 
term for all sorts of rules, which are not enforced on behalf of the state, but are seen, for 
example, as goals to be achieved”.254 In this respect, the PECL are very similar to the 
PICC. As is the case with the PECL, the PICC are a “private codification” prepared by 
leading jurists without any national or supranational order or authorisation. The main 
goal of both the PECL and the PICC was the compilation of uniform legal principles for 
reference, and, if necessary, the development of national legal systems. However, 
these two sets of Principles differ in one important respect – their scope of application. 
The PICC only apply to commercial contracts, whereas the PECL apply to all contracts, 
including consumer- and private contracts. Furthermore, the PECL only cover (Western) 
Europe,255 while the PICC are to be applied globally.256 
                                                 
253
  See O Lando “Salient features of the Principles of European Contract Law: a comparison 
with the UCC” (2001) 13 Pace International Law Review 339 340-341; R Backhaus “The 
limits of the duty to perform in the Principles of European Contract Law” 2004 8(1) 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1 3 (available online at  
<http://www.ejcl.org/81/art81-2.PDF>); Lando 2005 Am J Comp L 382. 
254
  See J M Smits “A European private law as a mixed legal system” (1998) 5 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 328 331. 
255
  See Art 1:101 PECL. Obviously the PECL will also apply when the parties have agreed to 
incorporate them into their contract. Conversely, the parties are also allowed to exclude 
the application of any of the Principles or derogate from or vary their effects, except as 
otherwise provided by the PECL (Art 1:102(2)). 
256
  See Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A 
Commentary 14-15. See also S Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in H 
L MacQueen & R Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African 
Perspectives (2006) 249 268. 
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The point of departure under the PECL is that every creditor has a right to claim specific 
performance.257 The PECL have followed the civilian approach, in granting the remedy 
as of right. The exceptions to this general rule are explicitly listed and operate strictly. 
This means that if none of the exceptions are present, a court would not have a 
discretion to refuse the remedy.258 The reason for recognising certain exceptions is that 
the PECL sought a compromise between the diverging common-law and civil-law 
viewpoints on specific performance.259  
According to Article 9:101 the creditor is entitled, as a rule, to enforce the performance 
of any monetary obligation that is due. The term “monetary obligation” refers to every 
obligation to make a payment, regardless of the form of payment and the currency in 
which it is to be paid, or even the nature of the obligation. This indicates that it is of no 
relevance whether the obligation concerns the payment of a price for goods the debtor 
bought or a service he received, or even the payment of damages or interest.260 Thus, 
the meaning of the term under the PICC and the PECL is exactly the same.  
Article 9:101(2) addresses the situation where a debtor is unwilling to receive the 
creditor’s performance in terms of a reciprocal contract, thereby preventing its own 
obligation from becoming due. It states that the creditor may proceed with his 
performance and subsequently claim performance of the debtor’s obligation. However, it 
goes on to limit this claim to situations where the creditor could not have made another 
                                                 
257
  See Art 9:101(1) & Art 9:102(1) PECL. The relevant provisions of the PECL are 
reproduced in Addendum A 418. 
258
  See Lando & Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II 396; Busch et 
al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A Commentary 347-
357. 
259
  See Lando & Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II 395; G J P de 
Vries Remedies op Grond van Niet-Nakoming van Internationale Contracten in het Licht 
van de PECL (2002) 25. 
260
  See Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A 
Commentary 347. 
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transaction that would not have caused him significant expense or effort and if 
performance by the creditor would not be unreasonable in the circumstances, for 
example, “where the debtor makes it clear that he no longer wants it”.261  
Article 9:102, on the other hand, relates to the right to claim performance of non-
monetary obligations. Article 9:102(1) specifically provides that “[t]he aggrieved party is 
entitled to specific performance of an obligation other than one to pay money, including 
the remedying of a defective performance”. The following paragraph proceeds to list the 
situations in which specific performance will not be granted. These include instances 
where (a) performance would be unlawful or impossible; or (b) performance would 
cause the debtor unreasonable effort or expense;262 or (c) the performance entails 
provision of services or work of a personal character or depends upon a personal 
relationship;263 or (d) the aggrieved party may reasonably obtain performance from 
another source.264 Article 9:102(3) adds to this list, by stating that the aggrieved party 
will lose his right to specific performance if he fails to exercise it within a reasonable 
time after he has or ought to have become aware of the non-performance. 
The aggrieved party’s right to specific performance also stems from the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda.265 While the principle is expressly contained in the PICC, the 
drafters of the PECL (like those of the CISG) considered it so obvious that they did not 
include it in a specific provision. It is, however, implied in several articles, including 
Article 1:102(1), which provides that the “parties are free to enter into a contract and to 
                                                 
261
  See Lando & Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II 392; and see 
Art 9:101(2)(a)-(b) Addendum A 421. Compare also text to n 244 (PICC) above. 
262
  See further para 6 4 2 below. 
263
  See further para 4 7 below. 
264
  See E Clive & D Hutchison “Breach of contract” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid 
(eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in 
Scotland and South Africa (2004) 176 195; Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European 
Contract Law and Dutch Law: A Commentary 353 (by M B M Loos). 
265
  See Lando & Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II 391. 
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determine its contents …”, and Article 6:111(1), which provides that “[a] party is bound 
to fulfil its obligations even if performance has become more onerous, whether because 
the cost of performance has increased or because the value of the performance it 
receives has diminished”.266  
It is important to note that enforcement of this right depends on whether the debtor’s 
performance was due under Article 7:102, and whether a failure to perform at that time 
actually amounted to non-performance in terms of Article 1:301(4).267 As indicated 
above, enforcement of this right depends on whether it is not excluded in terms of 
Article 9:102. Also, note that “[t]he fact that a right to performance is excluded under this 
Section does not preclude a claim for damages” (Article 9:103).268 
2 3 3 4  Specific performance under the DCFR 
The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)269 is “[a]n academic, not politically 
authorised text”; its purpose is to serve as a “possible model for an actual or ‘political’ 
Common Frame of Reference”.270 It is based in part on a revised version of the 
                                                 
266
  See further D P Flambouras “The doctrines of impossibility of performance and clausula 
rebus sic stantibus in the 1980 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods and the Principles of European Contract Law – a comparative analysis” (2001) 13 
Pace International Law Review 261 286. See also para 6 4 2 below on these doctrines. 
267
  See Addendum A 419. 
268
  See Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A 
Commentary 351 ff (esp 402 on the issue of termination). 
269
  Study Group on a European Civil Code & Research Group on Existing EC Private Law 
Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR) (2009) – see Addendum A 422. 
270
  C von Bar & E Clive (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) I (2009) 3-4: “It must be stressed that 
what is referred to today as the DCFR originates in an initiative of European legal 
scholars. It amounts to the compression into rule form of decades of independent 
research and co-operation by academics with expertise in private law, comparative law 
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Principles of European Contract Law,271  however, it goes further in terms of coverage 
as it “embraces non-contractual obligations to a far greater extent than the PECL”.272  
This present section is brief, given that the provisions in the PECL and the DCFR on 
specific performance display a high degree of similarity. According to Article III–3:301 
DCFR,273 the creditor is entitled, as a rule, “to recover money payment of which is 
due”.274 Article III–3:302 DCFR governs the availability of specific performance for non-
monetary obligations. According to Article III–3:302(1)-(2), the creditor is entitled to 
“enforce specific performance of an obligation other than one to pay money”, which 
“includes the remedying free of charge of a performance which is not in conformity with 
the terms regulating the obligation”.  
Article III–3:302(3) contains a number of exceptions, i.e. situations in which specific 
performance will not be granted for a non-monetary obligation, namely, where (a) 
performance would be unlawful or impossible; (b) performance would be unreasonably 
burdensome or expensive;275 or (c) performance would be of such a personal character 
                                                                                                                                                             
and European Community law … If the content of the DCFR is convincing, it may 
contribute to a harmonious and informal Europeanisation of private law.” 
271
  See G Low “Performance remedies and damages – a selection of issues”, unpublished 
paper presented at a conference on The Relationship between European and Chinese 
Contract Law hosted by the Tsinghua University in Beijing 16-17 February 2012 (copy on 
file with author) 5. 
272
  4, 11, 16-17. See also P Varul “Performance and remedies for non-performance: 
comparative analysis of the PECL and DCFR” 2008 Juridica International 104 106; G 
Dannemann & S Vogenauer “Introduction” in G Dannemann & S Vogenauer (eds) The 
Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English and German Law 
(2013) 1 10. 
273
  The relevant provisions of the DCFR are reproduced in Addendum A 422. 
274
  See further Von Bar & Clive (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 824-828. 
275
  See para 6 4 2 below. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   88 
 
 
that it would be unreasonable to enforce it.276 Article III–3:302(4), like the PICC and the 
PECL, adds to these exceptions, by stating that the creditor will lose the right to specific 
performance “if performance is not requested within a reasonable time after the creditor 
has become, or could reasonably be expected to have become, aware of the non-
performance”.  
Furthermore, and unlike the PECL,277 the DCFR provides in Article III–3:302(5) that the 
“creditor cannot recover damages for loss or a stipulated payment for non-performance 
to the extent that the creditor has increased the loss or the amount of the payment by 
insisting unreasonably on specific performance in circumstances where the creditor 
could have made a reasonable substitute transaction without significant effort or 
expense”.278 This provision does not directly restrict the right to claim specific 
performance, and differs from the provisions contained in the PICC and the PECL that 
exclude specific performance if the aggrieved party may reasonably obtain performance 
from another source. Instead, it discourages the creditor from insisting on specific 
performance if to do so would inflate the damages payable for non-performance, or the 
amount of stipulated payment for non-performance, if it would have been more 
reasonable to arrange for a substitute transaction – thereby facilitating an efficient 
breach. According to Low “[t]he effect of this and the previous rule is to create an 
incentive towards an efficient breach of contract – where the debtor will prefer to breach 
and pay expectation damages, rather than incur the relatively higher performance 
interest”.279 
Under the DCFR (like the PICC and the PECL) the creditor has a substantive right to 
enforce performance of monetary and non-monetary obligations. Also, granting an order 
                                                 
276
  See para 4 7 below. 
277
  Varul 2008 Juridica International 109. 
278
  Von Bar & Clive (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 833-834. See also G Low “Performance 
remedies and damages – a selection of issues” 5.  
279
  Low “Performance remedies and damages – a selection of issues” 5-6. 
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for specific performance is not in the discretion of the court; the court must make such 
an order, unless the exceptions apply.280 And even if one of these exceptions apply, 
according to Article III–3:303, damages is always available if the non-performance has 
caused the creditor loss (unless the non-performance is excused and subject to the 
proviso contained in Article III–3:302(5)).281 
2 3 3 5  Specific performance under the CESL 
On 11 October 2011,282 the European Commission proposed an optional283 Common 
European Sales Law (or CESL),284 which traders may choose to use to govern their 
cross-border contracts.285 The CESL is based on the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR), which in turn was based in part on the Principles of European 
                                                 
280
  Von Bar & Clive (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 828-829. 
281
  842. 
282
  See European Commission press release – available online at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/common_sales_law/i11_1175_en.pdf>. 
283
  G Low “A psychology of choice of laws” 2013 European Business Law Review 363: “Being 
an optional instrument, CESL adds to the buffet of transnational, national and soft laws 
that parties may already choose from as regards applicable laws to contracts.” See also H 
L MacQueen “The Europeanisation of contract law: the Proposed Common European 
Sales Law” University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No 17 (2014) 3.  
284
  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final. Annex I to the Regulation contains the text of 
the Common European Sales Law. The Proposal is available online at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/common_sales_law/regulation_sales_law_en.pdf
>. 
285
  Magnus “CISG vs. CESL” in U Magnus (ed) CISG vs. Regional Sales Law Unification: 
With a Focus on the New Common European Sales Law 99: “it is only applicable if the 
parties choose it. Although it contains mandatory provisions, the whole instrument is 
optional in the sense that it – and also its mandatory provisions – does not apply without a 
valid choice. In contrast to the CISG it is thus an opt-in solution.” 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   90 
 
 
Contract Law (PECL).286 “The purpose of this Regulation is to improve the conditions for 
the establishment and the functioning of the internal market by making available a 
uniform set of contract law rules ...”287 The proposed CESL covers the sale of goods, 
the supply of digital content and some related services.288 The European Parliament 
adopted a legislative resolution on the Proposal in February 2014. A decision by the 
European Council on its acceptance is, however, pending. The proposal has been met 
with opposition from the majority of EU states, including the UK and Germany,289 and 
approval by the Council in the near future therefore seems unlikely.290 
Article 106 CESL contains the general provisions on the buyer’s remedies in the case of 
non-performance of an obligation by the seller.291 Three types of remedies are 
available, namely, first, the right to specific performance (together with other remedies 
aimed at fulfilment: the right to withhold performance to achieve specific performance of 
the contract and to claim a price reduction), second, termination together with return of 
                                                 
286
  I Schwenzer “The Proposed Common European Sales Law and the Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods” (2012) 44 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 457 458. 
See also Varul 2008 Juridica International 106; Von Bar & Clive (eds) Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR) 4; S Whittaker & K Riesenhuber “Conceptions of contract” in G Dannemann & S 
Vogenauer (eds) The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English 
and German Law (2013) 120 137 ff. 
287
  Art 1(1) CESL; see also Explanatory Memorandum to the CESL, COM (2011) 4. 
288
  Art 1(1) CESL; see also para 4 7 n 314 below. 
289
  Their parliaments specifically question whether the principle of subsidiarity has been 
respected. 
290
  See further Dannemann & Vogenauer “Introduction” in Dannemann & Vogenauer (eds) 
The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English and German Law 
15; E Clive European Private Law News, 26 February 2014. Post available online at 
<http://www.epln.law.ed.ac.uk/2014/02/26/european-parliament-adopts-proposal-for-a-
common-european-sales-law/>.  
291
  The relevant provisions of the CESL are reproduced in Addendum A 425. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   91 
 
 
the contract price and, third, damages. This framework of remedies reveals that a 
buyer’s primary remedy292 is to “require performance, which includes specific 
performance, repair or replacement of the goods or digital content”.293  
Also, the buyer’s remedy corresponds to the seller’s right to cure.294 The seller is 
entitled to cure a defective tender under Article 109(1) CESL and the buyer has the right 
to require him to do so under Article 110 CESL; which states that the buyer is entitled to 
“require performance of the seller’s obligations”, which “includes the remedying free of 
charge of a performance which is not in conformity with the contract”.295 
A seller thus has a choice to either repair the defective goods or to replace them with 
conforming goods. It must be noted that a distinction is made between if the buyer is a 
trader or if he is a consumer. In the case of a consumer sales contract, this choice is 
with the consumer pursuant to Article 111, which must be completed by the seller within 
                                                 
292
  According to Art 106(1)(a) CESL. 
293
  Specific performance for the seller is usually a claim for the purchase price. According to 
Art 132, the seller is equally entitled to this remedy, to recover payment of the price when 
it is due, and to require performance of any other obligation undertaken by the buyer. 
Also, under Art 132(2), where the buyer has not yet taken over the goods or the digital 
content, and it is clear that the buyer will be unwilling to receive performance, the seller 
may nonetheless require the buyer to take delivery, and may recover the price, unless the 
seller could have made a reasonable substitute transaction without significant effort or 
expense. 
294
  See generally R Schulze (ed) Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Commentary 
(2012) 504 ff (by F Zoll); H L MacQueen et al “Specific performance and right to cure” in G 
Dannemann & S Vogenauer (eds) The Common European Sales Law in Context: 
Interactions with English and German Law (2013) 612 629 ff. 
295
  Compare III–3:302(1)-(2) DCFR above. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   92 
 
 
a reasonable time not exceeding 30 days from the moment of the buyer’s 
communication; otherwise the consumer may resort to other remedies.296  
Exceptions to the right to specific performance are stated in Article 110(3).297 The 
circumstances where specific performance cannot be required under the CESL are 
where:298 (a) performance would be impossible or has become unlawful;299 or (b) the 
burden or expense of performance would be disproportionate to the benefit that the 
buyer would obtain.300 
The reason for recognising certain exceptions is that the CESL (like the other 
instruments under consideration) sought to achieve “a compromise solution reflecting 
                                                 
296
  Where the remedy is replacement, the seller has a right and an obligation to take back the 
replaced item at his own expense. Also, the buyer is not liable to pay for any use made of 
the replaced item in the period prior to the replacement (Art 112). See further Schulze (ed) 
Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Commentary 509-511 (by Zoll). 
297
  See also Art 111(1) to the effect that the consumer’s entitlement to require specific 
performance (repair/replacement) is also lost in the cases where the buyer would not be 
entitled to specific performance (Schulze (ed) Common European Sales Law (CESL) – 
Commentary 509; MacQueen et al “Specific performance and right to cure” in Dannemann 
& Vogenauer (eds) The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with 
English and German Law 630). 
298
  In addition to the qualification that the right to demand cure by the seller also requires that 
the non-performance is not excused – see Schulze (ed) Common European Sales Law 
(CESL) – Commentary 504-505. 
299
  Art 110(3)(a) CESL. 
300
  Art 110(3)(b) CESL. See Schulze (ed) Common European Sales Law (CESL) – 
Commentary 507 (by Zoll, explaining the effect of this exclusion): “The right to require 
performance should not be economically inefficient. If the application of other remedies 
(eg damages) combined with the substitute transaction is essentially cheaper than 
imposing the performance on the seller, then this substitute transaction should be 
preferred.” For further discussion see para 6 4 2 below. 
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the different legal traditions, which contradict at this point”.301 This way of regulating the 
availability of specific performance largely corresponds to the other instruments under 
review. The buyer may demand performance of the seller’s obligations, unless certain 
exceptions apply. And if one of these exceptions applies, it still does not prevent the 
buyer from exercising other remedies that are available under the CESL,302 including 
termination of the contract as well as damages for loss suffered as a result of the non-
performance.303 
2 3 3 6  Comparative remarks on the international instruments 
As indicated above, the PICC, the PECL, the DCFR and the CESL favour specific 
performance as the primary remedy and a creditor will most likely obtain an order for 
specific performance under these instruments.304 In contrast to the CISG, these 
instruments do not treat specific performance as a remedy which is dependent on the 
rules of the forum.305 However, even though these instruments have adopted the 
general principle of specific performance, they also recognise a number of important 
exceptions, for example, when performance is impossible or disproportionally onerous 
                                                 
301
  Schulze (ed) Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Commentary 504 (by Zoll). 
302
  See again Art 106 CESL. 
303
  See again Schulze (ed) Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Commentary 505 (by 
Zoll). See also Art 106(4) CESL: If the seller’s non-performance is excused, the buyer may 
resort to any of the remedies referred to in Art 106(1) except requiring performance and 
damages. 
304
  See Heutger & Oosterhuis “Specific performance within the hierarchy of remedies in 
European contract law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: 
National and Other Perspectives 152. 
305
  See Lando & Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II 396 
(commenting on the PECL in particular): “Granting an order for performance thus is not 
within the discretion of the court; the court is bound to grant the remedy, unless the 
exceptions […] apply. National courts should grant performance even in cases where they 
are not accustomed to do so under their national law.” 
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by reason of legal or practical difficulties306 or when performance is of an exclusively 
personal character.307  
It is evident that there are several similarities between these instruments and the 
corresponding provisions in the Civil Codes of both Germany308 and the Netherlands. 
The ideology is more or less the same. Freedom of contract and the twin notion of pacta 
sunt servanda seem to underpin all of these codifications.309 Contractual freedom is, 
however, restricted and modified by principles of reasonableness, good faith and 
equity.310 Accordingly, some exceptions to the general principle of specific performance 
have been recognised.  
It has been said that the exceptions recognised under these instruments can be 
regarded as expressions of the general principle of reasonableness.311 “It is also clear 
that some of the specific grounds for refusal have a lot of hidden discretion within them. 
The rules are therefore flexible. None the less they seem principled in setting out the 
                                                 
306
  See para 6 4 2 below. 
307
  Excluding the CISG & CESL – see para 4 7 n 314 below. 
308
  See eg MacQueen et al “Specific performance and right to cure” in Dannemann & 
Vogenauer (eds) The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English 
and German Law 624-629. 
309
  See eg Whittaker & Riesenhuber “Conceptions of contract” in Dannemann & Vogenauer 
(eds) The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English and 
German Law 148 ff; G Low “Performance remedies and damages – a selection of issues” 
6. 
310
  See Whittaker & Riesenhuber “Conceptions of contract” in G Dannemann & S Vogenauer 
(eds) The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English and 
German Law 150 ff, and paras 6 3 & 6 4 below. 
311
  See eg D Haas, G Hesen & J Smits “Introduction” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 1 2-3. See also 
para 6 4 2 below. 
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rules in terms of a qualified right, rather than a discretionary remedy.”312 Thus, while 
adopting the civil-law position regarding the availability of the remedy, these instruments 
resemble the common-law position in stating that specific performance cannot be 
awarded in certain circumstances.  
Even though all of the instruments favour specific performance as the primary remedy, 
the conditions for obtaining such an order differ somewhat. It is clear that the rules 
regarding the right of a creditor to require performance by the debtor under the PICC, 
the PECL, the DCFR and the CESL, unlike the rules of the CISG, form what is perhaps 
a more detailed and coherent set of regulations, since they contain defined exceptions 
to the general principle. This is said to clarify the availability of specific performance as 
a remedy for breach of contract.313  
2 4  Evaluative remarks and conclusions 
The civil law and common law clearly differ in their theoretical approach to specific 
performance.314 In Anglo-American law, breach of contract provides the aggrieved party 
with a right to claim damages, while in civil-law countries, the aggrieved party maintains 
a right to demand performance of the contract. The Anglo-American approach is 
regarded as being oriented towards economically desirable solutions, whereas the civil-
                                                 
312
  Clive & Hutchison “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann et al (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in 
Comparative Perspective 195-196 (commenting on the PECL in particular). 
313
  See generally Felemegas “The right to require specific performance: a comparison 
between provisions of the CISG regarding the right to require specific performance and 
the counterpart provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles” in Felemegas (ed) An International 
Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law 143-159; Torsello “Remedies for 
breach of contract” in Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 765-766. See 
also text to n 236 para 2 3 3 1 (CISG) above. 
314
  See further M Hogg Promises and Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives (2011) 353; 
Chen-Wishart Contract Law 553. 
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law approach gives stronger expression to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
However, even though their underlying ideologies differ considerably, both systems 
regulate the remedy in terms of clearly defined rules, and the practical differences are 
often not as great as the theory suggests.315 Shavell, for example, acknowledges that 
the common law and German law in practice reach much the same solution by different 
routes, at least in the most important cases.316 The civil-law jurisdictions accept that 
there are certain exceptions to the creditor’s right, while Anglo-American law leaves an 
order of specific performance at the discretion of the courts. This dicretion is to be 
exercised according to settled rules and principles. An analysis of the practical solutions 
reached in both systems suggests that there is an increasing convergence between 
them towards similar solutions with respect to the remedy of specific performance. 
Examining these developments could potentially contribute significantly to our law 
governing the availability of specific performance.  
The model instruments under review also contain certain defined exceptions to the 
general principle of specific performance based on considerations of good faith and 
reasonableness. The drafters of these codifications recognised that this right could not 
be accepted without qualification. The same problems that are currently concerning our 
courts and academic writers prompted the inclusion of these defined exceptions. These 
instruments are considered compilations of uniform legal principles for reference, and 
the development of national legal systems. These insights could also be potentially 
instructive to our law governing the availability of specific performance.  
                                                 
315
  See eg Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 484; M P Furmston “Breach of contract” (1992) 
40(3) Am J Comp L 671 674, and Haas, Hesen & Smits “Introduction” in Smits et al (eds) 
Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 2. See also 
reference to Beck in text to nn 250-251 para 3 4 3 below, and to Lord Hoffmann in text to 
n 58 para 5 2 (i) below. 
316
  S Shavell “The design of contracts and remedies for breach” (1984) 97 Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 121-148.  
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As we have seen, South African law recognises a right to specific performance, but 
subject to a general judicial discretion unfettered by specific rules. It is quite striking that 
the civilian jurisdictions and the international instruments under review do not retain 
such an unrestrictive discretion as our courts do. The question is now whether South 
African courts should similarly follow a more concrete approach, and adopt defined 
rules with regard to when specific performance should be refused. In the common law, 
the jurisdiction of a court to grant specific performance in such circumstances is also 
confined within well-known rules. It has been said that common-law countries are 
generally not concerned with abstract theory,317 but rather with the practical 
appropriateness of legal rules and therefore prefer a legal framework that leads to an 
optimal allocation of resources.318 It may therefore be concluded that the South African 
approach is remarkably out of line with the two major traditions that formed it. This 
suggests that it requires serious reconsideration, from both a theoretical and practical 
perspective.319  
                                                 
317
  See eg B J van Heerden “An exploratory introduction to the economic analysis of law” 
(1981) 4 Responsa Meridiana 147. 
318
  In line with the economic theory of law – discussed in more detail in para 3 4 2 below. 
319
  See also para 7 1 below. 
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CHAPTER 3: ADEQUACY OF DAMAGES 
3 1  Introduction 
The preceding historical and comparative overviews only dealt with general principles or 
points of departure. This chapter is the first of a series of discussions of more specific 
considerations that influence awarding specific performance. It commences with the 
basic position regarding adequacy of damages as a factor that courts may consider in 
exercising the discretion to award specific performance in Anglo-American law. 
Thereafter the discussion turns to the effect of adequacy of damages on the availability 
of specific performance in South African law, and specifically on the extent to which the 
English common law has shaped our courts’ attitude in this regard. Finally, the chapter 
explores the relevance of this consideration in other systems, and then draws 
comparative conclusions, especially with a view to benefiting the development of South 
African law.  
The primary focus of this chapter will be on Anglo-American law and its influence on 
South African law, rather than on the civil law, where the question as to the inadequacy 
of damages does not arise as directly as in Anglo-American law. As we have seen, the 
former tradition regards specific performance as a supplementary remedy that is 
available only when some other legal remedy is believed to be inadequate,1 whereas 
the latter tradition regards specific performance as equally available with other 
remedies, to be granted when it will be the most appropriate and effective remedy in the 
circumstances. In the civil law, and model instruments,2 the inadequacy-of-damages 
                                                 
1
  See paras 2 1 & 2 3 2 above. 
2
  These instruments, in contrast to Anglo-American law, recognise specific performance as 
their primary or default remedy for breach of contract and generally do not accord the 
courts any discretion in granting it. Instead, they grant the creditor a right to specific 
performance, subject to certain exceptions. The right to claim specific performance under 
these instruments does not depend on the inadequacy of damages. See paras 2 3 1 &      
2 3 3 above. See further A M Garro “Reconciliation of legal traditions in the UN 
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requirement is not central to the problem of whether the specific performance is 
available. The enforcement of obligations is more important, and is regarded as 
essential to give expression to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.3  
3 2  Adequacy of damages in Anglo-American law 
The point of departure in Anglo-American law (which in this respect is curiously similar 
to Roman law)4 is to grant substitutionary relief, normally in the form of damages. It is 
only when awarding damages is inadequate, or is insufficient to do “complete justice” 
between the parties, that it will be in the discretion of the court to grant specific 
performance.5 The right to specific performance therefore turns upon whether the 
plaintiff can be properly compensated by a remedy at law.6 The existence and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods” 1989 The International 
Lawyer 443 458. 
3
  See para 2 3 1 above. 
4
  See B J van Heerden “An exploratory introduction to the economic analysis of law” 1981 
Responsa Meridiana 147 152; P Gross “Specific performance of contracts in South Africa” 
1934 SALJ 347; A Beck “The coming of age of specific performance” 1987 CILSA 
190 191; J J du Plessis “Spesifieke nakoming: ‘n regshistoriese herwaardering” 1988 
THRHR 349 356-357, and para 2 2 1 above. 
5
  See generally para 2 3 2 above. See further on this theoretical basis of equitable 
jurisdiction, A E Randall Leake on Contracts (1921) 839; Lord Mackay of Clashfern (ed) 
Halsbury’s Laws of England 4 ed reissue vol 16(2) (2003) para 410; J H Baker An 
Introduction to English Legal History 4 ed (2002) 98 ff; The Oxford History of the Laws of 
England VI (2004) 174 ff; J E Martin Hanbury & Martin’s Modern Equity 19 ed (2012) 34-
35, 762 ff. 
6
  As was said in the case of Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association 
[1893] 1 Ch 116, 126 per Kay LJ: “This remedy by specific performance was invented, and 
has been cautiously applied, in order to meet cases where the ordinary remedy by an 
action for damages is not an adequate compensation for breach of contract. The 
jurisdiction to compel specific performance has always been treated as discretionary, and 
confined within well-known rules.” And in Union Pacific Railway Co v Chicago, Rock Island 
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adequacy of such a remedy constitutes the determinative factor when a court has to 
decide whether or not to grant specific performance of a contract.7 
This inadequacy-of-damages criterion finds its origin in early English common law, 
where it was originally adopted to minimise the conflict between courts of law and courts 
of equity, the latter being able to intervene only where the former could not provide 
adequate relief.8 
The concept that the conclusion of a contract creates an enforceable duty to perform is 
foreign to common law. Instead, the point of departure is the proposition expressed by 
                                                                                                                                                             
& Pacific Railway Co 163 U.S. 564, 600 (1896) per Fuller CJ: “The jurisdiction of courts of 
equity to decree the specific performance of agreements is of a very ancient date, and 
rests on the ground of the inadequacy and incompleteness of the remedy at law. Its 
exercise prevents the intolerable travesty of justice involved in permitting parties to refuse 
performance of their contracts at pleasure by electing to pay damages for the breach.” 
See also R J Sharpe “Specific relief for contract breach” in B J Reiter & J Swan (eds) 
Studies in Contract Law (1980) 123 126. 
7
  See further for the English rule on the adequacy of damages: Buxton v Lister (1746) 26 
ER 1020, 1021; Harnett v Yielding (1805) 2 Sch & Lef 549, 553; Adderley v Dixon (1824) 
1 Sim & St 607, 610; Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co (1874) 9 
Ch App 279, 284; Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1997] 
2 WLR 898, 903; Bankers Trust Co v P T Jakarta International Hotels Development [1999] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 910, 911. See also Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) 
SA 776 (A) 785C-D per Hefer JA: “The most important rule, from which many of the others 
derived, was that specific performance would not be granted where the plaintiff could be 
compensated adequately by damages. It would thus appear that even in the Court of 
Chancery the emphasis fell on damages and that an order for specific performance was 
the exception rather than the rule.” 
8
  See I C F Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, 
Rectification and Equitable Damages 8 ed (2010) 59: “Historically the basis for the grant of 
specific performance by courts of equity has been the inadequacy of legal remedies, and 
particularly of damages, in the material circumstances.” 
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Holmes9 that “the only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is that the 
law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised act does not come to pass”.10  
The inadequacy-of-damages test is also applied in American law;11 as § 359 (1) of the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:  
“Specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to 
protect the expectation interest of the injured party.”12  
Thus, where the remedy of damages (or other common law remedies) does provide 
adequate protection to the creditor, specific performance will not be granted. This 
criterion ultimately constitutes the central consideration in Anglo-American law 
                                                 
9
  See para 1 1 1 above. 
10
  O W Holmes Jr The Common Law (1881) 301. See also “The path of the law” (1897) 10 
Harv LR 457 462 (reprinted (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 699 702); K Zweigert 
& H Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law (tr T Weir) 3 ed (1998) 480-481; R M 
Cunnington “The inadequacy of damages as a remedy for breach of contract” in C E F 
Rickett (ed) Justifying Private Law Remedies (2008) 115 133. From an economic point of 
view “[t]he simple theory of efficient breach advances a prescriptive version of that 
Holmesian Heresy: the law prefers an efficient breach to inefficient performance, and so a 
contractual duty is no more than a duty to perform or pay damages, whichever is cheaper 
…” (G Klass “Efficient breach is dead; long live efficient breach” Georgetown Public Law 
and Legal Theory Research Paper No 13-018 (2013) available online at 
<http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1185>. See also G Klass “Efficient breach” 
forthcoming in G Klass, G Letsas & P Saprai (eds) The Philosophical Foundations Of 
Contract Law). 
11
  See generally E A Farnsworth Contracts 3 ed (1999) §§ 12.4-12.7; J M Perillo (ed) Corbin 
on Contracts 12: Restitution, Specific Performance and Election of Remedies Interim ed 
(2002) § 1139; J M Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 6 ed (2009) §§ 16.1-16.4; G 
Klass Contract Law in the USA (2010) 212. 
12
  The relevant provisions of the Second Restatement and the US Uniform Commercial 
Code are reproduced in Addendum A (382-388 below). 
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regarding the availability of specific performance as a remedy for breach.13 So it was 
stated by Lord Redesdale in Harnett v Yielding:14  
“Unquestionably the original foundation of these decrees was simply this, that damages at 
law would not give the party the compensation to which he was entitled: that is, would not put 
him in a situation as beneficial to him as if the agreement were specifically performed.”15 
It is important to note that the process whereby the aggrieved party obtains a substitute 
performance and claims the expense of doing so from the party in breach is regarded 
as a form of damages and not as specific performance in Anglo-American law.16 If the 
creditor can procure suitable substitute performance, i.e. if he is able to make a so-
called “cover” transaction, equity will not intervene.17 Therefore, specific performance of 
contracts for the sale of shares in companies,18 or of generic goods, which are available 
in the market at an ascertainable price, is generally not ordered.19  
                                                 
13
  Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 480; R Stone The Modern Law of Contract 10 ed 
(2013) 501 ff. 
14
  (1805) 2 Sch & Lef 549, 553. See also H G Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts I: 
General Principles 31 ed (2012) 1907; and for the US, Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 
1139. 
15
  See more recently I C F Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific 
Performance, Injunctions, Rectification and Equitable Damages 8 ed (2010) 59: 
“Historically the basis for the grant of specific performance by courts of equity has been 
the inadequacy of legal remedies, and particularly of damages, in the material 
circumstances.” 
16
  Cf for German law: para 4 5 1 n 264 below. 
17
  As stated by Andrews CJ in Dills v Doebler 62 Conn. 366 (1892): “The universal test of the 
jurisdiction of a court of equity to restrain the breach of a contract is the inadequacy of the 
legal remedy of damages.” See earlier Snell v Mitchell 65 Me. 48. (1876). See also n 102 
below. 
18
  See Ryan v McLane 46 A. 340 (1900); Rimes v Rimes 111 S.E 34 (1922); McCutcheon v 
National Acceptance Corp 197 So. 475 (1940); Hurley v Thomas 169 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   103 
 
This rationale appears from the following dictum by Leach VC in Adderley v Dixon:20  
“So a Court of Equity will not, generally decree specific performance of a contract for the sale 
of stock or goods, not because of their personal nature, but because damages at law, 
calculated upon the market price of the stock or goods, are as complete a remedy to the 
purchaser as the delivery of the stock or goods contracted for; inasmuch as, with the 
damages, he may purchase the same quantity of the like stock of goods.” 
Section 2-716(3) of the US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) likewise determines that a 
buyer would be entitled to specific performance where he is unable to find replacement 
goods (i.e. to “cover”)21 on the open market or if he is only able to do so at considerable 
expense, inconvenience, or risk.22 However, where the goods involved are not unique, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1964); Gingerich v Protein Blenders Inc 95 N.W.2d 522 (1959); 
Express Shipping Ltd v Gold 880 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2d Dep’t 2009). And for England, see 
Cud v Rutter (1720) 1 P Wms 570, where specific performance of contract to sell stock 
was refused; Lord Parker LC holding that “a court of equity ought not to execute any of 
these contracts, but to leave them to law, where the party is to recover damages, and with 
the money may if he pleases buy the quantity of stock agreed to be transferred to him; for 
there can be no difference between one man’s stock and another’s” (at 571).  
19
  See Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1142; E Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 
1099-1100. 
20
  (1824) 1 Sim & St 607, 110. 
21
  See n 102 below. 
22
  See eg Schweber v Rallye Motors Inc 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1154 (N.Y. Sup 1973) 
(involving a 1973 Rolls Royce vintage automobile); Gay v Seafarer Fiberglass Yachts Inc 
14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1335 (N.Y. Sup 1974) (involving a fiberglass yacht, customised to 
the buyer’s specifications and having a special hull design manufactured only by the 
defendant); Dexter Bishop Co v B Redmond & Son Inc 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 406 (1st 
Dep’t 1977) (involving machines which process butter and margarine into table service 
pats); Cumbest v Harris 363 So. 2d 294 (Miss. 1978) (involving a stereo system, some of 
the components of which were irreplaceable or were replaceable only with difficulty and 
after long waiting periods); Colorado-Ute Electric Association Inc v Envirotech Corp 33 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 965 (D. Colo. 1981) (involving air pollution control equipment, which 
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and are therefore easily replaceable, and the creditor has an adequate remedy at law in 
the form of damages, specific performance will not be granted under the UCC.23   
Over the years English and American courts have identified a number of well-
recognised situations in which the remedy of damages is considered to be inadequate. 
The attention will now turn to the situations where Anglo-American law typically grants 
specific performance, based on the fact that the legal remedy of damages does not 
provide adequate relief to the aggrieved party.24 In such situations, the courts have the 
jurisdiction to grant specific performance, but they always maintain the discretion to 
refuse to do so.25 Their relevance to the South African legal system will subsequently be 
                                                                                                                                                             
was specifically designed for the buyer’s needs and was extremely large, complex, 
technical, and essentially irreplaceable). See further “Specific performance of a contract 
as a matter of right” 65 American Law Reports 7 (originally published 1930) – accessible 
via Westlaw International. 
23
  See Hilmor Sales Co v Helen Neushaefer Division of Supronics Corp 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
325 (N.Y. Sup 1969) (holding that an unusually low price does not make the goods 
unique); Tower City Grain Co v Richman 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1011 (N.D. 1975) (sale of 
wheat found not specifically enforceable as the wheat was not considered to be unique, 
the court ignored the fact that the defendants had in their possession the type and 
quantity of wheat specified in the contract); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp v Larry H 
Wright Inc 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 910 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (deciding that the existence of a 
national shortage does not show the buyer could not obtain goods elsewhere); Pierce-
Odom Inc v Evenson 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1693 (1982) (deciding that a mobile home was 
not shown to have a unique or peculiar value); In re Koreag, Controle et Revision SA 17 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that US currency was not unique even 
where cover is not available). See further “Specific performance of a contract as a matter 
of right” 65 American Law Reports 7. 
24
  These situations follow those originally identified in § 360 of the American Law Institute’s 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and also discussed in Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 
1099 ff; Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1907 ff. 
25
  See A Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 3 ed (2004) 458: “Specific 
performance will not be ordered unless damages (and the common law remedy of the 
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considered. In the following four sections, inadequacy of damages will be discussed in 
the context of those situations where the issue most frequently arises, but it must be 
appreciated that these fact patterns do not constitute a closed list, since damages may 
be inadequate in a range of other situations.26  
The central objective of the following discussion is to show that there are indications of 
a change in thinking in the common law doctrine about “adequacy of damages” in that it 
has developed in the direction of an approach that emphasises the appropriateness of 
the remedy in the circumstances rather than the inadequacy of the legal remedy of 
damages.  
3 2 1  No market substitute for performance available 
3 2 1 1  Contracts for the sale of land 
Damages are considered to be inadequate if no market substitute for performance is 
available. This constitutes the main justification for enforcing contracts involving land. 
Contracts concerning land are the most prominent class of contracts that will be 
specifically enforced.27 These contracts provide the purchaser a right to a particular 
piece of land. Monetary compensation would not provide adequate relief, because of 
                                                                                                                                                             
award of an agreed sum) are inadequate. This is the major hurdle that a claimant seeking 
performance must overcome, but, even having done so, it may still fail because of one of 
the several other bars.” See also Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies 60: “Of 
course, if damages are inadequate in this sense, discretionary considerations may 
nonetheless lead to a refusal of specific performance, with the consequence that the 
plaintiff may be confined to damages in any event.” 
26
  For examples, see Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 552-553. 
27
  See para 2 3 2 1 above. See also C Szladits “The concept of specific performance in civil 
law” 1955 Am J Comp L 208 209-210; G H Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A 
Comparative Account (1988) 64; Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1143; S Shavell 
“Specific performance versus damages for breach of contract: an economic analysis” 
(2006) 84 Tex LR 831 832. 
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the specific qualities of the piece of land, which are considered to be difficult to 
quantify.28 Therefore, the courts generally determine that either party to a contract for 
the sale of land is entitled, as a matter of right, to obtain an order for its specific 
performance,29 provided that the contract is not one which would be inequitable to 
enforce, or which, in its nature and circumstances, is objectionable.30  
This principle even applies where the apparent unique value of the land is disproved by 
the purchaser, who expresses a clear intention of reselling the land by contracting with 
a third party even before he has taken possession of the property.31 For example, in the 
recent Californian case of Real Estate Analytics v Vallas,32 the Court of Appeal reversed 
the trial court’s decision to award damages despite the buyer’s request for specific 
performance, and ordered specific performance of a contract for the sale of a large 
parcel of coastal property, even though the property was purchased solely for 
investment purposes. Thus, the inadequacy of damages is presumed in every case 
involving a contract for the sale of land, and specific performance of the contract follows 
                                                 
28
  See nn 34-35 below. Note that specific performance is also ordered of contracts to 
dispose of lesser interests in land. For example, in Verrall v Great Yarmouth Borough 
Council [1981] QB 202, specific performance was ordered to enforce a contractual license 
to occupy premises. See G Jones & W Goodhart Specific Performance 2 ed (1996) 128, 
and for the US, Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1143. Cf para 2 3 2 2 n 167 above. 
29
  According to Chen-Wishart Contract Law 542: “The seller can even obtain specific 
performance” based on “the court deeming interests in land to be unique; the rule that 
land contracts confer an immediate equitable proprietary interest on buyers; and the 
mutuality of granting the seller the same remedy as the buyer is entitled to.” 
30
  See J Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 29 ed (2010) 577. See also Wilhite v Skelton 
149 Fed. 67 (1906); McClurg v Crawford 209 Fed. 340 (1913). Other cases granting 
specific performance are collected in Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1143 n 55. 
31
  Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1908-1909. 
32
  160 Cal.App.4th 463 (2008). 
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as a matter of course.33 Where the contract sought to be enforced specifically concerns 
land, the jurisdiction to enforce specific performance is undisputed, and does not 
depend upon the inadequacy of the legal remedy in the particular case.34 So, it is said 
that when a court orders specific performance in terms of its equitable jurisdiction, it is 
upon the ground that the remedy at law is inadequate; but when the contract is for the 
sale of land, it is considered that damages is necessarily inadequate (as courts assume 
that land is unique and that no market substitute is available).35 Hence, if enforcement 
of the particular contract is equitable and justifiable (and of course provided it complies 
with other relevant contractual formalities), “it is almost a matter of course, although 
spoken of as a matter of sound discretion”, to grant specific performance.36 In this 
                                                 
33
  It was confirmed in Cummings v Nielson 129 Pac. 619 (1912), and Warren v Goodloe’s 
Executor 20 S.W. 2d 278 (1929), that where a contract for the sale of land is concluded 
fairly, it is the duty of the court to enforce it. 
34
  It was asserted in In Re Scott [1895] 2 Ch 603, that specific performance has always 
“been treated as a question of discretion whether it is better to interfere and give a remedy 
which the common law knows nothing at all about, or to leave the parties to their rights in 
a court of law. The foundation of the doctrine of specific performance [of a contract for the 
sale of land] is that land has quite a character of its own, that the real meaning between 
the parties to a contract for sale of land was not that there should be a contract with legal 
remedies only, and that the purchaser should get the land, and should not be put off, in an 
ordinary case, by offering him damages”. See also Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 
1143, and the cases collected in n 55. 
35
  As stated by Stafford J in Fowler v Sands 73 Vt. 236 (1901) (relying on J N Pomeroy Jr A 
Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence: as administered in the United States of America (1907) 
§ 1402), and confirmed recently by Haller J in Real Estate Analytics v Vallas 160 
Cal.App.4th 463, 466 (2008): “The law generally presumes real property is unique and 
that the breach of an agreement to transfer property cannot be adequately relieved by 
pecuniary compensation.” This was also confirmed in English case law – see Sudbrook 
Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1983] 1 AC 444, 478 per Lord Diplock. 
36
  As stated by Stafford J in Fowler v Sands 73 Vt. 236 (1901) relying on Pomeroy A 
Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence (1907) § 1404. See earlier, Park v Johnson 4 Allen 
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respect the right to an order for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of 
land presents an apparent exception to the general rule in favour of damages. And 
specific performance will not be denied simply because the plaintiff has the right to 
recover damages for the breach.37 
However, the justification of granting specific performance on the basis that the property 
is unique has been severely criticised, mainly because it is not true for every sale of 
land.38 The purchaser may, as we have seen, intend to resell the property immediately 
or to retain it as an investment39 (rather than as a home) without having a particular 
interest in its “uniqueness”.40 In these circumstances, where the purchaser has a purely 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Mass.) 259 (1862), per Dewey J at 261, citing Old Colony Railway Corp v Evans 6 Gray 
(Mass.) 25 (1856). 
37
  See Louisville Southern Railway Co v Ragland 15 Ky. L. Rep. 814 (1894): “An agreement 
will be enforced specifically, where the specific thing or act contracted for, and not mere 
pecuniary compensation, is the redress practically required; and in such cases, where 
there is good faith, valuable consideration, clean hands, and no unreasonable hardship to 
result to the defendant it is as much a matter of course for the chancellor to decree 
specific performance of a contract as it is for a court of law to give damages for its breach, 
and specific performance will not be denied simply because the party asking for it may 
have the right to recover damages for the breach.” (The case concerned an agreement by 
a railroad company to give a right of way through its land.) 
38
  See Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 458-459; Jones & Goodhart 
Specific Performance 130-132; R J Sharpe Injunctions and Specific Performance (1983) 
316 ff. 
39
  See P J Brenner “Specific performance of contracts for the sale of land purchased for 
resale or investment” (1978) 24 McGill Law Journal 513, esp 545-548. 
40
  See “counterpoint” discussion by M Chen-Wishart Contract Law 4 ed (2012) 542: “The 
automatic availability of specific performance in land contracts should be reconsidered. 
While specific performance is appropriate where the buyer has some unique interest in the 
land or the seller cannot readily resell the land or wants to free himself from burdens 
attached to the land, commercial parties motivated by profit should be regarded as 
adequately compensated by damages.” Cf Klass Contract Law in the USA 213: “The rule 
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monetary interest, (whether it is to achieve a profit by disposing of the property or using 
it to earn rent), the justification of non-substitutability would not apply.41 Damages would 
adequately compensate the purchaser for loss of profits since this assessment would 
not present the same difficulties as where a purchaser attaches a subjective value to 
the property over and above that reflected in the (objective) market.42 Sharpe explains 
that “[l]and is a fungible good to such a purchaser”.43 
Furthermore, comparable common-law jurisdictions seem to be aligning their views 
accordingly. Recent case law in Canada44 and New Zealand as well as subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                             
is fairly categorical. Thus specific performance will be awarded even if the injured party 
has already entered into a contract with a third party to resell the land for a higher price, or 
when there is sufficient demand that an injured seller could quickly resell, if at a slightly 
lower price – both situations in which it would be simple to compute fully compensatory 
damages.” 
41
  See Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 459: “there is no such obvious 
justification where the claimant was intending a quick resale, particularly where the resale 
contract has already been concluded”. 
42
  However, as Burrows correctly observes, if “there is no true substitute land, specific 
performance for the long-term investor is justified because of the acute difficulty of 
accurately assessing his profits” (Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 459). See 
again, Adderley v Dixon (1824) 1 Sim & St 607, 110 per Leach VC: “Thus a Court of 
Equity decrees performance of a contract for land, not because of the real nature of the 
land, but because damages at law, which must be calculated upon the general money 
value of land, may not be a complete remedy to the purchaser, to whom the land may 
have a peculiar and special value.” 
43
  Injunctions and Specific Performance 318.  
44
  It is an established principle in Canadian contract law that if the purchaser bought the 
property purely as an investment, damages will be an adequate remedy (Domovics v Orsa 
Investments Ltd [1993] 15 OR (3d) 661 (OCGD); John E Dodge Holdings Ltd v 805062 
Ontario Ltd [2001] 56 OR (3d) 341 (OSCJ)). The Canadian approach is evident from the 
following obiter dictum in Semelhago v Paramadevan [1996] 2 SCR 415 (SCC) 428-429, 
paras 21-22 per Sopinka J: “While at one time the common law regarded every piece of 
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academic commentary45 reveal that this traditional common-law approach in relation to 
contracts for the sale of land is not convincing.46 This assumption of uniqueness where 
the contract concerns land and the subsequent finding that there is no market substitute 
available is considered outdated as houses can be “made to order” especially on large 
residential estates.47 This essentially renders the argument that houses are so specific 
and unique that they are considered one of a kind, and therefore specifically 
enforceable, as nugatory.48 These courts have accordingly abandoned the presumption 
that specific performance should be awarded unless evidence is presented why it 
should not.   
                                                                                                                                                             
real estate to be unique, with the progress of modern real estate development this is no 
longer the case. Residential, business and industrial properties are all mass produced 
much in the same way as other consumer products. If a deal falls through for one 
property, another is frequently, though not always, readily available. It is no longer 
appropriate, therefore, to maintain a distinction in the approach to specific performance as 
between realty and personalty. It cannot be assumed that damages for breach of contract 
for the purchase and sale of real estate will be an inadequate remedy in all cases. The 
common law recognised that the distinction might not be valid when the land had no 
peculiar or special value … Specific performance should, therefore, not be granted as a 
matter of course absent evidence that the property is unique to the extent that a substitute 
would not be readily available.” That this represents the law in Canada was confirmed by 
the more recent Supreme Court decision in Southcott Estates Inc v Toronto Catholic 
District School Board 2012 SCC 51, paras 38-41.  
45
  See eg S Mills “Specific performance: sale of land” 2006 New Zealand Law Journal 196. 
46
  Jones and Goodhart also note that “in Canada provincial courts have denied specific 
performance on the ground that the land had been bought for investment or resale; an 
award of damages would adequately compensate the plaintiff for any loss of profits” 
(Specific Performance 130).  
47
  Cunnington “The inadequacy of damages as a remedy for breach of contract” in Rickett 
(ed) Justifying Private Law Remedies 116.  
48
  Burrows uses the example of a contract for the sale of identical new houses on a housing 
estate (Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 458). 
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Although specific performance has on occasion been refused of contracts to sell land, 
courts in the US and England still grant the remedy as a matter of course in these 
circumstances.49 And since specific performance is routinely ordered of obligations to 
sell land even if the land can be replaced in the market and damages would be perfectly 
adequate, it appears that for all intents and purposes specific performance has become 
the default remedy in these cases. Burrows is thus correct in his observation that “[a]ll in 
all, it seems clear that specific performance has simply taken over as the primary 
remedy for breach of an obligation to sell land, and that the adequacy of damages 
hurdle is in effect ignored”.50 Provisionally, it may be said that English law is working 
with a too crude generalisation or untenable presumption, and it would have been 
preferable to have a more flexible approach which would have enabled the nuanced 
treatment of situations which reveal subtle distinctions.51 
3 2 1 2  Contracts for the sale of personal property 
Specific performance of contracts for the sale of goods was traditionally only ordered if 
the goods concerned were unique in character, such as works of art, and certain 
heirlooms and antiques.52 The underlying principle was that with generic goods, the 
aggrieved party had an adequate remedy in damages, because he could acquire the 
goods elsewhere.53 For example, in Thorn v Public Works Commissioners,54 specific 
                                                 
49
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 128-132. See esp 130-131, for comprehensive 
discussion of why specific performance should normally be granted for a breach of a 
contract to sell land. 
50
  Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 459. 
51
  For similar concerns relating to our law, see text to n 252 para 3 4 3 below.  
52
  See paras 1 1 2 & 2 3 2 1 above. 
53
  See Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1146; Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of 
Contract 460; Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1911.  
54
  (1863) 32 Beav 490. See also Behnke v Bede Shipping Co Ltd [1927] 1 KB 649, where 
Wright J ordered specific performance of a contract to sell a ship on the ground that it 
“was of peculiar and practically unique value to the plaintiff … A very experienced ship’s 
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performance was ordered of a contract to sell the arch-stone, the spandrill stone and 
the Bramley Fall stone of the Westminster Bridge, after it had been pulled down for 
construction of a new bridge. 
However, this category was “sparingly used”,55 as is illustrated by the decision in Falcke 
v Gray.56 In this case the defendant let her furnished house to the plaintiff for six 
months. She also agreed that upon expiration of this period the plaintiff would have the 
option of buying certain articles, which included two vases, described by the court “as 
articles of unusual beauty, rarity and distinction”.57 The vases can thus be regarded as 
physically unique.58 The defendant’s agent mistakenly valued them at £40. (During the 
course of the trial it became apparent that the vases were undervalued, and were in fact 
worth about five times as much as the initial valuation.) The defendant began to doubt 
whether the valuation was accurate and removed the vases from the house. She also 
informed the plaintiff of the removal and subsequently sold the vases for £200 to a 
curiosity dealer. The plaintiff proceeded to obtain an injunction against the defendant 
and the second purchaser, and sought specific performance of their agreement. 
However, the defendant argued that as this was a contract for ordinary personal 
property, it could not be specifically enforced.  
The court would have been prepared to order specific performance of the sale 
agreement due to the unique and rare nature of the subject matter and the inadequacy 
                                                                                                                                                             
valuer has said that he knew of only one other comparable ship but that may now have 
been sold” (at 661). Cf CN Marine Inc v Stena Line A/B (The Stena Nautica) (No 2) [1982] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 336, where specific performance was refused as the plaintiff had failed to 
show that the ship was sufficiently different from other ships so that he had a special need 
for the particular ship.  
55
  Chen-Wishart Contract Law 541.  
56
  (1859) 4 Drew 651. 
57
  658. 
58
  See Cunnington “The inadequacy of damages as a remedy for breach of contract” in 
Rickett (ed) Justifying Private Law Remedies 128. 
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of damages in compensating for non-performance.59 However, specific performance 
was refused on other grounds. The defendant seller further argued that the contract 
constituted a hard bargain, as the initial purchase price agreed to by the plaintiff was not 
nearly market-related, and therefore could not be specifically enforced by the court. 
After considering case law on the question of inadequacy of price,60 the court found that 
inadequacy of price61 did justify the refusal of specific performance in this case, as it 
would be unreasonable to assist the plaintiff in obtaining such a bargain.62   
It may be reasoned then that damages will be inadequate (and specific performance will 
be granted) when the goods are unique, rare, or unusual. However, this rule does not 
apply if the bargain is unfair, with the consequence that the plaintiff may be confined to 
damages in any event. The question arises though whether the purchaser would not in 
any event receive such a bargain if the non-performing seller had to pay the full 
difference between the purchase price and market value as damages. But Kindersley 
VC, while denying specific performance, said: “In the present case the contract is for the 
purchase of articles of unusual beauty, rarity and distinction, so that damages would not 
be an adequate compensation for non-performance…”63 Thus, Kindersley VC initially 
stated that inadequacy is a sufficient reason for the court to exercise its discretion as 
the subject matter of the contract was unique. However, he continued and stated that 
the plaintiff purchaser knew that the price put upon the vases was not a fair price. The 
                                                 
59
  (1859) 4 Drew 651, 658. 
60
  Kindersley VC relied on Day v Newman 2 Cox Ch 77 (1788) and White v Damon 7 Ves 30 
(1802), as the more distinct and authoritative decisions concerning the question whether 
specific performance could be refused on the ground of inadequacy of price. 
61
  Kindersley VC said at 659: “That this was a hard bargain in the sense of its being for a 
very inadequate price there can be no doubt …” 
62
  Kindersley VC continued at 659: “The general rule with regard to hard bargains is that the 
Court will not decree specific performance, because specific performance is in the 
discretion of the Court for the advancement of justice; such discretion, indeed, to be 
exercised, not according to caprice, but on strict principles of justice and equity.”  
63
  (1859) 4 Drew 651, 658. 
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court ultimately refused to order enforcement of the contract as it would have operated 
strongly in favour of the plaintiff to the corresponding disadvantage of the defendant. It 
appears, though, that an award of damages would not have alleviated the defendant’s 
position in any event. 
The defendant thus succeeded with her second ground of defence and the plaintiff’s 
claim, against both defendant and second purchaser failed. The plaintiff’s claim against 
the second purchaser failed because the court found that there was not sufficient 
evidence showing that the second purchaser was aware of the fact that the defendant 
entered into a prior agreement, which prevented her from selling the vases to another.64  
It is important to note that, despite the judge’s suggestion to this effect,65  this decision 
does not provide support for the proposition that the inadequacy of price/consideration 
could per se or “standing by itself”66 (i.e. “where there has been not the least impropriety 
of conduct on the part of the person seeking specific performance”)67 influence the court 
to refuse specific performance (even where the goods are considered to be “unique” or 
“specific”). The prevailing and correct view is rather that specific performance may be 
refused where inadequacy of consideration is combined with some other factor that 
does not affect the validity of the contract, for example, unfair advantage taken by the 
plaintiff of his superior knowledge or bargaining position.68 This was in fact what 
motivated Kindersley VC in Falcke v Gray,69 to refuse specific performance, i.e. the fact 
that the plaintiff purchaser, as a dealer in curiosities, china, etc. was well aware of the 
                                                 
64
  Falcke v Gray (1859) 4 Drew 651, 665. 
65
  Per Kindersley VC at 664: “I am of opinion that in the present case I ought to refuse 
specific performance on the mere ground of inadequacy of price, even if there were none 
other.”  
66
  Martin Hanbury & Martin’s Modern Equity 790. 
67
   Per Kindersley VC at 660. 
68
  See Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1107-1108; Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1926; 
Chen-Wishart Contract Law 543. 
69
  (1859) 4 Drew 651. 
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value of similar articles (whilst the seller was completely ignorant of the true value of the 
vases),70 in conjunction with the fact that the price appeared to be inadequate.   
Thus, the factor of inadequacy of consideration along with other factors (which fall short 
of actually invalidating the contract) could influence a court to ignore the uniqueness of 
the subject matter of the contract and refuse specific performance. Inasmuch as the 
court in Falcke refused specific performance based on factors which fell short of 
invalidating the contract, i.e. the impropriety on the part of the plaintiff purchaser 
(knowing very well that the vases were undervalued), and that enforcing the contract 
would bear hardly on the defendant due to the inadequacy of price, this decision can 
also be relied on in support of the general proposition that specific performance will be 
refused if it would result in severe hardship to the defaulting party.71  
The position in American law also supports the conclusion arrived at above. The 
prevailing view is that mere inadequacy of consideration is not sufficient in itself to 
prevent a court from granting specific performance.72 This factor alone will not influence 
the court to refuse the remedy.73 Thus, American courts too, require that this factor be 
                                                 
70
  654, 655, 665. 
71
  See generally Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1106-1107: “Specific performance can be 
refused on the ground of severe hardship to the defendant e.g. where the cost of 
performance to the defendant is wholly out of proportion to the benefit which performance 
will confer on the claimant”, and specifically, para 6 2 below.  
72
  See eg Adams v Peabody Coal Co 82 N.E. 645 (1907) (option for $1, to sell land for 
further sum of $15 per acre specifically enforced). Compare the English case of Coles v 
Trecothick (1804) 9 Ves 234 (contract to sell for £20 000 was specifically enforced even 
though another person later offered £25 000. Lord Eldon stated: “Unless the inadequacy 
of price is such as shocks the conscience and amounts in itself to conclusive and decisive 
evidence of fraud in the transaction, it is not itself a sufficient ground for refusing specific 
performance.”).  
73
  G Blum & M B Morris “Specific performance” 71 AMJUR 2 ed § 97; “Specific performance 
of a contract as a matter of right” 65 American Law Reports 7. 
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accompanied by other facts indicating artifice, sharp practice, hardship, taking 
advantage of misfortune, or ignorance.74  
Falcke also serves to illustrate another puzzling aspect of the common-law approach. 
As indicated, the court would have been prepared to order specific performance of the 
contract to sell two unique vases even though the plaintiff seemed to have a merely 
commercial interest in them.75 This can then be compared to courts’ approach to breach 
of contracts to sell land. As already noted,76 courts will still be inclined to order specific 
performance of a contract to sell land even though the purchaser has a purely monetary 
or commercial interest in the property. Thus, the same approach is adopted in relation 
to other physically unique goods. As Burrows states: 
“Analogously to their approach to land, the courts appear not to be concerned with the 
purpose for which the claimant is buying the physically unique goods. In other words, no 
distinction appears to be drawn between the consumer, with his non-monetary interest, and 
the businessman who wants the goods for profitable use or resale. The same criticism can 
be made as in relation to land contracts: namely that for the reseller damages are adequate, 
since his interest is purely monetary and, unlike the long-term investor, they can generally be 
readily assessed.”77 
Now consider the specific enforceability of contracts of which the subject matter 
concerns ordinary (i.e. non-unique) personal property. It is clear that English courts at 
one time seemed reluctant to recognise the specific enforceability of contracts for the 
sale of ordinary personal property, i.e. goods that were not considered to be specific or 
unique, based on the substitutability of performance.78 There are, however, some 
                                                 
74
  See Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1165. 
75
  (1859) 4 Drew 651, 658. 
76
  See para 3 2 1 1 above. 
77
  Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 461. 
78
  See G H Treitel “Remedies for breach of contract” in IECL VII ch 16 (1976) 18; G H Treitel 
The Law of Contract 7 ed (1987) 788. 
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indications that the English courts are moving towards such an approach.79 For 
example, the criterion was strongly challenged in the famous case of Beswick v 
Beswick.80 Lord Pearce in particular preferred to focus on the question of whether the 
more appropriate remedy was that of specific performance.81 It is said that the courts 
have changed their approach, by asking instead, what remedy is the most appropriate 
in the circumstances of the individual case.82 The question therefore, is not whether 
damages is an adequate remedy anymore. For example, in Evans Marshall & Co Ltd v 
Bertola SA83 Sachs LJ proclaimed: “The standard question …, ‘Are damages an 
adequate remedy?’ might perhaps, in the light of the authorities in recent years, be 
rewritten: ‘Is it just, in all the circumstances, that a plaintiff should be confined to his 
remedy in damages?’”84 It is apparent from the case law that the courts are slowly 
accepting the view that specific performance should be ordered when it is the more 
appropriate remedy, even though damages may be regarded as an adequate remedy in 
the sense of the older authorities. This is illustrated by the fact that English courts seem 
                                                 
79
  See G H Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (1988) 65. 
80
  [1968] AC 58. For a discussion of the facts, see para 3 2 4 below. 
81
  [1968] AC 88. See also Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co [1967] ALR 385, 412. 
82
  See Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1907-1908. See also Burrows Remedies for 
Torts and Breach of Contract 457-458: “Some recent cases indicate a weakening of this 
bar, and it has even been argued that specific performance is now the primary remedy in 
England.” He then adds that this “seems exaggerated” but admits that “The recent 
apparent weakening not only of this, but of several other of the traditional bars, [means] 
that specific performance may be more freely available now than it was in the past.”  See 
also 470-472. 
83
  [1973] 1 WLR 349. See also Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106, 322; Co-operative 
Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1997] 2 WLR 898 903; Rainbow 
Estates Ltd v Tokenhold Ltd [1999] Ch 64, 73 per Lawrence Collins QC: “Subject to the 
overriding need to avoid injustice or oppression, the remedy should be available when 
damages are not an adequate remedy, or, in the more modern formulation, when specific 
performance is the appropriate remedy.” See also para 5 2 (iii) below. 
84
   [1973] 1 WLR 349, 379. 
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increasingly more willing to grant specific performance of contracts, even where the 
subject matter concerns generic goods,85 if the goods are in such short supply that the 
buyer is unable to obtain alternative performance from another source, referred to as 
cases of “commercial uniqueness”.86  
This was the case in Howard E Perry & Co v British Railways Board.87 Here the court 
granted specific performance of a duty to deliver a quantity of steel in favour of a steel 
stockholder against a rail carrier who refused to allow the steel to be moved during a 
period of industrial strike action by its employees, so as to avoid further industrial action. 
The court maintained that during the strike “steel [was] available only with great 
difficulty, if at all”. Council for the plaintiff argued that at that moment “steel [was] gold”. 
The court found that damages would not provide adequate compensation in the 
circumstances as the equivalent of what was detained was unobtainable in the 
market.88 This view is supported by an earlier decision Sky Petroleum Ltd v VIP 
Petroleum Ltd,89 in which the court also granted specific performance of goods 
considered to be generic under normal circumstances. Ordinarily, petroleum is not 
considered to be unique, but in this case it became a rare commodity because there 
was inadequate supply. The court granted specific performance of the sale of petroleum 
due to the surrounding circumstances that rendered it commercially unique.  
                                                 
85
  And thus falls outside of the scope of s 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which gives the 
court a discretion to order specific performance where an action is brought “for breach of a 
contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods”. See para 2 3 2 1 above. 
86
  This term was introduced by Treitel – see G H Treitel “Specific performance in the sale of 
goods” 1966 Journal of Business Law 211 215; Remedies for Breach of Contract: A 
Comparative Account 64; Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1102. See also V Mak 
Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law (2009) 84-89. 
87
  [1980] 1 WLR 1375. 
88
  [1980] 1 WLR 1383. 
89
  [1974] 1 WLR 576. 
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This view is further supported by a more recent decision in Thames Valley Power Ltd v 
Total Gas and Power Ltd.90 Here Thames Valley Power Limited (TVP) contracted to buy 
gas from Total for the operation of a combined heat and power plant at Heathrow 
Airport in 1995. The contract contained a floor and ceiling pricing mechanism to fix what 
TVP would pay. It also contained a clause relieving an affected party from the 
performance of its obligations upon the occurrence of a force majeure event. Gas prices 
rose and it became uneconomic for Total to keep supplying TVP at the contract price. 
As a result, Total informed TVP in writing that it was unable to perform its obligation to 
supply gas. TVP’s response was that the price increases did not make Total unable to 
perform – it just meant that the performance of Total’s side of the agreement would be 
less profitable for Total – and TVP accordingly requested an undertaking that Total 
continue to supply gas in accordance with the contract. In 2005, Total invoked the force 
majeure clause, and argued that its performance had become “commercially 
impracticable”.91 However, the court held that Total’s non-performance could not be 
excused or justified on this ground. Clarke J emphasised that a force majeure event 
must have made Total unable to supply gas. He distinguished between inability and 
inconvenience and held that “[t]he fact that it is much more expensive, even very greatly 
more expensive for it to do so, does not mean that it cannot do so”.92 
He further held (though it was “not strictly necessary” to decide whether it was a case 
for specific performance)93 that Total’s obligation was specifically enforceable, because 
the basis of the contract was that TVP “would be assured of a source of supply from a 
first-rank supplier at an agreed price for a 15 year term” and to “confine them to a claim 
in damages would deprive them of substantially the whole benefit that the contract was 
                                                 
90
  [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 441. 
91
  450. 
92
  451. 
93
  455. 
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intended to give them”.94 Beale et al hold that “[t]his amounts to saying that damages 
were not an adequate remedy because no substitute was available”.95 
Thus, if obtaining a substitute involves difficulty, it gives the goods a character of 
commercial uniqueness, which could consequently influence a court to grant specific 
performance even though the goods are (strictly speaking) generic and the situation is 
not explicitly covered by section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.96 Thus, goods may 
be unique in nature, or they may be unique because of surrounding circumstances. 
Treitel observes that if this development continues, English and American law, where it 
concerns this point, will move more closely together, so that the requirement that 
damages must be an inadequate remedy will be restored to its proper function, in line 
with American law. This proper function is to restrict the plaintiff’s claim to damages if he 
can thereby be placed in as good a position as specific performance. This would be the 
more sensible route in such a situation, because a judgment to pay money is easier and 
quicker to execute, and also minimises the risk of hardship to the debtor if he were to be 
compelled to perform.97  
The same reluctance is, however, not expressed in American law. According to Corbin,  
“There is no doubt that the American courts have become progressively more liberal in the 
granting of this effective remedy and have become less astute in enforcing the requirement 
that the remedy in damages shall be inadequate.”98  
                                                 
94
  455. 
95
  Chitty on Contracts 1916. 
96
  See A S Burrows “Specific performance at the crossroads” 1984 Legal Studies 102 103; 
Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1915-1917. See also n 85 above. 
97
  Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account 65. 
98
  See Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1139. See also Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 
481-484. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   121 
 
The courts in the United States have extended the remedy of specific performance to 
buyers of generic goods whose need for the actual supply was particularly urgent or 
who would not be able to get a substitute. The US Uniform Commercial Code has 
broadened the possibility of specific performance as a buyer’s remedy.99 As indicated in 
chapter 2 this is accomplished by the wording of § 2-716(1),100 which provides that 
“[s]pecific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other proper 
circumstances …” (own emphasis).101 The latter phrase therefore broadens the 
“uniqueness” requirement. This provision is an indication of the growing tendency of US 
courts to order specific performance on the basis of the appropriateness of the remedy 
and not on the adequacy of damages.102  
                                                 
99
  See M A Schmitt & M Pasterczyk “Specific performance under the Uniform Commercial 
Code – will liberalism prevail?” (1976-1977) 26 De Paul Law Review 54. 
100
  See para 2 3 2 2 above. 
101
  The official comment (2) to this section reads: “Uniqueness should be determined in light 
of the total circumstances surrounding the contract and is not limited to goods identified 
when the contract is formed. The typical specific performance situation today involves an 
output or requirements contract rather than a contract for the sale of an heirloom or 
priceless work of art. A buyer’s inability to cover is evidence of ‘other proper 
circumstances’.” (Output and requirements contracts are the major types of long-term 
supply contracts – see para 2 3 2 2 nn 184-185 above.) See also M Nichols “Remedies – 
specific performance and long-term supply contracts: an application of U.C.C. § 2-716” 
(1976) 30 Arkansas Law Review 65. 
102
  For discussion of the trend in the US, see M T van Hecke “Changing emphasis in specific 
performance” (1961-1962) 40 North Carolina Law Review 1; Comment “Specific 
performance: a liberalization of equity standards” (1964) 49 Iowa Law Review 1290. In 
practice, though, plaintiffs tend to prefer the remedy of “cover” (i.e. the recovery of the 
difference between the contract price and the price of purchasing replacement goods 
without unreasonable delay) provided by § 2-712 of the UCC (Addendum A 387), as it 
provides a more convenient and less time-consuming solution (see Treitel Remedies for 
Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account 64 n 28). 
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The case of Sedmak v Charlie’s Chevrolet Inc103 is particularly informative on the 
interpretation and effect of § 2-716. The court adopted a liberal approach to the Code in 
allowing specific performance even though the legal remedy of damages would have 
been adequate. Here the plaintiffs were told they could buy a limited edition “pace car” 
when it arrived at the dealership for the suggested retail price of approximately $15,000. 
Factory changes were made to the car at the plaintiff’s request before delivery to the 
dealer. When the car arrived at the dealership they were told they could bid on the car, 
but its popularity had increased the price. They did not bid, but instituted a claim for 
specific performance. The court held that the pace car was not unique in the traditional 
legal sense, however, its “mileage, condition, ownership and appearance” did make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the replication without considerable expense, delay, 
and inconvenience.104 The court ordered specific performance even though the legal 
remedy of damages may have been available to adequately compensate the 
plaintiffs.105 
                                                 
103
  622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo.App.1981). 
104
  699. 
105
  The court specifically addressed the the UCC’s adoption of the term “in other proper 
circumstances” and the official comment (2) to § 2-716 (at 700): “In view of this Article’s 
emphasis on the commercial feasibility of replacement, a new concept of what are ‘unique’ 
goods is introduced under this section. Specific performance is no longer limited to goods 
which are already specific or ascertained at the time of contracting. The test of uniqueness 
under this section must be made in terms of the total situation which characterizes the 
contract.... [U]niqueness is not the sole basis of the remedy under this section for the relief 
may also be granted ‘in other proper circumstances’ and inability to cover is strong 
evidence of ‘other proper circumstances’.” Quoted with approval in King Aircraft Sales Inc 
v Lane 68 Wash.App. 706, 714 (1993): “We agree with the Sedmak court’s interpretation 
of § 2-716 and, like that court, find the liberal interpretation urged by the UCC drafters to 
be entirely consistent with the common law of our state. Prior to adoption of the UCC, our 
cases did not always require the absence of a legal remedy before awarding specific 
performance nor did these cases require the goods to be absolutely ‘unique.’ Hence, the 
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Furthermore, certain statutory provisions in some of the states have also developed in 
this direction. For example, the draft Civil Code originally prepared for the state of New 
York in 1865 by David Dudley Field II, adopted in a number of other states (but not by 
its intended state), contained the traditional provision that specific performance could be 
ordered where damages did not provide “adequate” relief.106 Most of the states which 
adopted Field’s Code, such as California, North Dakota and South Dakota, have since 
repealed this provision. Maryland even adopted a statutory provision which determines 
that specific performance is not to be refused merely because the plaintiff has an 
“adequate” remedy at law.107 As for the other states which have not promulgated 
statutory provisions to this effect, their case law indicates that they are also moving in 
this direction.108  
English courts, on the other hand, are slower in accepting this view, and the 
requirement that damages must be inadequate before specific performance will be 
ordered, is still maintained.109 As Burrows puts it: 
“While Beswick can be given such a wide interpretation, and it is hard to interpret Lord 
Pearce’s judgment in any other way, the courts have taken the narrow view, for they have 
continued to apply the adequacy of damages bar without even mentioning Beswick.”110 
                                                                                                                                                             
liberal approach to ‘other proper circumstances’ suggested in Official Comment 2 is not a 
departure from our law.”  
106
  D D Field, Civil Code (Albany 1865) § 1887. See further on the Field Civil Code (1865), 
Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account 65; and on the Field 
Code of Civil Procedure (1848) which abolished the distinction in forms of procedure 
between an action at law and a suit in equity, E A Farnsworth An Introduction to the Legal 
System of the United States 4 ed (2010) 104.  
107
  Annotated Code of Maryland (Commercial Law) § 11-508 (accessible via Westlaw 
International). 
108
  See Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1139 and the cases collected there in n 28.  
109
  See eg M P Furmston Chesire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract 16 ed (2012) 796.  
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In the light of the above it can be concluded that there are two instances where specific 
performance will be ordered in respect of contracts for the sale of personal property. 
First, specific performance will be ordered where the subject matter of the contract is 
unique on the basis that a market substitute is unavailable.111 Secondly, it will be 
ordered in cases where the contract involves non-unique goods, but the circumstances 
are such that a substitute is practically unavailable.112 Courts have also started to 
recognise the specific enforceability of contracts for the sale of shares,113 even though 
these contracts would not ordinarily be specifically enforced, as shares are deemed 
readily available on the market and easily substitutable, making damages an adequate 
remedy. The courts have been influenced by the fact that the purpose of a contract for 
the sale of shares is often to secure control of the company. This has influenced the 
courts to grant specific performance, as the value of such control is considered difficult 
to quantify. Thus, if the number of shares contracted for would ensure the purchaser 
majority shareholding by obtaining the majority of the voting shares, it would make the 
shares unobtainable on the market.114 This example demonstrates how the 
substitutability of the subject matter of the contract could complicate the quantification of 
damages. The following section is devoted to this issue. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
110
  See Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 458, 471; E McKendrick 
Contract Law 8 ed (2009) 360 ff, and the authorities cited there.  
111
  Falcke v Gray (1859) 4 Drew 651; H G Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract 
Law 2 ed (2010) 846.  
112
  Sky Petroleum Ltd v VIP Petroleum Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 576; Howard E Perry & Co v British 
Railways Board [1980] 1 WLR 1375 confirmed in a recent English case Thames Valley 
Power Ltd v Total Gas and Power Ltd [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 441 (discussed above). 
113
  See eg Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada (CI) Ltd [1986] AC 207. 
114
  Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1148; Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of 
Contract 465; Chen-Wishart Contract Law 542. 
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3 2 2  Damages would be difficult to quantify 
Damages has also been deemed inadequate due to difficulties with quantification.115 
This position is closely related to the approach to uniqueness considered above.116 
Consider contracts for the sale of land. As indicated, these contracts are generally 
specifically enforced based on the fact that damages would not provide adequate relief, 
because of the unique qualities of the piece of land, which are considered to be difficult 
to quantify.117 Furthermore, courts have also specifically enforced contracts to pay for or 
to sell annuities because the value of the rights is difficult to determine;118 contracts to 
execute a mortgage for money already advanced because the value of having security 
for the loan is impossible to quantify,119 and contracts to indemnify because 
quantification of damages depends upon examination of long and intricate accounts, 
which a court cannot be expected to do.120 Courts have also enforced contracts for the 
                                                 
115
  Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1100-1101; Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1909. 
116
  See Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 466: “This head and the previous 
one (uniqueness) are inextricably linked: difficulty in assessing damages – whether in 
putting a value on a consumer’s interest, or in calculating possible investment profit, or in 
putting a figure on the serious disruption to a business – lies as the root justification for 
specific performance, where the contractual subject matter is unique” (citing Kronman 
“Specific performance” (1978) 45 U Chi LR 351 362). See also Cunnington “The 
inadequacy of damages as a remedy for breach of contract” in Rickett (ed) Justifying 
Private Law Remedies 117. 
117
  As already noted, courts do not appear to be concerned with the purpose for which the 
plaintiff bought the property, in other words specific performance will be ordered even if 
the buyer wants the property for profitable use or resale. 
118
  Kenney v Wexham (1822) 6 Madd 355; Swift v Swift (1841) 31 IR Eq 267; Beswick v 
Beswick [1968] AC 58. 
119
  Ashton v Corrigan (1871) LR 13 Eq 76; Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] 
AC 584. 
120
  Ranelaugh (Earl) v Hayes (1683) 1 Vern 189; Sporle v Whayman (1855) 20 Beav 607; 
Anglo-Australian Life Assurance Co v British Provident Life and Fire Society (1862) 3 Giff 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   126 
 
sale of debts because damages can only be calculated by speculation in these 
instances.121 Thus, if supply of substitute performance is limited, it may be difficult to 
quantify damages on the ground that it is unclear how much it will cost the plaintiff to 
obtain alternative performance.122 In such circumstances damages will be considered 
inadequate and specific performance will be ordered.123  
                                                                                                                                                             
521; Ascherson v Tredegar Dry Dock & Wharf Co Ltd [1909] 2 Ch 401; and see Fry 
Specific Performance of Contracts 731-732. 
121
  Adderley v Dixon (1824) 1 Sim & St 607. Cited by Grigsby Story’s Equity Jurisprudence 2 
ed (1892) § 718 as authority for the following important statement: “But although the 
general rule now is, not to entertain jurisdiction in equity for a specific performance of 
agreements respecting chattels […] the rule is a qualified one, and subject to exceptions; 
or, rather, the rule is limited to cases where a compensation in damages furnishes a 
complete and satisfactory remedy. Cases may readily be enumerated, which are, and 
have been deemed, fit for the exercise of equity jurisdiction. Thus, where there was a 
contract for the sale of 800 tons of iron, to be paid for in a certain number of years, by 
instalments, a specific performance was decreed; for such sort of contracts (it was said) 
differ from those which are to be immediately executed. But the true reason probably was, 
that under the particular circumstances of the case, there could be no adequate 
compensation in damages at law; for the profits upon the contract, being to depend upon 
future events, could not be correctly estimated by the jury in damages, inasmuch as the 
calculation must proceed upon mere conjecture.” 
122
  Cunnington “The inadequacy of damages as a remedy for breach of contract” in Rickett 
(ed) Justifying Private Law Remedies 117-118. 
123
  See in particular Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 360, cmt b: “The damage remedy 
may be inadequate to protect the injured party’s expectation interest because the loss 
caused by the breach is too difficult to estimate with reasonable certainty (§ 352). If the 
injured party has suffered loss but cannot sustain the burden of proving it, only nominal 
damages will be awarded. If he can prove some but not all of his loss, he will not be 
compensated in full. In either case damages are an inadequate remedy. Some types of 
interests are by their very nature incapable of being valued in money. Typical examples 
include heirlooms, family treasures and works of art that induce a strong sentimental 
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Recent literature and case law have expressed doubts on whether difficulties in 
quantifying the aggrieved party’s loss justify a finding of inadequacy of damages, and 
accordingly, awarding specific performance. Some contract scholars contend that “[i]t is 
not enough to point to difficulty in quantifying the claimant’s loss [to show that damages 
should be regarded as inadequate] since courts are very willing to overcome 
quantification difficulties”.124 
In this regard it is significant that in Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores 
(Holdings) Ltd (discussed fully below),125 the Court of Appeal emphasised the 
inadequacy of damages in compensating the plaintiff who faced enormous obstacles in 
proving what loss was caused by the defendant’s breach in closing its store.126 
However, the House of Lords played down this factor, and confirmed the trial court’s 
decision to refuse specific performance and its view that the courts too readily refuse 
damages where the loss would be difficult to quantify.127  
                                                                                                                                                             
attachment. Examples may also be found in contracts of a more commercial character. 
The breach of a contract to transfer shares of stock may cause a loss in control over the 
corporation. The breach of a contract to furnish an indemnity may cause the sacrifice of 
property and financial ruin. The breach of a covenant not to compete may cause the loss 
of customers of an unascertainable number or importance. The breach of a requirements 
contract may cut off a vital supply of raw materials. In such situations, equitable relief is 
often appropriate.”  
124
  Chen-Wishart Contract Law 541. See also Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 146; 
Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 88-89. 
125
  See para 5 2 below. 
126
  Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1996] Ch 286 (CA) 295 
per Legatt LJ: “The plaintiffs would have very considerable difficulty in trying to prove their 
loss. An award of damages would be unlikely to compensate them fully; and the losses of 
the other tenants of the shopping centre would be irrecoverable, except in so far as they 
might be mitigated by reduced rents. Argyll have acted with gross commercial cynicism, 
preferring to resist a claim for damages rather than keep an unambiguous promise.” 
127
  See para 5 2 (iv) below. 
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The relevance of the difficulty of assessing damages was denied in earlier decisions. 
For example, in Fothergill v Rowland,128 Sir George Jessel MR said:129 
“To say that you cannot ascertain the damage in a case of breach of contract for the sale of 
goods, say in monthly deliveries extending over three years … is to limit the power of 
ascertaining damages in a way which would rather astonish gentlemen who practice on what 
is called the other side of Westminster Hall. There is never considered to be any difficulty in 
ascertaining such a thing. Therefore I do not think it is a case in which damages could not be 
ascertained at law.” 
However, it is difficult to see how the remedy of damages would be adequate to protect 
the injured party’s expectation interest if the loss caused by the breach is too difficult to 
estimate. The correctness of this approach has rightly been doubted by Burrows:  
                                                 
128
  (1873) LR 17 Eq 132. See also Societe des Industries Metallurgiques SA v Bronx 
Engineering Co [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 465 where Buckley LJ states at 469-470: “I think 
there might well be difficulties in quantifying the damages, but mere difficulty in 
quantification is not, in my judgment, a matter which really affects the principle at all. I do 
not doubt that the damages would eventually be satisfactorily quantified.” The court ruled 
that an interim injunction restraining the sellers from removing (out of the court’s 
jurisdiction) and disposing of certain machinery which the sellers had contracted to sell to 
the buyers should not be granted since, even if the sellers were in breach, there was no 
“likelihood of the Court of trial decreeing specific performance of the contract of sale” since 
the machinery was available from another source making damages adequate. Curiously 
and rather remarkably, damages was considered to be adequate even though the court 
had acknowledged that the delay of up to 12 months in obtaining substitute machinery 
might substantially disrupt the plaintiff’s business. In doing so, the court clearly rejected 
uniqueness (both commercial and physical) as a reason for awarding specific 
performance based on inadequacy of damages. The case was decided after Sky 
Petroleum Ltd v VIP Petroleum Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 576, but before Howard E Perry & Co v 
British Railways Board [1980] 1 WLR 1375 and Thames Valley Power Ltd v Total Gas and 
Power Ltd [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 441. 
129
  (1873) LR 17 Eq 132, 140. This quotation appears in Burrows Remedies for Torts and 
Breach of Contract 466. 
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“This approach is most unfortunate, for where there is grave doubt about whether damages 
will put the claimant into as good a position as if the contract had been performed, specific 
performance is prima facie a better remedy…”130 
3 2 3  Insolvency of the defendant 
Support has been expressed in English law for awarding specific performance against 
an insolvent debtor. The justification is that an award of damages would be ineffective 
against a person who is insolvent, and who would therefore be unable to satisfy a claim 
for damages.131 Spry, for example, adopts this view, maintaining that: 
“A significant risk that a legal remedy such as damages will be ineffective on the ground of 
the inadequate resources of the defendant or otherwise, may of itself justify the conclusion 
that it is inadequate.”132 
The law governing the effect of insolvency on the availability of specific performance is 
simple: inadequacy of damages is the primary reason for granting specific performance 
and when the breaching party is insolvent, damages are inadequate, and therefore, the 
aggrieved party is entitled to claim specific performance.133  
However, authority also exists in support of the opposite view. It is true that the 
insolvency of one of the parties is generally conceded to have a very material bearing 
                                                 
130
  Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 467. See also Mak Performance-Oriented 
Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 89. 
131
  H L McClintock “Adequacy of ineffective remedy at law” 1932 Minn LR 233. 
132
  I C F Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies 5 ed (1997) 68, citing Associated 
Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd v Teigland Shipping A/S (“The Oakworth”) [1975] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 581, where the Court of Appeal granted an injunction on the ground that the 
defendants had no assets to satisfy the damages claim. See also Beale et al (eds) Chitty 
on Contracts 1910.  
133
  This analysis appears from the earlier decisions – see eg Doloret v Rothschild 57 ER 233, 
236 (1824); Clark v Flint 39 Mass. 231, 238-239 (1839). See also E Yorio Contract 
Enforcement: Specific Performance and Injunctions (loose-leaf updated by S Thel) § 7.1. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   130 
 
upon the question of the granting or refusing of relief, but many courts have doubted 
whether the defendant’s inability to satisfy a damages claim against him is sufficient 
reason to grant specific performance.134 The primary reason advanced in support of the 
remedy of damages where the defendant is insolvent, is that to grant specific 
performance would create an inequitable preference in favour of the plaintiff over the 
other creditors.135 In both England and America, specific performance has been refused 
against an insolvent on this ground. It was the fear of giving the buyer priority over 
secured creditors that prevented the court from ordering specific performance in In Re 
Wait136 for example.137  
                                                 
134
  See H C Horack “Insolvency and specific performance” (1918) 31 Harv LR 702; Perillo 
(ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1156. 
135
  McClintock 1932 Minn LR 233 234; Horack 1918 Harv LR 702 706, saying: “Since each 
creditor can make out a case for relief exactly similar to that of the party now before the 
court, and as each has at some time contributed to the enlarging of the defendant’s 
estate, it ought to make no difference whether one claimant got into his unfortunate 
position sooner or later than another.” 
136
  [1927] 1 Ch 606. 
137
  In National Bank of Kentucky v Louisville Trust Co 67 F.2d 97 (C.C.A.6th, 1933), the court 
said: “The granting to the complainant of relief in the nature of specific performance would 
be the equivalent of full satisfaction of its claim, and it would thus receive preference to 
which it is not entitled.” And in Geo E Warren Co v AL Black Coal Co 102 S.E. 672, 673 
(1920), the court similarly stated: “It is true some courts have held that insolvency is a 
consideration in determining whether or not a contract should be enforced; but, on the 
contrary, other courts have held that insolvency furnishes an additional reason for denying 
jurisdiction, for the reason that performance of his contract by an insolvent defendant 
would enable a plaintiff to obtain preference over the defendant’s other creditors.” See 
also Roundtree v McLain Hempst 245, 20 F.Cas 1260, 1262 (1834) (cf n 144 below); 
Jamison Coal & Coke Co v Goltra 143 F.2d 889 (1944). 
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This is why insolvency of the debtor is one of the recognised exceptions to a claim for 
specific performance under South African law.138 Thus, the opposite rule applies in our 
law. Specific performance can never be awarded because it would upset the paritas 
creditorum (whereby all unsecured creditors have an equal right to payment and 
proceeds of the insolvent estate).139 Eiselen explains the rationale as follows: 
                                                 
138
  See generally D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed 
(2012) 322; S van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 330.  
Therefore a trustee of an insolvent estate (or liquidator of a company) generally cannot be 
compelled to carry out the insolvent’s pre-sequestration (or pre-liquidation) contracts if the 
trustee elects to repudiate liability. The other party is confined to a concurrent claim for 
damages based on the trustee’s repudiation – see in this regard Bryant & Flanagan (Pty) 
Ltd v Muller 1977 (1) SA 800 (N) 247; Glen Anil Finance (Pty) Ltd v Joint Liquidators, Glen 
Anil Development Corporation Ltd (in liquidation) 1981 (1) SA 171 (A) 182; International 
Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Affinity (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 79 (C) 85; Norex Industrial 
Properties (Pty) Ltd v Monarch SA Insurance Co Ltd 1987 (1) SA 827 (A) 837; Thomas 
Construction (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) 
SA 546 (A) 567A; Du Plessis v Rolfes Ltd 1997 (2) SA 354 (A) 363; Nedcor Investment 
Bank v Pretoria Belgrave Hotel (Pty) Ltd 2003 (5) SA 189 (SCA) 192. See also R Sharrock 
et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 9 ed (2012) 86 ff; A D J van Rensburg, J G Lotz & T van 
Rijn (R D Sharrock) “Contract” in W A Joubert & J A Faris (eds) LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed (2010) 
para 495. That this represents the law in South Africa was confirmed by the recent SCA 
decision in Ellerines Bros (Pty) Ltd v McCarthy Ltd 2014 (4) SA 22 (SCA) paras [11]-[12] 
per Van Zyl AJA. 
139
  According to South African insolvency law, once a sequestration order is granted, a 
concursus creditorum (or “community of creditors”) is established by which the interests of 
the creditors as a group enjoy preference over the interests of individual creditors. This 
means that all (unsecured) creditors will have an equal right to payment and proceeds of 
the estate (see Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 4; Walker v Syfret 1911 AD 141 
166; Richter NO v Riverside Estates (Pty) Ltd 1946 OPD 209 223. More recently, in 
discussing the working of a concursus creditorum, Harms JA in Contract Forwarding (Pty) 
Ltd v Chesterfin (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) SA 253 (SCA) para [1], maintained that it “crystallises 
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“The reason for [this] exception is to be found in the need to treat all concurrent creditors of 
an insolvent estate equally. Since there are insufficient assets in an insolvent estate to 
discharge all the liabilities of the insolvent, an order of specific performance in favour of one 
creditor would necessarily result in that creditor’s claim being preferred to that of the other 
creditors.”140 
Common law courts have to find reasons for awarding specific performance, whereas 
South African courts have to give reasons for refusing the remedy.141 Based on the 
central requirement of inadequacy of damages, specific performance will be awarded, 
irrespective of the consequences of ordering specific performance against an insolvent 
debtor. However, it may be questioned whether this is a valid reason for awarding this 
remedy in common law. It appears to give rise to an inconsistency: the efficacy of the 
remedy at law is the determining factor, but how would the equitable remedy of specific 
performance be effective against an insolvent debtor? In practice it may be difficult to 
ensure that a contract is fulfilled if the debtor is insolvent,142 and this in turn subverts the 
point of awarding specific performance.  
                                                                                                                                                             
the insolvent’s position by preventing a creditor from advancing its own position to the 
detriment of other creditors”). 
140
  “Remedies for breach” in Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa 309 
322. 
141
  J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 
211; G F Lubbe & C M Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract: Cases, Materials, 
Commentary 3 ed (1988) 542. 
142
  As contended by Horack for example 1918 Harv LR 711: “The conclusion to which we 
must then come, if insolvency is a basis for specific performance in any case, is that all 
persons to whom the insolvent owes obligations are entitled to specific performance, or to 
some sort of relief which is equitable in its nature. But where there are many creditors who 
are all practically in the same situation specific performance is obviously impossible, since 
all cannot be paid in full and there is no reason for preferring one creditor over the others 
or giving preference to one class of obligations merely because goods were to be given 
rather than money. In each case, though the legal remedy would under normal 
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However, the prevailing common law view remains that insolvency of the defendant will 
of itself influence a court to decide that damages is inadequate. Spry confirms this in the 
most recent edition of Equitable Remedies: 
“[D]espite occasional statements to the contrary it appears to be clear that a significant risk  
that a legal remedy such as damages will be ineffective on the ground of the inadequate 
resources of the defendant or otherwise, may of itself justify the conclusion that it is 
inadequate.”143 
The likelihood that the damages claim will be satisfied must therefore be taken into 
account when the adequacy question is considered. And the inability to collect damages 
will make damages inadequate. Whilst the paritas creditorum principle underpins most 
insolvency laws, including the insolvency laws of America and England,144 it appears 
                                                                                                                                                             
circumstances give adequate relief, this remedy is of but little value here because of the 
insolvency of the defendant. The relief which is needed is not specific performance of any 
particular obligation, but rather an equal distribution of assets to all persons having similar 
claims which cannot be paid in full.” See also Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1156. 
143
  I C F Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, 
Rectification and Equitable Damages 8 ed (2010) 68; Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 
1909-1910: “Damages may also be an inadequate remedy because … the defendant may 
not be ‘good for the money’ [citing Sachs LJ in Evans Marshall & Co Ltd v Bertola SA 
[1973] 1 WLR 379, 380].” See also (for the US) Klass Contract Law in the USA 213; Yorio 
& Thel Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and Injunctions (2012 supplement) § 
7.4.1: “both scholars and early nineteenth-century cases agree that inability to collect 
damages makes the remedy in damages inadequate …” Cf Cunnington “The inadequacy 
of damages as a remedy for breach of contract” in Rickett (ed) Justifying Private Law 
Remedies 119.         
144
  See again Roundtree v McLain Hempst 245, 20 F.Cas 1260, 1262 (1834) where the court 
refused to order specific performance against the administrator of the debtor’s insolvent 
estate where the debtor had promised his creditor, the plaintiff, to procure and to assign to 
him certain securities; saying (at 1262) “to grant relief would violate the rule that a court of 
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that their approach compromises the paritas principle. But, as we know, the adequacy 
test is merely the first hurdle in obtaining specific performance.145 This was confirmed 
recently by Thel:146 
“[The] judicial inquiry does not end with a finding that damages are inadequate. Rather, the 
court must address the second and distinct issue of whether all the circumstances justify the 
equitable remedy of specific performance. On this issue, courts and scholars concur that 
factors other than adequacy of damages must be considered.”147 
Insolvency is relevant in the context of inadequacy. But, the insolvency of the 
defendant, though it might justify the conclusion that damages is inadequate, does not 
necessarily provide a basis for specific performance.148 Public policy considerations 
may nonetheless lead to a refusal of specific performance, with the consequence that 
                                                                                                                                                             
equity will never allow one creditor to gain an inequitable or undue advantage or 
preference over others”. See also Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1156. 
145
  See n 25 para 3 2 above. See also introductory statement by McClintock 1932 Minn LR 
233: “By a process  of inclusion and exclusion, the classes of cases in which courts of 
equity consider that the remedy at common law is inadequate to meet the needs of justice 
have been fairly well determined, and whenever a case in equity falls into one of those 
classes we may be quite confident that the court will grant equitable relief unless some 
factor is present which, according to other principles of equity, precludes relief even 
though the remedy at law is concededly inadequate.” 
146
  Yorio & Thel Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and Injunctions (2012 
supplement) § 7.4.1. 
147
  See also McClintock 1932 Minn LR 234: “In cases involving contracts of such a nature 
that the recovery of damages for their breach is admittedly an inadequate remedy, courts 
have refused to decree specific performance because to grant that relief would prejudice 
the interests of the public, or of other persons not parties to the contract.” 
148
  Yorio & Thel Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and Injunctions (2012 
supplement) § 7.4.1; Fry Specific performance of Contracts 30 (arguing against Doloret v 
Rothschild 57 ER 233, in which case Leach VC suggested that insolvency does provide a 
basis for specific performance). 
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the plaintiff may be confined to his legal remedies in any event. These considerations 
would typically arise if the plaintiff is not the only person affected by the defendant’s 
insolvency.149 Accordingly, specific performance may be denied if it would upset paritas 
creditorum. As Thel states:150 
“If the defendant is insolvent, there may be creditors other than the plaintiff who have a right 
to share in the remaining assets. If specific performance or an injunction would result in a 
preference with respect to these assets, the equitable remedy may be denied on grounds of 
public policy.”151 
Indeed, an order of specific performance in favour of one creditor would necessarily 
result in that creditor’s claim being preferred to that of the other creditors. Therefore, the 
South African solution of confining the creditor to a concurrent claim for damages (to 
ensure that all creditors are treated equally) may be regarded as preferable.  
However, as Corbin points out, specific performance could be granted without this 
effect. If the plaintiff is the defendant’s only creditor, “clearly no preference problems 
arise”. Then “there is no reason not to protect the plaintiff”.152 These are all valid 
arguments which cannot be ignored when courts determine what relief to afford the 
                                                 
149
  Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies 68; Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1156. 
150
  Yorio & Thel Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and Injunctions (2012 
supplement) § 7.4.2. For further discussion of this point, see Horack 1918 Harv LR 702; 
McClintock 1932 Minn LR 233. 
151
  He cites: Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 360, cmt d; § 365, cmt b; and In re MJK 
Clearing Inc 286 B.R. 109 (Bkrtcy.D.Minn. 2002) (affirmed by District Court 2003 WL 
1824937 (D.Minn.), and by Court of Appeals 371 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2004)); Seci Inc v 
Chafitz Inc 493 A.2d 1100, 1104 (Md.App. 1985); Block v Shaw 95 S.W. 806,808 (1906). 
152
  Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1156. See also Sharpe Injunctions and Specific 
Performance 284; Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies 68. 
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plaintiff. The effect and effectiveness153 of the remedy once granted should be 
considered when courts decide on a remedy.154 
3 2 4  Only nominal damages available 
Finally, damages is also regarded as an inadequate remedy in cases where damages 
would be purely nominal, since the plaintiff suffered no pecuniary loss. The case most 
often cited in this regard is the by now familiar Beswick v Beswick.155 This case involved 
a contract that provided for Mr Beswick to transfer property to his nephew, and for the 
nephew in turn to make certain payments to Mr Beswick’s wife after his death. Mr 
Beswick died only a year after conclusion of this agreement. The nephew only made 
one weekly payment subsequent to his death and refused to make any further 
payments. Mrs Beswick brought an action for breach of contract in her capacity as Mr 
Beswick’s personal representative. The nephew in turn contended that, since Mr 
Beswick had died, his estate had suffered no loss as a result of the breach of contract, 
and thus nominal damages were adequate.  
The House of Lords rejected his argument, holding that the nephew “wholly 
misunderstood” the adequacy test, as “[e]quity will grant specific performance when 
damages is inadequate to meet the justice of the case”.156 The fact that only nominal 
damages could be recovered therefore did not constitute a reason to refuse specific 
performance. Instead, it was held to be the main reason for granting specific 
performance. The House of Lords held that damages were an inadequate remedy as 
the estate itself had suffered no loss, since the payments were due to be made to the 
widow in a personal capacity. Accordingly, they made an order for specific performance 
compelling the nephew to carry out his obligations. Thus, specific performance will be 
                                                 
153
  See the argument in favour of the relevance of insolvency based on efficiency in 
McClintock 1932 Minn LR 233. 
154
  Cf for South African law: text to n 181 para 3 3 below. 
155
  [1968] AC 58. 
156
  102. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   137 
 
ordered in the situation where the plaintiff has a non-pecuniary interest in performance, 
which would be left unprotected by an award of nominal damages. Here Mr Beswick 
had an interest in performance for the benefit of a third party – his wife. 
The other relevant case that requires analysis in this context is Ruxley Electronics & 
Construction Ltd v Forsyth.157 This case concerned a contract for the construction of a 
swimming pool. The contract stipulated that the pool must be seven feet, six inches 
deep. However, it appeared that after construction, the pool was only six feet deep. This 
was still considered to be a safe depth for diving but Forsyth nonetheless brought an 
action for damages, claiming the cost of correcting the defect, i.e. having the pool 
demolished and rebuilt (totaling about £21 500). The trial court rejected this claim 
because it was considered unreasonable in the circumstances, and instead awarded 
Forsyth £2 500 for loss of amenity. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal 
but restored by the House of Lords. Here the plaintiff had a subjective non-pecuniary 
interest in obtaining a swimming pool that was seven feet, six inches deep regardless of 
whether this particular depth actually increased the value of his property. Lord Mustill 
found counsel’s contention that the plaintiff should only be able to recover damages if 
he could indicate that the defect decreased the value of his property, “unacceptable”158 
because in this particular case the amount by which the defect decreased the value of 
the property was nil, leaving Forsyth with no more than nominal damages. He 
acknowledged that the cost of reinstatement would be “wholly disproportionate”159 to the 
non-monetary loss suffered by the plaintiff, but that it would be equally unreasonable to 
deny all recovery for such a loss. Lord Mustill held that loss of amenity damages were 
required to recognise the plaintiff’s “consumer surplus” (a concept which has been 
defined as “excess utility or subjective value that the consumer receives from the good, 
over and above the utility associated with its market price”).160 These damages were 
                                                 
157
  [1996] AC 344. 
158
  360. 
159
  361. 
160
  D Harris, A Ogus & J Phillips “Contract remedies and the consumer surplus” (1979) 95 
LQR 581 582. See also G Hesen & R Hardy “Is the system of contract remedies in the 
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consequently not merely nominal, and hence there was no need to award specific 
performance. 
The discussion will now turn to South African law. It will be seen that our courts, under 
the influence of English law, have regarded adequacy of damages as a relevant factor 
in the exercise of their discretion, but currently adopt a predominantly civilian approach, 
inasmuch as they focus on maintaining the right to specific performance.161 The 
subsequent evaluative part will therefore examine whether and how our law can benefit 
from the experiences of modern English law. After dealing with English law, and 
potentially underlying economic efficiency arguments, the discussion will turn to whether 
our law currently gives sufficient weight to the adequacy of damages as a consideration 
against granting specific performance. Finally, suggestions will be made for the future 
development of our law. 
3 3  South African law 
South African courts have been influenced by English law in taking adequacy of 
damages into account when giving content to the discretion to refuse specific 
performance.162 There is a clear dictum to this effect in Thompson v Pullinger:163 
                                                                                                                                                             
Netherlands efficient from a law and economics perspective?” in J M Smits et al (eds) 
Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 287 290;   
E McKendrick Contract Law 8 ed (2009) 342-343; Stone The Modern Law of Contract 
467. 
161
  See n 2 and related text in para 3 1 above on the absence of an adequacy of damages 
principle in the civil law.  
162
  See generally para 1 1 3 1 above. See also De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 210-211; Lubbe & Murray Contract 542-543; A Cockrell 
“Breach of contract” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa (1996) 303 327; S Eiselen “Specific performance and 
special damages” in H L MacQueen & R Zimmermann European Contract Law: Scots and 
South African Perspectives (2006) 249 251. 
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“… it is said that in a contract of purchase and sale of shares which are daily dealt in on the 
market, as a rule, no specific performance is decreed, because the payment of 
compensation, calculated by the difference between the purchase price of the shares and 
that at which they can be obtained at the time when the defendant is placed in mora, is a full 
and satisfactory compensation. With respect to transactions in the public funds, and shares 
in companies which can daily be obtained on the market without difficulty, this is the case; 
but not with respect to shares which cannot easily be obtained, nor where, owing to some 
circumstance or the other, the rule ought not to be applied. (2 Story, Eq. § 717, a; 3 Parsons 
on Contract, part 2, Division 2, s. 3.)”164 
Wessels, similarly, after reviewing some English authorities, came to the conclusion 
that165  
                                                                                                                                                             
163
  (1894) 1 OR 298, 301 per Kotzé CJ. See also Farmers’ Co-operative Society (Reg) v 
Berry 1912 AD 343 350; Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99, 107; Rex v Milne 
and Erleigh (7) 1951 (1) SA 791 (AD) 873G-874C; Baragwanath v Olifants Asbestos Co 
(Pty) Ltd 1951 (3) SA 222 (T) 227G-228C; Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v 
Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 893 (A) 922H-923H, and Beck 1987 
CILSA 196 ff. 
164
  Kotzé CJ then affirmed an English judgment by the Chancery Division, and said (at 301-
302): “In a well-known case on this point [Duncuft v Albrecht (1841) 12 Sim 189, 199], 
specific performance of a contract for the sale of certain shares in a railway company was 
granted. Shadwell, V.-C., gave the following reasons for his judgment: ‘Now, I agree that it 
has long since been decided that you cannot have a bill for the specific performance of an 
agreement to transfer a certain quantity of stock. But in my opinion there is not any sort of 
analogy between a quantity of 3l. per cents., or any other stock of that description (which 
is always to be had by any person who chooses to apply for it in the market), and a certain 
number of railway shares of a particular description, which railway shares are limited in 
number, and which, as has been observed, are not always to be bad in the market.’” 
165
  J W Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (1951) vol 2 § 3136. See also       
§§ 3113 ff (esp § 3119) where Wessels indicates which English principles should be 
followed by our courts, as they are more than mere technicalities, but sound reasons for 
refusing specific performance, and in harmony with our Roman-Dutch legal foundation. 
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“Where damages are an adequate remedy and there is nothing in the nature of the contract 
to lead the court to the conclusion that the contract ought to be specifically performed, the 
court will not issue a decree of specific performance (Cud v Rutter, 1720, 1 P. Wms 570: 24 
E.R. 521; Withy v Cottle, 1823, 1 L.J.O.S Ch.117: 37 E.R.1024, L.C).”166 
There are situations where the remedy has been refused based on the fact that money 
would adequately compensate the plaintiff for his loss.167 The example most often 
referred to as illustration, is where the item could be easily repurchased on the open 
market. As the quote from Thompson v Pullinger168 above reflects, Kotzé CJ held that 
specific performance should not be granted in the case of shares in companies which 
can be obtained on the market daily without much difficulty.169 In this case the plaintiff 
was employed in a managerial position by a company of which the defendant was the 
managing director. The employment contract granted the plaintiff the option to purchase 
2 000 shares in the company at £1 per share. During the course of his employment, the 
plaintiff was wrongfully dismissed, and he sought specific performance of their 
agreement, claiming delivery of the 2 000 shares against payment of £2 000. The 
defendant, however, argued that the option was no longer available as it terminated 
upon the plaintiff’s dismissal, and refused to deliver the shares. The court found that the 
defendant could not derive any advantage from the wrongful dismissal and that the 
                                                 
166
  See n 18 above. See further Wessels § 3137: “Thus, if ordinary goods or chattels are sold 
such as may be bought anywhere, the court will not order specific performance, but if the 
goods are of a special nature, such as a picture by a particular artist, a vase or other work 
of art, an heirloom or indeed anything which has acquired a peculiar value, the court will 
order specific performance (Leake, Contracts, 8th ed., p. 874).” 
167
  In Visser v Neethling 1921 CPD 176, for example, specific performance was refused of an 
agreement to sell immovable property because the property had “no special and peculiar 
value” to the purchaser who had purchased the property, not for his own occupation, but 
in order to make a profit on re-sale thereof. (This is a peculiar example, for English law 
would surely have awarded specific performance due to the presumed uniqueness of land 
irrespective of the subjective intention of the purchaser – see text to nn 31 & 77 above.)  
168
  (1894) 1 OR 298. 
169
  301. 
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plaintiff therefore was entitled to delivery of the 2 000 shares against payment of £2 000 
to the defendant, as the defendant failed to prove that the shares in his company could 
be easily purchased on the market daily.  
However in Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society,170 it was held that Thompson’s 
case did not reflect our law accurately, as it was based on the incorrect assumption that 
English law became the source of practical application of the remedy.171 In Benson, the 
respondent claimed from the appellant delivery of 63 600 ordinary shares in a listed 
company known as the McCarthy Group Limited. The respondent had purchased from 
the appellant 171 500 shares in the company at a price of 210 cents per share. It was 
an implied term of the agreement that delivery of the shares would take place within a 
reasonable time. The appellant had delivered 107 900 of the shares but had failed to 
deliver the remaining 63 600. The trial court ordered the appellant to transfer the 
shares, and pay the respondent damages for the loss of a dividend he would have 
received had the shares been timeously delivered. On appeal, the appellant admitted 
his failure to deliver the 63 600 shares, but contended that the trial court should have 
exercised its discretion against granting specific performance because ordinary shares 
in the company were readily available in the market at the relevant time. And the 
respondent, once it became apparent that the remaining 63 600 shares would not be 
delivered, could have bought shares elsewhere and could have sued the appellant for 
such damages as it may have suffered as a result of the purchase.  
However, the Appellate Division rejected this contention, accepting and confirming the 
trial court’s decision. The latter court considered the fact that the shares were readily 
available in the market and the fact that the respondent could have been adequately 
compensated by damages, but ultimately found that it did not provide sufficient reason 
to refuse specific performance. The Appellate Division emphasised that although the 
right to specific performance is subject to a judicial discretion to refuse specific 
performance, this discretion cannot in any way be regulated by rigid rules which would 
                                                 
170
   1986 (1) SA 776 (A).  
171
  784-785. See also Beck 1987 CILSA 205. 
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restrict the court’s discretion and erode the right to specific performance.172 Because of 
the fundamental difference between English law and Roman-Dutch law when it comes 
to the exercise of the discretion to order performance, Hefer JA said that there is 
“neither need nor reason” for courts to continue following rules deriving from English law 
when exercising their discretion.173 
It follows that the adequacy of monetary damages does not constitute an independent 
ground on which courts will refuse an order for specific performance.174 Adequacy of 
damages was also mentioned in Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality175 as one of 
the grounds on which the court may, in its discretion, refuse specific performance, but it 
is clear from Benson that it is not, per se, sufficient.176 Hefer JA authoritatively stated 
that “a rule like the one contended for unduly limits the Court’s discretion, and is a 
complete negation of a plaintiff’s right to select his remedy”.177 In this regard he relied 
                                                 
172
  782I-783C. See also para 1 1 1 above. 
173
  785E. 
174
  See generally D J Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 226; F du Bois 
(ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 874; Sharrock “Contract” in 
Joubert & Faris LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed para 495, and specifically Eiselen “Specific performance 
and special damages” in MacQueen & Zimmermann European Contract Law: Scots and 
South African Perspectives 257. 
175
  1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378. 
176
  See also Botes v Botes 1964 (1) SA 623 (O) 629; Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) 
Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 81. 
177
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 784C, cited with approval by Foxcroft J in Santos Professional 
Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 81I. Hefer JA added at 784D that the 
related “available substitute” rule is “equally foreign to our law and inconsistent with a 
plaintiff’s right to performance”. 
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on an earlier decision, Swartz & Son (Pty) Ltd v Wolmaransstad Town Council,178 where 
Hiemstra J (in turn relying on De Wet)179 held the following: 
“Only English authorities are however quoted for the proposition. I doubt whether the mere 
possibility of recovering damages is enough in all cases. If it should be so, the plaintiff’s right 
of election would largely be rendered nugatory. It would cease to be a right and become a 
matter of indulgence by the Court.”180 
In rejecting the notion that adequacy of damages generally warrants refusing specific 
performance or result in damages being awarded, our courts have been reluctant to 
consider the effect the remedy will have once granted.181 Courts have chosen to ignore 
                                                 
178
  1960 (2) SA 1 (T). 
179
  J C de Wet & J P Yeats Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 2 ed (1953) 142. 
See also De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 211. 
180
   1960 (2) SA 1 (T) 3C-D. This quotation appears in Beck 1987 CILSA 198. In Botes v 
Botes 1964 (1) SA 623 (O), Hofmeyr J, having also relied on Swartz & Son, similarly 
stated that “As so ‘n bevel egter sou geweier word bloot om die rede dat skadevergoeding 
voldoende vergoeding vir die eiser sou oplewer, sou die beginsel wat in die Haynes-saak 
herbevestig is naamlik dat die Hof sover as moontlik uitvoering aan ‘n eiser se voorkeur vir 
reële eksekusie gee, nutteloos wees …” (629). 
181
  The locus classicus is the judgment of Innes J in Farmers’ Co-operative Society (Reg) v 
Berry 1912 AD 343 350: “And there are many cases in which justice between the parties 
can be fully and conveniently done by an award of damages. But that is a different thing 
from saying that a defendant who has broken his undertaking has the option to purge his 
default by the payment of money. For in the words of Storey Equity Jurisprudence, Sec 
717(a) it is against conscience that a party should have a right of election whether he 
would perform his contract or only pay damages for the breach of it. The election is rather 
with the injured party, subject to the discretion of the Court.” See also Cohen v Shires, 
McHattie and King (1882) 1 SAR TS 41; Shakinovsky v Lawson and Smulowitz 1904 TS 
326 330; Stacy v Sims 1917 CPD 533; Woods v Walters 1921 AD 303 309; Shill v Milner 
1937 AD 101 109; Roberts Construction Co Ltd v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W) 305B; BK 
Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 
433D-F; Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v BN Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A) 440G-H. For more 
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the fact that specific performance of the contract might result in wastage or loss, and the 
plaintiff can equally well be compensated by an award of damages. For example, in 
Industrial & Mercantile Corporation v Anastassiou Brothers,182 Davidson J granted 
specific performance despite the heavy transaction costs of performance.183 In this case 
the plaintiff sold to the defendant machinery and equipment, which were to be used for 
refrigeration. The defendant agreed to pay the purchase price against delivery of the 
equipment. However, when the plaintiff tendered delivery of the goods to the defendant, 
he refused to accept such delivery or to pay the purchase price. The plaintiff did not 
accept the defendant’s repudiation and consequently claimed the purchase price of the 
goods. The defendant argued that it would be inappropriate for the court to order 
payment of the purchase price against performance of the plaintiff’s obligation “as this 
would involve making an order which Courts should and do avoid making, namely, in 
which the want of supervision over the performance of the acts, on which the order is 
dependent, makes it either improper or useless to order the performance”.184 
Furthermore, the installation of the equipment would take between two weeks and a 
month, during which time its refrigerated goods would have to be stored elsewhere and 
the equipment presently in the shop would have to be removed, and this would cause 
the defendant “considerable loss and discomfort”.185 Accordingly, it was argued that 
damages was the more appropriate remedy. However, the court strongly disagreed and 
rejected the defendant’s argument.186  
                                                                                                                                                             
recent authority, see Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 
73 (C); Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) SA 293 (W), and Vrystaat 
Cheetahs (Edms) Bpk v Mapoe para 110.2 (unreported judgment with case no 4587/2010 
discussed in paras 4 2 1 2 & 4 8 4 below).  
182
  1973 (2) SA 601 (W). 
183
  Van Heerden 1981 Responsa Meridiana 156; Lubbe & Murray Contract 549.  
184
  1973 (2) SA 601 (W) 605H-606A. 
185
  606C. 
186
  609B-C per Davidson J: “That it would be inconvenient [for the defendant if he were 
compelled to accept performance by the plaintiff to install equipment in his premises] is 
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In relation to this aspect of our courts’ approach, it is important to note the concept of 
“efficient breach”. From an economic point of view, it may make sense for a party to 
commit breach of contract if this would lead to wealth/value maximisation or rather, 
minimise loss.187 This theory and its implications are dealt with in depth in the following 
section.188 It suffices for present purposes to note that efficiency justifications for the 
restriction of specific performance have not received much favour with South African 
courts.189 The familiar case of Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund,190 
which is considered in more detail elsewhere in this study, serves as an example.191 
One of the reasons why the court saw it fit to order specific performance of an obligation 
to work against the employee, a football coach, was the fact that he wanted to end the 
employment relationship with his employer, a football club, for a commercial reason: to 
conclude a more lucrative coaching contract with another club in the same soccer 
league (he committed “cynical breach”).192 In rejecting this argument, the court 
                                                                                                                                                             
likely, that he will suffer some financial loss is likely, but that he has brought on himself by 
an arrogant denial of his commitments and I do not believe he should earn particular 
sympathy for that.” See also para 6 1 2 below. 
187
  See generally Van Heerden 1981 Responsa Meridiana 154-156; Stone The Modern Law 
of Contract 463, M Bigoni et al “Unbundling efficient breach” University of Chicago Coase-
Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No 695 (2014); M Smits Efficient 
Breach and the Enforcement of Specific Performance LLM thesis Amsterdam Law School 
(2014) 6-10 (and reference there to Ronald Dworkin’s critique of Posner’s efficiency theory 
(para 3 4 2 below)). 
188
  See para 3 4 2 below. 
189
  Apart from the cases cited in n 181 above, see Shill v Milner 1937 AD 101; Industrial & 
Mercantile Corporation v Anastassiou Brothers 1973 (2) SA 601 (W) (cf para 6 1 2 below); 
Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A); Unibank Savings and 
Loans Ltd (formerly Community Bank) v Absa Bank Ltd 2000 (4) SA 191 (W). See also 
Van Heerden 1981 Responsa Meridiana 155-156 and the authorities cited there. 
190
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C). 
191
  See para 4 2 1 2 below. 
192
  See text to n 99 para 4 2 1 2 below. 
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effectively rejected the theory of efficient breach, which allows debtors to breach when it 
is more efficient for them to do so and pay damages (if any), rather than to perform the 
contract.  
Another reason why the court granted specific performance in this case was because 
specific performance is the primary remedy for breach of contract in our law.193 In 
deciding this and emphasising the supremacy of specific performance in our remedial 
system, according to Naudé,194 the court effectively rejected the position that specific 
performance should not be granted where an award of damages would adequately 
compensate the aggrieved party. However, what the court failed to consider,195 was the 
suggestion in Benson that the adequacy of damages as well as other obstacles to 
specific performance derived from English law, “remained relevant factors which are to 
be considered on the same basis as any other relevant fact …”196 Rules to the effect 
that specific performance should be refused where ordinary goods are sold, or shares 
which are readily available on the market (because damages would constitute an 
adequate remedy) were rejected in Benson, but, as Beck stated, Hefer JA “did not say 
that the principles of English law could never be referred to”.197 
                                                 
193
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 81A-E, 84I, 87A. See also para 2 2 3 above. 
194
  T Naudé “Specific performance against an employee: Santos Professional Football Club 
(Pty) Ltd v Igesund” 2003 SALJ 269 272. See also K Mould “The suitability of the remedy 
of specific performance to breach of a ‘player’s contract’ with specific reference to the 
Mapoe and Santos cases” 2011 PELJ 189 204. 
195
  2003 SALJ 272. See also Sharrock “Contract” in Joubert & Faris LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed para 
496.  
196
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 785F-G.  
197
  Beck 1987 CILSA 190 205. See also Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & 
Visser (eds) Southern Cross 330: The Benson judgment affirmed, inter alia, that “the 
English legal guidelines regarding the circumstances in which specific performance is an 
inappropriate remedy cannot fetter the discretion of a South African court (although they 
may continue to be relevant as factors to be considered in a pool of relevant 
considerations)”; G Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order 
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The question is thus not whether adequacy of damages might be a relevant factor in the 
court’s decision; this was affirmatively answered by Benson. The question is rather 
under what circumstances adequacy of damages might carry sufficient weight to 
warrant denying specific performance. In the following concluding section it will be 
sought to provide greater clarity in this regard. 
3 4  Evaluative remarks and conclusions 
3 4 1 Introduction 
The point of departure in Anglo-American law is that specific performance is only 
available when damages would not adequately compensate the aggrieved party. 
However, even though this adequacy-of-damages test is long established, it remains 
controversial. Professor Dawson once described it as “an unnecessary and irksome 
restriction of specific performance”, which is applied in an “arbitrary and irrational” 
manner.198 However, other commentators contend that it actually fulfils an important 
and valuable role in restricting the availability of “contempt-backed” remedies, which 
include specific performance.199 Section 3 2 above deals with a number of situations 
where damages is said to be inadequate, the underlying reason being that it fails to 
protect the parties’ interest in performance. Anglo-American law will then award specific 
performance as an alternative, secondary remedy whenever damages is inadequate to 
protect the plaintiff’s interest in performance.  
                                                                                                                                                             
for specific performance in South African Law” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance 
in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 95 110-111: “The Benson 
judgment itself recognises that factors that in the past have served as reasons to deny 
specific performance remain relevant to the exercise of the discretion.” 
198
  J P Dawson “Specific performance in France and Germany” (1959) 57 Mich LR 495 532. 
199
  Cunnington “The inadequacy of damages as a remedy for breach of contract” in Rickett 
(ed) Justifying Private Law Remedies 116. Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of 
Contract 459 also maintains that “the adequacy of damages restriction rests on a sound 
footing”. 
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It is clear that Anglo-American law has developed in the direction of an approach that 
places emphasis on the appropriateness of the remedy in the circumstances. The 
extraordinary remedy of specific performance rarely was available to a creditor at 
common law. However, as indicated above, the possibility of obtaining specific 
performance as a remedy has increased in the common law. This was accomplished by 
the development of the “inadequacy of damages” requirement to the “appropriateness 
of the remedy” requirement by the courts. This is an indication that common lawyers 
have gradually started to realise that their traditional approach is unduly restrictive.200 
Even one of their major justifications for the restriction of specific performance, namely 
economic efficiency, has been cast in doubt. As was mentioned in the introduction to 
this thesis and in the previous section, the theory of efficient breach goes some way to 
explaining why the common law of contract is generally more disposed to award 
damages than to insist on literal performance.201 The following section looks closely and 
critically at the efficiency justification and questions its tenability. 
3 4 2 The efficient breach fallacy  
In the common law an important motivation behind the approach that the remedy should 
provide adequate relief has been the need to promote economic efficiency. This view 
has been strongly advanced by proponents of the “economic analysis of law” 
approach.202 More specifically, academic support for the primacy of damages has been 
                                                 
200
  See esp para 3 2 1 2 above on the specific enforceability of contracts of which the subject 
matter concerns ordinary (i.e. non-unique) personal property. 
201
  See also n 10 para 3 2 above. 
202
  For a detailed consideration of the economic analysis of contract remedies, see Van 
Heerden 1981 Responsa Meridiana 147; L Kornhauser “An introduction to the economic 
analysis of contract remedies” (1986) 57 University of Colorado Law Review 683; S 
Shavell “Specific performance versus damages for breach of contract: an economic 
analysis” (2006) 84 Tex LR 831; L Smith “Understanding specific performance” in N 
Cohen & E McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (2005) 221; 
G Klass “Efficient breach is dead; long live efficient breach” Georgetown Public Law and 
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expressed in the theory of efficient breach, which has attempted to explain and justify 
the common law’s preference for damages.203 Anglo-American jurists and scholars 
often justify the limitation of specific performance on efficiency grounds.204 The basic 
premise of the economic analysis of law is that the primary purpose of legal rules and 
institutions is to achieve efficiency in the use of resources.205 Therefore, the proponents 
of the economic analysis of law argue that efficiency might suffer as a result of 
expanding the remedy of specific performance, because it prevents a debtor from re-
allocating his resources to higher valued uses even though damages would adequately 
compensate the creditor.206 Thus, the common law’s continuing preference for damages 
has been regarded as preferable (from an economic point of view) because damages 
allow the debtors to breach when it is more efficient for them to do so than to perform 
the contract.207 Furthermore, they argue that specific performance is over-compensatory 
                                                                                                                                                             
Legal Theory Research Paper No 13-018 (2013), and recent LLM thesis by Smits Efficient 
Breach and the Enforcement of Specific Performance. 
203
  See E A Farnsworth “Damages and specific relief” (1979) 27 Am J Comp L 247 247-248; 
Sharpe “Specific relief for contract breach” in Reiter & Swan (eds) Studies in Contract Law 
123 139 ff; G Hesen & R Hardy “Is the system of contract remedies in the Netherlands 
efficient from a law and economics perspective?” in J M Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 287 295; R A 
Posner The Economic Analysis of Law 8 ed (2011) 149 ff. For analysis of this position, 
see Van Heerden 1981 Responsa Meridiana 154 ff.  
204
  For book-length discussion on the efficiency standard for evaluating the law, see S 
Shavell Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (2004) and Posner The Economic 
Analysis of Law 8 ed (2011).  
205
  See A T Kronman “Specific performance” (1978) 45 U Chi LR 351-354; P Burrows & C G 
Veljanovski The Economic Approach to Law (1981) 3; Posner Economic Analysis of Law 
15-20; A Schwartz & D Markowits “The myth of efficient breach” 2010 Yale Law Faculty 
Scholarship Series Paper 93.  
206
  See Farnsworth 1979 Am J Comp L 250-251; Posner Economic Analysis of Law 150 ff. 
207
  Chen-Wishart Contract Law 552; B H Bix Contract Law: Rules, Theory, and Context 
(2012) 141 ff. 
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in many cases, because the rules regarding mitigation are not applicable. This would 
result in the plaintiff receiving more than he would receive if damages (which include the 
rules of mitigation) were awarded.208 Posner, who is a pioneer in law and economic 
analysis,209 contends that it is uneconomical to enforce performance of a contract after it 
has been breached, because it often results in a waste of resources.210 A breach is 
therefore regarded as efficient in economic terms if it entails an advantage to the 
breaching party that is greater than the monetary loss to the aggrieved party. In such a 
                                                 
208
  See E A Farnsworth “Legal remedies for breach of contract” (1970) 70 Colum LR 1145 
1158-1159; Sharpe “Specific relief for contract breach” in Reiter & Swan (eds) Studies in 
Contract Law 123 139 ff; Smith “Understanding specific performance” in Cohen & 
McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract 227; and see Domowicz 
v Orsa Investments Ltd (1993) 15 O.R. (3d) 661 (paras 56-57 in particular) and the 
authorities cited there. 
209
  According to Schwartz & Markowits “The myth of efficient breach” 2010 Yale Law Faculty 
Scholarship Series paper 93, the general law and economics view is captured in the title 
of Posner’s article “Let us never blame a contract breaker” (2008-2009) 107 Mich LR 
1349. See also P Cserne Freedom of Contract and Paternalism: Prospects and Limits of 
an Economic Approach (2012) 7. 
210
  See eg Patton v Mid-Continent Systems Inc 841 F.2d 742 (7th Cir.1988), in which Posner 
CJ states: “Even if the breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy. The 
promisor may simply have discovered that his performance is worth more to someone 
else. If so, efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break his promise, provided he makes 
good the promisee’s actual losses. If he is forced to pay more than that, an efficient 
breach may be deterred and the law doesn’t want to bring about such a result” (at 750). 
The example often referred to in this regard is that of the supplier who contracts to provide 
components to a manufacturer for use in the production of a product, but before delivery 
the supplier is approached by another manufacturer, who explains that he urgently needs 
the same component, and is prepared to pay more than the first manufacturer. Based on 
the efficiency argument, the supplier is allowed or even encouraged to breach, because 
he would benefit from it. 
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case, compensating the aggrieved party would still leave the breaching party in a better 
position than if the contract were required to be performed in specie.211  
However, some law and economics scholars argue that specific performance actually 
protects the expectation interest and therefore avoids over-compensation and under-
compensation.212 They argue that specific performance should be made routinely 
                                                 
211
  This is in line with the concept of Pareto efficiency, which is obtained when a distribution 
strategy exists whereby one party’s situation cannot be improved without making another 
party’s situation worse. A Pareto improvement occurs when it is possible to make at least 
one person better off by moving resources from one allocation to another, without making 
any other person worse off. Presently, economists often refer to the Kaldor-Hicks concept 
of efficiency. Under this criterion the market outcome is efficient if the gains of those that 
are made better off are higher than the losses of those that are made worse off by the re-
allocation of resources, so that the former group would be capable of compensating the 
latter group (see Posner Economic Analysis of Law 15-20). See also Cserne Freedom of 
Contract and Paternalism 6; Smits Efficient Breach and the Enforcement of Specific 
Performance 8, 38, and M Bigoni et al “Unbundling efficient breach” University of Chicago 
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No 695 (2014) 3.  
212
  The most well-known version of this claim (i.e. that specific performance is no less ex post 
efficient than expectation damages) appears in A Schwartz “The case for specific 
performance” (1979) 89 Yale LJ 271. See further P Linzer “On the amorality of contract 
remedies” (1981) 81 Colum LR 111; T S Ulen “The efficiency of specific performance” 
(1984) 83 Mich LR 341; A Sadanand “Lost profits, market damages, and specific 
performance: an economic analysis of buyer’s breach” (1987) 20(4) The Canadian Journal 
of Economics 750; D Friedmann “The efficient breach fallacy” (1989) 18 J Legal Stud 1; A 
Schwartz “The myth that promises prefer supra compensatory remedies” (1990) 100 Yale 
LJ 369. For more recent treatments of these claims, see R Brooks “The efficient 
performance hypothesis” (2006) 116 Yale LJ 568, 591-592; J S Kraus “A critique of the 
efficient performance hypothesis” (2007) 116 Yale LJ Pocket Part 424; G Klass “Efficient 
breach is dead; long live efficient breach” Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper No 13-018 (2013); T Eisenberg & G P Miller “Damages versus specific 
performance: lessons from commercial contracts” NYU Law and Economics Research 
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available to aggrieved parties, as it provides the most effective method of achieving the 
compensation goal of contract remedies, because it gives the creditor precisely what he 
contracted for.213 Their dissatisfaction and opinions resemble those expressed by 
civilian lawyers. Civil-law systems are inimical towards allowing the debtor to avoid 
performing his obligations by merely paying damages. German law does not completely 
preclude the idea of efficient breach,214 for example in relation to service contracts,215 
but the predominant view is against allowing the debtor to breach where the breach 
would provide a greater advantage to him.216 Demanding performance remains the 
primary right of the creditor, and performing the contract the primary duty of the 
debtor.217  
It can be doubted, though, whether the efficient breach justification is tenable.218 It has 
been contested in common law court decisions219 and scholarly literature alike.220 The 
                                                                                                                                                             
Paper No 13-09 (2013) (electronic copy available online at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241654>). 
213
  Cf Schwartz & Markowits “The myth of efficient breach” 2010 Yale Law Faculty 
Scholarship Series Paper 93, for a response to what the authors describe as “a growing 
chorus of claims that the standard remedy for breach of contract – the expectation remedy 
– is unjust”. The authors also provide a detailed analysis of the arguments that are 
advanced to support this claim in part 4 of their contribution. 
214
  See in this regard, Smits Efficient Breach and the Enforcement of Specific Performance 
30, for a European civil law perspective and, perhaps, a more impartial and reliable 
portrayal of the efficiency justification for the restriction of specific performance in certain 
instances. See also reference to Smits in n 81 para 2 3 1 1 above. 
215
  See para 4 5 1 below. 
216
  Compare also text to n 81 para 2 3 1 1 above. 
217
  B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston The German Law of Contract: A Comparative 
Treatise 2 ed (2006) 399. Compare also text to n 81 para 2 3 1 1 above. 
218
  Whether economic efficiency really requires substitutional rather than specific relief goes 
far beyond the scope of this chapter. This debate has been the subject of extensive 
discussion in law and economics scholarship, which cannot be consolidated here. See 
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criticisms are that the efficient breach theory does not give adequate consideration to 
the law’s role in preventing and resolving conflict, the purpose of creating a contract, the 
intrinsic value of a promise, and the law’s concern to prevent people from profiting as a 
consequence of their own wrongdoings.221 Furthermore, it is argued that the theory fails 
to translate into practice, as it limits the ability of creditors to recover fully. This is 
because determining the true extent of the loss suffered is difficult, and even if this 
obstacle is overcome, the law of contract contains a number of doctrines which have the 
effect of preventing creditors from recovering the full extent of their loss.222 The theory is 
also regarded as in itself inefficient, because it generates more transactions, and 
therefore related costs, than specific performance.223 Critics further contend that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
esp in this regard, Schwartz 1979 Yale LJ 271, and Van Heerden 1981 Responsa 
Meridiana 147. 
219
  See eg Van Camp Chocolates Ltd v Aulsebrooks Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 354 (CA); Day v 
Mead [1987] 2 NZLR 443 (CA); Newmans Tours Ltd v Ranier Investments Ltd [1992] 2 
NZLR 68 (HC); Butler v Countrywide Finance Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 623 (HC). 
220
  See esp F Cuncannon “The case for the specific performance as the primary remedy for 
breach of contract in New Zealand” (2004) 35 VUWLR 659. The author provides us with 
an extremely one-sided argument in support of specific performance and fails to recognise 
that the remedy also has some shortcomings, which substantiate the common law’s 
preference for damages. See also N C Z Khouri “Efficient breach theory in the law of 
contract: an analysis” (2002) 9 Auckland University Law Review 739. 
221
  Cuncannon 2004 VUWLR 662. 
222
  Friedmann 1989 J Legal Stud 13. See more recently, Bigoni et al “Unbundling efficient 
breach” University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research 
Paper No 695 (2014) 11, 27-28. 
223
  Cuncannon submits that if the debtor chooses to breach the contract, there will be at a 
minimum two additional transactions. First, there will be the transaction with the new 
creditor. Secondly, there will be the transaction forced upon the original creditor as a result 
of the breach. It is unrealistic to assume there will be no transaction costs in making the 
compensation payment. It is likely only to be resolved after negotiation or litigation. It may 
also lead to a third transaction, a delictual claim against the new creditor for interference 
with a contractual relationship (2004 VUWLR 667). See further I R Macneil “Efficient 
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theory is based upon the assumption that, as rational economic actors, creditors will be 
satisfied by an award of damages and will not be upset by the debtors being able to 
unilaterally determine the best use of the creditor’s contractual rights. This would be 
inconsistent with the parties’ motivations for entering into the contract and the principle 
of freedom of contract.224 Critics insist that, as a result of these shortcomings, the theory 
of efficient breach should be rejected as a justification for the supremacy of damages, 
as expressed in the adequacy-of-damages doctrine.225 
The international commercial environment similarly values the principles of freedom and 
sanctity of contract. International instruments place considerable emphasis on keeping 
promises in order to promote international business confidence and, as a consequence, 
facilitate international contractual negotiations and relationships.226 The model 
instruments under review also specifically incorporate a duty to observe good faith.227 A 
major point of criticism against the common law position is that it encourages parties to 
breach contracts, based on economic considerations of efficiency, i.e. provided that it 
                                                                                                                                                             
breach of contract: circles in the sky” (1982) 68 Virginia Law Review 947; E A Posner 
“Economic analysis of contract law after three decades: success or failure?” (2003) 112 
Yale LJ 829; Smith “Understanding specific performance” in Cohen & McKendrick (eds) 
Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract 225, and Smits Efficient Breach and the 
Enforcement of Specific Performance 13-16. 
224
  Friedmann argues that “the essence of contract is performance. Contracts are made in 
order to be performed” (“The performance interest in contract damages” (1995) 11 LQR 
628 629). See also C S Warkol “Resolving the paradox between legal theory and legal 
fact: the judicial rejection of the theory of efficient breach” (1998-1999) 20 Cardozo Law 
Review 321 343-345.  
225
  Cuncannon 2004 VUWLR 666-667. See also Friedmann 1989 J Legal Stud 1; 1995 LQR 
628; C Webb “Performance and compensation: an analysis of contract damages and 
contractual obligation” (2006) 26 OJLS 41; and “counterpoint” discussion by Chen-Wishart 
Contract Law 552.  
226
  See para 2 3 3 above. 
227
  See Articles 1.7 PICC; 1:201 PECL; III–1:103 DCFR; 2 CESL; 7 CISG (Addendum A). 
See also paras 6 3 & 6 5 1 below. 
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results in a more efficient allocation of resources. Parties are encouraged to commit 
breach of contract, which is in direct opposition to the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
and the underlying ideology of the international instruments.228  
3 4 3  The supplementary role of adequacy of damages in South African law 
Although South African courts have rightly rejected the traditional English adequacy of 
damages limitation, our law can gain from the experiences of modern English law. As 
indicated above, English law has more recently increasingly appreciated that in deciding 
which remedy to grant, courts engage in a context-specific evaluation of which remedy 
would be the most appropriate in the circumstances. The Benson decision provides 
insight and direction in this regard. 
In this case, Hefer JA identified three general principles which guide the discretion to 
refuse an order of specific performance. Firstly, the discretion “is aimed at preventing an 
injustice – for cases do arise where justice demands that a plaintiff be denied his right to 
performance – and the basic principle thus is that the order which the Court makes 
should not produce an unjust result which will be the case, eg, if, in the particular 
circumstances, the order will operate unduly harshly on the defendant”. Secondly “the 
remedy of specific performance should always be granted or withheld in accordance 
with legal and public policy”. Thirdly, Hefer JA says that “the Court will not decree 
specific performance where performance has become impossible”.229 
Hence, it is well settled that courts should always bear in mind that granting the remedy 
should not produce injustice. According to Hutchison and Du Bois “[t]he basic principle 
underlying the exercise of the discretion is that the order made by the court should not 
                                                 
228
  See again para 2 4 above. 
229
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783C-F. See also M A Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and 
Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law (1989) 132-134; A J Kerr The Principles of the 
Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 681, and para 7 2 1 below. 
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produce an unjust result”.230 It is then in this context that the issue of adequacy of 
damages becomes relevant. The implication is that the debate regarding the adequacy 
of damages rule in our law cannot be separated from the broader requirement 
(reiterated in Benson) that granting specific performance should not produce an unjust 
result.  
Benson provides more recent and more authoritative support for the proposition that the 
harsh operation of the remedy on the defaulting party or third parties should be a 
concern to our courts especially if the loss can be prevented by granting damages.231  
From Benson we can infer that although adequacy of damages is not, per se, a 
sufficient basis for refusing specific performance; it is relevant to the courts’ decision 
where there are other considerations, namely injustice and harshness, which militate 
against the granting of specific performance.232 And the adequacy criterion may aid in 
applying the general “Benson principles” which (currently) regulate the discretion to 
refuse an order of specific performance.233 In this regard the reasoning of Hiemstra J in 
Swartz & Son is instructive. Here the applicant agreed to erect a building for the 
respondent municipality. Whilst engaged in such work, the applicant received a letter 
from the respondent’s attorneys in which they notified him that they were terminating the 
agreement (because he failed to furnish security and because the work was neglected, 
i.e. because he violated the terms of their agreement) and that another building 
contractor had been appointed to complete the work. Hiemstra J considered the 
provision of security as vital to their agreement, and held that the applicant’s continued 
failure to provide it whilst the contract required security “forthwith” amounted to a breach 
which justified the respondent’s cancellation.234 He further refused to order specific 
                                                 
230
  Du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 873. See also Lambiris Orders of 
Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 131. 
231
  See also text to n 245 below. 
232
  See Roberts Construction Co Ltd v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W) esp 307 (discussed in 
para 4 2 1 2 below). See also De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 211.  
233
  See, however, para 7 2 2 below. 
234
  1960 (2) SA 1 (T) 4F-5A. 
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performance, because it would be unreasonable towards the respondent in the 
circumstances,235 and because damages would in any event provide adequate 
compensation to the applicant.236  
The overlapping operation of the “adequacy” and “injustice”/“hardship” factors and the 
supplementary role of adequacy of damages is also illustrated by Haynes v 
Kingwilliamstown Municipality237 and the leading modern English case on specific 
performance, Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd.238 The 
facts of these cases and the reasons for the decisions have been dealt with 
elsewhere.239 It is sufficient for present purposes to note that in both cases the 
oppressiveness of requiring the defendant to perform his contractual obligations and the 
fact that damages would adequately compensate the plaintiff, influenced the courts to 
refuse the remedy. 240 
Lubbe and Murray also offer valuable guidance in this regard. They contend that even 
though case law suggests that South African law has been unnecessarily influenced by 
English principles,241 it fails to explain why specific performance should be the preferred 
remedy, even where damages is an adequate remedy.242 The authors also pose the 
following insightful question/s: 
                                                 
235
  4. 
236
  1960 (2) SA 1 (T) 3 (own emphasis). The judge rejected the applicant’s contention that 
damages could not be accurately assessed because the loss of the contract may imperil 
his chances of getting other contracts, describing this argument as “far-fetched” (at 5B). 
237
  1951 (2) SA 371 (A). 
238
  [1997] 2 WLR 898. 
239
  See paras 5 2 (Argyll) & 6 1 1 (Haynes) below. 
240
  On the relevance of undue hardship for the decision whether to specifically enforce a 
contract, see ch 6 below. 
241
  Citing National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 151 (T) 
and Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
242
  Lubbe & Murray Contract 547-548. 
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“Is the financial loss that the guilty party might suffer a factor that the court should consider in 
choosing to exercise its discretion not to order specific performance? Might this be one of the 
circumstances in which, in the words of Hefer JA in the Benson case, ‘the order will operate 
unduly harshly on the defendant’?” 
McLennan has also suggested that in spite of there being no rule that a court will refuse 
to order specific performance where a contract involves goods that are readily available 
on the market, our courts should be wary when exercising their discretion in favour of 
specific performance in these cases.243 The main reason advanced is that damages 
could be the more appropriate remedy in some of these cases, as it provides a more 
convenient and less time-consuming and therefore less expensive solution.244 Phrased 
in economic analysis of law terminology, he thus argues that courts should be mindful of 
exercising their discretion in favour of specific performance if the result would be an 
inefficient use of resources.245   
It is submitted that these are valid arguments which cannot be ignored when courts 
determine what form of redress to afford the plaintiff. We can also take instruction from 
other jurisdictions, which support greater use of specific performance as a remedy for 
breach of contract, such as Germany and the Netherlands. While they accept the right 
                                                 
243
  See case comment on Benson by J S McLennan “Specific performance and the court’s 
discretion” 1986 SALJ 522. See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 548. 
244
  See 1986 SALJ 524: “We are not told why the appellant failed to deliver the shares nor 
why the respondent did not purchase them on the stock market. If it had done so, and if it 
could, in fact, have acquired the shares for 210 cents or less, it might have saved itself an 
enormous amount of trouble, time and expense.” See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 549. 
245
  In his words (524): “the English rule, despite its drawbacks, does at least have an appeal 
to good commercial sense, and it probably operates to discourage (a) plaintiffs from acting 
unreasonably and thereby (b) unnecessary litigation”. According to Lubbe & Murray 
(Contract 549), McLennan thereby “suggests that the very failure to deliver goods that are 
freely available may reflect a background that makes a plaintiff’s insistence on specific 
performance unreasonable, and thus that courts should be disinclined to order specific 
performance”. Compare also Van Heerden 1981 Responsa Meridiana 155. 
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of every contractual party to specific performance of the contract, these systems also 
accept that there are certain limitations to this general entitlement to specific 
performance. It follows that the right will only be enforced in situations where one of the 
defined exceptions does not apply.246 For example, in German law, § 275(2) of the BGB 
excludes the duty of performance “to the extent that performance requires expense and 
effort which, taking into account the subject matter of the obligation and the 
requirements of good faith, is grossly disproportionate to the interest in performance of 
the obligee”. In Dutch law, the courts will similarly refuse to enforce a contract where the 
contract will be extremely disadvantageous and unreasonable to the debtor.247 Thus, 
the enforceability of the right to performance is determined by the facts of the case and 
courts are able to refuse to enforce an obligation where it would have harsh and 
unreasonable effects on the debtor.   
Moreover, the international instruments, which accommodate both common-law and 
civil-law systems, and demonstrate how a synthesis of diverging principles could be 
achieved in a more successful manner, recognise exceptions in terms of which the 
remedy can be refused if the facts of the case demand it. The PECL, for example, 
provides in Article 9:102(2)(b) that specific performance will not be granted where 
performance would cause the debtor unreasonable effort or expense. Subsection (2)(d) 
also restricts the aggrieved party’s entitlement to specific performance if he may 
reasonably obtain performance from another source. The PICC, the DCFR, and the 
CESL contain similar provisions.248 In an insightful manner, Chen-Wishart, in concluding 
her comparative discussion of the considerations that weigh against the remedy, 
observes that  
                                                 
246
  See generally para 2 3 1 above. See esp Smits Efficient Breach and the Enforcement of 
Specific Performance (n 214 above). 
247
  See eg, HR 16 January 1981, NJ 1981, 312 (X/Y) (cf text to n 138 para 6 3 below). 
248
  See Articles 7.2.2 PICC, III–3:302 DCFR, 110-111, 132 CESL and paras 2 3 3 2 (esp n 
244) above & 6 4 below. 
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“[t]he open-textured nature of these considerations means that, no matter how the discretion 
is structured (whether as the primary or supplementary remedy), courts of all systems must 
engage in the same delicate balancing of competing policies on the facts of particular 
cases”.249  
Finally, the following meaningful passage by Beck250 also merits attention, because it 
drives the point home in the South African context:  
“In theory there is certainly an important difference between Roman-Dutch law and common 
law; in practice, however, it is of considerable less moment. As shown above, the tendency in 
England has been to move away from the rigid categories of the past and to grant specific 
performance when it is the most appropriate remedy; a similar development has been seen 
in the South African cases considered above. While there can be no doubt, therefore, that 
logically speaking the approach of Hefer JA is sound, some of his reasoning seems to smack 
of the purist movement illustrated by Forsyth in his study of the Appellate Division. It is 
submitted that the court would have done better to stick to a more systematic exposition of 
the best solution.”251 
This means that our courts must carefully consider and balance the circumstances of 
each case in deciding between awarding specific performance and damages. Our 
courts should focus on finding the appropriate remedy for the specific case and must be 
mindful not to proceed too dogmatically in order to preserve Roman-Dutch principles.252 
                                                 
249
  Contract Law 553.  
250
  1987 CILSA 190 205. 
251
  Citing C F Forsyth In Danger for their Talents: A Study of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa from 1950-80 (1985). 
252
  The following statement by Hefer JA certainly “smacks” of the “purist movement” Beck 
alludes to above: “This right is the cornerstone of our law relating to specific performance. 
Once that is realised, it seems clear, both logically and as a matter of principle, that any 
curtailment of the Court’s discretion inevitably entails an erosion of the plaintiff’s right to 
performance and that there can be no rule, whether it be flexible or inflexible, as to the 
way in which the discretion is to be exercised, which does not affect the plaintiff's right in 
some way or another” (1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 782I-783A). 
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It is suggested that Hefer JA’s argument in favour of specific performance253 may not be 
strong enough where the party in breach is likely to suffer considerably from having to 
comply with the agreement and the aggrieved party can equally well be compensated 
by an award of damages. Insistence on specific performance may be unreasonable in 
these circumstances.254 
3 4 4  Conclusion 
While reasserting the “unfettered” discretion of the courts to refuse specific 
performance, the court in Benson also made it clear that this discretion is not an 
arbitrary capricious discretion;255 and therefore it must be regulated by principles that 
will make it equitable256 and judicial.257 Benson’s case thus provides certain parameters 
within which courts can exercise their discretion.258 For example, if the granting of the 
order will cause undue hardship to the defendant, courts should refuse to grant it. This 
is an aspect of the equitable nature of the discretion, which requires the court always to 
have in mind the need to avoid injustice. As was mentioned earlier, Benson’s case did 
not render the English or “Haynes” factors irrelevant.259 These can be applied, in order 
                                                 
253
  See text to n 173 above. 
254
  See reference to Lubbe & Murray in n 245 above. 
255
  See Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 321, 323. 
256
  323. See also Beck 1987 CILSA 200. 
257
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783B-C. See also F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law 873; R H Christie & G B Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed 
(2011) 547. 
258
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783C per Hefer JA: “This does not mean that the discretion is in all 
respects completely unfettered. It remains, after all, a judicial discretion and from its very 
nature arises the requirement that it is not to be exercised capriciously, nor upon a wrong 
principle…” It follows that, although the discretion is not circumscribed by any other rules, 
there are factors that may play a role in the exercise of the discretion due to this inherent 
requirement (cf text to n 229 above).  
259
  See esp text to nn 196-197 above. See also Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the 
discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in South African Law” in Smits et al 
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to decide whether specific performance would cause injustice.260 Accordingly, it is 
suggested that, subject to the overriding need to avoid injustice or oppression, courts 
should take into account the possibility that the plaintiff would be adequately 
compensated by damages. However, it is suggested that the relevance of damages as 
remedy is limited. The purpose of this chapter was to indicate that if the adequacy of 
damages is to influence the decision whether to refuse specific performance, it can only 
be of secondary or “parasitic” significance inasmuch as it supports other considerations 
for refusing the remedy, such as preventing injustice or harshness, rather than acting as 
a main or primary reason for doing so. These other considerations are dealt with in 
detail in the following chapters. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 100, and 
paras 4 8 2, 6 1 1 & 6 1 2 below. 
260
  See also Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract 226: “[i]n our law the creditor 
has a right to specific performance which should only be refused when factors appear that 
make the decree inequitable to the defendant”, and Lambiris Orders of Specific 
Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 134: “courts will do 
everything in their power to preserve the plaintiff’s right to choose an order of specific 
performance as his remedy except issue an order that is unjust, inequitable or impossible 
for the debtor to comply with. This guiding light has been kept under a bushel at times but 
its glimmer is often discernable in the cases if one is looking out for it”. 
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CHAPTER 4: PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS 
4 1  Introduction 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the enforcement of agreements for personal 
services, and especially with how the courts from various jurisdictions have balanced 
competing factors in awarding this remedy. The chapter first discusses and analyses 
how South African courts currently treat the enforcement of personal service contracts. 
Thereafter, it deals with the treatment of this problem by different legal systems and 
international instruments, with the aim of determining what principles they adopted to 
the enforcement of these contracts and what considerations underlie these principles. 
The chapter concludes with an evaluative discussion, which takes into account the 
different approaches revealed by the comparative analysis. Finally, some suggestions 
will be made for the future development of our law.  
Whereas chapter 3 aimed to indicate that the adequacy of damages should not 
constitute a decisive factor in refusing specific performance, this chapter intends to 
explore to what extent the fact that a contract involves highly personal obligations 
should generally be an impediment to an order for specific performance.  
When examining orders of specific performance of personal service contracts, it is 
important to appreciate that they could assume various forms or types, or could be 
divided into specific sub-categories.1 In the following section a distinction will be drawn 
between two main categories of personal service contracts, namely employment 
contracts and other service contracts. The latter category includes agreements to 
perform a specific service that do not entail a continuous personal relationship.2  
The phenomenon that a personal service contract can assume various forms has 
ancient origins. Roman law, for example, distinguished between locatio conductio 
                                                 
1
  See eg A J Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 681. 
2
  See Pougnet v Ramlakan 1961 (2) SA 163 (N) 166, referring to Schierhout v Minister of 
Justice 1926 AD 99 107. 
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operarum and locatio conductio operis.3 Locatio conductio operarum relates to the 
letting and hiring of someone’s personal services in exchange for remuneration;4 it 
typically is a contract of employment. In South African law, locatio conductio operarum5 
is sometimes translated as “contract of employment” or (rather confusingly and vaguely) 
as “contract of service”.6 Locatio conductio operis in turn relates to the letting and hiring 
of a specific piece of work,7 such as the repair or construction of a building. It is 
sometimes (again rather confusingly) translated as “contract of work”.8 For purposes of 
this discussion and to avoid any unnecessary confusion, the general category “personal 
service contracts” is used. This is divided into two branches referred to above, namely 
locatio conductio operarum (contract of employment) and locatio conductio operis 
(contract of work). Thus, the category includes general services (operarum) and specific 
work assignments (operis). 
                                                 
3
 See D J Joubert “Die kontraktuele verhouding tussen professionele man en kliënt” 1970 
Acta Juridica 9; J A C Thomas Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 296-298; M Kaser Roman 
Private Law 3 ed trans R Dannenbring (1980) 219-224; P du Plessis Borkowski’s 
Textbook on Roman Law 4 ed (2010) 277-279; R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: 
Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 394-395, Smit v Workmen’s 
Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) 56-58; B Jordaan “Employment 
relations” in R Zimmermann & D Visser Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in 
South Africa (1996) 389 390; M Freedland & N Kountouris The Legal Construction of 
Personal Work Relations (2011) 116 ff. 
4
  See D 16 3 1 9; 19 2 19 9; 19 2 38; Thomas Textbook of Roman Law 297. 
5
  See generally on locatio conductio operarum in South African law, J S A Fourie Die 
Dienskontrak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg LLD thesis UNISA Pretoria (1977). 
6
  Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A); Minister van Polisie 
v Gamble 1979 (4) SA 759 (A); Mtetwa v Minister of Health 1989 (3) SA 600 (D); Toerien 
v Stellenbosch University 1996 (1) SA 197 (C); Marais v Bezuidenhout 1999 (3) SA 988 
(W); Motor Industry Bargaining Council v Mac-Rites Panel Beaters & Spray Painters (Pty) 
Ltd 2001 (2) SA 1161 (N); Stein v Rising Tide Productions CC 2002 (5) SA 199 (C). 
7
  See D 19 2 22 2; 19 2 30 3; 19 2 36; 50 16 5 1; Thomas Textbook of Roman Law 296. 
8
  See cases cited in n 6 above.  
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Quite often, locatio conductio operarum has been regarded as distinguishable from 
locatio conductio operis in the civilian tradition on the basis that the provider of the 
service does not promise that he will ensure that a certain result comes about but 
merely that he will perform the service as promised.9 In South African law, the 
distinction was further explained as follows by the court in Colonial Mutual Life 
Assurance Society Ltd v Macdonald:10 
“In the former case (locatio conductio operarum) the relation between the two contracting 
parties is much more intimate than in the latter (locatio conductio operis), the servant 
becoming subordinate to the master, whereas in the latter case the contractor remains on a 
footing of equality with the employer. Where a master engages a servant to work for him the 
master is entitled under the contract to supervise and control the work of the servant.” 
Hence “[t]he more independent, generally speaking, the position of the person rendering 
the services, the stronger the probability that we are dealing with locatio conductio 
operis”.11 However, in Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner12 Jansen JA 
held that the element of supervision and control is not the sole determinative factor but 
                                                 
9
  See P van Warmelo An Introduction to the Principles of Roman Civil Law (1976) 181-187;  
Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 393-394; B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston 
The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise 2 ed (2006) 153 528. 
10
  1931 AD 412. Here the respondent, an insurance agent, was classified as an independent 
contractor under the locatio conductio operis and not an employee or “servant” of the 
insurance society, for whose negligent acts the society (principal) would have been liable.  
11
  Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 397. 
12
  1979 (1) SA 51 (A). In this case the appellant, an agent of an insurance company, 
suffered severe bodily injuries in a motor car accident arising out of and in the course of 
performance of his duties. He was classified as an independent contractor in accordance 
with an agreement of locatio conductio operaris, because there was no right of supervision 
and control of an agent by the insurance company; he was not a “workman” as 
contemplated by the Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941, and he was therefore not 
entitled to compensation and payment of medical aid expenses under the provisions of 
the Act.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   166 
 
merely one of the indicia, and that there may also be other important criteria to be 
considered to distinguish between a contract of service (locatio operarum) and a 
contract for work (locatio operis) or, to use the terminology of English law, an employee 
and independent contractor.13  
Apart from the existence of a relationship of authority, a number of other criteria have 
been applied in South African law in drawing the distinction. The employer generally 
provides tools and equipment to the employee, whereas an independent contractor 
uses his own tools and equipment. An employee must perform the services personally; 
a contractor may perform through others. An employee is paid periodically, for instance 
daily, weekly or monthly; an independent contractor is usually paid at the end of the 
contract or project. A contract of service terminates on expiry of the period of service 
stipulated in the contract, whereas a contract for work terminates on completion of the 
work or production of the specified result.14  
Based on these indicators of independence, performers such as musicians, singers, 
comedians, disc jockeys and magicians can be categorised as independent contractors: 
they provide their own equipment, they retain the right to exercise artistic control over 
the elements of their performance, they set or negotiate the rate of pay received from 
the establishment where they perform, and they normally provide their services under a 
single engagement arrangement.  
                                                 
13
  1979 (1) SA 51 (A) 62-63. 
14
  For further distinguishing factors, see Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 
1979 (1) SA 51 (A) 64-68; SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie (1999) 20 ILJ 585 
(LAC) 590F-591D; F van Jaarsveld & S van Eck Principles of Labour Law 2 ed (2002) 58-
63; F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 928-929; R le Roux 
“The evolution of the contract of employment in South Africa” 2010  Ind LJ 139 157. For 
the importance of this distinction, see B Jordaan & R G L Stelzner “Sport and the Law of 
Employment” in J A A Basson & M M Loubser (eds) Sport and the Law in South Africa 
(2000) 13-14. 
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The preceding overview reflects that there is no single satisfactory test governing the 
question whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor. In determining 
whether or not a person is an employee, the courts attempt to discover the true 
relationship between the parties. They consider all the factors that are present in, or 
absent from, the contract and the relationship15 and then stand back and consider the 
picture or dominant impression that emerges. It should also be noted that the fact that 
the provisions of a contract categorises a party as an independent contractor or 
employee is not conclusive of the true relationship between the parties.16 
Against the background of this conceptual overview of the meaning of the concept of a 
personal service contract, and its sub-division into employment contracts and other 
service contracts, we can now turn to the way in which the specific enforcement of 
these contracts is dealt with in specific jurisdictions. Where appropriate, some further 
conceptual clarification may be called for in the context of specific legal systems or 
model instruments.  
4 2  South African law 
4 2 1  Contract of employment (locatio conductio operarum) 
Although the contemporary version of the employment contract is Roman-Dutch in 
origin, it is generally accepted that much of the modern South African common law 
                                                 
15
  See further on the theory of characterisation or Typenlehre, sources cited in n 358 para 4 
8 3 below. 
16
  In Linda Erasmus Properties Enterprise (Pty) Ltd v Mhlongo (2007) 28 ILJ 1100 (LC) the 
court applied the “dominant impression” test and decided that the respondent, an estate 
agent, was an employee, even though the contract stated that the agent was an 
independent contractor and not an employee of the company. The degree of control that 
the company had over the agent was a significant factor in deciding that there was an 
employment relationship. See also Pam Goldings Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus (2010) 
31 ILJ 1460 (LC). 
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relating to it developed in accordance with English law.17 In accordance with the latter 
system, it was often held in our law that courts will not enforce a contract of 
employment, whether against the employer or employee.18 For example, in Pougnet v 
Ramlakan,19 the court refused to order the owner of a farm to continue to employ a 
manager in whom he had lost confidence and decided that an award of damages would 
be more appropriate.20 It is a well-established rule of English law that the only remedy 
                                                 
17
  See generally Jordaan “Employment relations” in Southern Cross 400-414; A C Basson et 
al Essential Labour Law 5 ed (2009) 22; K Mould “The suitability of the remedy of specific 
performance to breach of a ‘player’s contract’ with specific reference to the Mapoe and 
Santos cases” 2011 PELJ 189 193. According to Le Roux 2010 Ind LJ 142, no culture of 
employment had developed by the time of the British occupation, although free artisans 
had worked at the Cape by that time. 
18
  See Ingle Colonial Broom Co Ltd v Hocking 1914 CPD 495; Schierhout v Minister of 
Justice 1926 AD 99 107; Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 
785; G F Lubbe & C M Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary 3 ed (1988) 544-545; J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 210 n 69; S van der Merwe et al Contract: 
General Principles 4 ed (2012) 331 n 31. 
19
  1961 (2) SA 163 (D). 
20
  See further Gracie v Hull Blythe and Co (SA) Ltd 1931 CPD 539; Beeton v Peninsula 
Transport Co (Pty) Ltd 1934 CPD 53; Rogers v Durban Corporation 1950 (1) SA 65 (D); 
Ngwenya v Natalspruit Bantu School Board 1965 (1) SA 692 (W) (where it was held that in 
the absence of legislation to the contrary, an employee’s only remedy for an employer’s 
breach of contract/wrongful dismissal is damages). These decisions appear to establish 
that such a contract can be terminated unilaterally and that thereafter no contract exists 
which can be specifically enforced. Cf Myers v Abramson 1952 (3) SA 121 (C) 123-124 
where Van Winsen J doubted whether the practice of the court in allowing only the 
particular remedy of damages to the wrongfully-dismissed employee can rightly be 
elevated to a rule of law to the effect that such contracts can be terminated unilaterally so 
that they cannot be specifically enforced under any circumstances. Thus the general rule 
prevails: if one party to the contract had unjustifiably repudiated it, the injured party has 
the right to elect to accept the repudiation, and consensually to put an end to the contract 
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available to an employee who has been wrongfully dismissed is damages. English 
courts will not grant specific performance against the employee, nor will they order an 
employer to reinstate or pay an employee for the remainder of his service contract.21 
This means that an employer or employee is restricted to a claim for damages in the 
event of a breach by the other.22 
It has already been pointed out that our modern labour law traditionally has a strong 
Roman-Dutch and English law foundation.23 However, this branch of our law has been 
developed extensively by case law and legislation. The following section provides a 
general overview of the current legal position. It commences with a more in-depth 
analysis of the specific characteristics and nature of the modern employment contract. 
This analysis builds on the more general distinction between employment contracts and 
other service contracts set out in the previous section. 
According to Grogan, a contract of employment can be defined as “an agreement 
between two parties in terms of which one of the parties (the employee) undertakes to 
place his or her personal services at the disposal of the other party (the employer) for 
an indefinite or determined period in return for a fixed or ascertainable remuneration, 
and which entitles the employer to define the employee’s duties and to control the 
manner in which the employee discharges them”.24 The parallels with the locatio 
                                                                                                                                                             
and sue for damages, or to ignore the repudiation, and hold the other party to the contract 
and claim specific performance. See in this regard Van Wyk v Albany Bakeries Ltd [2003] 
12 BLLR 1274 (LC) para [13] quoted with approval by the CCMA in Bonthuys v Central 
District Municipality [2007] 5 BALR 446 (CCMA) 455. 
21
  Sir John Macdonell The Law of Master and Servant 2 ed (1908) 162; Viscount Hailsham 
(ed) Halsbury’s Laws of England 1 ed vol 31 (1917) para 366, as referred to by Milne J in 
Pougnet v Ramlakan 1961 (2) SA 163 (N) 166. See more recently H Collins et al Labour 
Law (2012) 843. 
22
  See para 4 3 below. 
23
  See text to n 17 above and Van Jaarsveld & Van Eck Principles of Labour Law 7-8. 
24
  J Grogan Employment Rights (2010) 43. 
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conductio operarum of the earlier civil law are clear. A similar definition is provided by 
Basson et al: “the contract of employment as we know it today can be defined as an 
agreement between two parties in terms of which one party (the employee) works for 
another (the employer) in exchange for remuneration”.25  
Furthermore, the Labour Relations Act,26 the Basic Conditions of Employment Act27 and 
the Employment Equity Act28 all define an employee in similar terms: 
“(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for 
the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and 
(b) any other person who in any other manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer.”29 
The identification of the essentials of a contract of employment is a controversial matter 
because there is no unanimity regarding the basic features of the contract.30 However, 
from the above it can be inferred that the basic elements of a contract of employment 
are:31  
(i)  a mutual agreement; 
(ii) in terms of which services are rendered; 
                                                 
25
  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 22. 
26
  66 of 1995.  
27
  75 of 1997. 
28
  55 of 1998. 
29
  Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, s 1 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
and s 1 of the Employment Equity Act. 
30
  According to Le Roux 2010 Ind LJ 139-140, the South African concept of the contract of 
employment, “as it is currently understood, is a relatively new concept and is in a state of 
relative unity”. She cautions that this reality must be comprehended when engaging with 
the future of the contract of employment. 
31
  See also Van Jaarsveld & Van Eck Principles of Labour Law 48; M W Prinsloo “Enkele 
opmerkinge oor spelerskontrakte in professionele spansport” 2000 TSAR 229 230; J 
Grogan Workplace Law 10 ed (2009) 29. 
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(iii) under the authority (or “control”, to use Grogan’s words) of the employer; 
(iv) for an indefinite or determined period;32 
(v) in return for remuneration. 
In line with the English approach referred to earlier, it has repeatedly been held by 
South African commentators33 and courts34 that specific performance of employment 
contracts will not ordinarily be granted whether against the employer or employee.35 
Kerr emphasises that even though there are no specific rules governing the exercise of 
our courts’ discretion, certain categories when specific performance will not be granted 
have received the courts’ attention.36 One of these categories is contracts for personal 
                                                 
32
  Under South African law employees are normally appointed on a permanent basis and the 
contract continues until the employee reaches a predetermined age, or until the contract is 
terminated by one of the parties in accordance with the contract. See Van Jaarsveld & 
Van Eck Principles of Labour Law 56; Jordaan & Stelzner “Sport and the Law of 
Employment” in Sport and the Law in South Africa 15. 
33
  See eg R H Christie & G B Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed 
(2011) 550. 
34
  See nn 18-20 above. 
35
  See further De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 210; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General 
Principles 331-332; Jordaan “Employment relations” in Southern Cross 407; J V du 
Plessis & M A Fouché A Practical Guide to Labour Law 7 ed (2012) 19; Van Jaarsveld & 
Van Eck Principles of Labour Law 98; Basson et al Essential Labour Law 54-55. See also 
more recently Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) SA 293 (W) para [17]; 
Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para [88] and 
Abdullah v Kouga Municipality [2012] 5 BLLR 425 (LC). 
36
  Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 680-681. See also Christie & Bradfield Christie’s 
The Law of Contract in South Africa 546-553. 
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services.37 A number of reasons have been advanced for this approach. The majority 
relates to social policy.38  
It has been suggested that it is inadvisable to force parties to resume a close, perhaps 
confidential relationship while the trust between them has been compromised.39 On this 
basis, it was held in Pougnet v Ramlakan40 that specific performance will not be granted 
even in situations where the employer and the employee are unlikely to come into 
frequent contact with each other. Furthermore, the order would not ensure that the 
employee would fulfil his duties diligently and adequately.41 And pertinent to this point, 
the fact that it would be difficult for the courts to ensure compliance with an order of 
                                                 
37
  See Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 550; D Hutchison & 
C Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 323; Van der Merwe et al Contract: 
General Principles 331. 
38
  See Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 323; Van der Merwe 
et al Contract: General Principles 331; M S M Brassey “Specific performance – a new 
stage for labour’s lost love” (1981) 2 ILJ 57 58; Lubbe & Murray Contract 543; N Smit 
Labour Law Implications of the Transfer of an Undertaking LLD thesis Rand Afrikaans 
University (2001) 208-209. 
39
  As emphasised in Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1929 AD 99; Pougnet v Ramlakan 1961 
(2) SA 163 (D) and more recently, Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 
2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para [88] where Moseneke DCJ, for the majority of the court said: 
“Although it is clear that there has been a breakdown in trust that alone is not a sufficient 
ground to justify a unilateral termination of a contract of employment. It must however be 
said that the irretrievable breach of trust will be relevant for purposes of remedy. The 
ordinary remedies for breach of contract are either reinstatement or full payment of 
benefits for the remaining period of the contract. In my view, even if the contract of 
employment were terminated unlawfully, Mr Masetlha would not be entitled to 
reinstatement as a matter of contract.” Quoted with approval by Lagrange J in Abdullah v 
Kouga Municipality [2012] 5 BLLR 425 (LC) para [11]. See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 
543; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 331. 
40
  1961 (2) SA 163 (D) 166. 
41
  As emphasised by Trollip J in Gründling v Beyers 1967 (2) SA 131 (W) 146. 
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specific performance is also one of the reasons adduced in support of the refusal to 
grant specific performance.42 The rationale essentially is that because of the personal 
relationship involved and its continuing nature, there would be a constant threat of 
disputes arising over whether the contract was being performed properly. The court is 
not regarded as sufficiently equipped to provide the constant supervision which would 
be necessary to prevent such disputes arising or to adjudicate them as they arose.43 
The latter reason and the merits thereof will be dealt with in depth in the following 
chapter.44  
According to Jordaan, the reasons set out above clearly correspond with those set forth 
by the English courts for their refusal to grant claims for specific performance of 
employment contracts.45 However, it can be questioned whether these reasons actually 
justify our courts’ refusal to grant specific performance with regard to contracts of 
employment. Our courts appear to have accepted them blindly, without recognising the 
exceptional nature of the remedy in English law. It is well-established that specific 
performance is an equitable remedy in English law, granted as an exception to the 
principal remedy of damages.46 However, as we have seen, the general point of 
departure in South African law is that specific performance is available “as of right”.47 It 
                                                 
42
  See Ingle Colonial Broom Co Ltd v Hocking 1914 CPD 495; Gründling v Beyers 1967 (2) 
SA 131 (W) 146; S Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in H L 
MacQueen & R Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African 
Perspectives (2006) 249 258. 
43
  See De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 210; Christie & Bradfield Christie’s 
The Law of Contract in South Africa 550. 
44
  For a concise explanation of this argument as well as convincing counter-arguments, see 
the English case of CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307 318, and the 
comparative study by S Rowan Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Analysis 
of the Protection of Performance (2012) 56-58.  
45
  See Jordaan “Employment relations” in Southern Cross 408. 
46
  See paras 2 3 2 1 & 3 2 above and 4 3 below. 
47
  See para 1 1 1 above. 
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is therefore problematical for our courts to refuse to order specific performance of 
contracts of employment based on policy reasons uncritically received from English 
law.48 In the light of the emphasis that is placed on a party’s right to specific 
performance in modern South African law,49 it therefore appears that the applicability of 
these reasons in our law and the correct justification for this rule need to be re-
examined to determine whether there is merit in recognising a restriction to specific 
performance based on the personal nature of the obligation. Especially where 
employment contracts assume a more hybrid nature, and reflect characteristics of 
contracts to provide a specific service (locatio conductio operis or contract of work) or 
cases where the one party’s liberty is less constrained by enforcement, for example the 
employer, rather than the employee.50 
In relation to employment contracts, a distinction may be drawn between ordering 
payment or reinstatement by the employer, and compelling the employee to perform.51 
The focus will first be on the employee’s claim against his employer.52  
                                                 
48
  See eg Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99 107-108; Roberts Construction Co Ltd 
v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W) 305-306; Myers v Abramson 1952 (3) SA 121 (C) 125-
126; Pougnet v Ramlakan 1961 (2) SA 163 (D) 166 ff; Gründling v Beyers 1967 (2) SA 
131 (W) 146, and Mabaso v Nel’s Melkery (Pty) Ltd 1979 (4) SA 358 (W) 359.  
49
  Farmers’ Co-operative Society (Reg) v Berry 1912 AD 343 350; Benson v SA Mutual Life 
Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 781-782; A Beck “The coming of age of specific 
performance” 1987 CILSA 190 195; G Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to 
refuse an order for specific performance” in G Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr 
(2006) 77 84-87 (reproduced with minor changes in J Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 95). 
50
  See para 7 2 below. 
51
  Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 681. 
52
  In this context, it is worth remembering that before Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 
1977 (2) SA 943 (A), most courts assumed that the repudiation of an employment 
contract, albeit wrongful, automatically terminated it. However, in this case the Appellate 
Division held that a fundamental breach of an employment contract does not per se end 
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4 2 1 1  The employee’s claim against the employer 
In National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd,53 it was held that, in 
principle, an employee is entitled to specific performance, although there may be factors 
which could influence a court to refuse such an order.54 The court reaffirmed that it has 
a discretion whether or not to order specific performance and that there was no rule 
prohibiting such an order.55 It follows that the reasons traditionally advanced in arguing 
against specific performance as a remedy in the context of the employment contract are 
only to be regarded as factors that have to be taken into consideration in the exercise of 
its discretion.56 
Thus, the court in Stag Packings rejected the traditional (English common law) rule 
against an employee’s claim for specific performance of an employment contract, and 
held that there was no reason why there should be a departure in such cases from the 
general principle that a plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of his contract, subject 
to the court’s discretion to refuse it. It follows that ordering specific performance of the 
employer’s obligations is more generally accepted.57 However, Christie makes an 
important observation in this regard, namely that the reasons why the courts have not 
granted such orders in the past remain valid and applicable, and it should not be 
forgotten that in every case the court has a discretion to refuse the remedy depending 
                                                                                                                                                             
the contract, but serves only to give the innocent party the choice either to enforce the 
contract or to terminate it (confirmed recently by the SCA in NUMSA v Abancedisi Labour 
Services (857/12) [2013] ZASCA 143 (30 Sep 2013)). See also Jordaan “Employment 
relations” in Southern Cross 408. 
53
  1982 (4) SA 151 (T). 
54
  158. See also Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A) 952.  
55
  1982 (4) SA 151 (T) 156H. 
56
  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 55; Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) 
SA 293 (W) paras [19]-[21]. 
57
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 331. 
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on the circumstances.58 He supports and illustrates this by saying that the court was 
justified in exercising its discretion in Seloadi v Sun International (Bophuthatswana) 
Ltd,59 where the court refused to grant an order that a hotel should reinstate employees 
whom it had summarily dismissed, because there was hostility towards the hotel. 
Furthermore, in the more recent case Masetlha v President of the Republic of South 
Africa60 the head of the National Intelligence Agency had been dismissed by the 
President and the Constitutional Court refused to order reinstatement. The reason, per 
Moseneke DCJ, was that the special relationship of trust between the head of the 
Intelligence Agency and the President was “irretrievably breached” and therefore 
specific performance was considered inappropriate in the circumstances.61 This 
decision was applied and followed in Abdullah v Kouga Municipality62 where the court 
similarly declined to order reinstatement of the chief financial officer of Kouga 
Municipality, who had been suspended by the municipality due to a breakdown of trust, 
and instead awarded contractual damages (consisting of remuneration for the remaining 
period of his contract).63  
The current position regarding enforcement against employers has been summarised 
as follows by Kerr: 
“It used to be said that a court would not normally grant an order of specific performance of 
contracts of service. Now it is clear that no general rule can be made for all contracts of 
                                                 
58
  Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 551. 
59
  1993 (2) SA 174 (BG) 186I-190E. 
60
  2008 (1) SA 566 (CC). 
61
  Paras [88]-[91]. 
62
  [2012] 5 BLLR 425 (LC). 
63
  Para [18] per Lagrange J: “the summary termination of the applicant’s services was an 
unlawful, but given the breakdown of trust an order of reinstatement would not be 
appropriate and his remedy should be confined to his contractual damages”. 
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service. Contracts of employment in industry and in similar spheres of work are governed by 
a number of statutes and specific precedents.”64 
As far as  labour legislation is concerned, section 193 of the Labour Relations Act65 and 
section 77A(e) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act,66 provide the Labour Court 
with the power to make an order of specific performance in relation to employment 
contracts. As such, these provisions are also indicative of the movement away from the 
traditional reluctance of our courts, which was first introduced by Stag Packings. 
Instead, our law is moving towards recognition of the employee’s right to remain 
employed once he has entered into the employment contract. Labour courts are using 
their powers to make status quo orders instead of ending employment relationships. 67  
                                                 
64
  Principles of the Law of Contract 681. 
65
  66 of 1995. If the unfairness of a dismissal is confirmed by the Labour Court or arbitrator 
appointed in terms of the Act it may according to s 193 direct the employer to do the 
following: (a) to reinstate the employee from any date not earlier than the date of 
dismissal; (b) to re-employ the employee; or (c) to pay compensation to the employee. 
66
  75 of 1997. Section 77A(e) provides that “the Labour Court may make any appropriate 
order, including an order making a determination that it considers reasonable on any 
matter concerning a contract of employment in terms of section 77 (3), which 
determination may include an order for specific performance, an award of damages or an 
award of compensation”. 
67
  See Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in European Contract Law: 
Scots and South African Perspectives 258-259; Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 323; Majake v Commission for Gender Equality 2010 (1) SA 87 
(GSJ). Considering s 77A(e) BCEA, the Labour Court in Abrahams v Drake & Scull 
Facilities Management (SA) (Pty) Ltd [2012] 5 BLLR 434 (LC) ordered an employer to 
restore the salary of an employee after it had unilaterally reduced her remuneration to 
align it with the salaries earned by other employees. See also SAPU v National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service [2006] 1 BLLR 42 (LC) para [82] per 
Murphy AJ. 
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The rest of this discussion will focus on the employer’s claim for enforcement against 
the employee. The reason for doing so is that the position concerning the enforcement 
of the employer’s obligations can by and large be regarded as resolved. In line with the 
international trend68 it is now well established by statute that a court may force the 
employer to reinstate an employee for the remainder of his employment contract.69 This 
position, which was also confirmed in Toerien v Stellenbosch University,70 is also 
defensible as a matter of principle and policy. A consideration that weighs heavily in this 
regard is that an employee enjoys a constitutional right to fair labour practices; when an 
employer unlawfully terminated his services, the only way to give full effect to this right 
might be enforcement of his contract (subject only to the court’s discretion, as for 
example in the Masetlha case).71 Furthermore, even though the personal freedom of the 
employer is also implicated when he is compelled to have an employee work for him, 
one can argue that this happens to a lesser degree, since the employer is not forced to 
work, but to reinstate. In contrast to an employee, an employer’s liberty is less 
constrained by enforcement, and hence the traditional civil liberty argument is less 
relevant. 
 
 
                                                 
68
  See eg Part X of (UK) Employment Rights Act 1996 (para 4 3 below); and § 8 of 
Protection Against Unfair Dismissal Act of Germany (para 4 5 1 below). 
69
  It should be noted that employees’ rights in this regard is limited in the case of the 
magistrates’ courts. See s 46(2)(c) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and A A 
Landman “Saving of costs: a ground for reducing specific performance of a claim 
sounding in money?” 1997 SALJ 263. 
70
  (1996) 17 ILJ 56 (C). 
71
  Section 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that 
“Everyone has the right to fair labour practices” and s 33(1) further provides that 
“Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair”.   
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4 2 1 2 The employer’s claim against the employee 
The position is more complicated where an employer seeks an order for specific 
performance against his employee.72 Here the personal freedom of the employee is 
implicated more strongly than when the employer is compelled to reinstate employees. 
Many South African judgments and academic works have expressed the view that 
courts should not generally award specific performance of the obligation to work against 
an employee.73 Following the English courts, our courts in the past would never 
specifically enforce an employment contract by ordering an employee to work for an 
employer because this would constitute forced labour (a concept we will return to later 
on).74  For example, in the English case of Millican v Sullivan75 the court held that it 
would be “monstrous” to compel an unwilling employee to work in terms of an order, 
and that they have “never dreamt of enforcing by injunction agreements that were 
strictly personal in their nature”.  
The position in our law resembles the position in England and the United States, where 
specific performance against an employee is similarly viewed with disfavour. Therefore 
these contracts could give rise to a claim for damages instead.76 It is especially 
                                                 
72
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 331. 
73
  See Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99 108; Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 
545 (O) 552A; Tiger Bakeries Ltd v FAWU (1988) 9 ILJ 82 (W) 87D; Nationwide Airlines 
(Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) SA 293 (W) para [17]; Lubbe & Murray Contract 544; A 
Roycroft & B Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 101-103; Christie 
& Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 550-551; Kerr Principles of the 
Law of Contract 680-681. 
74
  See para 4 2 1 above; Jordaan “Employment relations” in Southern Cross 407. 
75
  (1888) 4 TLR 203 204. 
76
  See eg Subaru Tecnica International Inc, Prodrive Limited v Richard Burns, CSS Stellar 
Management Limited, Automobiles Peugeot SA 2001 WL 1479740 Ch D para 77 per 
Strauss J (citing decision of Oliver J in Nichols Advanced Vehicle Systems Inc v De 
Angelis, unreported, 21 December 1979, involving a F 1 racing driver); B M Loeb 
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noteworthy that our law differs from English and American law insofar as our courts 
display a reluctance77 to award specific performance to compel employees to work, 
rather than recognise a rule that it should never be awarded. Civil-law systems, as 
represented here by German and Dutch law, also recognise as a rule that specific 
performance will not be granted against an employee.78 It appears that our law faces a 
choice between continuing with its flexible approach or adopting a rule that specific 
performance may never be awarded against employees (which is also followed in some 
systems). In the rest of this section it will be enquired whether denying specific 
performance against employees should be a concrete rule or exception to the right to 
specific performance, or whether our courts should merely be reluctant to award specific 
performance against an employee.  
Let us first consider claims aimed at forcing a party to work for the employer. In this 
regard the court in Troskie v Van der Walt79 refused specific performance of a positive 
undertaking to enter into the service of an employer because the contract involved the 
rendering of services of a personal and skilled nature that required close cooperation 
between the parties.80 In this case the respondent repudiated his contract to play rugby 
for the second appellant (Old Greys Rugby Club) by joining the opposing Collegians 
Rugby Club, with the intention of remaining with them. However, the appellants did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Deterring player holdouts: who should do it, how to do it, and why it has to be done” 
(2001) 11 Marquette Sports Law Review 275 287 n 64; Naudé 2003 SALJ 269. 
77
  Le Roux stated in 2003 that “courts are reluctant to order specific performance in cases of 
breach of contract where the defaulting party is required to render performance of a very 
personal nature, such as contracts of employment” (“How divine is my contract? 
Reflecting on the enforceability of player or athlete contracts in sport” 2003 SA Merc LJ 
116). Christie agrees with this statement, noting that “[a]n order for the specific 
performance of a contract of employment will, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, not 
normally be granted” (Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 550). 
78
   See paras 4 5 & 4 6 below. 
79
  1994 (3) SA 545 (O) 552. 
80
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 331. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   181 
 
accept the respondent’s repudiation and applied for an order compelling him to play for 
the Old Greys Club for the period stipulated in the contract.81 The trial court per 
Malherbe JP, decided the following:82 
“Na my mening is dit ‘n belaglike smeekbede en sal geen redelike Hof so ‘n bevel tot 
spesifieke nakoming van Van der Walt se beweerde kontraktuele verpligting gelas nie.” 
On appeal, Wright J, refused to order specific performance of the respondent’s 
contractual obligation on the following basis:83  
“Die aard van die dienste wat in die onderhawige saak gelewer moes word, is die speel van 
rugby vir ‘n besondere klub. Die lewering van die betrokke diens is nie alleen afhanklik van 
die persoonlike entoesiasme, bereidwilligheid en deursettingsvermoë van die besondere 
speler nie, maar ook is daar aan die betrokke dienste ‘n groot mate van kundigheid, 
bedrewenheid en vaardigheid van persoonlike aard verbonde en wat afhanklik sal wees van 
die besondere speler se spesifieke eienskappe en ook sy verhouding met die klub vir wie hy 
rugby speel. Dit is sterk te betwyfel of daar in die besondere omstandighede van hierdie saak 
ooit ‘n bevel van spesifieke nakoming gepas sou kon wees …” 
It is interesting that Wright J emphasises the nature of the performance sought to be 
enforced. According to him it is highly doubtful whether an order of specific performance 
would be appropriate where the performance is entirely dependent on the personal 
enthusiasm, willingness and drive of the debtor, and where the performance involves a 
great deal of ability, proficiency and skill of a personal nature which will be dependent 
on the specific qualities of the debtor as well as on his relationship with the creditor.84 
He compares performance of this nature to the rule that applies to cession, namely that 
where the performance is of such a personal nature, and is closely connected to the 
person of the creditor, the creditor’s personal right may not be transferred without the 
                                                 
81
  Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (O) 548. 
82
  553. 
83
  552. 
84
  552H-J. 
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consent of the debtor.85 Accordingly, an employer is not entitled to cede his right to the 
services of an employee to another.86 In other words, he equates non-transferability to 
unenforceability: in the same way as an employer may not transfer his claim against an 
employee to one of his creditors so that the latter can enforce it, the employer himself 
may not specifically enforce his personal right or claim against an employee. The 
Troskie decision demonstrates how the availability of specific performance (in the 
context of employment contracts) depends on the nature of the performance. The 
nature of the performance can also determine that specific performance should be 
granted of an employment contract and thus yield an opposite conclusion. 
In the absence of the characteristics typically associated with employment contracts, as 
discussed by Wright J, the Full Bench in Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v 
Igesund87 was prepared to order specific performance of an obligation to work against 
an employee. The case concerned the right of the court to order specific performance of 
a contract for personal services, more specifically a contract of employment, albeit that 
the court held that “this was not a case of an ordinary contract of employment”,88 as we 
will also presently see. The first respondent, a football coach, had entered into a 
coaching contract with the appellant club. The contract provided that a breach by 
either of the parties entitled the other either to cancel the contract and claim damages or 
to claim specific performance. Before the expiry of his contract, the first respondent was 
made a more lucrative offer by the second respondent, another club in the same soccer 
league. He proceeded to give the appellant notice of termination of his services and 
thereby effectively committed breach of contract in the form of repudiation. The 
appellant approached the court to declare that the contract was binding and to grant an 
order of specific performance against the first respondent. The application failed in the 
                                                 
85
  553. See also G F Lubbe “Cession” in L T C Harms & J A Faris (eds) LAWSA 3 3 ed 
(2013) para 165; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 408-409. 
86
  Isaacson v Walsh & Walsh (1903) 20 SC 569. 
87
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C). 
88
  76D. 
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court a quo,89 but the Full Bench ordered the first respondent to continue as head coach 
of the appellant and thereby distanced itself from the view held by many South African 
commentators and case law, that specific performance of an obligation to work should 
generally not be granted against an employee.90  
There were, however, special circumstances that persuaded the Full Bench to grant 
specific performance.91 According to Naudé, there were four main reasons for granting 
specific performance.92 In the first instance the court emphasised that the contract was 
a unique contract of employment.93 Three characteristics distinguished the particular 
contract from an ordinary contract of employment:94 the contract contained a clause 
which granted the right to claim specific performance in case of breach;95 the parties 
contracted on an equal footing, and Igesund enjoyed considerable latitude in performing 
his duties.96 A second consideration which swayed the court in favour of granting 
specific performance was the primacy of specific performance in our remedial scheme. 
The court emphasised that specific performance was the primary remedy for breach of 
employment contracts.97 It held that the constitutional value of contractual autonomy, 
part of “freedom” and informing the constitutional value of “dignity”, also favours the 
primacy of specific performance as a remedy for breach.98  
                                                 
89
  Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 (5) SA 697 (C). 
90
  See eg Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 551; A J Kerr 
The Principles of the Law of Contract 680-681; Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 
99 108; Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (O) 552A. 
91
  See Naudé’s case note 2003 SALJ 269; Mould 2011 PELJ 198 ff.  
92
  Naudé 2003 SALJ 270. 
93
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 76D. 
94
  Naudé 2003 SALJ 270; Mould 2011 PELJ 203. 
95
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 76A-C. 
96
  79D. 
97
  81A-E, 84I, 87A. 
98
  86F-87C. See also Naudé 2003 SALJ 277. 
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The third reason for granting specific performance was that there was also no 
breakdown of the relationship between the parties. Instead, the employee’s principal 
reason for leaving was commercial, namely a more lucrative contract with a 
competitor.99 According to Naudé this distinguishes the present case from other 
breaches by employees, where the employee had a more legitimate reason to be 
unwilling to continue with the contract and was justified in leaving the relationship.100 
This was relevant because there was an important distinction between a wrongfully 
dismissed employee and one who contracted with his employer on equal terms and 
unlawfully resiled from his contract of employment in order to earn more money from a 
competitor.101  
The fourth and final reason for granting specific performance was that there was no 
recognised hardship to the respondent.102 The Full Bench emphasised that “Courts 
should be slow and cautious in not enforcing contracts. They should, in a specific 
performance situation, only refuse performance where a recognised hardship to the 
defaulting party is proved”. According to Foxcroft J, the reasons given by the court a 
quo in refusing the application, merely amount to “practical considerations” which do not 
meet the proper test.103  
The Full Bench made a very bold move in rejecting Wright J’s reliance in Troskie104 on 
Kerr’s view that “[n]o court, for example, can force a singer to sing or an artist to paint a 
picture because these tasks require the application of highly personal skills”.105 The 
                                                 
99
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 77F-G. 
100
  2003 SALJ 277. 
101
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 78I. See also Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in 
South Africa 551. 
102
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 86H. See also para 6 1 2 below. 
103
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 86G-H. 
104
  See Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (O) 552C. 
105
  A J Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 4 ed (1989) 530 (repeated in 6 ed (2002) 
680-681). 
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court thereby implied that specific performance might be equitable in situations “where 
an opera house, having advertised that an international star will perform, will face great 
criticism and possibly financial loss when it cannot force the artist to appear, no matter 
how bad his performance might actually be”.106 The conclusion drawn here is that there 
might be circumstances where a court will not be prevented from ordering enforcement 
of personal service contracts especially when concerns typically associated with its 
enforcement, such as the threat to the debtor’s personal freedom, are not present.107  
The example of the singer who cannot be forced to perform probably has its roots in the 
old English case of Lumley v Wagner.108 In this case, a Miss Wagner had agreed to sing 
for three months at Her Majesty’s Theatre in London. The case concerned an action 
instituted to restrain her from singing for a third party by granting an injunction for that 
purpose.109 The Chancery Court held110 that  
“[w]herever this court has no proper jurisdiction to enforce specific performance, it operates 
to bind men’s consciences, as far as they can be bound, to a true and literal performance of 
their agreements and it will not suffer them to depart from their contracts at their pleasure, 
leaving the party with whom they have contracted to the mere chance of any damages which 
a jury may give. The exercise of this jurisdiction has, I believe, had a wholesome tendency 
towards the maintenance of that good faith which exists in this country to a much greater 
degree perhaps than in another; and although the jurisdiction is not to be extended, yet a 
Judge would desert his duty who did not act up to what his predecessors have handed down 
as the rule for guidance in the administration of such an equity”.  
                                                 
106
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 83I. 
107
  See para 4 8 below. 
108
  (1852) 1 De G M & G 604. As observed by Foxcroft J, 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 83J-84A. 
109
  For further details of the case and ratio, see Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 177 
ff; Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 84. See also 
para 4 4 n 251 below. 
110
  (1852) 1 De G M & G 604 619. 
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The Chancery Court effectively achieved specific performance in an indirect manner.111 
The defendant could not be forced to sing at the plaintiff’s theatre, but she could be 
compelled to refrain “from the commission of an act which she has bound herself not to 
do”, even if this ultimately meant fulfilling her employment contract with the theatre.112 
By granting an injunction which prevented her from singing elsewhere, the court 
indirectly forced her to sing at the plaintiff’s theatre.113 But it must be noted that in this 
particular case sufficient confidence existed on the part of the employer in the 
employee’s ability to fulfil her duties diligently. The traditional reasons against specific 
performance therefore did not apply, and the case was distinguishable on a variety of 
grounds.114 Judges also consequently refused to allow this decision to be a precedent 
for any general principle that the court had jurisdiction to grant specific performance of 
contracts to provide services.115 Thus, it can still be maintained that in English law the 
original rule against specific performance remains. English courts will not grant an 
                                                 
111
  Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 83J. 
112
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 177-178. 
113
  Wagner never performed her contract to sing for Lumley, but the two were reconciled four 
seasons later. For these details see Z Chaffee “Equitable servitudes on chattels” (1928) 
41 Harv LR 945 975 n 89.  
114
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 170; R J Sharpe Injunctions and Specific 
Performance (1983) § 695. 
115
  The Court of Appeal in Whitwood Chemical Co v Hardman [1891] 2 Ch 416, 428 per 
Lindley LJ described the decision as “an anomaly which it would be very dangerous to 
extend”. See also MacDonald v Casein Ltd [1917] 35 DLR 443, 444-445 per Macdonald 
CJA “The tendency of the Courts now appears to be not to follow Lumley v. Wagner … 
and the line of cases founded on that decision, unless there be in the particular case an 
express negative stipulation.” Another similar case is Chapman v Westerby [1913] WN 
277, 278 where it was held per Warrington J that “[there must be a stipulation] requiring 
the contracting party not to do some particular act on which the Court can put its finger”. 
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injunction where the claim essentially boils down to an attempt to have the contract of 
employment specifically enforced.116  
In Santos, the Full Bench relied on the practice in England of granting indirect specific 
performance against employees by injunction as illustrated in the case of Lumley to 
support its view that the right to specific performance also applies in relation to 
employment contracts.117 The Lumley case also persuaded another South African court 
to prohibit an employee from working for another employer in the same sector for the 
remainder of his contract in Roberts Construction Co Ltd v Verhoef.118 This was a 
standard restraint of trade case: there was an express term prohibiting employment 
elsewhere. The court insisted that it would provide “all the relief in its power, without 
looking to the effect which may ultimately be produced by the restraint which it places 
on the party who is disposed to break the contract, although the effect of such an 
injunction may be to compel the specific performance of the contract”.119 
The Santos decision, which has been described as “far-reaching”120 has given rise to a 
number of difficulties. The first relates to content and relevance of the boundaries 
between employment contracts and other service contracts. As briefly indicated earlier, 
the employment contract between the football club and Igesund by no means 
constituted an ordinary employment contract. According to Van der Merwe et al “the 
special circumstances of the case weighed heavily with the court. The factor that tipped 
                                                 
116
  Sharpe Injunctions and Specific Performance § 693, referring to Whitwood Chemical Co v 
Hardman [1891] 2 Ch 416. See also R S Stevens “Involuntary servitude by injunction” 
(1921) 6 Cornell Law Quarterly 235. 
117
  Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 84A-D; and see 
Naudé 2003 SALJ 275. 
118
  1952 (2) SA 300 (W). 
119
  305B. 
120
  See Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in European Contract Law: 
Scots and South African Perspectives 258; repeated by the same author in Hutchison & 
Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 323. 
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the scales was that the contract in issue was not an ordinary contract of 
employment”.121 The contract concerned departed from the general concept of an 
employment contract. Igesund’s contract, due to its unusual nature, is distinguishable 
from an ordinary employment contract, which is less likely to be enforced due to policy 
considerations, such as concern for the employee’s personal freedom, and the fact that 
the employee often is in a weaker bargaining position. Igesund was an employee, but 
an unusual one: he contracted on equal terms with the applicant, demanded a very high 
sum of money for his services, and was given complete freedom in the exercise of his 
duties. Because Igesund had more bargaining power, and Santos had no control over 
his functions, it can be argued that he was actually comparable to an independent 
contractor. Based on all of these factors, the court ultimately made an order of specific 
performance. The case is therefore clearly distinguishable from ordinary employment 
contracts, and other factors trumped the concerns typically associated with enforcement 
of an employment contract against an employee.122  
A further problematic aspect of Santos, is that it did not take into account policy 
considerations such as forced labour.123 The court a quo, per Desai J, cited “disapproval 
of forced labour” as one of the factors militating against ordering specific performance 
against an employee.124 However, the Full Bench did not engage with the court a quo’s 
forced labour argument.125 They emphasised that the only operative reason for refusing 
specific performance was to avoid hardship to the employee, a consideration which, 
according to the Full Bench, did not apply in this particular case.126  
                                                 
121
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 332. 
122
  See para 7 2 2 text to n 51 below. 
123
  See, on the term “forced labour”, A Naidu “The right to be free from slavery, servitude and 
forced labour” 1987 CILSA 108; Naudé 2003 SALJ 280-281; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill 
of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 291-293. 
124
  Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 (5) 698 (C) 701C. 
125
  Naudé 2003 SALJ 280; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 314. 
126
  Naudé 2003 SALJ 280; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 314. 
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According to Naudé, “[t]here appears to be merit in the forced labour argument”, seeing 
that section 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which states 
that “no one may be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour”, possibly creates a 
presumption against specific performance of an employment contract.127 However, this 
is not an outright prohibition: in some circumstances, granting an order of specific 
performance could be a justifiable limitation of the section 13 right.128 Rautenbach has 
pointed out that, section 13 prohibits extreme forms of the limitation of the right to 
occupational freedom such as “military service, prison labour and the performance of 
civil service in, for example, times of emergency”.129 Naudé acknowledges that specific 
performance of an employment contract does not seem to fall under this definition.130 
However, there are also broader definitions of forced labour. Currie and De Waal131 
refer to the International Labour Organization’s definition as “all work or service which is 
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said 
person has not offered himself voluntarily”.132 It can be argued that specific performance 
of an employment contract falls within this definition and can be considered an instance 
of forced labour. However, notwithstanding such a technical approach, it can 
undoubtedly be said that considerations such as the human free will and autonomy go 
against direct enforcement of such obligations. In concluding her discussion of section 
13, Naudé makes the following important comment: 
“Section 13 and the policy behind s 22 of protecting personal freedom should, however, 
make courts very wary of granting specific performance against an employee.”133 
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  Naudé 2003 SALJ 280. 
128
  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 292. 
129
  I M Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium (RS 2011) 
para 1A61. 
130
  Naudé 2003 SALJ 280. 
131
  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 291. 
132
  See Art 2(1) Forced Labour Convention of 1930 of which South Africa is a member state. 
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  Naudé 2003 SALJ 281. 
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Naudé argues that even though Igesund was no ordinary servant, forcing him to 
continue to coach for the applicant, still raises concern for his personal freedom. The 
Full Bench also overlooked the respondent coach’s contention that the move to the 
second respondent club would provide him with the necessary financial security to allow 
relocation of his family, in order for them to be reunited and live together in Cape 
Town.134 Ultimately she argues that courts should refuse specific performance in such a 
case, on the basis that it would cause unfair hardship to the employee.135  
Although one would agree with Naudé that policy considerations such as preventing  
forced labour should indeed be taken into account by our courts in refusing to order 
specific performance of employment contracts against employees, these considerations 
are not conclusive, and were indeed outweighed by others in the Santos case: it is 
especially significant that the contract in issue was not an ordinary contract of 
employment, which is less likely to be enforced based on policy considerations such as 
the concern for the employee’s personal freedom to favour the employer. As Naudé 
correctly points out, Santos is distinguishable from Troskie on the basis that the rugby 
player, “[u]nlike the first respondent, is under the constant control of his employer, and 
continually has close personal contact with his employers in the performance of his 
duties”.136 The justifications that apply to typical employment contracts did not apply, 
                                                 
134
  But see Naudé 2003 SALJ 281: “The court’s response was simply that commercial 
reasons were the principal factors causing the breach [...] It appears from the affidavits 
filed that the first respondent had probably also lived apart from his family during his 
previous contract with Orlando Pirates Football Club […] so that the importance of being 
reunited with his family perhaps did not carry much weight. The first respondent also did 
not make any allegation that his family had indeed agreed to relocate to Cape Town if he 
joined the second respondent, so that it was not clear that specific performance of his 
contract with the appellant was all that stood in the way of such relocation. It is therefore 
not surprising that the resolution of the ‘problems with his family’ as a result of his move to 
the second respondent was only mentioned as a possibility by the court a quo…” 
135
  Naudé 2003 SALJ 281. 
136
  Naudé 2003 SALJ 274. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   191 
 
and hence did not provide sufficient reason for refusal of specific performance. 
Therefore it is submitted that the Full Bench’s reasoning and finding was correct, and 
that enforcement was warranted in this instance.137 
This reasoning could also be applied to Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger.138 
Here an airline captain was held to his agreement to give three months’ notice of 
termination of his employment. The court pointed out that, in the exercise of the court’s 
discretion to refuse specific performance of an employment contract, the remedy was 
not normally granted, but there was no “hard-and-fast rule” to that effect.139 The court 
ordered specific performance, having regard to the particular relationship between the 
applicant and respondent and the nature and circumstances of the agreement.140 The 
real reason the respondent had sought to terminate his employment was to be able to 
take up more lucrative employment with another airline.141 Furthermore, the respondent 
was not an ordinary employee because he was a highly qualified professional pilot who 
had contracted on equal terms with the applicant and was able to command a high sum 
of money for doing so, and in the performance of his duties, the respondent was in 
exclusive command of the aircraft he was piloting, i.e. his decision-making insofar as 
piloting the aircraft was concerned was not subject to the applicant’s control.142 It can 
therefore be argued that he was also comparable to an independent contractor. The 
justifications that apply to typical employment contracts did not apply, and hence did not 
provide sufficient reason for refusal of specific performance and the court was also 
correct in enforcing the particular contract. 
                                                 
137
  See also para 7 2 2 below. 
138
  2008 (1) SA 293 (W). See further Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in 
South Africa 551. 
139
  Para [17]. 
140
  Paras [28]-[30]. 
141
  Para [23]. Compare text to n 99 above. 
142
  Paras [24]-[26].  
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Both cases give rise to difficulties of classification. It is submitted that both respondents 
(the football coach and the airline captain) may be regarded as employees (inasmuch 
as they performed services of a continuous nature in terms of a mutual agreement in 
return for remuneration),143 but unusual ones. Specific enforcement was warranted even 
though specific performance is generally not awarded against employees. There were 
certain aspects of these particular employment contracts that made them so unusual 
that the courts did not yield to the general reluctance of our judiciary to order specific 
performance in cases of breach of contract where the debtor is required to render 
performance of a very personal nature. 
Thus far, the focus was only generally on whether an employer could force an employee 
to continue working for him. Related to this is an undertaking (for example in a bursary 
agreement) where a person undertakes to become an employee in the future. These 
undertakings are likewise not enforced. Instead, if the person fails to commence work 
with the employer/grantor he will be required to reimburse the amount that was granted 
to him in terms of the bursary agreement.144  
Both these situations must be distinguished from the important phenomenon in practice 
of restraint of trade agreements, whereby employers seek to enforce various 
undertakings by employees not to enter into the service of another employer during or 
after the term of his employment contract, which they incorporate to protect their 
economic interests.145 As Christie correctly points out “[a] plaintiff who asks for an 
interdict to prohibit such a breach is in reality asking for specific performance in the 
negative form of non-performance of the forbidden or inconsistent act to ensure 
                                                 
143
  See again criteria listed in text to nn 33 ff para 4 2 1 above. 
144
  See eg Namibian High Court decision in Namibia Post Limited v Hiwilepo [2011] NAHC 
172. 
145
  For in-depth discussion of restraints of trade, see J Saner Agreements in Restraint of 
Trade in South African Law (loose-leaf); P J Sutherland The Restraint of Trade Doctrine in 
England, Scotland and South Africa PhD thesis Edinburgh (1997). 
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performance of the contract”.146 This type of undertaking is more readily enforced in our 
law.147 
In Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis,148 the appellate division held that 
restraints of trade should be treated like all other contractual terms and, in principle, be 
regarded as enforceable. Thus, in general, restraint of trade clauses are valid in our law, 
provided that they conform to public policy and are reasonable. This means that the 
party seeking to enforce the restraint is entitled to its enforcement, unless the party 
bound by the restraint is able to prove on a balance of probability that it would be 
unreasonable to enforce the restraint in the circumstances of the particular case.149 In 
practical terms this means that the employer seeking to enforce the restraint merely has 
to invoke the provisions of the contract and prove the breach, whilst the employee who 
wants to avoid its enforcement will be burdened with the onus of proving its illegality 
because public policy requires that people should be bound by their contractual 
                                                 
146
  Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 555. Cf remarks made by Zulman J in 
Longhorn Group (Pty) Ltd v The Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) SA 836 (W) 843C-D, that 
this type of relief is not specific performance, which, according to Eiselen, “are hard to 
explain or understand” (European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 
253 n 34). 
147
  See Roberts Construction v Co Ltd v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W); Van der Merwe et al 
Contract: General Principles 331. However, a court is less inclined to enforce an implied 
restraint than would be the case where it is express – Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 
545 (O) 556F-G. 
148
  1984 (4) SA 874 (A). 
149
  Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) 893A-B, 898C-D; 
Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 768D-E; Coetzee v Comitis 2001 (1) SA 1254 (C) 
1273; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) 482-483; Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 211-
212; Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in European Contract Law: 
Scots and South African Perspectives 253-255.  
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undertakings.150 If the employee can prove that the restraint is unreasonable (by proving 
that it does not protect a substantive interest),151 he will not be bound,152 because by the 
same token public policy discourages unreasonable restrictions on people’s freedom of 
trade.153  
One question that still needs to be answered, however, is whether enforcement of an 
agreement in restraint of trade amounts to an infringement of the employee’s personal 
liberty and similarly leads to forced labour, since the employee is indirectly forced to 
honour his employment contract. Whether this is the case and should be an impediment 
to the enforcement of restraints will be addressed later.154  
4 2 2  Contract of work (locatio conductio operis) 
As indicated earlier,155 in South African law the contract of employment must be 
distinguished from other personal service contracts, more specifically, the contract of 
work (locatio conductio operis). The contract of work has been defined as a mutual 
agreement between a locator (the employer/client who commissions the work) and a 
conductor (the contractor) in terms of which the latter undertakes to execute a particular 
piece of work and promises to produce a certain specified result.156 A significant 
                                                 
150
  Thus, freedom of contract is preferred over freedom of trade in our law. See Roffey v 
Catterall, Edwards & Goudré (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 505F; Magna Alloys and 
Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) 891; Van der Merwe et al Contract: 
General Principles 185. 
151
  Examples of such interests include business connections and business secrets. See 
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
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  Which will be the case if, for example, the sole objective of the restraint is to eliminate 
competition. See in this regard, Hirt & Carter (Pty) Ltd v Mansfield 2008 (3) SA 512 (D). 
153
  Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 776I-777B. 
154
  See para 4 8 4 below. 
155
  See para 4 1 above. 
156
  Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) 61B; quoted with 
approval in Phaka v Bracks (JR1171/11) [2013] ZALCJHB 91 para [17]. 
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distinguishing factor between a contract of employment and a contract of work in our 
law is that the services as such are not the object of the contract of work. The client is 
not interested in the contractor’s labour, but in the result of his labour.157  
Examples of work undertaken by an independent contractor include the construction of 
a road158 or of a dam,159 the repair of a building or of a road,160 the demolition of a 
building,161 the sinking of a borehole,162 the installation of an electric service,163 and the 
cartage of goods.164 The work performed by the independent contractor does not have 
to be of a physical nature, it may also be intellectual services (operae liberales).165 For 
example, accountants and advocates are also considered to be independent 
contractors.166  
Our law treats these contracts as regular commercial contracts to which the general 
principles of the law of contract apply. Hence, a contractor’s breach will entitle the client 
to claim specific performance, subject only to the qualification that the court has a 
discretion to refuse it.167 Nienaber, however, holds that “[s]uch an order will usually but 
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  Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 393-394. Comparable to obligations de résultat in 
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  Van Rensburg v Straughan 1914 AD 317. 
163
  Breslin v Hichens 1914 AD 312. 
164
  Parke v Hamman 1907 TH 47; Horne v Williams & Co 1940 TPD 106. 
165
  Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) 56H. 
166
  Spurrier v Coxwell NO 1914 CPD 83. For more examples, see F du Bois Wille’s Principles 
of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 942. 
167
  Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
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not necessarily be refused when it involves the execution of work”.168 Van der Merwe et 
al similarly hold that “courts in the past have also been reluctant to grant specific 
performance of obligations arising from mandate and contracts for services (locatio 
conductio operis), for example where a builder has undertaken to do alterations to a 
house or where a lessor is bound to repair the leased property”.169 The authors suggest 
that the reason for this approach is that it would be difficult for a court to supervise the 
execution of an order for specific performance. According to Christie, building contracts 
have not been specifically enforced on the ground of the imprecision of the 
obligations.170 This is essentially the same reason explained from a different angle, 
since the preciseness of the obligations affects the court’s ability to decide whether the 
work is being performed properly.171 A contractual obligation may be imprecise in the 
sense that granting an order for specific performance may lead to a lengthy dispute on 
whether it has been carried out properly.172  
The facts of National Butchery Co v African Merchants Ltd173 show that there is merit in 
these concerns. It illustrates how an order to perform construction work can run into 
trouble and consequently require repeated applications to the court. The court ordered 
                                                 
168
  P M Nienaber “Building and engineering contracts” in L T C Harms & J A Faris (eds) 
LAWSA 2(1) 2 ed (2003) para 478. 
169
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 332 esp n 37. 
170
  See Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 552. See also J W 
Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (1951) vol 2 § 3117 ff; Barker v Beckett 
& Co Ltd 1911 TPD 151 164. 
171
  Lubbe & Murray Contract 546. 
172
  Christie “suggests that where obligations are imprecise further disputes might arise 
between the parties, the defendant claiming that he has performed satisfactorily pursuant 
to an order of specific performance, and the plaintiff denying this” (Lubbe & Murray 
Contract 546). Compare statements by Lord Hoffmann in text to n 64 & n 80 para 5 2 (i) 
below. 
173
  (1907) 21 EDC 57. See also Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South 
Africa 553; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 306. 
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African Merchants Ltd to perform its contract to erect a cold storage and ice-making 
plant for National Butchery Co. National Butchery Co had to return to the court twice, 
seeking its intervention to ensure the erection of the plant in accordance with the 
contract. However, more recently, Coetzee J in Ranch International Pipelines 
(Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v LMG Construction (City) (Pty) Ltd174 emphatically rejected the 
traditional objection to the enforcement of building contracts and explained his 
reasoning as follows: 
“I wonder if this so-called difficulty is not grossly over-emphasised. Is it not imaginary rather 
than real? I could not find a case on record where such a difficulty actually arose in practice 
and which had to be dealt with by the Court after an order to perform a building contract had 
been made. Why should there be any difficulty? What is the need of supervision anyway? 
Does the Court ever supervise the execution of its judgments? Surely not. Orders ad factum 
praestandum are made all the time. There is no supervision thereof and no intervention by 
the Sheriff. If there is an intentional refusal to perform, contempt proceedings may follow. 
Why should different considerations then apply to building contracts? Accurate performance 
of them with the requisite skill or workmanship is irrelevant in this context. As it is in the case 
of every other order ad factum praestandum. The judgment creditor will surely cancel the 
contract when it is unintentionally incorrectly performed. The judgment does not replace the 
contract. After all, this risk, as well as that of not succeeding in contempt proceedings, the 
owner took when he asked the Court for this order. It is his affair. If the owner has elected to 
claim this remedy and he is prepared to take these risks, why, one may ask, should it lie, as 
a matter of logic, in the mouth of the defaulting builder to advance any reason connected with 
the quality of his performance or his general unwillingness, as a basis for avoiding an order 
compelling him to perform his bargain?” 175 
On these grounds an order of specific performance was granted against the client, 
forcing it to cooperate with the contractor in completing the work in the sense of allowing 
him to perform. By pointing out that the judgment does not replace the contract and 
therefore introduces no new difficulty in deciding whether the work is being performed 
                                                 
174
  1984 (3) SA 861 (W) 880G-881F.  
175
  880H-881B. 
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properly, Coetzee J discredited the traditional objection to the specific enforcement of 
construction contracts. Furthermore, in the light of the emphasis that is now placed on a 
contractant’s right to specific performance, Van der Merwe et al assert that our courts’ 
current approach should be fundamentally reconsidered.176  
It would appear that there is merit in this suggestion. The question whether difficulties 
with supervision should influence awarding specific performance will only be 
investigated in detail in the next chapter, but it may as well be remarked here that 
Coetzee J’s objections in Ranch International Pipelines appear to be cogent, and, that it 
is doubtful whether this rationale justifies refusing a creditor his right to specific 
performance.177 It may therefore be argued that there is no apparent sustainable reason 
for courts to exercise their discretion against specific enforcement of such contracts. 
The Ranch case has not, however, resolved the matter and it is submitted that 
intervention by our courts is required to bring coherence to this area of our law.  
It should also be noted that the Consumer Protection Act178 impacts on the rules 
applicable to these contracts.179 Section 54 provides that a consumer has the right to 
demand quality service. In particular, a consumer has the right to the timely 
performance and completion of the services, or, if that is not possible, timely notice of 
any unavoidable delay in the performance of the services; the performance of the 
services in a manner and quality that persons are generally entitled to expect; the use, 
delivery or installation of goods (if any such goods are required for performance of the 
services) that are free of defects and of a quality that persons are generally entitled to 
expect; the return of their property in at least as good a condition as it was when the 
                                                 
176
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 332. 
177
  See also ISEP Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) 
Ltd 1981 (4) SA 151 (T) 5, and authority cited there. 
178
  68 of 2008, which applies to services delivered by independent contractors under locatio 
conductio operis but not to services delivered under locatio conductio operarum (section 
5(2)(e)). 
179
  Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 459. 
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consumer made it available to the supplier for the purpose of performing such 
services.180 This would be the case, for example, where a consumer has to leave an 
electrical appliance with an electrician.  
If the service provider fails to meet these standards of service delivery, the consumer 
can choose between demanding that the service provider performs properly or 
demanding a refund of “a reasonable portion of the price paid for the services 
performed and goods supplied, having regard to the extent of the failure”.181 
The Act provides an express basis for the enforcement of the obligations of suppliers of 
services by consumers. It gives priority to specific performance of service contracts in 
accordance with our law’s general point of departure, and supports the previous 
statement that there is no apparent convincing reason for courts to exercise their 
discretion against specific enforcement of such contracts. 
4 3  English law182 
The references to English law thus far were mainly incidental to explain developments 
in South African law. We will now consider English law in more detail to understand 
these developments better and to determine the road ahead for our law. Although the 
English law relating to the contract of employment was still in its developmental stages 
during the nineteenth century, it has shaped the attitude of our courts to the 
enforcement of personal service contracts.183 
                                                 
180
  Section 54(1). 
181
  Section 54(2). 
182
  See generally para 2 3 2 1 above. 
183
  See Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99 108. See also Jordaan “Employment 
relations” in Southern Cross 389; Brassey 1981 ILJ 58; Le Roux 2010 Ind LJ 139. 
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The majority of English commentators do not distinguish between employment contracts 
and other contracts for services in discussing their enforceability.184 Generally, broad 
terminology such as “contracts of personal service” or “contracts involving personal 
service” is used.185 An employment contract is usually defined to mean the same as a 
“contract of service”.186 The literature on the enforceability of personal service contracts 
therefore does not uphold the traditional Roman law divide between a person who is 
employed (under locatio conductio operarum) and someone who is self-employed 
(under locatio conductio operis). It can be said that this distinction is unnecessary since 
the general rule is that contracts for personal services or involving the continuous 
performance of services will not be specifically enforced, no matter how defined.  
English courts were still prepared to order specific enforcement of personal service 
contracts during the eighteenth century,187 but they would not even consider doing so in 
the late nineteenth century.188 As Lord Reid pointed out in Ridge v Baldwin,189 “[t]he law 
regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There cannot be specific performance of a 
                                                 
184
  The dichotomy between employees and the self-employed is recognised and more 
influential in other areas of English law, for example in tax law. See S Deakin “The 
contract of employment: a study in legal evolution” (2001) 31 ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No 203 available online at 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP203.pdf>. 
185
  See J Beatson Anson’s Law of Contract 28 ed (2002) 639; E Peel Treitel’s Law of 
Contract 13 ed (2011) 1110. 
186
  See s 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. See also H Beale et al Cases, Materials 
and Text on Contract Law 2 ed (2010) 869-870. 
187
  See eg Ball v Coggs (1710) 1 Bro Parl Cas 140; East India Co v Vincent (1740) 2 Atk 83. 
Macdonell (Master and Servant 2 ed 162) points out that Equity Courts did at one time 
order specific performance of service contracts. 
188
  See eg Pickering v The Bishop of Ely (1843) 2 Y & C Ch Cas 249; Johnson v Shrewsbury 
and Birmingham Railway Co (1853) 43 ER 358. 
189
  [1964] AC 40 65. See also M R Freedland The Personal Employment Contract (2003) 
352. 
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contract of service”. The underlying reasoning for this position appears from Innes CJ’s 
dictum in Schierhout v Minister of Justice:190  
“Now, it is a well established rule of English law that the only remedy open to an ordinary 
servant who has been wrongfully dismissed is an action for damages. The Courts will not 
decree specific performance against the employee … Equity Courts did at one time issue 
decrees for specific performance. But the practice has long been abandoned, and for two 
reasons: the inadvisability of compelling one person to employ another whom he does not 
trust in a position which imports a close relationship; and the absence of mutuality, for no 
Court could by its order compel a servant to perform his work faithfully and diligently. The 
same practice has been adopted by South African Courts, and probably for the same reason. 
No case was quoted to us where a master has been compelled to retain the services of an 
employee wrongly dismissed … and I know of none. The remedy has always been 
damages.” 
Another relevant passage, and one more appropriate for present purposes, appears in 
an old English case, Johnson v The Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway Company191  
in which Knight-Bruce LJ, in refusing specific performance of a contract of service for 
the management of a railway company, said:192 
“There is here an agreement, the effect of which is that the plaintiffs are to be the confidential 
servants of the defendants in most important particulars, in which, not only for the sake of the 
persons immediately concerned but for the sake of society at large, it is necessary that there 
should be the most entire harmony and spirit of co-operation between the contracting parties. 
How is this possible to prevail in the position in which (I assume for the purpose of the 
argument by the default of the defendants) the defendants have placed themselves? We are 
asked to compel one person to employ against his will another as his confidential servant, for 
duties with respect to the due performance of which the utmost confidence is required. Let 
him be one of the best and most competent persons that ever lived, still if the two do not 
agree, and good people do not always agree, enormous mischief may be done.” 
                                                 
190
  1926 AD 99 107. 
191
  (1853) 43 ER 358. 
192
  (1853) 43 ER 358 362-363. 
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The prevailing view in modern English law is that employment contracts are not 
specifically enforceable by either the employee or the employer.193 According to Beale 
et al “[i]t has long been settled that a contract of personal service (or employment) will 
not, as a general rule, be specifically enforced at the suit of either party”.194 And 
according to Sir Roger Ormrod: “Nobody would willingly grant an injunction forcing 
either an employer on an employee or an employee on an employer, simply on the 
basis that it would not work.”195 This is also reflected in a more recent decision, where it 
was held that specific performance will not be granted against an employee because it 
implicates his personal liberty.196 
A number of reasons have been advanced in support of this rule (apart from Ormrod’s 
rather vague assertion that it would not work).197 The first is that the order might be 
unreasonable towards the party who is now required to employ someone with whom he 
does not wish to work anymore, or in whom he has lost confidence or trust. Since it is 
the employer who pays for the work, he should be entitled to decide who remains 
                                                 
193
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 56; M P Furmston Chesire, Fifoot & Furmston’s 
Law of Contract 16 ed (2012) 800; H G Beale et al Chitty on Contracts 31 ed vol 1 (2012) 
1918. Specific performance was refused against an employee in Clark v Price (1819) 2 
Wils Ch 157; De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch D 430, and against an employer in 
Johnson v Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway Co (1853) 43 ER 358; Brett v East India 
and London Shipping Co Ltd (1864) 2 Hem & M 404; Rigby v Connol (1880) 14 Ch D 482.  
194
  See Beale et al Chitty on Contracts 1918, and the cases collected in n 101. 
195
  Powell v London Borough of Brent [1987] IRLR 466 476. See also Rigby v Connol (1880) 
14 Ch D 482, 487 per Jessel MR: “The courts have never dreamt of enforcing agreements 
strictly personal in their nature, whether they are agreements of hiring and service, being 
the common relation of master and servant, or whether they are agreements for the 
purpose of pleasure, or for the purpose of scientific pursuits, or for the purpose of charity 
or philanthropy.”, and Alexander v Standard Telephones and Cables plc [1990] ICR 291. 
196
  Young v Robson Rhodes [1999] 3 All ER 524 534.  
197
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 169. 
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employed by him.198 Then there is also the by now familiar, but less compelling 
consideration of difficulties of constant supervision by the court.199 Finally, and most 
importantly, the order is thought to promote forced labour since the employee will have 
to resume his duties against his will.200 The latter constitutes one of the main reasons 
why English courts have in the past refused to enforce personal service contracts, as 
evidenced by Fry LJ’s statement in De Francesco v Barnum:201 “the courts are bound to 
be jealous, lest they should turn contracts of service into contracts of slavery”. It is this 
policy ground, which we have also encountered in the South African context, that 
accounts for the rule.202 Thus, English law follows a very strict and straightforward 
approach – a contract of employment will not be enforceable against the employee first 
of all, due to the traditional civil liberty reasons, and also not against the employer on 
the ground that an employer should not have to employ anyone against its will; 
employers will thus never be compelled to employ employees they do not wish to 
employ.203  
                                                 
198
  See A Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 3 ed (2004) 482-483. 
199
  See Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893] 1 Ch 116. This 
argument is dealt with in detail in the following chapter. See also n 44 para 4 2 1 above. 
200
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 56; Beale et al Chitty on Contracts 1918. 
201
  (1890) 45 Ch D 430 438. Here a 14 year old girl entered into a 7 year apprenticeship 
agreement with De Francesco to be taught stage dancing. The girl agreed that she would 
be at De Francesco’s total disposal during the 7 years. She would accept no professional 
engagements except with De Francesco’s express approval, he was under no obligation 
to maintain her or to employ her, the payment scale was extremely low, she could not 
marry without his permission and De Francesco could terminate their arrangement 
whenever he wished. The girl, however, accepted other work and De Francesco’s action 
failed to prevent it. The Court held that the apprenticeship deed was unfair and 
unenforceable against her.  
202
  Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1110. 
203
  See generally M R Freedland The Contract of Employment (1976) 273 ff; Jones & 
Goodhart Specific Performance 173; Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract 
Law 871-872. 
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The common law principle against specific performance of employment contracts has 
also received statutory recognition. Section 236 of the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, provides that no court shall, whether by way of an 
order for specific performance or specific implement of a contract of employment, or an 
injunction or interdict restraining a breach or threatened breach of such a contract, 
compel an employee to do any work or attend at any place for the doing of any work. 
English law further recognises the principle that contractual undertakings not to 
compete or restraints of trade are prima facie void and unenforceable unless the 
restraint of trade is reasonable to protect the interest of the party who imposed the 
restraint.204 This places the onus to prove reasonableness on the party seeking to 
enforce the restraint, compared to our law,205 where the onus is on the party under 
restraint to prove that the restraint is unreasonable.206 The employer in effect has to 
                                                 
204
  Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 502 ff; Beale et al Chitty on Contracts 1269 ff, 1950 ff. The 
principle was famously encapsulated as follows in  Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns 
and Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535 565 per Lord Macnaghten: “The public have an 
interest in every person’s carrying on his trade freely: so has the individual. All 
interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of 
themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and therefore void. That 
is the general rule. But there are exceptions: restraints of trade and interference with 
individual liberty of action may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular 
case. It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is 
reasonable—reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties concerned and 
reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and so guarded as to 
afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same 
time it is in no way injurious to the public.” 
205
  See text to nn 145 ff para 4 2 1 2 above. 
206
  See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd 1968 AC 269 319; Magna 
Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) 887. See also T Floyd “The 
constitutionality of the onus of proof when enforcing restraint-of-trade agreements: an 
appropriate evaluation of the common-law rules” 2012 THRHR 521 522. 
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prove that the restrictions he has placed on the employee’s freedom of trade is not more 
than is reasonably necessary for the protection of his legitimate commercial interests.207 
Legislative force is also (supposedly) given to the principle that an employer cannot be 
forced to employ. This principle is reflected in the provisions of the Employment Rights 
Act 1996, in Part X on unfair dismissals. Under these provisions, a tribunal may order 
the reinstatement of the employee, but if such an order is not complied with, the 
employer can only be made to pay compensation. Reinstatement provides a potential 
solution to unfair dismissals and it appears that the primacy of the remedy of 
reinstatement is emphasised in the legislation. However, even though it might seem to 
provide a solution; it is not an attractive option in practice. According to Collins et al “the 
dismissal and its surrounding events will probably have led to a loss of trust and 
confidence on both sides, to such an extent that neither party wishes to continue the 
relationship. Reinstatement therefore appears to be a solution that usually no one 
wants”.208 It follows that in practice, reinstatement is “effected in only a tiny proportion of 
… cases”209 so that it is compensation which is the employee’s “primary remedy”.210 
The Act allows for an order to reinstate in principle, but it is not generally given effect to. 
Thus, despite the emphasis in the legislation upon reinstatement being the primary 
remedy, it appears that the remedy is rarely effective. And for the reasons listed above, 
most employees do not desire reinstatement. Therefore the normal remedy for unfair 
dismissal comprises financial compensation.211 
                                                 
207
  Beale et al Chitty on Contracts 1287; Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 508. See also Lumley 
v Wagner discussed in paras 4 2 1 2 above & 4 4 below.  
208
  Collins et al Labour Law 839. 
209
  Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2003] 1 AC 518 para [78], per Lord Millet; Lord Steyn states the 
proportion to be “only about 3%” (para [23]). 
210
  Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2003] 1 AC 518 para [23]. 
211
  Collins et al Labour Law 844; Freedland The Personal Employment Contract (2003) 352-
354; Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578 1586. See also Burrows 
Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 491. 
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We now turn to service contracts that do not amount to employment contracts. As 
indicated above, English law does not deal with the enforceability of employment 
contracts and other contracts for service separately. However, some authors have 
employed such a distinction. Jones and Goodhart, for example, note that some non-
employment contracts are specifically enforceable and others are not. They cite the 
following examples which illustrate the distinction. The first is that of the author who 
enters into an agreement with a publisher to write a book. It is held that courts will not 
order specific performance of such an obligation,212 but it is said that courts will order 
specific performance of a contract to assign a publisher the copyright of a work not yet 
written.213 Similarly, specific performance can be ordered of a contract to publish a book 
which has been completed.214 Thus, before its completion, the court will not grant 
specific performance against an author to complete the book or article, but will do so 
upon its completion. Even though the examples given by the authors are not personal 
service contracts sensu stricto and it may be said that an author can be ordered to hand 
over the completed work to the publisher because this is rather a contract to deliver the 
final product of the author’s labour,215 it remains a personal service contract under the 
broad definition adopted at the outset. 
It should be noted that in recent years it has been said that the general principle that 
contracts should not be enforced if this were to restrain another’s personal freedom is 
less persuasive than it once was.216 And there is “some evidence”217 that indicate that 
English courts are becoming more willing to grant specific performance of contracts of 
personal service outside the employment context – as shown by the comment of 
                                                 
212
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 169. 
213
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 169, citing (n 3) Erskine Macdonald Ltd v Eyles 
[1921] 1 Ch 631, as authority. 
214
  Citing Barrow v Chappel & Co Ltd [1976] RPC 355. 
215
  Cf for Dutch law: text to n 300 para 4 6 below. 
216
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 57. 
217
  171. 
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Megarry J, reviewing in 1971 the status of the principle against specific enforcement of 
contracts for personal service in CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris:218 
“One day, perhaps, the courts will look again at the so-called rule that contracts for personal 
services or involving the continuous performance of services will not be specifically enforced. 
Such a rule is plainly not absolute and without exception, nor do I think that it can be based 
on any narrow consideration such as difficulties of constant superintendence by the court … I 
do not think it should be assumed that as soon as any element of personal service or 
continuous services can be discerned in a contract the court will, without more, refuse 
specific performance.” 
However, such statements have not been repeated since then, and modern textbooks 
still contain the traditional rule. In the latest version of Treitel’s Law of Contract, for 
example, contracts involving personal services are discussed under the heading: 
“Contracts not specifically enforceable” under which the same familiar line appears: “It 
has long been settled that equity will not, as a general rule, enforce a contract of 
personal service”.219 Burrows also concedes that despite evidence that English law has 
moved closer to the principle of specific performance as adopted in civil-law 
jurisdictions, a plaintiff must still prove that damages is inadequate before a court will 
grant specific performance of personal service contracts.220 However, Burrows’ 
statement requires qualification. In this respect, an important point made in Young v 
Robson Rhodes,221 is worth highlighting. In this case it was held that “questions of the 
adequacy of damages are irrelevant” when it comes to the issue of (non-) enforcement 
of personal service contracts, because it is the policy ground of personal freedom that 
justifies the refusal.222 Thus, while it is technically required to prove inadequacy of 
                                                 
218
  [1972] 1 WLR 307 318. 
219
  See Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1110 and cases collected in n 180. See also Beale et 
al Chitty on Contracts 1918 and cases collected in n 101. 
220
  A S Burrows “Judicial remedies” in P Birks (ed) English Private Law II (2000) 813 874 
para 18.185. 
221
  [1999] 3 All ER 524. 
222
  Young v Robson Rhodes [1999] 3 All ER 524 534. 
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damages, this rule is not dependent upon damages being an adequate remedy. The 
main reasons for the general rule against specific performance of personal service 
contracts remains the policy considerations as discussed above. Burrows’ statement 
may also create the incorrect impression that a plaintiff can convince a court to grant 
specific performance of a personal service contract based on the inadequacy of 
damages. Even if damages are inadequate, the remedy will not be available to enforce 
such a contract, based on policy considerations such as the concern for the defendant’s 
dignity and liberty. These considerations underlie the general rule against specific 
performance of such contracts. Hence, there is a general prohibition of specific 
enforcement of personal service contracts. The courts are not merely generally 
reluctant, as in South Africa. However, as indicated by authors such as Jones and 
Goodhart, there are exceptions to this general rule where English courts will consider 
specifically enforcing personal service contracts, especially those that do not amount to 
employment contracts / involve the continuous performance of services. 
4 4  American law223  
American law adopts the same point of departure as English law. As a general rule,224 
and in line with the common law tradition, a contractual obligation to perform a personal 
service will not be specifically enforced by US courts.225 The literature does not 
                                                 
223
  See generally para 2 3 2 2 above.  
224
  As will be indicated, there are exceptions to this general rule where courts will consider 
specifically enforcing personal service contracts. See eg Metropolitan Sports Facilities 
Commission v Minnesota Twins Partnership 638 N.W. 2d 214, 216 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002): 
“While personal-services contracts generally are not enforceable by specific performance, 
they may be enforceable under genuinely extraordinary circumstances.”  
225
  Rutland Marble Co v Ripley (1870) 77 U.S. 339; Beverly Glen Music Inc v Warner 
Communications Inc 178 Cal. App. 3d 1142 (1986), M A Foran Williston on Sales 5 ed III 
(1996) 697 § 25-45; E Yorio & S Thel Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and 
Injunctions 2 ed (2012) § 15.2; Loeb 2001 Marquette Sports Law Review 287; J M Perillo 
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distinguish between different types of personal service contracts and the rules relating 
to specific performance are generally discussed under the broad heading “personal 
service contracts”, of which the prime example is the contract of employment.226 As 
explained by official comment b (“What is personal service”) to § 367 of the American 
Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts, examples of personal services 
include the professional obligations of actors, singers and athletes, as well as the 
obligations of employees in traditional master-servant relationships. Notably, however, 
courts and commentators have held that a service will only be considered personal if it 
cannot be delegated or performed vicariously. A service must therefore be non-
delegable to be unenforceable.227 It follows that, under American law, an artist cannot 
be compelled to paint a portrait.228 
§ 367 of the Second Restatement states (under the heading “contracts for personal 
service or supervision”): 
“(1) A promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced. 
 (2) A promise to render personal service exclusively for one employer will not be enforced by 
an injunction against serving another if its probable result will be to compel a performance 
involving personal relations the enforced continuance of which is undesirable or will be to 
leave the employee without other reasonable means of making a living.”229 
                                                                                                                                                             
(ed) Corbin on Contracts 12: Restitution, Specific Performance and Election of Remedies 
Interim ed (2002) § 1204; J M Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 6 ed (2009) 557. 
226
  See eg Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1204; Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 
557-558. 
227
  See Wilson v Sandstrom 317 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1975); E A Farnsworth Contracts 3 ed 
(1999) 781; Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1204.  
228
  Compare text to nn 240-242 below. 
229
  The provisions of the Second Restatement referred to in this section are reproduced in 
Addendum A 382-385. The official text and comments are also accessible via Westlaw 
International. 
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According to the official comment to this paragraph (entitled “rationale of refusal of 
specific performance”) the refusal is based in part upon the undesirability of compelling 
the continuance of personal relationship after disputes have arisen and confidence and 
loyalty have been affected and of imposing what might seem like involuntary 
servitude.230 It further determines that to this extent the rule stated in subsection (1) is 
an application of the more general rule under which specific performance will not be 
granted if the use of compulsion is contrary to public policy (contained in § 365). The 
refusal is also based upon the difficulty of enforcement inherent in passing judgment on 
the quality of performance. To this extent the rule stated in subsection (1) is also an 
application of the more general rule on the effect of difficulty of enforcement (contained 
in § 366).  
Commentators’ explanations of why specific performance is refused are in similar 
vein:231 
“The rule for personal service contracts is explained in part by judicial discomfort with 
ordering an individual to undertake specifically described acts or enter into unwanted 
associations, as evidenced by courts’ and commentators’ frequent reference to the 
prohibition on involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Courts have also observed that the enforcement of a decree of specific performance is 
particularly problematic in the case of personal services, as it is often difficult for the court to 
evaluate the quality of performance. Nor is it clear that such orders are effective, given that 
the value of personal services often depends on the trust and loyalty, which breach and 
recourse to legal remedies might have destroyed.” 
These reasons are equally applicable where specific performance is sought of an 
employer’s obligation to retain an employee in his service, save for the fact that 
enforcement against an employer does not involve the issue of involuntary servitude 
(the same reason our law enforces employment contracts against employers), but 
                                                 
230
  See § 367, cmt a. See also Farnsworth Contracts 781. 
231
  G Klass Contract Law in the USA (2010) 216. See also Farnsworth Contracts 781; Perillo 
Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 557-558. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   211 
 
would nevertheless involve difficulty of supervision, and the possible continuation of an 
unpleasant personal relationship.232 US courts will not order an employer or an 
employee to maintain the undesirable personal relationship that performance of these 
contracts requires.233 Perillo, however, convincingly argues that the reasons for refusing 
specific performance against an employer are questionable, because arbitration awards 
ordering reinstatement have been specifically enforced, and reinstatements have also 
been ordered under civil service and civil rights legislation.234 But the prevailing view in 
modern American law remains that employment contracts are not specifically 
enforceable by either the employee or the employer. 
However, as § 367(2) reflects, courts may prevent (by way of a prohibitive order)235 a 
party (the one who has to perform a service) from breaching a negative clause which 
restrains him from providing services for another specified party (i.e. it may prevent him 
from working for third parties).236 This means that the court in effect indirectly enforces 
the contract. The purpose of such a negative injunction is not to force the breaching 
party to perform, but to enforce a negative contractual term that services will not be 
rendered to the aggrieved party’s competitors. According to Perillo “[t]he theory is that 
the court is merely enforcing an express or implied negative covenant not to work for 
competitors during the contract term”.237 However, § 367(2) of the Second Restatement 
observes that such a negative injunction will not be granted “if its probable result will be 
to compel a performance involving personal relations the enforced continuance of which 
is undesirable or will be to leave the employee without other reasonable means of 
                                                 
232
  Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 557-558. 
233
  Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1204; Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 557-
558. 
234
  See Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 558 and authority cited there. 
235
  Or “negative injunction”, which is the term more commonly used in common-law systems. 
236
  See Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1204; S Shavell “Specific performance versus 
damages for breach of contract: an economic analysis” 2006 Tex LR 831 857; Perillo 
Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 557.  
237
  Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 557. 
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making a living”.238  (These consideratoins are of course also familiar in the context of 
South African law on restraint of trade agreements.)  It follows that § 367(2) grants a 
right of indirect enforcement by way of an injunction against working for third parties, but 
then qualifies this right in certain circumstances – as illustrated in Beverly Glen Music, 
Inc v Warner Communications, Inc239 discussed below. 
Another example where a court will consider specifically enforcing contracts for 
services, is if the contract contains aspects that make it less personal in nature.240 For 
example, in Mellon v Cessna Aircraft Co241 the court awarded specific performance of a 
contract to maintain an airplane, due to the fact that “Cessna service is available 
throughout the country at a number of authorized Cessna service centers”. It added that 
“[t]he very availability of Cessna-authorized service at multiple locations distinguishes 
Cessna’s obligation under this contract from a personal services contract between, for 
example, a performer with a unique style and a promoter or theatre”.242  
The general rule adopted in the US is also policy-based, especially when the interests 
of society are at stake. For example, in Fitzpatrick v Michael,243 the court held that even 
if there is no adequate remedy at law, equity will not specifically enforce a contract for 
personal services, because “the mischief likely to result from the enforced continuance 
of the relationship incident to the service when it has become personally obnoxious to 
one of the parties is so great that the best interests of society require that the remedy be 
refused”.244 It follows that the same policy grounds or societal interests are advanced in 
favour of the general (common law) rule against enforcement. According to Scott and 
                                                 
238
  See Farnsworth Contracts 331; Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 557; Klass 
Contract Law in the USA 216-217; Yorio & Thel Contract Enforcement § 16.1. 
239
  178 Cal. App. 3d 1142 (1986).  
240
  R E Scott & J S Kraus Contract Law and Theory 3 rev ed (2003) 991. 
241
  64 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D. Kan 1999). 
242
  1064. See also Scott & Kraus Contract Law and Theory 991. 
243
  177 Md. 248, 9 A.2d 639 (1939). 
244
  641 per Offutt J. See also Farnsworth Contracts 781. 
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Kraus,245 these include that compelled performance is likely to be unsatisfactory since 
the compelled party is less likely to perform to the best of his abilities, or may perhaps 
even intentionally deliver the worst service possible. They also specifically rely on the 
Thirteenth Amendment argument,246 and state that such enforcement might lead to 
claims of constitutionally-prohibited forced labour.247  
A good example of the US courts’ strict approach to enforcement of contracts for 
personal services is Beverly Glen Music Inc v Warner Communications Inc.248 Here, 
Anita Baker, a singer, breached her contract with the plaintiffs by signing with their 
competitors, the defendants. The plaintiffs first claimed specific performance of the 
contract, which the court refused based on the Thirteenth Amendment of the US 
Constitution. Then they claimed an injunction prohibiting her from working for their 
competitor, which the court also refused based on the absence of a negative term in 
their contract. Finally, they claimed an injunction preventing the defendant from hiring 
her, but the court also refused this claim stating that this will still be tantamount to 
involuntary servitude as it would deny her the opportunity to earn money elsewhere and 
pressure her to honor her contract with them.249 It is clear from this decision that US 
courts are even stricter in enforcing the principle against specific performance of 
personal service contracts than English courts. The facts of this case clearly correspond 
with those of Lumley v Wagner.250 It will be recalled that in the latter case, the Chancery 
Court was willing to indirectly enforce Wagner’s contract by granting an injunction to 
                                                 
245
  Contract Law and Theory 990. 
246
  Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution reads: “Neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.” 
247
  See also Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 557. 
248
  178 Cal. App. 3d 1142 (1986). See Scott & Kraus Contract Law and Theory 990. 
249
  Scott & Kraus Contract Law and Theory 990-991. 
250
  1852 1 De GM & G 604. 
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refrain “from the commission of an act which she has bound herself not to do”.251 The 
court thus specifically enforced a negative clause even if Wagner was thereby in effect 
forced to fulfil her contract to sing at Her Majesty’s Theatre.252 However, this case can 
be distinguished from the US case discussed above,253 on the ground that the contract 
between the parties in Lumley contained an express term which prevented Wagner from 
singing at another theatre. Such a negative clause was absent in the Warner case. It is 
of particular significance that the Chancery Court in Lumley still held that Wagner could 
indirectly be “forced” to sing, while the US court was not prepared to order the artist to 
sing; the US court specifically emphasised that  
“Whether the plaintiff proceeds against Ms Baker directly or against those who might employ 
her, the intent is the same; to deprive Ms Baker of her livelihood and thereby pressure her to 
return to plaintiff’s employ. Plaintiff contends that this is not an action against Ms. Baker, but 
merely an equitable claim against Warner to deprive it of the wrongful benefits it gained when 
it ‘stole’ Ms. Baker away. Thus, plaintiff contends, the equities lie not between the plaintiff 
and Ms. Baker, but between plaintiff and the predatory Warner Communications company. 
Yet if Warner’s behaviour has actually been predatory, plaintiff has an adequate remedy by 
way of damages. An injunction adds nothing to plaintiff’s recovery from Warner except to 
coerce Ms. Baker to honor her contract. Denying someone his livelihood is a harsh remedy 
… To expand this remedy so that it could be used in virtually all breaches of a personal 
service contract is to ignore over 100 years of common law on this issue.”254 
                                                 
251
  See text to nn 112 ff para 4 2 1 2 above. In this case the parties included the following 
term in their agreement: “Mademoiselle Wagner engages herself not to use her talents at 
any other theatre, nor in any concert or reunion, public or private, without the written 
authorisation of Mr Lumley.”  
252
  1852 1 De GM & G 604 619; Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 177 ff; B H Bix 
Contract Law: Rules, Theory, and Context (2012) 107; para 4 2 1 2 above. 
253
  Beverly Glen Music Inc v Warner Communications Inc 178 Cal. App. 3d 1142 (1986); 
Scott & Kraus Contract Law and Theory 990-991. 
254
  Beverly Glen Music Inc v Warner Communications Inc 178 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 1145 
(1986). 
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To summarise, American courts justify their refusal to grant specific performance with 
regard to personal service contracts on the following grounds: difficulty of enforcement 
of such an order, public policy considerations, such as concerns for individual 
autonomy, and the unwillingness to force parties into an unwanted personal 
association.255 Thus, in order to qualify as an unenforceable personal service contract, 
the breaching party’s performance must be non-delegable and the order must be 
problematic because of difficulty of enforcement, public policy considerations or the 
personal nature of the performance. The fact that an order of specific performance is 
thought to interfere unduly with the personal liberty of the employee constitutes the main 
reason why specific performance is not available against an employee in the US, as 
evidenced by courts’ and commentators’ repeated reference to the prohibition on 
involuntary servitude in the US Constitution.256 This is similarly a recurrent theme in 
English law. In the following sections, the relevance of this consideration, as well as 
certain others, will be investigated in the context of certain civil-law systems and model 
instruments. 
4 5  German law257  
The enforcement of personal service contracts in German law is notoriously 
controversial and uncertain. The following exposition is limited to the majority views, as 
reflected in comparative materials.258  
                                                 
255
  Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 558. 
256
  See eg Arthur v Oakes 63 Fed. 310, 317-318 (7th Cir. 1894) per Harlan CJ: “It would be 
an invasion of one’s natural liberty to compel him to work for or to remain in the personal 
service of another. One who is placed under such constraint is in a condition of involuntary 
servitude,– a condition which … shall not exist within the United States …”  
257
  See generally para 2 3 1 1 above. 
258
  Markesinis et al German Law of Contract; H Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on 
Contract Law 2 ed (2010). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   216 
 
German law, in accordance with the civil-law tradition,259 distinguishes between a 
contract of services (Dienstvertrag), which resembles locatio conductio operarum,260 
and a contract for work (Werkvertrag), which in turn resembles locatio conductio 
operis.261 The main difference between a contract of services (Dienstvertrag) and a 
contract for work (Werkvertrag) is that the provider of the service does not promise that 
he will ensure that a certain result comes about, but merely that he will perform the 
service as promised.262 A contract for services could therefore encompass the typical 
contract of employment,263 but could also cover the services provided by a medical 
practitioner, who could also not promise a result (i.e. that the patient would be healed). 
Whereas in South African law, the latter contract would be a locatio conductio operis, 
based on other factors. For example, the practitioner is not under the control of his 
patient, he uses his own equipment and generally receives payment (or issues an 
account) after completion of the procedure. German law attaches no significant weight 
to these factors; the central question to classification is whether a certain result is 
promised. The consequences and enforceability of a contract of services (Dienstvertrag) 
and a contract for work (Werkvertrag) will now be discussed in turn. 
4 5 1  Contract of services (Dienstvertrag) 
The point of departure in § 888(1) of the Zivilprozessordnung (German Code of Civil 
Procedure or ZPO) is that if an act cannot be performed by a third party (nicht 
vertretbare Handlungen), and it depends entirely on the will of the party obliged to 
perform it, the court can impose a fine to induce performance, and if this is not 
successful, even order imprisonment.264 Thus, where the obligation is solely dependent 
                                                 
259
  See para 4 1 above. 
260
  See § 611 ff BGB. 
261
  See § 631 ff BGB. 
262
  See generally Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 528. 
263
  See eg Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 153. 
264
  See F Faust & V Wiese “Specific performance – a German perspective” in J Smits et al 
(eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 47 
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on the specific debtor’s will and incapable of being delegated to a third party, specific 
performance will be ordered, because this is work that only the debtor can properly 
perform.  
However, on a procedural level, the ZPO forbids the enforcement of service 
agreements.265 § 888(3) determines that § 888(1) does not apply to where someone 
has to perform services (Diensten) in terms of a contract of service (Dienstvertrag). 
§611 BGB (broadly) states the typical contractual duties in a service contract: 
“(1) By means of a service contract, a person who promises service is obliged to perform the 
services promised, and the other party is obliged to grant the agreed remuneration. 
(2) Services of any type may be the subject matter of service contracts.” 
Because German procedural law maintains that the personal obligation to provide 
services cannot be specifically enforced,266 it follows that an employment contract will 
                                                                                                                                                             
49: “acts which can be performed by third parties and not only by the debtor … are 
enforced by the court allowing the plaintiff to employ a third party to perform the act at the 
debtor’s expense. Thus, the practical result is the same as if the creditor had made a 
cover transaction and claimed damages form the outset … But … the court renders 
judgment not for damages but for performance …” Also noting (n 7) that, according to 
Treitel “Remedies for breach of contract” in IECL VII (1976) 7, “the conversion into a 
pecuniary claim would cause the claim to be regarded as one for damages in the common 
law context”. Compare text to n 16 para 3 2 above. 
265
  Thus, as explained by Faust & Wiese “Specific performance – a German perspective” in 
Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 
49: “courts will render judgment for specific performance because, under German 
substantive law [§ 241(1) BGB], the employee is under an obligation to work … However, 
in order to protect the personal freedom of the [employee], procedural law forbids the 
enforcement of these judgments”. 
266
  See S Shavell “Specific performance versus damages for breach of contract: an economic 
analysis” (2006) 84 Tex LR 831 862; Faust & Wiese “Specific performance – a German 
perspective” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other 
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not be specifically enforced by German courts. The contract is governed by §§ 611 ff 
BGB, a number of statutes,267 and the Grundgesetz (Federal Law), specifically Article 
12.268  
In this regard, German law further distinguishes between ordering 
payment/reinstatement by the employer (which is more generally accepted) and 
ordering specific performance against an employee. German courts will not award 
specific performance of an obligation to perform a service, i.e. compel an employee to 
perform in terms of his employment contract. The same traditional underlying reasons is 
given in support of this rule, namely that it essentially amounts to forced labour, which is 
contrary to the debtor’s human dignity, since there is an interference with his personal 
freedom.269  
However, like South African law (and unlike American law, and in effect, unlike English 
law), German law generally accepts that employers’ obligations can be specifically 
enforced. In Germany, a court can order an employer that wrongfully dismissed an 
employee to reinstate the employee. According to the Protection Against Unfair 
Dismissal Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz or KSchG)270 if the unlawfulness of a dismissal 
is confirmed by the labour court,271 the employer is required to continue the employment 
                                                                                                                                                             
Perspectives 49; Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 870; M Smits 
Efficient Breach and the Enforcement of Specific Performance LLM thesis Amsterdam 
Law School (2014) 29. 
267
  A number of professional duties are set out by statute, for example, legislation governing 
service-delivery by hospitals and other service providers.  
268
  This Article guarantees freedom to choose and exercise one’s profession and to choose 
where to do so. 
269
  See Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 405; Faust & Wiese “Specific performance 
– a German perspective” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: 
National and Other Perspectives 49. 
270
  1951 (amended several times since then). 
271
  § 1 KSchG determines when a dismissal will be considered fair and justified. 
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and must reintegrate the employee into its operational structure (i.e. reinstate him into 
his former position).272 The courts have gone so far as to order reinstatement even 
where it required the employer to restructure its operations in such a way as to provide 
the employee with work.273  
Even though reinstatement is the prescribed remedy in the case of unlawful dismissal, 
the court may also decide to terminate the employment relationship on request of either 
the employer or the employee if it would be unreasonable to order the continuation of 
the relationship, for example, because the mutual trust was destroyed between the 
parties.274 If the court finds that the employment relationship should be dissolved, the 
employer is required to pay compensation275 to the employee.276 This means that the 
employee can institute legal action in the labour court to protect himself against 
dismissal, but even if he wins the case, the court might dissolve the employment 
relationship, and order the employer to pay compensation. Whether this legislation is 
effective in preserving jobs and protecting employees against unfair dismissal is 
therefore doubtful. According to a study published in 2009 “only about 9 per cent of 
applications made to the courts by dismissed employees lead to their reinstatement”.277 
                                                 
272
  § 8 KSchG; H Küsters Social Partnership: Basic Aspects of Labour Relations in Germany 
(2007) 115-118. 
273
  See “Radiologist case”: BAG, NJW 1956, 359 (10.11.1955), discussed in Beale et al 
Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 870. 
274
  § 9 KSchG. See also Küsters Social Partnership: Basic Aspects of Labour Relations in 
Germany 117-118. 
275
  § 10 KSchG determines the maximum amounts of such compensation.  
276
  Küsters Social Partnership: Basic Aspects of Labour Relations in Germany 117-118; M 
Weiss & M Schmidt Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Germany 4 rev ed (2008) 131-
132. 
277
  “Protection Against Dismissal” published by Eurofound, a European Union body, 
established to work in specialised areas of EU policy, available online at 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/GERMANY/PROTECTIONAGAINSTDISMISSAL-
DE.htm>.  
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This means that unfortunately a high proportion of applications by employees normally 
result in the employment relationship being cancelled in return for compensation and 
not the retention of their job. Even so, the KSchG provides an express basis for the 
employee’s right to enforcement of the employer’s obligations in unfair dismissal cases. 
4 5 2  Contract for work (Werkvertrag) 
In illustrating the distinction between a contract of services (Dienstvertrag) and a 
contract for work (Werkvertrag), Markesinis refers to the stock example of the 
contractual relationship between the medical practitioner and his patient. The medical 
practitioner merely promises to perform a procedure but does not promise to bring 
about a certain result, i.e. that the patient recovers.278 This type of contract therefore 
falls under the category of service contracts. § 888(3) ZPO, however, does not preclude 
the enforcement of personal service obligations under a contract for work 
(Werkvertrag).279 This effectively means that obligations to do work (i.e. a promise to 
achieve a particular result) are capable of being specifically enforced. § 631 BGB refers 
to the typical contractual duties in a contract to produce a work: 
“(1) By a contract to produce a work, a contractor is obliged to produce the promised work 
and the customer is obliged to pay the agreed remuneration. 
(2) The subject matter of a contract to produce a work may be either the production or  
alteration of a thing or another result to be achieved by work or by a service.” 
It can be derived from § 887(1) ZPO, that the reasoning behind this approach is that if 
obligations can be performed vicariously, i.e. by a third party, they are capable of being 
indirectly enforced. The execution of obligations to perform an act that can be 
                                                 
278
  Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 528. Cf for French law, Zimmermann The Law of 
Obligations 395 n 65: “the position is the same as in German law: the obligation de 
médicale is an obligation de moyens [promise for best efforts], not an obligation de 
résultat [promise for results]” (see also n 157 para 4 2 2 above). 
279
  Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 870. 
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performed vicariously (vertretbare Handlungen) consists of allowing the creditor to have 
the act done at the expense of the debtor.  
However, where the obligation is solely dependent on the specific debtor’s will and 
incapable of being delegated to a third party, specific performance will be ordered, 
because this is work that only the debtor can properly perform.280 According to 
Markesinis, activities that do not require the special skill of the debtor can, generally, be 
performed vicariously. Repairs on a building work can, for example, be performed 
vicariously, whereas the painting of a portrait cannot be vicariously performed.281 It 
follows that, under German law, an artist can be compelled to paint a portrait. 282  
This position radically departs from the position under the common law, and is 
problematical for a number of reasons. First of all, forcing someone to perform against 
his will similarly raises concerns for his personal freedom. A decision to order an artist 
to paint may in effect give rise to the by now familiar problem of forced labour. 
Furthermore, forced performance may ultimately lead to sub-standard work. Beale et al 
therefore maintain that, due to these “practical difficulties and the probably 
unsatisfactory nature of the end product”, specific performance of these personal 
obligations would rarely be claimed in practice.283  
 
                                                 
280
  Subject to § 275(1)-(3) BGB (see para 6 3 below). For example, “[i]f the obligation to 
provide the service is impossible to perform, the promisee is released from that obligation 
by § 275[1] BGB” (Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 530). See also text to n 77 
para 2 3 1 1 above. 
281
  Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 404. 
282
  Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 870. It is worth remembering that if 
it is a Dienstvertrag under § 888(3) ZPO, the court cannot fine or imprison him to induce 
performance.  
283
  Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 870. 
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4 6  Dutch law284  
Dutch law, in line with the civil-law tradition,285 maintains that a creditor may claim 
specific performance of any obligation. In terms of Article 3:296(1) BW, this includes 
obligations to do or not to do something.286 However, specific performance will not be 
ordered in case of obligations with a personal character.287 Again, the textbook example 
is obligations which are of an artistic nature, such as the obligation to write a book.288 In 
such a case the creditor will have to be satisfied with damages, termination or both of 
these remedies.289  
Dutch law does not explicitly or directly exclude specific performance of personal 
service contracts; Article 3:296(1) BW makes it clear that the right to specific 
performance may not be enforced if it is restricted by law, the nature of the obligation or 
juridical act.290 Thus, in certain instances, the nature of the obligation can determine that 
its performance cannot be enforced, as in the case of the obligation with a personal 
character.291 This can be inferred from the wording of Article 3:296 and subsequent 
interpretation thereof by commentators such as De Vries292 and Hartkamp.293  
                                                 
284
  See para 2 3 1 2 above. 
285
  See generally para 2 3 1 above. 
286
  D Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law (2002) 348; 
Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-II De Verbintenis in het Algemeen (2009) nr 343 & nr 356. 
See also Art 3:299 BW. 
287
  A S Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 2 rev ed (2011) 145. 
288
  G de Vries “Recht op nakoming in het Belgisch en Nederlands contractenrecht” in J Smits 
& S Stijns (eds) Remedies in het Belgisch en Nederlands Contractenrecht  (2000) 27 46. 
289
  Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 145. 
290
  Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-II (2009) nr 344. The relevant provisions of the BW are 
reproduced in Addendum A 401-407. 
291
  De Vries “Recht op nakoming in het Belgisch en Nederlands contractenrecht” in Smits & 
Stijns (eds) Remedies in het Belgisch en Nederlands Contractenrecht  27 46; D Haas De 
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The exact same justification for this (indirect) restriction as in the reviewed systems is 
applicable in Dutch law; the underlying reason is that compelling the artist to paint or the 
author to write, implicates their personal freedom, and that compulsion could also 
compromise the quality of the work. Haas, firstly explains that  
“[h]et meest principiele bezwaar tegen een veroordeling tot nakoming van een 
hoogstpersoonlijke verbintenis is de inbreuk die de veroordeling maakt op de persoonlijke 
vrijheid van de debiteur”. 
According to him, this is because enforcement of such obligations is contrary to the 
principle nemo praecise cogi ad factum.294 And therefore, a debtor cannot be compelled 
to perform obligations of a personal nature, but would instead be liable for the monetary 
equivalent.295 
Furthermore, Haas explains that  
“het tweede argument is dat een veroordeling tot nakoming contraproductief is, omdat het 
dwangaspect aan de correcte uitvoering van de hoogstpersoonlijke verbintenis in de weg 
staat”.296  
Therefore, a plaintiff would in any event not want to claim specific performance, 
because there is a risk that it might lead to sub-standard performance, because even if 
                                                                                                                                                             
Grenzen Van Het Recht Op Nakoming doctoral thesis Vrije University Amsterdam (2009) 
69. 
292
  De Vries “Recht op nakoming in het Belgisch en Nederlands contractenrecht” in Smits & 
Stijns (eds) Remedies in het Belgisch en Nederlands Contractenrecht 27 46. 
293
  Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 145. See also Haas De Grenzen Van Het 
Recht Op Nakoming 340: “According to the current law, an obligee can defend against a 
claim for specific performance of a personal contractual obligation by referring to the 
‘nature of the obligation’ (Article 3:296(1)).” 
294
  See para 2 2 1 above. 
295
  Haas De Grenzen Van Het Recht Op Nakoming 72. 
296
  76-77. 
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the defendant could be forced to perform, the quality of the resultant performance 
cannot be guaranteed.297 This objection is familiar from the overview of South African 
and Anglo-American law above. 
De Vries, however, holds that “[z]odra het persoonsgebonden karakter aan de te 
verrichten prestatie komt te ontvallen, is deze uitzonderingsbepaling dan ook 
uitgewerkt”. Accordingly, he says (in the context of a familiar example) that once the “ink 
has flown from the author’s pen”, nothing prevents a court to order him to deliver the 
completed manuscript to the publisher.298 This prevents the scope of the exclusion from 
being too wide and arbitrary. As soon as the work is completed, considerations of forced 
labour are no longer relevant. It follows that, before the manuscript is completed, the 
court will not grant specific performance,299 but will do so upon its completion.300 
Although the Dutch and the German positions on the enforceability of personal service 
contracts often correspond in practice, they differ in theory, inasmuch as a claim for 
specific performance of, for example, an obligation of an employee to perform his 
services (Diensten) in terms of a contract of service (Dienstvertrag), is admissible in 
Dutch law,301 whereas in German law such an obligation cannot be specifically enforced 
according to § 888(3), inasmuch as it is not aimed at a specific result.302 This is why 
                                                 
297
  See Busch et al The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law 355. 
298
  De Vries “Recht op nakoming in het Belgisch en Nederlands contractenrecht” in Smits & 
Stijns (eds) Remedies in het Belgisch en Nederlands Contractenrecht  27 46. 
299
  Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-II (2009) nr 344. 
300
  Cf for English law: text to nn 212 ff para 4 3 above. 
301
  See Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law 355. See 
also H Dondorp & H de Jong “Coercive measures to enforce obligations under Dutch law 
(1838-1933)” in J Hallebeek & H Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The 
Historical Development 135 148. 
302
  See para 4 5 1 above. 
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German law awards damages to the employer, even though the general remedy for 
breach of a contract is specific performance.303 
Crucially, though, in Dutch law such a claim may not be accompanied by a demand for 
a dwangsom (a periodic penalty payment for non-compliance with the court order)304 or 
gijzeling (imprisonment in order to force the employee to perform),305 because including 
such additional measures would inevitably and ultimately lead to labour that can be 
considered involuntary and therefore contrary to the constitutional value protecting each 
individual’s personal freedom.306 This is why, in practice, plaintiffs instead claim either 
damages or termination or both, since no other (permissible) measures exist to ensure 
performance.307 It can be argued therefore that the theoretical or procedural principle 
that obligations to do or not to do must be enforced is never realised in practice, and 
that specific performance of personal service contracts is in effect not feasible. 
Moreover, on the basis of the maxim nemo praecise cogi ad factum,308 obligations to 
perform highly personal acts would also give rise to a claim for damages under Dutch 
                                                 
303
  K Zweigert & H Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law (tr T Weir) 3 ed (1998) 472-474. 
See paras 2 3 1 1 & 4 5 above. 
304
  See Dondorp & De Jong “Coercive measures to enforce obligations under Dutch law 
(1838-1933)” in Hallebeek & Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific Performance: The 
Historical Development 135 153. 
305
  See J J du Plessis “Spesifieke nakoming: ‘n regshistoriese herwaardering” 1988 THRHR 
349 359; M A Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South 
African Law (1989) 40; Dondorp & De Jong “Coercive measures to enforce obligations 
under Dutch law (1838-1933)” in Hallebeek & Dondorp (eds) The Right to Specific 
Performance: The Historical Development 135 148. 
306
  Art 15(1) of The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2008, provides that 
“[o]ther than in the cases laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament, no one may be 
deprived of his liberty”. 
307
  See Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law 355. 
308
  See text to n 14 para 2 2 1 above. 
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law.309 In practice, however, these obligations are often indirectly secured by way of 
contractual penalties.310 The prospect of being liable for a penalty sum would probably 
encourage an employee not to breach the contract in the first place.311 The threat of a 
penalty thus serves as an incentive to specific performance. 
4 7  International instruments 
As previously indicated, all the instruments under review adopt the same point of 
departure.312 Specific performance is recognised as the primary remedy by the PECL, 
the PICC, the DCFR the CISG, and the CESL but subject to certain exceptions.313 The 
present discussion focuses on the relevant principles under the PECL, PICC and the 
DCFR.314 
                                                 
309
  Art 3:296 BW. See J Oosterhuis Specific Performance: German, French and Dutch Law in 
the Nineteenth Century 360.  
310
  J Oosterhuis Specific Performance: German, French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth 
Century 448. 
311
  See Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-II (2009) nr 346; Du Plessis 1988 THRHR 359. 
312
  See para 2 3 3 above. 
313
  See L Chengwei Remedies for Non-performance 36; G de Vries “Recht op nakoming in 
het Belgisch en Nederlands contractenrecht” in J Smits & S Stijns (eds) Remedies in het 
Belgisch en Nederlands Contractenrecht (2000) 27 30; R Schulze (ed) Common 
European Sales Law (CESL): Commentary (2012) 504 575; G Dannemann & S 
Vogenauer (eds) The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English 
and German Law (2013) 618. See also para 2 3 3 above. 
314
  It does not take into account the CISG or the CESL, which only applies to contracts for the 
sale of goods. According to Art 3(2) of the CISG it “does not apply to contracts in which 
the preponderant part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consist in 
the supply of labour or other services”. The CESL is similarly limited to the sale of goods 
(and digital content) and does not cover service contracts sensu strictu. It only applies to 
so-called related services, i.e. any service related to the goods or digital content such as 
installation, maintenance, repair or processing provided by the seller of the goods or the 
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The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) establish a clear right to specific 
performance.315 According to Article 9:102(2)(c), the remedy cannot, however, be 
obtained where “the performance consists in the provision of services or work of a 
personal character or depends upon a personal relationship”.316 Similar limitations can 
be found in each of the other instruments:317 Article 7.2.2 of the PICC provides that the 
creditor may require performance, unless “(d) performance is of an exclusively personal 
character” and paragraph 3(c) of DCFR III-3:302 excludes specific performance of an 
obligation to perform personal services if the services are “of such personal character 
that it would be unreasonable to enforce it”. Noteworthy is the difference in reference to 
the type of contract: PECL refers to services or work; PICC does not refer to either; and 
DCFR refers to personal services. The international instruments say nothing about 
employment contracts specifically. It is therefore uncertain what types of obligations are 
covered. It is not clear why these instruments do not distinguish between various types 
of personal service contracts, or between contracts binding parties in an existing 
relationship and those aimed at a future relationship, or why they generally do not 
recognise an equitable discretion (except the DCFR).318 Furthermore, the literature and 
commentaries do not seem to distinguish between different categories of services. The 
present section is therefore relatively short for the simple reason that, unlike the other 
systems under review, the rules on the contract of services, although equally important, 
are not as developed or well-researched and documented.  
                                                                                                                                                             
supplier of the digital content under the sales contract. Since the CESL applies to “related 
service contracts”, irrespective of whether a separate price was agreed for the related 
service, as stated in Art 5(c) CESL, specific performance can also be required of these 
services and no limitation is recognised in respect thereof (see CESL Part V: Obligations 
and remedies of the parties to a related service contract).  
315
  See para 2 3 3 3 above. 
316
  See R Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives (2005) 49. 
317
  See paras 2 3 3 2 & 2 3 3 4 above. 
318
  See text to n 351 para 4 8 3 below. 
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It has been said that DCFR III-3:302 was inspired by Europe’s concern for human rights 
protection.319 Therefore, due regard must be had to the debtor’s fundamental and 
human rights and freedoms.320 The official comment to this Article specifically states 
that 
“Paragraph (3)(c) is based partly on considerations of practicality. It might be pointless to try 
to enforce specific performance of certain obligations of a highly personal character. Mainly, 
however, it is based on respect for the debtor’s human rights. The debtor should not be 
forced to perform if the performance consists in the provision or acceptance of services or 
work which is of such a personal character or is so dependent upon a personal relationship 
that enforcement would infringe the debtor’s human rights. The criterion here is not simply 
the personal nature of the work or services to be provided. To exclude enforcement of 
specific performance of all obligations to provide work or services of a personal character 
would be far too broad. The criterion is whether enforcing performance would be 
unreasonable. In deciding that question regard would have to be had to the debtor’s human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including in particular the rights to liberty and bodily 
integrity.” 
The official comment then states as an example, the obligation to participate in a clinical 
trial involving surgical procedures would accordingly not be enforceable.321  
                                                 
319
  C von Bar & E Clive (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) I (2009) 8. 
320
  See G Low “Performance remedies and damages – a selection of issues”, unpublished 
paper presented at a conference on The Relationship between European and Chinese 
Contract Law hosted by the Tsinghua University in Beijing 16-17 February 2012 (copy on 
file with author).  
321
  DCFR III-3:302, cmt G (Von Bar & Clive (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) I 832); and see Low 
“Performance remedies and damages – a selection of issues”; P Varul “Performance and 
remedies for non-performance: comparative analysis of the PECL and DCFR” 2008 
Juridica International 104 108. 
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Thus, paragraph 3(c) of DCFR III-3:302 specifically excludes specific performance of an 
obligation to perform personal services if the services are of such a personal character 
that it would be unreasonable to enforce it.322 The comment also provides that there 
might be situations, for example, where a painting is nearly done, where it would be 
reasonable for the creditor to enforce the obligation to complete the work.323 In 
commenting on this limitation and its implications, Varul, similarly holds that “there is no 
reason that many ordinary employment contracts should not be enforced, although 
certain employment contracts requiring work or services of a highly personal nature 
from the debtor’s point of view, or the continuance of a highly personal relationship, 
might be covered by DCFR article III.–3:302, paragraph 3(c)”.324 One could argue here 
that the Igesund situation325 will not be covered by the limitation, which supports the 
conclusion reached earlier that there might be cases when compelling performance by 
an employee may be possible after all (i.e. when the “general” approach does not 
apply), due to the fact that the specific employment contract was less personal in nature 
and there was no reason why its enforcement would be unreasonable. The criterion 
under the DCFR is whether enforcing performance would be unreasonable. This stands 
in contrast to the all-or-nothing approaches of some legal systems which, as indicated 
earlier, either contain outright prohibitions on specific performance in these cases, or 
allow it.  
It is also noteworthy, that the expression “of a personal character” in paragraph 3(c) of 
DCFR III-3:302 does not cover services or work which may be delegated.326 The same 
                                                 
322
  Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 870. 
323
  DCFR III-3:302, cmt G (Von Bar & Clive above). 
324
  2008 Juridica International 104 108 (Varul incorrectly refers to paragraph 2(c)). 
325
  See text to nn 88 ff para 4 2 1 2 above. 
326
  See cmt G on DCFR III-3:302. See also Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract 
Law 870; Varul 2008 Juridica International 104 108. 
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principle also applies to the PECL and PICC.327 This narrows the scope of the 
exclusion. 
Both the PECL and the PICC are based on the same considerations as DCFR III-3:302, 
namely that ordering specific performance of personal service/work contracts would 
implicate the non-performing party’s personal freedom as it is tantamount to forced 
labour, and the quality of services rendered under compulsion might not be 
satisfactory.328 
This view is formulated by Lando and Beale (commenting on the PECL) as follows: 
“[F]irstly, a judgment ordering performance of personal services or work would be a severe 
interference with the non-performing party’s personal liberty; secondly, services or work 
which are rendered under pressure will often not be satisfactory for the aggrieved party…”329 
Schelhaas (commenting on the PICC) similarly objects that specific performance would 
unduly interfere with the personal freedom of the debtor: 
“The fourth exception to the right to performance occurs when performance is of an 
exclusively personal character … The basic rationale for denying performance in such 
situations is that it interferes with the personal freedom of the aggrieved party, and that it 
gives rise to a number of practical difficulties: even if the aggrieved party were to succeed in 
compelling the unwilling non-performing party, this would presumably impair the quality of the 
service subsequently rendered.”330 
                                                 
327
  Chengwei Remedies for Non-performance 64. 
328
  Chengwei Remedies for Non-performance 64; Haas De Grenzen Van Het Recht Op 
Nakoming 70; Varul 2008 Juridica International 104 108. 
329
  O Lando & H Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II (2000) 397. 
330
  S Vogenauer Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (PICC) (2009) 794-795 para 42. See also International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004) 
(para 2 3 3 2 n 232 above) 212: “Where a performance has an exclusively personal 
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Ultimately it can be said that even though the application of the instruments varies, they 
all accept and recognise a limitation to the right to specific performance, based on the 
personal nature of the performance, and reinforced by the same policy considerations. 
These instruments adopt a modern and uniform approach to specific performance, 
whereby they establish a clear right to specific performance, but subject to certain 
exceptions. This suggests that they have some potential to serve as models for reform, 
should our courts decide to engage in a modernization of the rules relating to the 
remedy of specific performance. It is to this potential that we will now turn. 
4 8  Evaluative remarks and conclusions 
4 8 1 Introduction 
The foregoing discussion reveals that by and large similar reasons are advanced by the 
systems and instruments under consideration for refusing to award claims for specific 
performance in the context of personal service contracts, even though the content of 
these contracts may have differed. The underlying rationales for refusing the remedy in 
these cases may also be applied to our law. These considerations are apparent when 
considering South African practice, as evidenced by the analyses of the case law.  
The aim of the following section is to explain the current South African position and 
indicate how specific performance of service contracts is dealt with at present, identify 
its shortcomings, and explore possible solutions. As indicated, the rules on specific 
performance of personal service contracts provide an example where there is a large 
degree of convergence between common law, civil law and international instruments 
aimed at harmonisation. The comparison of these systems and their experiences could 
therefore be instructive.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
character, enforcement would interfere with the personal freedom of the obligor. 
Moreover, enforcement of a performance often impairs its quality …” 
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4 8 2 The current approach and the need to prioritise social policy considerations 
It will be recalled that earlier in this chapter it was shown that in South African law the 
reasons traditionally advanced in arguing against specific performance as a remedy in 
the context of personal service contracts are currently only to be regarded as factors 
that have to be taken into consideration in the exercise of the courts’ discretion in 
refusing specific performance.331 In National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings 
(Pty) Ltd332 it was held that the factors discussed were practical considerations rather 
than legal principles that restrict the court’s discretion to refuse specific performance.333 
The court in Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society334  also recognised that factors 
that served as reasons to deny specific performance in the past remain relevant to the 
exercise of the discretion.335 This means that these considerations are not definitive, but 
guiding principles that courts should take into account in the exercise of their 
discretion.336 Cases decided after this decision also followed and confirmed this 
approach.337  
It is clear that the refusal of specific performance was mostly based on considerations of 
social policy. The fundamental objection is that courts are extremely wary to turn 
contracts of service into contracts of forced labour, or even, contracts that essentially 
impose a form of slavery. Thus, one general reason most often given for denying 
specific performance is that it interferes with the debtor’s personal freedom, whilst due 
regard must always be had to the debtor’s fundamental and human rights and 
                                                 
331
  See para 4 2 1 1 above. 
332
  1982 (4) SA 151 (T) 157C. 
333
  Jordaan “Employment relations” in Southern Cross 409.  
334
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
335
  785. 
336
  See Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 546. 
337
  See eg Myburgh v Daniëlskuil Munisipaliteit 1985 (3) SA 335 (NC); Consolidated Frame 
Cotton Corp Ltd v President of the Industrial Court 1985 (3) SA 150 (N); Tshabalala v 
Minister of Health 1987 (1) SA 513 (W). 
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freedoms. The question that arises is which of the two competing sides of party 
autonomy deserves priority: that agreements willingly entered into should be fulfilled in 
specie, or that no one should be compelled to act against their will? 
It is well-established that one of the main concerns of our law of contract is to enforce 
agreements willingly entered into. This notion finds expression in the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda.338 According to Christie, this maxim “serves as a useful reminder of the 
fundamental social and economic importance of the enforcement of contracts”.339 This 
principle basically has two inter-related meanings: that the parties to a contract are 
entitled to contract on whatever terms and in whatever manner they wish, as well as to 
have their contract enforced. Our courts have elevated this principle to the highest level 
of the values entrenched in the Constitution.340 
                                                 
338
  See Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 576-582. 
339
  “The law of contract and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium (RS 33 2013) § 
3H5. See also C Lewis “The uneven journey to uncertainty in contract” 2013 THRHR 80, 
esp 82: “Bargains struck by parties should in principle be observed. That is foundational to 
our law of contract. There may be exceptions where public policy determines that the 
bargain is unconscionable as far as any party to it is concerned. But where that is not so, 
commerce requires that parties to a contract must observe it.” 
340
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 280. See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) 
SA 323 (CC) para [57] per Ngcobo J: “public policy, as informed by the Constitution, 
requires in general that parties should comply with contractual obligations that have been 
freely and voluntarily undertaken. This consideration is expressed in the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda, which, as the Supreme Court of Appeal has repeatedly noted, gives effect to 
the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity. Self-autonomy, or the ability to 
regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence of freedom 
and a vital part of dignity. The extent to which the contract was freely and voluntarily 
concluded is clearly a vital factor as it will determine the weight that should be afforded to 
the values of freedom and dignity. The other consideration is that all persons have a right 
to seek judicial redress. These considerations express the constitutional values that must 
now inform all laws, including the common-law principles of contract.” 
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Cameron JA made the following important statement in Brisley v Drotsky341 regarding 
the place of this right to enforcement of a contract in our constitutional context: 
“[T]he Constitution’s values of dignity and equality and freedom require that the courts 
approach their task of striking down contracts or declining to enforce them with perceptive 
restraint.  One of the reasons is that contractual autonomy is part of freedom. Shorn of its 
obscene excesses, contractual autonomy informs also the constitutional value of dignity … 
The Constitution requires that its values be employed to achieve a careful balance between 
the unacceptable excesses of contractual ‘freedom’, and securing a framework within which 
the ability to contract enhances rather than diminishes our self-respect and dignity.”342 
Hawthorne343 also provides some guidance in the weighing up of these competing 
interests:  
“The present principle of pacta sunt servanda should be interpreted to conflict as little as 
possible with fundamental rights such as equality or freedom from servitude or forced labour 
… These implications do not, however, in my opinion mean that where the effect of an 
application of a rule or principle amounts to a limitation of fundamental rights as between 
private individuals, the protection of fundamental rights will necessarily take precedence over 
subjective rights of performance validly  acquired.”  
In its finding, and as indicated above, the Full Bench in Santos344 relied on the 
constitutional value of contractual autonomy, as favouring specific performance as the 
                                                 
341
  2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). See also Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 37-
38, and R H Christie “The law of contract and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights 
Compendium (RS 33 2013) § 3H6. 
342
  2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) paras [94]-[95] (own emphasis added). 
343
  L Hawthorne “The principle of equality in the law of contract” 1995 THRHR 157. See also 
Christie “The law of contract and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium (RS 33 
2013) § 3H6. 
344
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C). 
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primary remedy for breach.345 Contractual autonomy does indeed provide a general 
justification for preferring specific performance as a remedy in case of breach, because 
the parties chose to bind themselves to perform and should therefore be held to their 
promises. However, our law’s commitment to the protection of an innocent party’s 
interest in the performance of the contract naturally cannot be absolute, and according 
to Cockrell:346 
“There would be no contradiction involved in affirming the principle of pacta sunt servanda at 
the level of the ascription of contractual responsibility, and still maintaining that for policy 
reasons the law should restrict the availability of specific performance as a remedy in favour 
of an award of damages. For example, it might be argued that for reasons of ‘justice’ specific 
performance should be refused where such an award would be unduly intrusive and 
oppressive.”  
Therefore it is suggested here that instead of upholding the sanctity of contracts, courts 
should restrict the availability of specific performance where performance is of such a 
personal nature that it would be unreasonable to enforce it, for instance, due to 
infringement of the debtor’s right to liberty and dignity, since there are less invasive 
methods of protecting the creditor’s expectation interest in this instance. Either 
damages or termination or both will prove to be better remedies.  
4 8 3  The proposal for reform: unreasonable enforcement of personal services 
as exceptional category 
The analysis thus far has revealed that even though our courts “have studiously 
refrained from unpacking legal principles and engaging in a process of substantive 
                                                 
345
  For which the court also relied (at 86F-87C) on Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
See also Naudé 2003 SALJ 277. 
346
  A Cockrell “Breach of contract” in R Zimmermann & D Visser Southern Cross: Civil Law 
and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 303 331. 
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reasoning” regarding the considerations relevant to the exercise of its discretion,347 and 
display a concern “to avoid the stultification of the judicial discretion by the development 
of rules”,348 they “normally” refuse specific performance where the contract sought to be 
enforced is of a very personal nature. As recently as 2008, it was decided in Nationwide 
Airlines that “[w]here it concerns a contract of employment … a court will in the exercise 
of its discretion not normally grant specific performance”.349 This prompts considering 
whether it may be desirable to recognise a more general or “concrete” limitation to the 
principle of specific performance. Under such an approach the point of departure would 
remain the same: the remedy would still be available “as of right” or “in principle”, 
however, this right to specific performance would not be absolute, but subject to certain 
exceptions.  
According to most authorities, there are two recognised exceptions where the discretion 
is actually illusory or absent, namely impossibility of performance and the debtor’s 
insolvency.350 It is proposed here that this list of exceptions be expanded to 
accommodate the reality that in the context of personal service contracts, the judicial 
discretion is generally exercised to refuse specific performance. This can be ascribed to 
important policy considerations. In the context of service contracts, the notion that 
specific performance is the norm and refusal the exception is therefore often an illusion.  
                                                 
347
  333. This quotation is taken from Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to 
refuse an order for specific performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 109. 
348
  To quote Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives 111. 
349
  Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) SA 293 (W) para [17]. See also Troskie 
v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (O) 552. 
350
  See Ward v Barrett NO 1963 (2) SA 546 (A) 552-553; Rampathy v Krumm 1978 (4) SA 
935 (D) 941; D J Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 224; Lubbe & 
Murray Contract 542; and see para 7 2 2 below. 
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However, we are not dealing with an exception which is identical to the impossibility and 
insolvency cases, for it cannot be said that specific performance of service contracts 
invariably has to be refused: this is apparent from the judicial enforcement of 
employment contracts against employers, and the hybrid Igesund-type contract cases. 
South African law therefore does not have to follow the broad approach of some 
instruments which provide that all personal service contracts are unenforceable. The 
test proposed here is that there should be a more narrow rule, which sets out a third 
exception relating to services, and does so in a more nuanced manner. Although it is 
admitted that the following test is abstract, it is proposed that such a rule could be that 
specific performance should be refused where performance is of such a personal 
character that it would be unreasonable to enforce it. This rule emanates from the 
principle that, as a matter of human dignity and personal liberty, no person should be 
compelled to work or maintain a personal relationship against his will. The wording of 
the rule was adopted from the DCFR, which as we have seen, adopts a broad test, 
based on whether it would be unreasonable to enforce obligations to perform personal 
services.351 This approach was preferred for its flexibility, which stands in contrast to the 
more rigid PICC approach, in terms of which the remedy is excluded if performance is of 
an exclusively personal character. The approach adopted by PECL may further be 
regarded as too imprecise, because the criterion is simply the personal nature of the 
work or services to be provided. The proposed approach is also comparable to the 
approach adopted by German law where reinstatement is the prescribed remedy for 
unfair dismissals,352 unless the court decides to terminate the employment relationship if 
it would be unreasonable to order reinstatement, in which case the employer is required 
to pay compensation to the employee.353 
As we have seen, the courts have strictly maintained its general discretion to award 
specific performance and have repeatedly rejected the development of rules that would 
                                                 
351
  See text to n 322 para 4 7 above. 
352
  § 8 KSchG (Protection Against Unfair Dismissal Act). 
353
  See para 4 5 above. 
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regulate the exercise of their discretion.354 However, as Lubbe contends, this strictly 
maintained (open-ended) discretion hampers the development of our law.355 The 
insistence that this discretion remains “unfettered”356 has resulted in a failure by our 
courts to recognise that certain policy considerations should influence the availability of 
this remedy more strongly than is recognised at present.357 The desirability of a rule-
based approach with a residual discretion or the removal of this specific performance 
discretion will be investigated in the final chapter of the thesis.  
Lubbe, in considering the desirability and tenability of a rule-based approach in our law, 
provides us with a possible solution. He considers the possibility of recognising certain 
Fallgruppen or case groups358 in which the remedy should be denied.359 According to 
Lubbe, the adoption of this methodology might lead to the denial of the remedy in cases 
                                                 
354
  Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A); Isep Structural 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration (Pty) Ltd 1981 (4) SA 1 (A); National Union of 
Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 151 (T). See also Lambiris Orders 
of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 126, and the 
authorities cited there. 
355
  See “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance 
in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National 
and Other Perspectives 111-112. 
356
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783. 
357
  See Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives 111. 
358
  On Fallgruppen, see T Naudé “The function and determinants of the residual rules of 
contract law” 2003 SALJ 820 838; T Naudé & G Lubbe “Exemption clauses – a rethink 
occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom” 2005 SALJ 441 454, and the authority 
cited there. 
359
  See Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance in South African Law” in Smits Specific Performance in Contract Law 112-
113. 
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of hardship.360 He then specifically suggests that “a rule that specific performance 
generally will not be granted as against an employee might develop from the practice of 
our courts in such cases”.361 Lubbe thereby confirms that practice has possibly opened 
the way for such a development. More importantly, he also states that  
“[t]he recognition that specific performance might in particular circumstances be appropriate 
even as against an employee [eg Igesund] does not contradict this view. It merely reflects the 
need to develop [our] law by means of the elaboration of sub-rules which enable the 
differentiated treatment of situations which reveal factual distinctions and are governed by 
different policy considerations”.362 
4 8 4 The operation of the proposed exception relating to personal service 
contracts  
It has been argued above that there must be a recognised exception to the general 
point of departure that specific performance is a right, and it was further argued that this 
exception should be that performance must be refused if the service is of such a 
personal nature that it would be unreasonable to enforce it. It now remains to be 
considered how this exception should operate.  
As indicated, this would almost invariably be the case where an employer claims 
specific performance of an employment contract against an employee. The implication 
of this proposed development will be that the right to specific performance will 
(generally) be limited in cases of employment contracts based on the fact that the 
contract sought to be enforced is so personal in character that its enforcement would be 
unreasonable.363  
                                                 
360
  113. See also para 6 5 4 below. 
361
  112-113. 
362
  113.  
363
  See para 4 2 1 above. 
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However, since employees’ conditions of service are governed by legislation, which 
prescribe the procedure whereby employers may terminate the employment contract, 
courts should be allowed to enforce employment contracts against employers by 
ordering reinstatement of employees where employers have not followed the prescribed 
procedure in dismissing them. In such a case it has been held that what was done 
contrary to the provisions of the legislation was of no effect, and that the employee was 
still in the employer’s service.364   
Moving on from the employment contract to the independent contractor under the 
contract for work or locatio conductio operis, we see that currently a contractor’s breach 
entitles the client to claim specific performance, subject only to the qualification that the 
court has a discretion to refuse it. In terms of the proposed approach, a contract for 
work (locatio conductio operis) will also not be enforced if performance is of such a 
personal nature that its enforcement would be unreasonable. Generally, contracts for 
work are less personal in nature than employment contracts, in terms of which services 
are rendered under the authority of the employer. An employment contract can 
therefore be distinguished from a contract for work based on, inter alia, the absence of 
the element of control.365 The contractor performs his duties independently from the 
client. It is therefore also recognised in our law that a contractor may perform through 
others, whereas an employee must perform the services personally. Electrical wiring or 
repairs on a building can, for example, be performed vicariously. As indicated above, 
US courts are also prepared to order specific performance of a contract if it contains 
aspects that make the contract less personal in nature.366 A service will only be 
considered personal (and unenforceable) in the US if it cannot be delegated or 
performed vicariously.367 It has also been shown that the expression “of a personal 
                                                 
364
  Rogers v Durban Corporation 1950 (1) SA 65 (D) 70 per Broome J. 
365
  See para 4 1 above. 
366
  See eg Mellon v Cessna Aircraft Co 64 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D. Kan 1999).  
367
  See para 4 4 above. 
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character” in DCFR III-3:302 does not cover services or work which may be delegated. 
The same principle also applies to the PECL and the PICC.368  
The operation of the exception in the context of the contract of work or locatio conductio 
operis will depend on the nature of the work, specifically whether the work requires a 
high level of ability, proficiency and skill of a personal nature or is dependent upon the 
personal volition and drive of the party.  
This would almost invariably be the case where specific performance is sought against 
independent contractors whose obligations cannot be delegated because their skills are 
not generic such as artists and singers. However, courts may even order an artist to 
paint, provided it is reasonable. This would be the case, for example, where an artist’s 
signature is required to complete a portrait, because the value of the painting largely 
depends on the signature. In this instance it would be entirely reasonable to order 
specific performance of the obligation (to sign the painting), because this would not 
involve a large degree of ability, proficiency or skill. The outcome is also objectively 
testable, since the court can compare the signature to other signatures by the same 
artist. However, a court cannot force an artist to complete an incomplete painting 
because there is a large degree of ability, proficiency and skill of a personal nature 
involved and performance of such an obligation is dependent on the volition of the artist. 
And due to the nature of the performance there would be constant doubt whether the 
contract was being performed properly.369 
                                                 
368
  See para 4 7 above. 
369
  In 1894 the Court of Appeal in Paris held in Cass civ, 14 March 1900, S 1900.1.489 
(“Lady Eden’s portrait”) that a portrait of Lady Eden commissioned by her husband, Sir 
William Eden, belonged to the artist, Whistler, until its delivery, and that Eden could not 
sue for the execution and delivery of the portrait, since obligations to execute or not to 
execute can only be settled by an award of damages. The case came before the court 
after a dispute arose about the price of the portrait. Eden sent a cheque which Whistler 
considered inadequate and he refused to deliver the portrait. Eden instituted legal 
proceedings against Whistler whereupon he adapted the composition originally intended 
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The proposition also addresses the concerns raised in relation to German law which 
permits the enforcement of non-delegable obligations. An artist, for example, can be 
ordered to produce a portrait under German law, whereas under the proposed 
development for our law, artists will only be ordered to perform if it would be reasonable 
to do so.  
Thus, even though the classification of the type of contract is problematic, it is ultimately 
not indicative of enforceability if one considers the formulation of the proposed 
exception: that specific performance will be refused where performance is of such a 
personal character that it would be unreasonable to enforce it. To exclude specific 
performance of all obligations to provide work or services of a personal character would 
be far too broad – as the court said in Roberts Construction v Verhoef:370 “Strict 
adherence to the rule that no contract of service may be even indirectly enforced may 
give rise to grave injustice and the evasion of plain contractual duties.”371 There is a 
need for differentiation according to the policy considerations that govern cases that are 
different in nature.372 Therefore, the criterion is whether enforcing performance would be 
unreasonable. The limitation contains a qualification or discretionary component. The 
discretion would be limited to cases where courts are confronted with the enforcement 
of obligations to provide work or services of a personal character. 
Under this limitation, a fair degree of latitude is accorded to the courts. What is 
unreasonable will largely depend on the facts of individual cases. The proposition is 
                                                                                                                                                             
for Lady Eden to another head. In the end Whistler was allowed to keep the portrait, on 
the condition that the face was made unrecognisable. See further Beale et al Cases, 
Materials and Text on Contract Law 868-869. 
370
  1952 (2) SA 300 (W) 306D. 
371
  Quoted with approval by Naudé 2003 SALJ 281. See also National Union of Textile 
Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 151 (T); quoted with approval by Horn J in 
Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) SA 293 (W) para [18], and reference to 
Kerr in para 7 2 2 and related text to n 41 below. 
372
  Cf reference to Lubbe in text to n 362 above. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   243 
 
therefore also in line with the Nationwide Airlines decision,373 in that the limitation does 
not amount to a “hard-and-fast rule”374 but allows for a more nuanced approach to 
refuse specific performance of certain obligations of a (highly) personal character. 
However, the criterion is not simply the personal nature of the obligations, but whether 
enforcing these obligations would be unreasonable.375 In deciding whether enforcement 
would be unreasonable, courts may have to consider the debtor’s human rights and 
fundamental freedoms,376 including in particular the rights to dignity, liberty and bodily 
integrity.377  
Accordingly, employment contracts requiring work or services of a highly personal and 
skilled nature or the continuance of a highly personal relationship, such as a contractual 
obligation to play rugby for a particular club or franchise, would not be specifically 
enforced. Thus, Wright J’s line of reasoning in Troskie378 is supported here and it is 
therefore suggested that a court should not order specific performance of a contractual 
obligation that would essentially compel a rugby player to play for a team for which he is 
unwilling to play.379 This would not only protect the interests of the player but also that of 
                                                 
373
  See esp paras [17]-[21]. 
374
  Para [17]. 
375
  See esp Varul’s commentary on the DCFR 2008 Juridica International 104 108. 
376
  In accordance with s 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which 
requires a court  to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when 
interpreting and developing the common law.  
377
  According to I M Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights 
Compendium (RS 33 2013) § 1A61, the conduct and interests protected by s 13 overlap 
with those covered by the right to freedom and security of the person (s 12), which 
encompasses the right to bodily integrity (s12(2)). 
378
  Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (O) 552. 
379
  Cf S Cornelius “Sanctity of contract and players’ restraints in South African sport” 2003 
TSAR 727; K Mould “A critical study of the recurring problem of repudiation in the context 
of professional rugby in South Africa with particular emphasis on transformative 
constitutionalism” (2010) 35(1) Journal for Juridical Science 49; 2011 PELJ 207 ff. 
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the team, since the nature of the services would make it impossible to determine 
whether the contract was being performed properly and the team could eventually 
receive sub-standard performance by an unwilling player.  
Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Bpk v Mapoe380 provides a good illustration of the 
consequences of ordering specific performance of such an obligation.381 The facts 
largely correspond to the facts of Troskie. The respondent, a professional rugby player, 
repudiated his contract with the applicant, the Free State Cheetahs, by signing an 
employment contract with another provincial rugby team, the Natal Sharks. The 
Cheetahs refused to release the respondent and brought an urgent application against 
him, to force him to return and play for them. The High Court (per Van Zyl J, who relied 
primarily on the Full Bench decision in Santos)382 found that the respondent could not 
offer his services as a professional rugby player to the Sharks before his contract with 
the Cheetahs ended, and ordered him to return to the Cheetahs and honour his 
obligations to play professional rugby for them (thereby confirming the arbitrator’s initial 
order).383 The Sharks were also prohibited from infringing on the contract between the 
respondent and the Cheetahs.384  
However, despite the High Court’s decision, Mapoe never returned to the Cheetahs, 
who ultimately had no choice but to release him, albeit to a different team, the Golden 
Lions.385 This shows that a judgment ordering an unwilling rugby player to perform in 
                                                 
380
  Unreported judgment with case no 4587/2010 delivered on 29 Sep 2010 by the Free State 
Provincial Division of the High Court per Van Zyl J (copy on file with author).  
381
  And possibly explains why Malherbe JP described a similar application as “ridiculous” in 
Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (O) 553. 
382
  Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Bpk v Mapoe 4587/2010 (unreported) paras [106] ff. 
383
  Para [126]. 
384
  Paras [119]-[121]. 
385
  As confirmed on the news site “Sport24”: <http://www.sport24.co.za/Rugby/Lions-confirm-
Mapoe-signing-20101104>. Mapoe also ignored the arbitrator’s initial order that he had to 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   245 
 
accordance with his employment contract is not of much use to his employer, because 
the performance of the obligation is (to quote Wright J in Troskie) “not only dependent 
upon the personal enthusiasm, willingness and drive of the player concerned, but there 
is also a great deal of ability, proficiency and skill of a personal nature involved in the 
services in question which will be dependent upon the specific qualities of the player 
concerned as well as on his relationship with the club for which he plays rugby”.386  
Unfortunately, it appears that in Vrystaat Cheetahs, the Santos decision was read out of 
context. Van Zyl J was correct in finding that a professional rugby player is a unique 
employee, like the coach in Santos, but incorrect in finding that despite the skilled and 
highly personal nature of the particular service, specific performance was warranted. 
She overlooked the fact that there was a fundamental difference between Igesund and 
Mapoe even though both were unique employees. A rugby player (irrespective of his 
classification as either amateur or professional),387 “... is under the constant control of 
his employer, and continually has close personal contact with his employers in the 
performance of his duties”.388 Had she fully acknowledged the significance of the nature 
of the performance, instead of focusing on the fact that Mapoe was a professional and 
not an amateur rugby player, she might have realised that specific performance was still 
an unsuitable remedy as confirmed in Troskie.389 
The Santos judgment can be explained on this basis (albeit with opposite effects). As 
indicated, the contract between the club and its head coach, whilst in essence a 
contract of employment, possessed certain sui generis characteristics which eventually 
                                                                                                                                                             
honour his contract with the Cheetahs until it lapsed and continued practising with the 
Sharks (Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Bpk v Mapoe para [12]). 
386
  Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (O) 546. 
387
  Van Zyl J held (para [104]) that Troskie “baie duidelik onderskeibaar van die onderhawige 
geval is, deurdat daardie uitspraak verleen is in ‘n situasie en era van amateurrugby, 
terwyl die onderhawige geval baie duidelik slaan op professionele rugby teen vergoeding”.  
388
  Naudé 2003 SALJ 274. 
389
  Cf Mould 2010 Journal for Juridical Science 57 ff; 2011 PELJ 207 ff. 
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persuaded the court to enforce the contract. It was reasonable to enforce this particular 
contract of employment because there were elements present which made the contract 
less personal in nature.390 
As indicated, the current South African definition of a contract of employment possesses 
an element of authority of the employer over the employee. Our courts regard the 
element of control by the employer over the employee as one of the main 
characteristics, if not the key characteristic, of the employment relationship,391 but the 
club in this instance had no right to dictate to the coach how he should exercise his 
duties. Igesund was given complete freedom in the exercise of his duties. Unlike a usual 
employee, Igesund was not at the beck and call of his employer to render his services 
at the latter’s request. He stood in a more independent position vis-à-vis the club. 
However, unlike an independent contractor, Igesund was still obliged to perform his 
duties himself (though he probably could avail himself of the services of assistants to 
assist him in the performance thereof). Even though the agreement displayed elements 
of a contract of work (locatio conductio operis), it did not make Igesund an independent 
contractor, but due to these characteristics, the contract was enforceable. Irrespective 
of Igesund’s classification or the type of contract between the club and its coach, 
specific performance was reasonable and justifiable because there were aspects of the 
contract that made the contract so unusual that the general rule could not apply. At this 
juncture, it is worth remembering that US courts will consider specifically enforcing 
contracts for services, is if the contract contains aspects that make the contract less 
personal in nature. As mentioned earlier, in Mellon v Cessna Aircraft Co392 the appeal 
court awarded specific performance of a contract to maintain an airplane, due to the fact 
that it was a generic type of service, rather than a unique type of service.  
                                                 
390
  See text to n 42 para 7 2 2 below.  
391
  See eg cases cited in n 16 para 4 1 above and J Grogan Workplace Law 10 ed (2009) 42-
43. 
392
  64 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D. Kan 1999). 
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It can therefore be inferred from the above discussion that the nature of the 
performance, rather than the specific type of contract (locatio conductio 
operis/operarum), is crucial in applying the rule.393 An order for specific performance 
would not be granted where, due to the highly personal and skilled nature of the 
performance, there would be constant doubt whether the contract was being performed 
properly. For this reason, specific performance should not be awarded against singers, 
writers, artists or professionals who participate in team sports. Depending on the facts 
of the case, these persons may be either employees or independent contractors. 
Hence, the limitation cuts through the locatio conductio operarum/operis distinction. 
Some of these contracts might involve such a close personal relationship and highly 
skilled work or services that the exception would apply. Others might not. But no one, 
be it a contractor or employee, should be forced to perform if the performance consists 
in the provision of work or services that is of a highly personal or skilled character. 
Under the proposed development, a court will still be able to prevent a party in breach 
from providing the same or similar services to the aggrieved party’s competitors, and 
thereby grant specific performance in an indirect manner (i.e. enforce restraints of 
trade). This is in complete accordance with our current law394 and with other legal 
systems – even English law (which departs from the principle of damages), considers 
an injunction the appropriate remedy for preventing the breach of a negative contractual 
duty.395 As we have seen, English courts cannot force an employee to perform 
according to their contract, but they can issue an injunction barring the employee from 
performing an act which he has expressly bound himself not to do. Article 7.2.2(d) of the 
PICC similarly allows a party to seek an injunction under the applicable national law to 
prevent the non-performing party from performing for a competitor.396 The same 
                                                 
393
  In Dutch law the nature of the obligation can also determine that it cannot be enforced (as 
in the case of the obligation with a highly personal character) – see para 4 6 above. 
394
  See para 4 2 1 2 above. 
395
  See para 4 3 above. 
396
  See para 4 7 above. 
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principle also applies in the US,397 where (as in our law) restraints of trade are 
considered valid and enforceable except if it would be unreasonable to enforce the 
restraint clause in the circumstances of the case.  
According to Burrows, the English position on indirect enforcement can “presumably” be 
explained on the ground that “the law considers it less of an infringement of individual 
liberty to be ordered not to do something than to be ordered to do something”.398 The 
argument basically is that to force someone to perform a service is an impermissible 
imposition on their individual autonomy, whereas if you restrain them from working for 
someone else you are not forcing them to positively work for the person they contracted 
with. The purpose of such a negative or prohibitive order is not to force the breaching 
party to perform, but to enforce a contractual term in terms of which he expressly 
undertook not to compete or perform his services elsewhere.399 Indirect enforcement of 
such undertakings by way of an interdict is therefore regarded as one of the instances 
where specific performance should be awarded for the rule would not apply, since the 
aim is to prevent rather than to compel performance.  
In essence the proposed limitation resembles our law on restraint of trade clauses: such 
a clause is considered enforceable to the extent that its enforcement is not 
                                                 
397
  See para 4 4 above. 
398
  Burrows “Judicial remedies” in English Private Law 875. His view is supported and 
considered one of the reasons why it will depend on the circumstances whether the 
remedy will not be awarded of a personal service contract. 
399
  In Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App Cas 709 720, Lord Cairns said: “if parties, for valuable 
consideration, with their eyes open, contract that a particular thing shall not be done, all 
that a court of equity has to do is to say, by way of injunction, that which the parties have 
already said by way of covenant, that the thing shall not be done; and in such case the 
injunction does nothing more than give the sanction the process of the Court to which 
already is the contract between the parties.” See also Stevens 1921 Cornell Law Quarterly 
235. 
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unreasonable in the circumstances of the particular case.400 Thus, our law recognises a 
similar defence with regard to these clauses, which have a well-established test of 
unreasonableness.401 By the same token, a personal service contract should not be 
enforced if it would be unreasonable with reference to the nature of the performance 
concerned. The onus to raise such an impediment to an order for specific performance 
(i.e. that the contract sought to be enforced is of such a personal character that it would 
be unreasonable to enforce it) rests on the defaulting party who wants to avert specific 
enforcement of the personal service contract.402 
4 8 5  Conclusion 
This chapter set out to investigate the possibility of adopting a more concrete approach 
to enforcing personal service contracts by way of an order of specific performance. 
Drawing on certain international instruments and legal systems as a frame of reference, 
it was shown that such a development would be valuable due to the unpredictability and 
incoherence of our current approach.403  
It is clear from the analyses of the relevant case law that the open-ended discretion to 
award or refuse specific performance is misleading. One of the more significant findings 
to emerge from this study is that our courts generally refuse specific performance in 
                                                 
400
  See text to n 149 para 4 2 1 2 above. 
401
  See Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 197; Bredenkamp v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) 482. 
402
  The same procedural principle applies to raising other possible impediments to specific 
performance (i.e. impossibility or insolvency): Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v BN Aitken (Pty) Ltd 
1982 (1) SA 398 (A) 442B-443G; Klimax Manufacturing Ltd v Van Rensburg 2005 (4) SA 
445 (O) para [12]; Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Bpk v Mapoe (unreported) para [115]). See 
also Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) para [49] in 
the context of restraints. See further para 7 2 2 below. 
403
  See Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Zimmermann & Visser Southern Cross 330; Eiselen 
“Specific performance and special damages” in MacQueen & Zimmermann (eds) 
European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 252. 
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cases of breach of contract where the defaulting party is required to render performance 
of a very personal nature. The implication of this finding is that the law could be 
discredited if this reality is not reflected in legal doctrine.404 A definite need therefore 
exists for recognising a concrete exception to the right to specific performance where 
the contract sought to be enforced is of such a personal character that it would be 
unreasonable to enforce it. This is essential to ensure the sustainability and coherence 
of our law on the availability of specific performance. 
                                                 
404
  This finding is consistent with Lubbe’s views (see “Contractual derogation and the 
discretion to refuse an order for specific performance” in Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of 
AJ Kerr 94; “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives 111). See also para 7 3 below. 
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CHAPTER 5: SUPERVISION OF PERFORMANCE 
5 1  Introduction 
South African courts have been reluctant to order specific performance in cases where 
the task of supervising the performance could be unduly burdensome. This is especially 
apparent where specific performance was sought of obligations arising from 
agreements of mandate, contracts for services, lease agreements, and building 
contracts.1 Specific obligations our courts have refused to enforce on this basis include 
obligations to incorporate a company,2 to do repairs to a house,3 to appoint someone as 
director,4 or to apologise to someone.5 The lower courts in any event have no 
jurisdiction6 in matters where an order of specific performance (ad factum 
praestandum)7 without an alternative of damages8 is sought.9 
                                                 
1
  P Gross “Specific performance of contracts in South Africa” 1934 (51) SALJ 347 365 ff; G 
F Lubbe & C M Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 
3 ed (1988) 545-547; J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 210; R H Christie & G B Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract 
in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 551-552; S van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 4 
ed (2012) 332.  
2
  Lucerne v Asbestos Co Ltd v Becker 1928 WLD 311. 
3
  Mink v Vryheid Coal & Iron Co (1912) 33 NPD 182. 
4
  Dey v Goldfields Building Finance & Trust Corp 1927 WLD 180. 
5
  Keyter v Terblanche 1935 EDL 186 (the undertaking to apologise was contained in a 
settlement agreement). 
6
  Section 46(2)(c) Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944; s 16(d) Small Claims Courts Act 61 of 
1984. 
7
  The preferred view in our law is that orders ad pecuniam solvendam are not, for the 
purposes of these provisions, orders for specific performance (Otto v Basson 1994 (2) SA 
744 (C) confirming Tuckers Land & Development Corporation (Edms) Bpk v Van Zyl 1977 
(3) SA 1041 (T)). See further I M Bredenkamp The Small Claims Court (1986) 21; D J 
Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 222; Christie & Bradfield 
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This view that specific performance will not be ordered where it will be difficult for a 
court to enforce the order has been supported by local academic writers10 and the 
courts.11 Some favour denying specific performance on this ground without really 
providing specific and sufficient justifications and merely accept it as self-evident, 
whereas others have criticised it, for example, in the context of lease.12 
One example of such an obligation, which is often referred to in this context, is a 
lessor’s obligation to afford the lessee commodus usus13 of the leased property during 
                                                                                                                                                             
Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 544; D E van Loggerenberg Jones & 
Buckle: The Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa I 10 ed (2012) 305. 
8
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 333: “Except for orders ad pecuniam 
solvendam specific performance in principle cannot be claimed in the magistrate’s court.” 
9
  See Carpet Contract (Pty) Ltd v Grobler 1975 (2) SA 436 (T); Otto v Basson 1994 (2) SA 
744 (C); Malkiewicz v Van Niekerk and Fourouclas Investments CC [2008] 1 All SA 57 (T). 
The prohibition provisions do, however, contain certain exceptions (Van der Merwe et al 
Contract: General Principles 333 n 47). 
10
  See especially J W Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (1951) vol 2 § 3124: 
“Where the court cannot ensure performance, it will not decree specific performance. A 
contract which requires constant supervision, or where the duties to be performed are 
continuous, is not such a contract as the court will order to be specifically performed … 
Thus, the court will not decree specific performance of a building contract or of a contract 
to do work and labour. If the court did decree specific performance, it would have to 
punish for contempt of court if the work were not properly performed, and this would 
involve direct superintendence of the work by an officer of the court, a proceeding for 
which manifestly a court of law is not suited.”  
11
  See eg Barker v Beckett & Co Ltd 1911 TPD 151 164; Lucerne Asbestos Co Ltd v Becker 
1928 WLD 311 331; Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 238 242; Nisenbaum and Nisenbaum v 
Express Buildings (Pty) Ltd 1953 (1) SA 246 (W) 249; Carpet Contracts (Pty) Ltd v Grobler 
1975 (2) SA 436 (T) 440-441; Lottering v Lombaard 1971 (3) SA 270 (T) 272. 
12
  See G Bradfield & K Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease 3 ed (2013) 146. 
13
  Holmes JA defines commodus usus as “the snugness and benefit of his occupation” in 
The Treasure Chest v Tambuti Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1975 (2) SA 738 (A) 748. 
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the full term of the lease. In our law there is a positive contractual obligation on a lessor 
to deliver and maintain the leased premises in a proper condition.14 In accordance with 
every contracting party’s general right to specific performance, our courts have ordered 
lessors to carry out their duty to deliver the property to the lessee.15 However, our courts 
have been reluctant to order specific performance of the lessor’s duty to maintain the 
leased property in a proper16 condition.17 In Nisenbaum and Nisenbaum v Express 
Buildings (Pty) Ltd18 De Villiers J described the position as follows: 
“[W]here the tenant complains of disrepair or failure to repair, or failure to add or build 
something on to a building, by the landlord, the Court will not order specific performance. It is 
clear that where specific performance is claimed, the matter is in the discretion of the Court 
… The judgment [in Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 238] seems to indicate, as I have stated, that 
as a general rule in disputes between landlord and tenant as to repair of buildings, or neglect 
to repair or failure to carry out some structural alterations, the Court will not order specific 
performance because it is a difficult matter for the Court to supervise and see that its order is 
carried out, and as the question whether there has been specific performance of the Court’s 
order was difficult to determine, it would be difficult to enforce it.”19 
                                                 
14
  Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease 144. 
15
  See eg Woods v Walters 1921 AD 303; Tshandu v City Council Johannesburg 1947 (1) 
SA 494 (W); Heynes Mathew Ltd v Gibson NO 1950 (1) SA 13 (C). 
16
  The term “proper” in this context means that the premises should be reasonably fit for the 
purpose for which it is leased. The “purpose” is then determined by considering the use to 
which the premises are to be put by the lessee. See A J Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease 
3 ed (2004) 302-303. 
17
  See eg Barker v Beckett & Co Ltd 1911 TPD 151; Chauncey v Blood’s Estate 1911 WLD 
213; Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 238; Hunter v Cumnor Investments 1952 (1) SA 735 (C); 
Nisenbaum and Nisenbaum v Express Buildings (Pty) Ltd 1953 (1) SA 246 (W); Gijzen v 
Verrinder 1965 (1) SA 806 (D). 
18
  1953 (1) SA 246 (W). 
19
  249G-H. Note, however, that the court subsequently pointed out that the general rule 
against specific performance in this context is not an absolute one (249H-250A). 
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Thus, the main basis for such reluctance was that it was difficult for the court to 
supervise and see that its order was in fact carried out. The justification is that a lessee 
is allowed to effect the necessary repairs himself and then to recover the costs from the 
lessor or deduct it from the rental due,20 provided of course notice was given to the 
lessor of the defects.21 
Our courts have also been reluctant to specifically enforce building contracts on the 
ground that they would be unduly burdened with the task of supervising the 
performance.22 
Different concerns have been raised with regard to this position. First, will it be 
necessary for the court itself to supervise the work?23 If the lessor (or builder for that 
matter) has been ordered to effect repairs and failed to do so, the lessee may once 
again approach the court for relief, and any court then has the power to deal with such a 
reluctant defendant.24 Secondly, is it reasonable and fair towards the lessee that he has 
                                                 
20
  The same procedure exists in civilian systems, and is known as specific performance by 
equivalence or third party performance, which is typically claimed for generic acts resulting 
from leases or building contracts (see J Oosterhuis Specific Performance in German, 
French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth Century: Specific Performance: German, French 
and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth Century: Remedies in an Age of Fundamental Rights 
and Industrialisation (published) doctoral thesis Vrije University Amsterdam (2011) 448). 
21
  Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease 146; Kerr The Law of Sale 
and Lease 315; Hunter v Cumnor Investments 1952 (1) SA 735 (C); Bhima v Proes Street 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 1956 (1) SA 458 (T); Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel 
(Pty) Ltd 1962 (3) SA 143 (A); Steynberg v Kryger 1981 (3) SA 473 (O). 
22
  See para 5 5 below. See also para 4 2 2 above. 
23
  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 210-211; W E Cooper The South African 
Law of Landlord and Tenant 2 ed (1994) 89; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of 
Sale and Lease 146. 
24
  Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease 146. See also M A Lambiris 
Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law (1989) 
137. 
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to effect the repairs at his own cost, when the lessor is the one who is contractually 
bound to maintain the leased property in a proper condition? Furthermore, what 
happens where a lessee is not financially able to repair the leased property?25 
These questions, which deal with fundamental problems relating to our courts’ approach 
to the availability of the remedy of specific performance, will be considered and 
analysed from a predominantly comparative perspective in this chapter.26 The 
justification for adopting such a perspective is familiar, namely that the experiences of 
other legal systems and instruments may prove to be particularly useful and instructive 
by revealing shortcomings in our approach and, more importantly, by providing insights 
into how these deficiencies can be addressed. The discussion will centre on the 
underlying reasons given in a decision to refuse to order specific performance, based 
on the fact that enforcing such an order would require constant supervision. In this 
regard specific reference will be made to the key arguments raised in the leading 
English case of Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd.27 
Since the South African position was significantly influenced by the approach that 
English courts adopted, it is especially important to examine developments in the latter 
jurisdiction. The chapter therefore commences with an analysis of the English position, 
followed by the American position. The influence of the Anglo-American position on our 
legal system will then be discussed. The purpose is to establish whether their 
justifications (as will be discussed in the following section) for denying specific 
performance substantiate the refusal of an order for specific performance, and how our 
courts’ approach may be improved, bearing in mind the experiences of the English 
courts and their American counterparts.  
Thereafter the treatment of the objection under German, Dutch and international law will 
be examined. These systems and international instruments do not recognise constant 
supervision as an obstacle to specific performance. However, factors such as certainty 
                                                 
25
  See para 5 5 below.  
26
  See para 5 5 below. 
27
  [1997] 2 WLR 898. 
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and reasonableness, which form the foundation of this objection (as will be indicated 
further on), emerge in the defined exceptions recognised by the civil-law systems and 
the different international instruments. Although these approaches will not be discussed 
as comprehensively as the common law, it does not indicate that their experiences are 
less important or less relevant, since they also provide valuable insights that may assist 
in evaluating and informing our law on specific performance. 
5 2  English law 
It has long been maintained in English case law that it is not possible to order specific 
performance of an obligation which is to be performed over a period of time.28 The 
classic justification for this position is that the court has no effective mechanism for 
supervising performance.29 Thus, even where it is clear that, according to the traditional 
consideration of adequacy, damages would not be adequate, courts further refuse 
specific performance on the ground that the order would require constant supervision.30 
English courts distinguish between orders to carry on an activity and orders to produce 
                                                 
28
  See Pollard v Clayton (1855) 1 K & J 462; Blackett v Bates (1865) 1 Ch App 117; 
Fothergill v Rowland (1873) LR 17 Eq 132;  Powell v Duffryn Steam Coal Co v Taff Vale 
Railway Co (1874) 9 Ch App 331 335 per James LJ: “Where what is required is not merely 
to restrain a party from doing an act of wrong, but to obligate him to do some continuous 
act involving labour and care, the Court has never found its way to do this by injunction.” 
29
  In plain language: “it is a recognized rule that the Court will not decree specific 
performance of a contract, the execution of which would require watching over and 
supervision by the Court” (G R Northcote Fry’s Specific Performance of Contracts 6 ed 
(1921) 46-47 § 99). See also E Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 1113. Note 
that this principle only applies to non-monetary obligations and not continuous obligations 
to pay money, and it follows that an agreement to pay an annuity can be specifically 
enforced.   
30
  See R J Sharpe “Specific relief for contract breach” in B J Reiter & J Swan (eds) Studies 
in Contract Law (1980) 123 126; M Hogg Promises and Contract Law: Comparative 
Perspectives (2011) 350. 
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a particular result, and generally the former is regarded problematic.31 This distinction 
and the relevance thereof will be maintained throughout this chapter.  
In 1920, Pound explored the origins of the supervision objection in an article about the 
progress of law and equity.32 He traced the objection to the reluctance of the English 
Chancellors, during the early development of the Chancery courts’ equitable jurisdiction, 
to make orders if they were not certain of their enforceability.33 They generally avoided 
orders requiring performance beyond a single act, because imprisonment of the 
defendant for contempt, if he proves recalcitrant, will not get the contract performed in 
specie.34 And this, in turn, could threaten their authority as a court separate from the 
courts of law. Hence, there developed a “prejudice for historical reasons against 
affirmative decrees in cases calling for more than a simple act”.35 
Essentially, this objection originated from a fear of not being able to enforce orders to 
perform, which would jeopardise the Chancery Court’s reputation and dignity as a 
capable functioning entity, as they were still in the process of establishing their position 
                                                 
31
  See generally A S Burrows “Specific performance at the crossroads” 1984 Legal Studies 
102 107; H G Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 2 ed (2010) 877 ff; H 
G Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts I: General Principles 31 ed (2012) 1924 ff. This 
distinction between orders to carry on an activity and orders to produce a particular result 
incidentally is also to be found in civil law (see B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston 
The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise 2 ed (2006) 153). 
32
  R Pound “Progress of the law, 1918-1919 equity” (1920) 33 Harv LR 420 434-437. See 
also H L Oleck “Specific performance of builders’ contracts” (1952) 21 Fordham LR 156; 
Sharpe “Specific relief for contract breach” in Reiter & Swan (eds) Studies in Contract Law 
126 144; J M Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts 12: Restitution, Specific Performance and 
Election of Remedies Interim ed (2002) § 1171. 
33
  Pound 1920 Harv LR 434. 
34
  Sharpe “Specific relief for contract breach” in Reiter & Swan (eds) Studies in Contract Law 
126. 
35
  This quotation is taken from Sharpe, who in turn, relies on Pound 1920 Harv LR 435. 
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and their authority.36 However, the question arises whether a fear of risking one’s 
reputation provides sufficient justification for avoiding orders requiring performance 
beyond a single act or where it is said that the court cannot ensure performance, 
especially when one considers that courts of equity would have been willing to do so 
had they been more established. Sharpe therefore contends that “[i]n the modern age, it 
is not at all obvious that the dignity of the court suffers in the unlikely event that resort 
must be had to imprisonment for contemptuous refusal to comply with a positive decree. 
It might well be said that a greater threat to the integrity of the judicial system is posed 
by the grant of a damages award in that sanctions for noncompliance by the defendant 
are much less severe”. The argument is that the court’s dignity and integrity is more 
likely to be negatively affected by the fact that they make damages orders which are 
less likely to be complied with, since there are less severe sanctions which will prompt 
the defendant to perform (indirectly). Where the court refuses to order specific 
performance the innocent party may not even be able to recover the benefit of his 
bargain by means of damages. Since there is less of a threat in orders to pay a sum of 
money (orders ad pecuniam solvendam),37 it is even less likely that the plaintiff will 
obtain relief.  
A classic modern authority on the supervision objection is Ryan v Mutual Tontine 
Westminster Chambers Association.38 Here the Court of Appeal held that a provision in 
a lease agreement of a residential flat providing that the lessors appoint a porter who 
was to be “constantly in attendance” could not be specifically enforced, because it 
                                                 
36
  See also Sharpe “Specific relief for contract breach” in Reiter & Swan (eds) Studies in 
Contract Law 126 144, and Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1171. 
37
  The order must be one ad factum praestandum (order to do or refrain from doing 
something which includes specific performance) before the court will enforce it by 
committal for contempt. When the order is for the payment of money (eg an order to pay 
damages) it cannot be enforced by committal for contempt. See reference to Dawson n 69 
below. 
38
  [1893] 1 Ch 116. See Sharpe “Specific relief for contract breach” in Reiter & Swan (eds) 
Studies in Contract Law 144 n 72. 
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would require “constant superintendence by the court which the court has always in 
such cases declined to give”.39 Specific performance has also been refused in 
numerous other cases for the same reason. For example, specific performance has 
been refused of obligations of a railway company to operate signals and provide engine 
power,40 to cultivate a farm in a particular manner,41 to deliver goods by instalments,42 
and to keep an airfield in operation.43  
The relatively more recent House of Lords decision in Co-operative Insurance Society 
Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd,44 reinforced the principle that courts would not 
generally make orders requiring a party to perform an obligation that is continuous in 
nature, such as “keep-open” clauses. This decision is of particular significance as it 
provides the underlying reasoning for this principle.45 Not only did Lord Hoffmann 
explain why in general the common-law system does not award specific performance as 
the primary remedy, he systematically and scrupulously explained the rationale behind 
the English courts’ approach to orders of specific performance requiring constant 
supervision by the court. This exposition contains a number of fundamental insights that 
may be very useful in evaluating the South African approach to similar fact patterns.  
Before embarking on an in-depth analysis of the ratio of Lord Hoffmann’s judgment, it 
would be useful to provide a brief discussion of the facts of this case. The defendant 
(lessee) entered into a long-term lease of 35 years with the plaintiff (lessor) for the 
largest shop in a shopping centre. The defendant owned a chain of supermarkets, one 
of which was located and operated on the plaintiff’s premises. However, due to fierce 
                                                 
39
  [1893] 1 Ch 116 123. 
40
  Blackett v Bates (1865) 1 Ch 117. 
41
  Phipps v Jackson (1887) 56 LJ Ch 350. 
42
  Dominion Coal v Dominion Iron & Steel [1909] AC 293. 
43
  Dowty Boulton Paul v Wolverhampton Corporation [1971] 2 All ER 277. 
44
  [1997] 2 WLR 898. 
45
  See A Phang “Specific performance – exploring the roots of ‘settled practice’” 1998 
Modern Law Review 421 422. 
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competition, the defendant decided to close down its less profitable supermarkets, 
which included one located in the plaintiff’s shopping centre, and gave the plaintiff only 
about a month’s notice. The lease itself had about another 19 years to run and the 
defendant’s actions were therefore in breach of a provision in the agreement which 
stipulated that he had “[t]o keep the demised premises open for retail trade during the 
usual hours of business in the locality and the display windows properly dressed in a 
suitable manner in keeping with a good class parade of shops”.46 The plaintiff attempted 
to persuade the defendant to continue trading until a suitable assignee or sub-lessee 
had been found, and also offered to negotiate a temporary rent concession, but the 
defendant proceeded to close the supermarket as planned. The plaintiff thereafter 
claimed specific performance of the provision in conjunction with damages.  
In the court of first instance, Maddocks J refused to order specific performance, based 
on authority that there was a “settled practice”47 that courts would not make orders 
which would require a defendant to run a business.48 The judge did not merely follow 
authority, but also provided reasons why he thought that specific performance would be 
inappropriate. Two such reasons were justifications for the general practice. First, an 
order to carry on a business, as opposed to an order to perform a “single and well 
defined act”,49 was difficult to enforce by the sanction of committal, i.e. imprisonment for 
contempt.50 And secondly, where a business was being run at a loss, specific relief 
would be “too far reaching and beyond the scope of control which the court should seek 
                                                 
46
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 901. 
47
  See eg Braddon Towers Ltd v International Stores Ltd [1987] 1 EGLR 209 213, where 
Slade J said: “Whether or not this may be properly described as a rule of law, I do not 
doubt that for many years practitioners have advised their clients that it is the settled and 
invariable practice of this court never to grant mandatory injunctions requiring persons to 
carry on business.”  
48
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 902. 
49
  902. 
50
  See also Burrows 1984 Legal Studies 107. 
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to impose”.51 The other reasons related to the particular case: resumption of the 
business would be expensive (refitting the shop was estimated to cost over £1 million) 
and although the defendant had knowingly acted in breach of the “keep open” provision, 
it had done so “in the light of the settled practice of the court to award damages”.52 
Finally, Maddocks J found that, while the assessment of damages might be difficult, it 
was not the kind of exercise which the courts were unfamiliar with.53  
After the matter was taken on appeal, the Court of Appeal54 granted specific 
performance compelling the defendant to carry on their business in terms of the long-
term lease. However, the House of Lords reversed this decision, and refused to order 
specific performance of the contract.55  
The attention now turns to the primary underlying reasons provided in Lord Hoffmann’s 
decision to refuse to order specific performance. He delivered the sole substantive 
judgment with which the other Law Lords agreed. This judgment is regarded  as the 
leading case in all scholarly treatments of the supervision objection, as it illustrates the 
balancing of factors for and against ordering specific performance in cases where the 
supervision issue arises.56 No subsequent case law deals with these competing factors 
so extensively. 
(i)  The supervision argument 
According to Lord Hoffmann, the long-established practice that the court will not grant 
orders compelling a party to trade, “has never, so far as [he knows], been examined by 
this House and it is open to [the plaintiff] to say that it rests upon inadequate grounds or 
                                                 
51
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 902. 
52
  902. 
53
  902. 
54
  Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1996] Ch 286. 
55
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 902. 
56
  See eg Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 394; Beale et al Cases, Materials and 
Text on Contract Law 878; Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1924. 
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that it has been too inflexibly applied”.57 Furthermore, he pointed out that while specific 
performance is traditionally regarded as an exceptional remedy under English law, the 
opposite was true with respect to legal systems based on civil law, such as France, 
Germany and Scotland, where the plaintiff is prima facie entitled to specific 
performance. In this regard, he made the following insightful observation, that 
“[i]n practice, however, there is less difference between common law and civilian systems 
than these general statements might lead one to suppose. The principles upon which 
English judges exercise the discretion to grant specific performance are reasonably well 
settled and depend upon a number of considerations, mostly of a practical nature, which 
are of very general application. I have made no investigation of civilian systems, but a 
priori I would expect that judges [in these systems] take much the same matters into 
account in deciding whether specific performance would be inappropriate in a particular 
case”.58 
Turning to the main reasons advanced in support of the settled practice, Lord Hoffmann 
began by pointing out that this principle was “not entirely dependent upon damages 
being an adequate remedy”.59 He concluded that “the reasons which underlie the 
established practice may justify a refusal of specific performance even when damages 
are not an adequate remedy”. Instead, he focused on another reason more frequently 
                                                 
57
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 902. 
58
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 903. 
59
  Citing (at 903) Sir John Pennycuick VC in Dowty Boulton Paul Ltd v Wolverhampton 
Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 204, who refused to order a corporation to maintain an airfield 
as a going concern because (at 211) “[i]t is very well established that the court will not 
order specific performance of an obligation to carry on a business”. He added (at 212): “It 
is unnecessary in the circumstances to discuss whether damages would be an adequate 
remedy to the company.” 
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used in support of this practice, namely that it would require constant supervision by the 
court.60  
Lord Hoffmann first clarified what is meant by “continued superintendence”, the phrase 
used in the Ryan case, referred to above.61 He emphasised that it did not imply literal 
supervision by the court (or some other officer of the court) itself. He then cites62 
Megarry J in CH Giles & Co v Morris,63 who said that “difficulties of constant 
superintendence” were a “narrow consideration” because “there is normally no question 
of the court having to send its officers to supervise the performance of the order … 
Performance … is normally secured by the realisation of the person enjoined that he is 
liable to be punished for contempt if evidence of his disobedience to the order is put 
before the court …” But according to Lord Hoffmann this is rather besides the point, and 
does not serve to discredit the supervision objection, as the underlying difficulty which 
courts want to avoid is giving an indefinite series of rulings in order to ensure the 
execution of its order. According to him, constant supervision of specific performance is 
regarded as a problem because it envisages numerous further applications to court over 
an extended period with the prospect of detailed investigations of each successive 
breach. In his words: 
 
“[S]upervision would in practice take the form of rulings by the court, on applications made by 
the parties, as to whether there had been a breach of the order. It is the possibility of the 
                                                 
60
  Citing (at 903) Dixon J in J C Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 
297-298: “Specific performance is inapplicable when the continued supervision of the 
Court is necessary in order to ensure the fulfillment of the contract.”  
61
  See text to n 38 above. According to Burrows, “[t]his is not an easily understood notion, 
but what it appears to mean is that, irrespective of the uncertainty bar, specific 
performance will be denied where too much judicial time and effort would be spent in 
seeking compliance with the order” (Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 3 ed 
(2004) 475-476). 
62
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 903. 
63
  [1972] 1 WLR 307 318. 
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court having to give an indefinite series of such rulings in order to ensure the execution of the 
order which has been regarded as undesirable.”64 
 
Such repeated rulings are undesirable because punishment for contempt is “the only 
means available to the court to enforce its order”,65 a mechanism which he describes as 
“so powerful, in fact, as often to be unsuitable as an instrument for adjudicating upon 
the disputes which may arise over whether a business is being run in accordance with 
the terms of the court’s order”.66 And apart from damaging the defendant’s commercial 
reputation, it would force the defendant to run its business in a certain manner when it 
had decided that it was not in its economic interest to continue running the business. He 
regarded this as an inappropriate way to compel the running of a business.67  
However, this argument has been met with opposition, mainly because it ignores the 
reality that every circumstance does not necessarily demand the employment of this 
serious mechanism. It is often ignored that other means exist to ensure compliance with 
a court order.68 Dawson, in a much earlier work, for example, refers to substituted 
performance as a viable alternative:69  
“The interesting question is whether we [common lawyers], like the French, have become 
prisoners of our own system or, more accurately, whether we have become confused by our 
lack of system. Would our courts be more willing to grant specific performance if a sharp line 
were drawn and firmly maintained between civil and criminal contempt – between execution 
                                                 
64
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 903. 
65
  903. Lord Hoffmann’s concern for the efficacy of punishment for contempt for enforcing 
anything beyond a single act returns to the explanation for the Chancery courts’ initial 
reluctance to order specific performance of such obligations. See discussion above about 
the origins of the supervision objection. 
66
  904. 
67
  904. 
68
  See Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1923-1924. 
69
  J P Dawson “Specific performance in France and Germany” (1958) 57 Mich LR 495 537-
538. 
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process for the benefit of the litigant and punishment for attack on judicial authority? Why 
must every equity order, except some decrees establishing simple money debts, be thought 
of as carrying implicitly the threat of arrest, money fine, sequestration – the whole panoply of 
coercive devices that our equity courts draw on at their discretion? Our courts could surely 
have made a much wider use of substituted performance, by plaintiff, by third parties or by 
receivers and other persons that they temporarily invest with a limited public authority. This 
could be done without any commitment to go further with money fines and especially with 
arrest. If limited means were adapted to limited ends, with greater selectivity, more might be 
attempted and the barriers to specific performance that we have inherited might be reduced.” 
It has also been held that it is perhaps not even necessary to employ coercive 
measures, because in practice orders are often obeyed without recalcitrance.70 
Burrows, for example, submits that defendants rarely disobey court orders. He argues 
that the mere possibility of recalcitrance is not a sufficient reason to refuse the remedy, 
and on the rare occasion that a defendant does not obey a court order, courts are able 
to ensure compliance without having to invoke the “full judicial machinery” by, for 
example, appointing a single officer of the court to oversee performance.71 He also 
stresses that “even if judicial time and effort are involved, it is still strongly arguable that 
this is outweighed by the fact that justice otherwise requires the claimant to be granted 
specific performance”.72 
                                                 
70
  See CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307 318 per Megarry J. See also A 
Schwartz “The case for specific performance” (1979) 89 Yale LJ 271 304; Burrows 1984 
Legal Studies 110; A M Tettenborn “Absolving the undeserving: shopping centres, specific 
performance and the law of contract” 1998 Jan/Feb Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 23 
30; Phang 1998 Modern Law Review 426; E Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 
1113.  
71
  Burrows 1984 Legal Studies 107-110; Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 481. 
72
  Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 481. 
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Moreover, it is clear that even where an order is not complied with, viable alternatives 
(to punishment for contempt) exist to ensure performance in the end.73 Treitel, for 
example, argues that it may be possible for the court to appoint an expert as its officer 
in order to supervise performance of a recalcitrant defendant or, alternatively, the court 
could empower the plaintiff to appoint a person to act as an agent of the defendant who 
then supervises the latter in ensuring enforcement of the order.74 Lord Wilberforce also 
expressed his doubts as to the validity of the supposed difficulties with supervision in 
Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding,75 maintaining that it is “an irrelevance: for what the court 
has to do is to satisfy itself, ex post facto, that the covenanted work has been done, and 
it has ample machinery, through certificates, or by enquiry, to do precisely this”. Lord 
Pearce in Beswick v Beswick76 held that these technical difficulties could be overcome 
and therefore “the court should not be deterred by such a consideration from making an 
order which justice requires”. This led Sharpe to conclude that “both on principle and on 
authority … the tendency to refuse specific performance in cases involving supervision 
should become much less pronounced”.77  
According to Lord Hoffmann, such contempt proceedings are also undesirable because 
enforcement, particularly in the context of repeated applications over a period of time, is 
“likely to be expensive in terms of cost to the parties and the resources of the judicial 
                                                 
73
  See eg Schwartz 1979 Yale LJ 293-294; Sharpe “Specific relief for contract breach” in 
Reiter & Swan (eds) Studies in Contract Law 123-150; Burrows Remedies for Torts and 
Breach of Contract 481; G Jones & W Goodhart Specific Performance 2 ed (1996) 46. 
See also Parker v Camden London Borough Council [1986] Ch 162 175 178, referring to 
provisions contained in an ordinance, which enable the court, when an order is not being 
complied with, to appoint some other person to perform the order on behalf of the person 
who has failed to do so. 
74
  See Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1113-1114. 
75
  [1973] AC 691 724. 
76
  [1968] AC 58 91. 
77
  “Specific relief for contract breach” in B J Reiter & J Swan (eds) Studies in Contract Law 
123 147. See also J Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 29 ed (2010) 579. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   267 
 
system”.78 It is at this point that Lord Hoffmann draws the very important distinction 
between orders which require a defendant to carry on an activity, such as running a 
business and orders which require him to achieve or produce a particular result.79 In his 
view “[t]he possibility of repeated applications for rulings on compliance with the order 
which arises in the former case does not exist to anything like the same extent in the 
latter. He then adds that “[e]ven if the achievement of the result is a complicated matter 
which will take some time, the court, if called upon to rule, only has to examine the 
finished work and say whether it complies with the order”.80 This distinction between 
orders to carry on activities and to achieve results explains why the courts have been 
prepared to order specific performance of building contracts and repairing 
covenants.81  And it is also on this basis that Lord Hoffmann managed to avoid the 
authority on “building cases” supporting the possibility of specific performance. The 
distinction, he said, was that in those decisions all the contractor was being ordered to 
do was to achieve a particular result.82 However, one could argue that supervision will 
still be required of execution of building works; even though these contracts are aimed 
at a finished product that can be judged according to the specifications of the contracts 
and do not involve the performance of a continuous duty, these types of contracts would 
take some time to be executed and involve several different detailed and complex 
obligations – the execution of which the court would similarly find difficult to supervise. 
Burrows therefore rightly questions “why the constant supervision objection should be 
thought valid in respect of orders to carry on activities but not orders to achieve 
results”.83 
                                                 
78
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 904. 
79
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 904. See also Burrows 1984 Legal Studies 107. 
80
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 904. 
81
  Citing Wolverhampton Corporation v Emmons [1901] 1 QB 515 (building contract) and 
Jeune v Queens Cross Properties Ltd [1974] Ch 97 (repairing contract).    
82
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 904-905.  
83
  Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 480. 
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To summarise, according to Lord Hoffmann, constant supervision is a concept that 
involves two more fundamental principles based on certainty. First, a person subject to 
a mandatory court order carrying the potential of punishment for contempt has a right to 
know with a considerable degree of precision what was expected of him.84 A court will 
not be able to guarantee this with orders which require a defendant to carry on an 
activity over an extended period. Secondly, there was the possibility of the court being 
overwhelmed by numerous applications to commit for alleged contraventions of its 
specific performance order. This would involve lengthy argument as to whether the 
defendant was complying with the order, which in turn would result in a waste of judicial 
time and resources.  
Finally, on the facts, Lord Hoffmann held that the obligation in the lease agreement 
requiring the store to remain open was not sufficiently precise to be capable of specific 
performance because it did not specify the level of trade, the area of the premises within 
which trade must be conducted, or even the kind of trade. He emphasised that “[t]he 
fact that the terms of a contractual obligation are sufficiently definite to escape being 
void for uncertainty, or to found a claim for damages … does not necessarily mean that 
they will be sufficiently precise to be capable of being specifically performed”.85 The 
terms in question were considered too vague to allow a clear order to be made.  
                                                 
84
  So in Wolverhampton Corporation v Emmons [1901] 1 QB 515, Romer LJ said that the 
first condition for specific enforcement of a building contract was that “the particulars of the 
work are so far definitely ascertained that the court can sufficiently see what is the exact 
nature of the work of which it is asked to order the performance”. Similarly in Redland 
Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652, Lord Upjohn stated (666) the following general principle 
for the grant of mandatory injunctions to carry out building works: “[T]he court must be 
careful to see that the defendant knows exactly in fact what he has to do and this means 
not as a matter of law but as a matter of fact, so that in carrying out an order he can give 
his contractors the proper instructions.” 
85
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 905. 
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However, the argument based on the requirement of certain and precise formulation of 
the contractual obligation has been criticised. Burrows finds Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning 
unconvincing for a number of reasons. In particular, he questions why the order could 
not be drawn up with sufficient precision.86 He argues that courts are able to overcome 
the uncertainty problem by implying terms in cases of doubt. He refers to Sudbrook 
Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton,87 where the House of Lords held that if the agreed 
method for valuation fails in a contract for the sale of land, a court will determine the fair 
and reasonable price, thereby rendering the contract specifically enforceable.88 
Tettenborn, on the other hand, simply contends that the obligation in question is not so 
uncertain as to render it unenforceable. He argues that while there are some contractual 
obligations that are so imprecise that they could not be specifically enforced without 
leaving the defendant in the dark about just what was expected of him, an obligation to 
keep a shop open should not fall into this category. He argues that there is not a big 
difference between a builder being ordered to construct a building and a retailer being 
ordered to “keep the demised premises open for retail trade during the usual hours of 
business in the locality”. According to Tettenborn, the defendant knew what had to be 
done: a shop is or is not open, in the same way as a house is or is not built or repairs 
are or are not done. He admits to the fact that the retailer’s obligations in Argyll included 
further items which might not have been suitable for specific performance (in particular 
the clause which required that the windows be dressed “in a suitable manner in keeping 
with a good class parade of shops”). However, he argues that the same goes for a 
contract to build a house, which is specifically enforceable despite the fact that some 
terms of it (for example as to the quality of workmanship) are not, and the plaintiff could 
then acquire a limited specific performance order if he is satisfied to leave the 
                                                 
86
  Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 480. 
87
  [1983] 1 AC 444. 
88
  Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 494-495. 
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enforcement of other, less certain obligations, to future damages litigation. Ultimately, 
the argument turns on why the same principles cannot be applied in the retail context.89  
Both commentators make valid points: first, it may be argued that uncertainty should not 
have restricted awarding specific performance, because the defendant had complied 
with the obligations before he cancelled the agreement and knew what was expected of 
him in terms of the lease agreement.90 Secondly, even if the court struggled to precisely 
formulate their order from the terms of the obligation, they could still apply common 
sense and imply terms to overcome the uncertainty objection. These views will be 
expanded on later in the discussion.91  
(ii)  The unjust enrichment argument 
Lord Hoffmann also discussed a further objection to an order requiring the defendant to 
carry on a business, which was initially emphasised by Millett LJ in the Court of 
Appeal.92 This is that it may cause injustice by allowing the plaintiff to enrich himself at 
the defendant’s expense. The loss which the defendant may suffer through having to 
comply with the order (for example, by running a business at a loss for an indefinite 
period) may be far greater than that which the plaintiff would suffer from the contract 
being breached.  
                                                 
89
  See Tettenborn 1998 Jan/Feb Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 29-30. 
90
 The Court of Appeal treated the way the defendant previously conducted business as 
measuring the extent of his obligation to do so in future. However, in terms of Lord 
Hoffmann’s approach, the obligation depends upon the language of the contract and not 
upon what the defendant has previously chosen to do: “It is in my view wrong for the 
courts to speculate about whether Argyll might voluntarily carry on business in a way 
which would relieve the court from having to construe its order. The question of certainty 
must be decided on the assumption that the court might have to enforce the order 
according to its terms.” ([1997] 2 WLR 898 908). 
91
  See para 5 5 below. 
92
  [1996] Ch 286 305. 
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It is not clear how and why this disproportion between the parties’ potential losses led 
Lord Hoffmann to an unjust enrichment inquiry since he even concedes that the 
defendant by his own breach of contract puts himself in such an unfortunate position. 
Yet according to him, “the purpose of the law of contract is not to punish wrongdoing but 
to satisfy the expectations of the party entitled to performance”.93 Lord Hoffmann 
refers94 to an explanation provided by Sharpe: “In such circumstances, a specific decree 
in favour of the plaintiff will put him in a bargaining position vis-à-vis the defendant 
whereby the measure of what he will receive will be the value to the defendant of being 
released from performance. If the plaintiff bargains effectively, the amount he will set will 
exceed the value to him of performance and will approach the cost to the defendant to 
complete.”95 It is still uncertain how this relates to unjust enrichment. 
It is accepted that there are situations where a court order may put the person who 
obtains it in an unacceptably strong bargaining position. As Lord Westbury put it in 
Isenberg v East India House Estate Co Ltd,96 when asked to order the defendant to 
demolish part of a new building because it interfered, to a minor extent, with the 
plaintiff’s light, he saw no reason to do so if the result would be to “deliver over the 
defendants to the plaintiff bound hand and foot in order to be made subject to any 
extortionate demand that he may by possibility make”.97  
Not surprisingly, the relevance of this argument has been doubted.98 One could argue 
that Lord Hoffmann should never have invoked this argument, based on the facts of the 
                                                 
93
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 906. 
94
  906. 
95
  Sharpe “Specific remedies for contract breach” in Reiter & Swan (eds) Studies in Contract 
Law 129. 
96
  (1863) 3 De GJ & S 263 273. 
97
  Statement also referred to by Lord Hoffmann [1997] 2 WLR 898 906, and initially on 
appeal by Millet LJ [1996] Ch 286 304. 
98
  See in particular D Friedmann “Economic aspects of damages and specific relief” in         
D Saidov & R Cunnington (eds) Contract Damages: Domestic and International 
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case. The facts did not present this difficulty at all: how can there be unjust enrichment if 
the plaintiff receives the performance to which he was rightly entitled to under a valid 
contract? Because English law does not recognise the sine causa requirement (at least 
not according to the dominant view),99 his analysis is problematic from a civil-law 
perspective (and specifically South African law), whereby the plaintiff would only be 
receiving a benefit to which he is entitled to in terms of a valid contract, and nothing 
more.100 Apparently, Lord Hoffmann’s argument in Argyll Stores is more policy-based 
than technical in nature, and the criticism based on the sine causa requirement may 
therefore be less tenable from a common-law perspective. 
(iii)  The procedural argument 
Finally, Lord Hoffmann raised the argument that, whatever the situation at the time, if an 
order for specific performance were to be granted, subsequent events might change 
matters by making its continued enforcement either oppressive or otherwise 
unacceptable. Counsel for the plaintiff raised the counter-argument that in such a case it 
would always be open to the defendant to apply for the order to be varied or 
discharged.101  
Lord Hoffmann, however, did not accept this submission. He was of the opinion that any 
order made by the court would be a final order and there was no authority to the effect 
that once such an order had been made the defendant could return to court at a later 
stage and reopen the matter. Furthermore, even if there was such authority he regarded 
                                                                                                                                                             
Perspectives (2008) 65 81. See also Tettenborn 1998 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 
34-36. 
99
  On sine causa or absence of basis in English law, see A S Burrows The Law of Restitution 
3 ed (2011) 95 ff and C Mitchell et al (eds) Goff & Jones The Law of Unjust Enrichment 8 
ed (2011) 8-9, which may be contrasted with P Birks Unjust Enrichment 2 ed (2005) 101 ff 
(where a more civil-law based approach is advocated). 
100
  See J du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment (2012) 54. 
101
      [1997] 2 WLR 898 908. 
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it as difficult to formulate any criterion of what would amount to a sufficiently unexpected 
change of circumstances to warrant the discharge of the order.102 Tettenborn 
specifically questioned this aspect of the judgment, because if it is indeed true that an 
order of specific performance cannot be subsequently varied to take account of 
supervening events, it effectively means that a court has to refuse to make an order 
which in all probability will be enforceable, merely because (hypothetically) 
circumstances might arise which would make its continued enforcement oppressive.103 
According to Tettenborn, the difficulty with Lord Hoffmann’s opinion is that, taken 
literally, it would rule out virtually any order to carry out particular works, including those 
where specific performance is available. Even in the case of building contracts, for 
example, the objection raised by Lord Hoffman will still be applicable: these types of 
contracts would naturally take some time to be executed, during which events could 
occur which makes further enforcement undesirable.104 Therefore, Berryman and 
Carroll rightly conclude that 
“it seems quite appropriate for a court to grant specific relief, where the problems with 
supervision remain hypothetical and constitute speculation, until such time as any difficulty is 
incurred by the parties. At that stage, the court could reassess its decision to persevere with 
the contract and bring the relationship to an end by requiring the plaintiff to crystallize its loss 
in damages. Where problems with supervision arise immediately (the inability to describe 
                                                 
102
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 908-909. 
103
  See also J Berryman & R Carroll “Coercive relief – reflections on supervision and 
enforcement constraints” unpublished draft paper prepared for Remedies Discussion 
Forum Prato, Italy June 2013 (copy on file with author) 12: “It also appears to be 
inconsistent with the House of Lords’ own judgment in Johnson v. Agnew [1980] A.C. 367. 
There, the non-performance of a specific performance decree remained a continuing 
breach of the contract, conferring upon the plaintiff the right to bring an action in common 
law for breach and to seek damages.” 
104
  See Tettenborn 1998 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 36. See also I C F Spry The 
Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, Rectification and 
Equitable Damages 8 ed (2010) 113-119. 
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what has to be done would be one instance), the court should refuse the specific 
performance decree forthwith”.105 
Ultimately, Lord Hoffmann concluded that these various reasons, none of which would 
necessarily be sufficient on its own, indicated that the refusal of specific performance 
was justified. He added that granting or refusing specific performance remains a matter 
for the judge’s discretion and that “[t]here are no binding rules, but this does not mean 
that there cannot be settled principles, founded upon practical considerations of the kind 
which I have discussed, which do not have to be re-examined in every case, but which 
the courts will apply in all but exceptional circumstances”.106  
Commentators107 who favour Millet LJ’s dissenting judgment (on appeal) criticise Lord 
Hoffmann’s uncompromising confirmation of the settled practice, and maintain that 
every case requires a court to start from a clean slate, free of pre-conceived 
preferences. They prefer Millet LJ’s more flexible proposition that “equitable relief will be 
granted where it is appropriate and not otherwise”.108 This accords with Megarry J’s 
view in Tito v Waddell (No 2)109 that equitable relief should be granted if it could achieve 
“more perfect and complete justice”. However, it is similarly clear from Lord Hoffmann’s 
judgment that the true test is one of “appropriateness of relief”.110 Even though Lord 
Hoffmann confirmed the established practice, it is submitted that he did not do so 
                                                 
105
  Berryman & Carroll “Coercive relief – reflections on supervision and enforcement 
constraints” 12 (referring to S Rowan Remedies for Breach of Contract (2012) 57-58). 
106
  Referring to the passage of Slade J in Braddon Towers Ltd v International Stores Ltd 
[1987] 1 EGLR 209 213: “Whether or not this may be properly described as a rule of law, I 
do not doubt that for many years practitioners have advised their clients that it is the 
settled and invariable practice of this court never to grant mandatory injunctions requiring 
persons to carry on business.”  
107
  See eg H Y Yeo “Specific performance: covenant to keep business running” 1998 May 
Journal of Business Law 254. 
108
  [1996] Ch 286 304. 
109
  [1977] Ch 106 322. 
110
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 903. See also para 5 2 (iv) below. 
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uncritically. His focus was always on the merits and the equities of the case before him. 
He awarded a remedy based on what he thought was the most appropriate in the 
circumstances. Both his finding and reasoning can indeed be criticised, but it cannot be 
said that he committed himself to a particular decision beforehand based on established 
practice.  
(iv) Evaluation  
As indicated above, the decision of the House of Lords has attracted substantial 
criticism,111 especially regarding the manner in which the discretion to grant specific 
performance is exercised in English law and Lord Hoffman’s reasoning for refusing the 
order for specific performance. It is questioned whether the supposed practical 
objections to specific performance advanced by him was in fact founded. 
Admittedly, a number of the arguments that have been raised against Lord Hoffmann’s 
reasoning are valid. As mentioned earlier, Dawson (who wrote long before Lord 
Hoffmann’s judgment) convincingly argues that there are other possible means to 
ensure compliance with a court order, and every order should not be assumed to carry 
the threat of the serious consequences for being held in contempt.112 Perhaps even 
more convincing is the point made by Burrows, that the serious and undesirable 
consequences of contempt proceedings (which forms a substantial part of Hoffmann’s 
rationale) rarely realize in practice, since court orders are often obeyed without 
recalcitrance. And even so, this prospect alone should not influence a court to refuse 
                                                 
111
  Notably, Tettenborn 1998 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 23; H Y Yeo 1998 Journal of 
Business Law 254-259; Phang 1998 Modern Law Review 421-432; F Cuncannon “The 
case for the specific performance as the primary remedy for breach of contract in New 
Zealand” 2004 VUWLR 659 671-675; Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 
480 ff; Berryman & Carroll “Coercive relief – reflections on supervision and enforcement 
constraints”. 
112
  Dawson 1958 Mich LR 537-538. 
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the remedy especially where justice requires the plaintiff to be granted specific 
performance.113  
However, it is submitted that the refusal of the remedy of specific performance in this 
particular case was ultimately justified, because Lord Hoffmann clearly states that the 
“cumulative effect”114 of the different factors indicated that it should not be ordered. As 
indicated, the difficulty of supervision was not the sole ground for his decision. He does 
not follow the settled practice of refusing orders for specific performance of an obligation 
to keep a business running slavishly. Instead, he evaluates the different underlying 
factors by which English courts are discouraged to grant specific performance of these 
types of obligations. He also provides a defensible rationale for the practice, where he 
could have simply referred to the practice without having any regard to the underlying 
reasons for maintaining it. He carefully analysed the interests at stake and determined 
that the plaintiff’s interests, weighed against the many disadvantages of specific 
performance, would be adequately protected by a damages award. The argument is 
that when the problem of supervision is the only factor which stands in the way of 
granting the remedy, it should not discourage a court to grant the remedy, but in cases 
where a variety of other factors against making such an order are present, and where 
these outweigh the interest in performance, the refusal of the remedy is justified (as was 
the case in Argyll).115 This suggests that, on different facts, interests worthy of 
protection may be present which will not be protected unless the court grants an order 
of specific performance. Even though Burrows severely criticises Lord Hoffmann’s 
reasoning, he states that this does not mean that the ultimate decision was incorrect.116 
The decision can, according to Burrows, be explained on different, more convincing, 
grounds: 
                                                 
113
  Burrows 1984 Legal Studies 107-110; Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 481, 
485. 
114
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 907. 
115
  See Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1924; Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1114-1115. 
116
  Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 480.  
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“To force a defendant to carry on with business that is losing money may well fall foul of the 
severe hardship bar or a separate specific bar. But this should have been addressed 
separately than being confused with the constant supervision objection.”117 
It is suggested that undue hardship to the defendant may have been a more convincing 
reason for the decision. The loss which the defendant would have suffered through 
having to comply with the order by running a business at a loss for an indefinite period 
was greater than the plaintiff would suffer from the contract being breached. Economic 
hardship to the defendant evidently provides a better justification for the refusal. But 
even though the premise is rejected, the conclusion is supported here. 
It should also not be overlooked that Argyll was decided in England – a jurisdiction less 
willing to engage coercive remedies. Specific performance is only exceptionally 
available.118 Therefore the statement by Berryman and Carroll that even within Great 
Britain, Argyll Stores is not followed in Scotland,119 is particularly problematic because 
specific performance, or specific implement as it is known in Scotland, is the primary 
right of the innocent party in cases of breach of contract in Scots law (a mixed legal 
system).120 The authors refer to Highland & Universal Properties Ltd v Safeway 
                                                 
117
  480-481. In his concluding paragraph (at 504), Burrows also says that “while the decision 
in that case seems correct, their Lordships’ support for the constant supervision objection 
was misplaced”. 
118
  Neil Andrews also concludes that the House of Lords’ refusal in Argyll “to overstretch 
specific performance in this context seems quite justified” because apart from agreements 
to transfer land, specific performance is not the primary remedy in English law (Contract 
Law (2011) 536-537). 
119
  Berryman & Carroll “Coercive relief – reflections on supervision and enforcement 
constraints” 13-14. 
120
  E Clive & D Hutchison “Breach of contract” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) 
Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland 
and South Africa (2004) 176 193; H L MacQueen & J Thomson Contract Law in Scotland 
3 ed (2012) 233 § 6.6. MacQueen and Macgregor correctly observe that “If the two 
jurisdictions analyse the facts from standpoints which are diametrically opposed, then 
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Properties Ltd,121 a case decided after Argyll Stores, where the Court of Session 
ordered a defendant who wished to close its supermarket (as in Argyll Stores) to 
maintain operating its supermarket. But Scots law has always followed this practice as 
evidenced by the decision in Retail Parks Investments Ltd v The Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc (No 2)122 where an order was similarly granted to oblige a lessee in a 
shopping centre to continue conducting its business of retail banking from its shop in the 
centre.123 
                                                                                                                                                             
different conclusions will be reached. This is the inevitable result of the different status of 
an order for performance in the Scottish and English jurisdictions.” (“Specific implement, 
interdict and contractual performance” 1999 Edin LR 239 243). See also M Chen-Wishart 
Contract Law 4 ed (2012) 553. 
121
  2000 SLT 414. 
122
  1996 SC 227. 
123
  For discussion and further cases, see MacQueen & Thomson Contract Law in Scotland 
233-237; H L MacQueen & L J Macgregor “Specific implement, interdict and contractual 
performance” 1999 Edin LR 239. See in particular Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v 
Halfords Ltd 1998 SC 212, where specific performance of a continuous trading obligation 
was not granted because the terms of the lease were insufficiently clear to form the basis 
of such an order. The court also held that Lord Hoffmann’s decision in Argyll Stores was 
not binding but open to “respectful” consideration in Scotland (229). The court did not 
agree with Lord Hoffmann’s finding that the matters which courts may take into account in 
the exercise of their discretion in England and Scotland are the same, because “it does 
not appear to be consistent with logical analysis to … postulate a similarity in effect where 
the rules, the major premise in any syllogistic analysis, differ” (229). See also Edrei 
Investments 9 Ltd (In Liquidation) v Dis-Chem Pharmacies (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 553 
(ECP) (discussed fully in para 6 1 2 below), in which a South African court obliged an 
anchor shop to continue trading despite causing it to trade at a loss, since this fact did not 
deprive the lessor of its right to elect to hold the lessee to its obligations. 
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A study of subsequent academic literature clearly indicates that the difficulty of 
supervision, as a sole ground for refusing specific performance, has been discredited.124 
The supervision objection alone is not enough to justify a refusal of specific 
performance anymore. It cannot be said that as soon as any element of continuous 
services can be discerned in a contract the court will, without more, refuse specific 
performance. As we have seen earlier, Treitel, for example, asserts that “difficulty of 
supervision should not be exaggerated”, because ultimately the decision to grant or 
refuse the remedy depends on a balancing of all the relevant factors for and against 
ordering specific performance.125 This is also well-illustrated by the Argyll decision, 
where Lord Hoffmann specifically considered other factors which weighed against an 
order for specific performance, together with the supervision objection. Treitel observes 
that the reliance by Lord Hoffmann on these other factors, suggests that a court “will not 
be deterred from granting such relief merely on the ground that it will require constant 
supervision. The outcome of each case will depend on the ‘cumulative effect’ of this 
factor together with any others which favour (or as in the Co-operative Insurance case) 
militate against specific relief”.126 Clearly the variety of interests at stake precludes a 
strict rule that specific performance should never be available of contracts to be 
performed over time and hence requires supervision.  
Burrows is particularly persuasive in advocating the total removal of the supervision bar:  
                                                 
124
  See eg Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 579: “At one time it was said that an order 
for specific performance would not be granted if the Court would be required constantly to 
supervise the execution of the contract.” The author cites Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding 
[1973] AC 691 724 (see text to n 75 para 5 2 (i) above) and Posner v Scott-Lewis [1987] 
Ch 25, where an undertaking to employ a resident porter was specifically enforced, in 
contrast to Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893] 1 Ch 116 
(CA) (see text to n 38 para 5 2 above). See also G McMeel “Anchors away” 1998 LQR 43; 
Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1924. 
125
  Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 1113.  
126
  1114-115. See also Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 1925. 
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“Certainly it is unsatisfactory to deny justice on an unsubstantiated hunch about the costs of 
specific performance, and in any event, it has to be explained why this area should not be 
treated differently from, for example, family law, where the cost of continuing judicial 
involvement in supervising maintenance, access and custody orders is considered 
acceptable. In short, the policy justifications for the constant supervision objection to specific 
performance seem particularly weak and the attempts by some judges, but, alas, not the 
House of Lords, to remove this bar should therefore be supported.”127 
Jones128 in a case note published after Argyll,129 notes that English courts have been 
more willing to grant specific performance and have not simply followed precedent 
which restricts their discretion to do so.130 He refers to the development illustrated in 
case law whereby English courts have been considering the appropriateness of the 
remedy in the circumstances, rather than focusing on the adequacy of the remedy 
available in law.131 However, he expresses doubt as to the appropriateness of the 
remedy in the Argyll case, since it is doubtful whether Co-operative Insurance Society 
would have ever been able to prove what loss it suffered as a result of Argyll’s breach.  
However, in the light of the many factors militating against specific performance 
considered by Lord Hoffmann, the defendant’s interests undoubtedly outweighed the 
aggrieved party’s interest in specific performance. The largest part of the judgment 
indicated why specific performance was inappropriate (and damages appropriate) in the 
circumstances, because an award of damages “brings the litigation to an end. The 
defendant pays damages, the forensic link between them is severed, they go their 
separate ways and the wounds of conflict heal” whereas an order for specific 
                                                 
127
  Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 481. 
128
  Co-author of Jones and Goodhart’s Specific Performance 2 ed (1996), first published in 
1986. 
129
  G Jones “Specific performance: a lessee’s covenant to keep open a retail store” (1997) 56 
CLJ 488. 
130
  Jones cites Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Egerton [1983] 1 AC 444 478 per Lord Diplock. 
131
  See ch 3 for a detailed discussion of the adequacy of damages rule (esp paras 3 2 &        
3 4 1 above). 
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performance “prolongs the battle. If the defendant is ordered to run a business, its 
conduct becomes the subject of a flow of complaints, solicitors’ letters and affidavits”.132  
Therefore, according to Andrews, “[t]he last word on the proper scope of specific 
performance should go to Lord Hoffmann”.133 Furthermore, Maddocks J (with whom 
Lord Hoffmann agreed) even conceded this point – he acknowledged that, while the 
assessment of damages might be difficult, it was the kind of exercise which the courts 
had done in the past and were prepared to undertake again.134  
Jones ultimately concludes that the House of Lords’ decision should be welcomed 
instead of being deplored, because there is much to be said for the cogent arguments 
made by Lord Hoffmann. He agrees that the difficulties of supervision, which include the 
prospect of further litigation and the “draconian” sanction of contempt, cannot be 
ignored. And that these, in conjunction with economic arguments (concerning the 
burdensome consequences of ordering Argyll to resume its business) clearly militate 
against ordering specific performance.135 McMeel similarly commends Lord Hoffmann 
for elucidating the true basis of the constant supervision bar, which according to him 
“had received a rather overliteral interpretation in earlier cases”.136 Undoubtedly, Jones, 
McMeel and Andrews are in the minority in providing support for Lord Hoffmann’s 
arguments. Despite the magnitude of valid criticism raised against Lord Hoffmann’s 
reasoning, especially by Burrows, it is suggested that it nevertheless provides valuable 
instruction for the development of our law towards a concretisation of the relevant 
factors that could guide our courts in exercising their discretion to refuse to order 
specific performance. 
 
                                                 
132
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 906-907.  
133
  Andrews Contract Law 537. 
134
  [1997] 2 WLR 898 902. Cf text to n 53 para 5 2 above. 
135
  Jones 1997 CLJ 490-491. 
136
  McMeel 1998 LQR 45. 
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5 3  American law 
American courts have also considered the practical difficulty of supervision in deciding 
whether to exercise their discretion to grant specific performance. They generally do not 
grant specific performance if they will be unable to enforce their order effectively.137 
Therefore the traditional rule was that court will refuse to grant an order for the specific 
performance of continuous acts.138 However, in modern practice the prospect of 
extensive supervision will not necessarily influence a court to refuse specific 
performance in all cases.139 This is apparent from § 366 of the American Law Institute’s 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, comment a: 
“Granting specific performance may impose on the court heavy burdens of enforcement or 
supervision. Difficult questions may be raised as to the quality of the performance rendered 
under the decree. Supervision may be required for an extended period of time. Specific relief 
will not be granted if these burdens are disproportionate to the advantages to be gained from 
enforcement and the harm to be suffered from its denial. A court will not, however, shrink 
from assuming these burdens if the claimant’s need is great or if a substantial public interest 
is involved. In such cases, for example, structures may be ordered to be built and facilities 
may be required to be maintained. Experience has shown that potential difficulties in 
enforcement or supervision are not always realized and the significance of this factor is 
peculiarly one for judicial discretion…” 
As in English law, the principle is therefore flexible. A case can still be made for specific 
performance of a contract where the question of difficulty of supervision arises, if the 
                                                 
137
  This has long been maintained – see eg Fleischer v James Drug Stores, 62 A.2d 383 
(1948); Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1171. 
138
  See Beck v Allison (1874) 56 N.Y. 366, 370 per Grover J: “It is obvious that the execution 
of contracts of this description, under the supervision and control of the court, would be 
found very difficult if not impracticable, while the remedy at law would, in nearly, if not all 
cases, afford full redress for the injury. It is for these reasons that such powers have never 
been exercised in this country.” See also note published in 1925 Colum LR 348-353. 
139
  E A Farnsworth Contracts 3 ed (1999) 781. 
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plaintiff proves that the harm to be suffered from refusing the remedy outweighs the 
advantages of doing so. Arguments in favour of specific performance will still be 
considered and may be upheld by the courts,140 and a problem with supervision per se 
is not a conclusive argument against an order of specific performance. 
Nevertheless, numerous cases exist where courts have refused specific performance 
on the ground that the performance required is of a continuous nature and its 
enforcement would require continued supervision by the court.141 For example, courts 
have refused specific performance of contracts to operate a mine over a long period,142 
to cut timber and saw it into lumber,143 and to provide a long term elevator service.144 
However, experience has shown that potential difficulties in enforcement or supervision 
are not always realized; courts are able to formulate their orders so as to put effective 
pressure on the defendant, for example, by requiring periodical reports relating to the 
standard of the performance rendered.145 The New York Court of Appeals has even 
stated that “[m]odern writers think that the ‘difficulty of enforcement’ idea is exaggerated 
and that the trend is toward specific performance …”146  
The decision in Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission v Minnesota Twins 
Partnership147 illustrates this trend toward greater flexibility in awarding specific 
                                                 
140
  See eg Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission v Minnesota Twins Partnership 638 
N.W. 2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) discussed below. 
141
  See eg Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1171 n 76. 
142
  Stanton v Singleton 59 P. 146 (1899). 
143
  Bomer v Canady 30 So. 638 (1901). 
144
  Nakdimen v Atkinson Improvement Co 233 S.W. 694 (1921).  
145
  See eg Dells Paper & Pulp Co v Willow River Lumber Co 173 N.W. 317 (1919); Kahn v 
Wausau Abrasives Co 129 A. 374 (1925). 
146
  Grayson-Robinson Stores v Iris Construction Corporation 168 N.E.2d 377, 379 (N.Y. 
1960), confirming an order directing specific performance of a construction contract. See 
also J M Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 6 ed (2009) § 16.10. 
147
  638 N.W. 2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
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performance of contracts that potentially involve difficulties of supervision. Here the 
Minnesota Court of Appeal confirmed the trial court’s decision to award a temporary 
injunction requiring the Minnesota Twins baseball team to continue playing its home 
games in the city-owned public stadium, thereby compelling them to honour the terms of 
their lease agreement with the sports facilities commission. The stadium lease was not 
a typical commercial lease, as the commission did not receive rent from the team, but 
rather benefited by the team’s promise to play games in the stadium. Furthermore, the 
lease actually identified specific performance as a potential remedy for a breach of 
contract.148  
The court first pointed out that, in a specific performance suit it was required to balance 
the equities of the case in determining whether the equitable remedy is appropriate. It 
found that specific performance was the most appropriate remedy on the facts due to 
the lack of evidence provided by the Twins team indicating significant burdens that 
would be imposed by granting a temporary injunction forcing the team to play its games 
in the stadium, as opposed to the adverse effect that withdrawal from the stadium would 
have on the community and associated commercial activities. The court took judicial 
notice of the importance of professional sports in citizens’ social lives, the entertainment 
and recreational purposes the stadium would serve, the jobs the stadium would provide 
and the anticipated benefits to nearby businesses.149 Damages was also found to be 
insufficient to compensate for the harm suffered by the community for the loss of a 
professional sports team, because money could not compensate the people for 
immeasurable, indirect and intangible losses.150 According to Toussaint CJ “the 
possibility of irreparable harm to the commission and the public outweighed the 
potential harm shown by the Twins and Major League Baseball”.151  
                                                 
148
  It authorised any remedy allowed by law or equity, including but not limited to injunctive 
relief and specific performance in the event of breach. 
149
  638 N.W. 2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) para [16]. 
150
  Para [16]. 
151
  Para [17]. 
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In discussing the administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision and 
enforcement of the injunction (as brought up by the Twins team), the court confirmed 
the trial court’s determination that granting the relief would not impose significant 
administrative burdens. A significant burden would ensue if the franchise had already 
left town. The order would then require a massive restructuring of the status quo that 
could entail administrative and supervisory costs significant enough to dissuade a court 
from issuing an injunction. But here, the status quo is merely preserved by the 
injunction.  From a comparative standpoint, this opinion provides support for the finding 
in Argyll Stores, where the equipment and fittings were already removed from the store. 
An award of specific performance would have required a massive restructuring of the 
status quo, a point specifically underlined by Lord Hoffmann.152 
The court also rejected the Twins’ reliance on case law; specifically Hamilton West 
Development Ltd v Hills Stores Company153 as authority to substantiate their argument 
that there was a hard and fast rule that specific performance was not available to 
enforce continuous obligations in commercial leases.154 However, Hamilton does not 
support the proposition that equitable remedies are always prohibited in commercial-
lease disputes; on the contrary the court found that in Hamilton, where the issue was 
whether a shopping-center developer could obtain a permanent injunction to prevent a 
store from ceasing operations in breach of the continuous operation obligations 
imposed by the lease, the federal court actually expressed the view that Ohio state 
courts would reject an inflexible rule against specific performance in all cases, but would 
narrowly interpret such clauses.155 It follows that there is no general rule against specific 
performance of agreements to be performed over time and hence requiring supervision, 
as it was once thought. The courts merely look with disfavour on specific performance 
of these agreements and exercise great caution in enforcing these agreements due to 
                                                 
152
  See para 5 2 above. 
153
  959 F.Supp. 434 (N.D.Ohio 1997). 
154
  638 N.W. 2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) para [13]. 
155
  959 F.Supp. 434, 439-440 (N.D.Ohio 1997).  
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the danger of constant disputes and the possible burden of continued supervision. But it 
cannot be assumed that if an element of continuous services can be discerned in a 
contract that would therefore require supervision, the court will, without more, refuse 
specific performance. 
Even though experience has indicated that this factor is not as relevant as it once was 
and there is no strict rule against specific performance of continuous obligations that 
require constant supervision, it is still maintained that constant and continued 
supervision may justify the refusal of the remedy under American law. However, US 
courts often (like their English counterparts)156 advance difficulty of supervision as a 
reason for refusing specific performance when the difficulty arises from the vagueness 
or uncertainty of the terms of the contract,157 instead of referring to their inability actually 
to supervise the enforcement of the contract.158  
                                                 
156
  Apart from Argyll Stores where Lord Hoffmann regarded an obligation to “run a 
supermarket” as too uncertain to enforce, see Mosely v Virgin 30 ER 959 (1796) 
(obligation to “lay out £1000 in building”); Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction 
Railway Co (1874) 9 Ch App 279 (obligation to “erect a station”); Joseph v National 
Magazine Co Ltd [1959] Ch 14 (obligation to publish an “article on jade”). See also n 84 
para 5 2 (i) above; Pound 1920 Harv LR 433-434; Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts 
1925, 1933; Chen-Wishart Contract Law 547; M P Furmston Cheshire, Fifoot and 
Furmston’s Law of Contract 16 ed (2012) 802-803. 
157
  See Farnsworth Contracts 778-779; R A Lord Williston on Contracts 4 ed (2004) vol 25 § 
67:97; Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts § 16.8. According to § 362 of the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts: “Specific performance or an 
injunction will not be granted unless the terms of the contract are sufficiently certain to 
provide a basis for an appropriate order.” 
158
  See eg Bomer v Canady 30 So. 638 (1901); Park v Minneapolis Railway Co 189 N.W. 532 
(1902); Plantation Land Co v Bradshaw 207 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1974); Bethlehem 
Engineering Export Co v Christie 105 F.2d 933, 934 (2d Cir. 1939) per Hand J: “This 
contract is so obscure, and, strictly taken, so incoherent, that nobody can be sure of its 
meaning … Arguendo, we shall assume that these promises created a valid contract 
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At present, American courts are willing to grant specific performance if the plaintiff’s 
need is great or if a substantial public interest is involved. In such cases, for example, 
structures may be ordered to be built and facilities may be required to be maintained.159 
According to Corbin160 “[t]he greater the hardship of the plaintiff’s case, the clearer the 
inadequacy of damages as a remedy, and the greater the extent of the public interest, 
the more likely it is that specific performance will be decreed”.161 
It may be concluded then that neither English nor American courts will necessarily 
refuse specific performance when the question of difficulty of supervision arises. Sharpe 
even maintains that “there has never been an absolute refusal to award the remedy in 
cases which might require supervision where the plaintiff is able to demonstrate 
sufficient need for it. In fact, the principle is a flexible one”.162 According to Megarry J 
“the matter is one of the balance of advantage and disadvantage in relation to the 
particular obligations in question; and the fact that the balance will usually lie on one 
                                                                                                                                                             
which could be enforced at law like any other, but it does not follow that equitable 
remedies would also be available.”  
159
  Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1172. 
160
  § 1172. 
161
  See also the authoritative extract from Standard Fashion Co v Siegel-Cooper Co 157 N.Y. 
60 (1898), cited by Corbin § 1172 n 88: “Contracts which require the performance of 
varied and continuous acts, of the exercise of special skill, taste and judgment, will not, as 
a general rule, be enforced by courts of equity, because the execution of the decree would 
require such constant superintendence as to make judicial control a matter of extreme 
difficulty. An exception to this rule, founded upon the rights of the public rather than those 
of the plaintiff, obtains with reference to contracts relating to the management and control 
of railroads and other agencies of transportation which enjoy special privileges conferred 
by statute, and promote the general welfare. When the inconvenience of the courts in 
acting is more than counterbalanced by the inconvenience of the public if they do not act, 
the interest of the public will prevail.” 
162
  R J Sharpe Injunctions and Specific Performance (1983) 286. 
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side does not turn this probability into a rule”.163 The advantages of refusing specific 
performance will always be weighed against the harm to be suffered (by both the 
plaintiff and the wider public) from its refusal (i.e. their interest in performance). And the 
courts will most likely order specific performance of a continuous obligation, if the harm 
to be suffered from refusing the remedy outweighs the advantages of doing so.164  
As we have seen in both English and American law, the inability of the courts actually to 
supervise performance in accordance with its order/the contract is not the real issue. 
The problem is the lack of certainty of performance and the possible burden or hardship 
(that may be assumed by the defendant or the court) inherent in the enforcement of 
such performance. Again, to quote Megarry VC, in another case: “[while] it was at one 
time said that an order for specific performance of the contract would not be made if 
there would be difficulty in the courts supervising its execution … The real question is 
whether there is a sufficient definition of what has to be done in order to comply with the 
order of the court”.165 Sharpe similarly maintains that the appropriate concern of courts 
in modern times is not so much for difficulties in ensuring compliance with specific 
performance orders “but rather a desire for finality to litigation and conservation of 
judicial resources”166  because “20th century regulatory experience indicates that so long 
as there is sufficient definition of the obligation, enforcement machinery is available to 
ensure compliance”.167   
                                                 
163
  CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307 318, quoted with approval in Price v 
Strange [1978] Ch 337 359-360. 
164
  Notably, Lord Hoffmann, in deciding whether or not specific performance should be 
granted, was also concerned with the interest of the public, which according to him, would 
not be served by wasting resources and maintaining an already hostile relationship 
([1997] 2 WLR 898 906). For comment on this view, see Phang 1998 Modern Law Review 
430-432. 
165
  Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106 321-322. 
166
  “Specific relief for contract breach” in Reiter & Swan (eds) Studies in Contract Law 145. 
167
  144. 
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The argument here is therefore essentially that if a court specifically enforces 
imprecisely-defined obligations, it could operate harshly on the defendant since he 
would not know what is expected of him and face being held in contempt. Furthermore, 
courts will be overwhelmed by numerous applications to determine the adequacy of the 
defendant’s compliance. It may also be difficult to assess the adequacy of the 
defendant’s performance if the nature of the required performance was not properly 
defined in the first place. Such subsequent litigation would lead to a waste of judicial 
time and resources. Thus, the difficulties with a contract to be performed over time are 
essentially the possible cost of increased judicial effort and the possible harm to the 
defendant (if the obligation is not sufficiently defined which is often the case with 
continuous obligations), and not literal supervision by the courts.168 
5 4  German law, Dutch law and the international instruments 
Problems with supervision are not discernable as impediments to a creditor’s right to 
specific performance in German law, Dutch law or the international instruments under 
review. Therefore, these systems and instruments will only be discussed to the extent 
that they address concerns related to the supervision objection, and more specifically 
the certainty and hardship issues. 
In German law a plaintiff’s right to specific performance is subject to some limitations. 
One situation where this right will be denied is where the requirement of certainty of 
performance is not met. So, a court will refuse enforcement if the creditor’s application 
under §§ 887, 888 or 890 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) is not 
sufficiently certain.169  
                                                 
168
  For this reason, Sharpe advises that in deciding whether or not to grant specific 
performance, courts have to examine “not only the nature of the obligation, but also the 
extent of its definition” (Injunctions and Specific Performance 295). 
169
 Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 881. 
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As indicated earlier, specific performance is a concept of substantive law.170 The 
practice of refusing specific performance in cases where the contractual obligations are 
uncertain can presumably be traced back to the idea that in German law the concept of 
specific performance is directly inferred from the principle of pacta sunt servanda. This 
means that the creditor’s claim for specific performance flows naturally from a valid 
contract and specific performance does not presuppose a breach of contract, but is the 
consequence of the contract’s existence: the parties are under an obligation to fulfil their 
contractual promises.171 Thus, where the obligations in the contract itself are not 
sufficiently certain and defined, so that they would be capable of being specifically 
enforced, it is understandable that the creditor’s claim (flowing from the contract itself) 
cannot be maintained. Problems with supervision are not discernable as a defined 
exception to the right to specific performance in German law. However, as indicated 
above, English and American courts often advance difficulty of supervision as a reason 
for refusing specific performance when the difficulty arises from the vagueness or 
uncertainty of the terms of the contract (even though the vagueness or uncertainty is not 
so substantial that it results in voidness).172 Beale, in his comparative treatise, also 
discusses the German position by referring to certainty of performance under the 
heading of supervision.173 No express link is, however, detectable between the 
supervision issue and hardship in German law. 
A creditor’s right to specific performance under Dutch law is similarly not unrestricted.174 
Notwithstanding the primary position of specific performance in the Dutch legal system, 
Article 3:296(1) of the Dutch Civil Code or Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) makes it clear that 
specific performance cannot be claimed if the law, the nature of the obligation, or a 
                                                 
170
  See para 2 3 1 1 above; and see F Faust & V Wiese “Specific performance – a German 
perspective” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and 
Other Perspectives (2008) 47 49-50.  
171
  See para 2 3 1 1 above. 
172
  See text to n 85 para 5 2 (i) above. 
173
  Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 877, 881. 
174
  See para 2 3 1 2 above. 
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juridical act, determines otherwise. Apart from these limitations listed in the BW, the 
availability of specific performance has also been limited through developments in the 
case law. These developments include limitations on grounds of reasonableness and 
equity.175 The development of the concepts of reasonableness and equity, even though 
codified in Articles 6:2 and 6:248(2) BW,176 also depends on the courts, as these 
concepts encompass a rather wide range of possible limitations. The Hoge Raad has 
held that the parties in a legal relationship must act in accordance with the requirements 
of reasonableness and equity and, accordingly, have to act not only in their own 
interests, but also in the interests of the other party/parties involved.177 More recently, 
the Hoge Raad also reaffirmed and emphasised the need to balance the interests of the 
parties concerned.178 Accordingly, a court can refuse specific performance if the debtor 
has a substantial interest in such refusal.179 Furthermore, Article 3:13 BW prohibits the 
abuse of a right. The exercise of any right, including the right to specific performance 
afforded by Article 3:296, will be regarded as an abuse “when it is exercised with no 
other purpose than to damage another person or with another purpose than for which it 
is granted or when the use of it, given the disparity between the interests which are 
served by its effectuation and the interests which are damaged as a result thereof, in all 
reason has to be stopped or postponed” (Article 3:13(2)). Based on these provisions it 
has been argued that a creditor may not claim specific performance if it would 
                                                 
175
  D Haas & C Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in J Smits, D Haas & G Hesen 
(eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 11 
17. 
176
  See para 2 3 1 2 above & para 6 3 below. 
177
  See HR 15 November 1957, NJ 1958, 67 (Baris/Riezenkamp). See also D Busch et al 
(eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A Commentary (2002) 
355 (commentary by M B M Loos). 
178
  See HR 5 January 2001, NJ 2001, 79 (Multi Vastgoed/Nethou) discussed in para 6 3 
below. 
179
  Haas & Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 20, 26. 
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unreasonably burden the debtor.180 This may be the case if, for example, specific 
performance is sought in respect of imprecisely defined contractual obligations. 
However, problems with supervision and certainty of performance are not discernable 
as defined exceptions to a creditor’s right to specific performance in Dutch law.  
Difficulties of supervision and related problems of uncertainty are equally not recognised 
as defined exceptions to the right to specific performance in the international 
instruments under consideration. There are indications in these instruments that 
reasonableness will be considered in deciding whether to acknowledge the plaintiff’s 
right to specific performance,181 but none specifically deal with problems of supervision 
or the related certainty issue.182 Neither is listed under the defined limitations to the right 
to specific performance.183   
 
 
                                                 
180
  See Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A 
Commentary 355 (by Loos). 
181
  See generally Arts 46(3) CISG; 9:102(2)(b) PECL; 7.2.2(b) UNIDROIT PICC; 3:302(3)(b) 
DCFR; 110(3)(b) CESL. 
182
  Cf text to n 180 para 6 4 2 below. 
183
  However, the instruments all contain an overriding requirement of good faith and fair 
dealing (see para 6 4 2 below); it follows that a party “would not be entitled to exercise a 
remedy if doing so is of no benefit to him and his only purpose is to harm the other party” 
(O Lando & H Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law: Parts I and II (2000) 115). 
Moreover, as Clive and Hutchison maintain, in discussing the limitations under the PECL 
(“Breach of contract” in Zimmermann et al (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative 
Perspective 195), basic human rights are always in the background. Accordingly, it may 
be argued that no court, irrespective the jurisdiction, would grant an order for specific 
performance in such vague terms that the defendant could be arbitrarily imprisoned for 
contempt. And, the principle of good faith possibly leaves some scope for taking into 
account problems of supervision and related certainty issues. 
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5 5  Evaluative remarks and conclusions 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was shown that South African courts have 
traditionally expressed some support for refusing specific performance of certain 
obligations (especially obligationes faciendi) where it would be difficult to supervise the 
execution of such an order.184  
Unsurprisingly, this position attracted a great deal of criticism in our law. The primary 
(and by now familiar) basis of the criticism is that, in most cases, it is not necessary for 
the court itself to oversee the work and it is unlikely that problems will arise in the 
enforcement of the court’s order.185 The court is equipped to deal with a recalcitrant 
defendant.186 If, after being ordered to effect the necessary repairs, the lessor fails to do 
so, the lessee may once again approach the court for relief.187 Our courts have, in 
recent years, also criticised the previous position, and recognised that specific 
performance may be the only viable remedy to many lessees in South Africa.188  
Mpange v Sithole189 was the first reported decision in our law where a court was 
prepared to grant specific performance of a lessor’s obligation to maintain the leased 
                                                 
184
  See eg Barker v Beckett & Co Ltd 1911 TPD 151 164; Lucerne Asbestos Co Ltd v Becker 
1928 WLD 311 331; Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 238 242; Nisenbaum and Nisenbaum v 
Express Buildings (Pty) Ltd 1953 (1) SA 246 (W) 249; Lottering v Lombaard 
1971 (3) SA 270 (T) 272.  
185
  See De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 210-211; Cooper The South African Law of 
Landlord and Tenant 89. 
186
  See eg PL v YL 2013 (6) SA 28 (ECG) para [10]: the court “has the inherent power or 
authority to ensure compliance with its own orders”. 
187
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
137. 
188
  Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease 146. See also T Naudé 
“The law of lease” 2007 ASSAL 872-873. 
189
  2007 (6) SA 578 (W). The applicants were lessees of an inner city building which their 
lessor, the respondent, had failed to maintain in a safe and proper condition. They were 
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property.190 Here Satchwell J criticised the earlier reluctance of the courts to grant 
specific performance in these circumstances. She pointed out that the supervision 
objection had become untenable in view of subsequent decisions such as Benson v SA 
Mutual Life Assurance Society,191 and Isep Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd 
v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd.192 These decisions emphasised that a contracting 
party was in principle entitled to specific performance, and criticised earlier cases in 
which this right was limited. These limitations, which derived from English practice, 
included the limitation that specific performance would generally not be granted where it 
would be difficult for the court to enforce its order. Satchwell J took direct cognisance of 
English law and then correctly observed that this limitation had fallen out of favour even 
in England.193 She also agreed with academic writers194 who criticised the reluctance to 
refuse specific performance of the lessor’s obligation to maintain the leased premises195 
and confirmed the dictum in Nisenbaum and Nisenbaum v Express Buildings (Pty) 
Ltd,196 that there was no authority for casting the tendency not to order specific 
performance where it would be difficult for a court to enforce the order of specific 
performance as an absolute rule.197 Apart from being correct in her assessment of 
English law, Satchwell J also accurately described the current status of the supervision 
objection in our law.  
                                                                                                                                                             
living in “slum” conditions, which included lack of privacy, absence of sufficient lavatories, 
one water tap for some 500 occupants, and illegal and dangerous provision of electricity. 
190
  See Naudé 2007 ASSAL 872-874. 
191
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
192
  1981 (4) SA 1 (A). 
193
  Mpange v Sithole 2007 (6) SA 578 (W) para [42], quoting Jansen JA in Isep Structural 
Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd 1981 (4) SA 1 (A) 5C. 
194
  Also referring to Cooper The South African Law of Landlord and Tenant 89. 
195
  Mpange v Sithole 2007 (6) SA 578 (W) paras [43]-[44]. 
196
  1953 (1) SA 246 (W) 249B-250A.  
197
  Mpange v Sithole 2007 (6) SA 578 (W) para [40]. Cf para 5 1 n 19 above. 
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Ultimately, the court did not order specific performance as the lessor was not the owner 
of the building and the registered owner had not been joined as a party to the case, 
whilst such an order would inevitably affect his interests.198 The court concluded that it 
would have required more “details as to the priorities for renovation and repair, 
expertise with regard to such endeavours, the costs thereof, the time periods involved, 
the disruption to current inhabitants in their occupation whilst such renovations endure 
[and] possible alternative accommodation for the duration of such renovation”.199 
Therefore, the court ordered a reduction in rental.200 
The difficulty of supervision is also advanced in support of a refusal to enforce building 
contracts in our law.201 However, this reasoning was challenged by Coetzee J in Ranch 
International Pipelines (Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v LMG Construction (City) (Pty) Ltd.202 The 
court rejected the rule which stated that courts would not award specific performance of 
building contracts. It found that the underlying justification for refusing specific 
performance of such contracts, i.e. the difficulty of supervision of its order, is “over-
emphasised” in our law since courts never really supervise fulfilment of their orders in 
practice.203 The court, in support of this view, pointed out that the order which it granted 
did not replace the contract and therefore did not introduce any new difficulties in 
deciding whether the work had been performed properly. According to Coetzee J, 
difficulty of supervision does not provide a valid justification for refusing an order. The 
judge provides us with valuable and convincing practical considerations which can be 
                                                 
198
  Paras [60]-[63], [82]. See also Naudé 2007 ASSAL 873. 
199
  Para [77]. 
200
  Para [87]. See further Naudé 2007 ASSAL 873-874. 
201
  See text to n 22 para 5 1 above. 
202
  1984 (3) SA 861 (W) 880-881. 
203
  880H. In this regard, Coetzee J’s view resembles Treitel’s view on the objection in English 
law (see para 5 2 above). 
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said to discredit the supervision argument (see Coetzee J’s dictum quoted in chapter 
4).204 
According to Jansen JA in ISEP Structural Engineering & Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland 
Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd,205 the reluctance of the courts to order specific performance 
“where it would be difficult for the Court to enforce its decree” is “a limitation derived 
from the English practice, and not consonant with our law”.206 
It is clear that this limitation (“derived from English practice”) is no longer applicable in 
South African law. As in English law, the supervision problem is over-emphasised and 
there are many examples in the case law where the courts specifically enforce contracts 
to build or repair,207 as well as contracts to perform a specific task.208 And it is almost 
certain that the difficulty of supervision will not be regarded as a sufficient ground for 
refusing this remedy in the future. Therefore, it should not be assumed that courts will, 
                                                 
204
  See text to n 175 para 4 2 2 above. This dictum was followed in Raik v Raik 1993 (2) SA 
617 (W) 626, where the court held an embittered recalcitrant husband to an agreement to 
grant his wife a “get” or Jewish Ecclesiastical bill of divorce in order to dissolve their 
Jewish marriage. 
205
  1981 (4) SA 1 (A) 5. 
206
  As confirmed in National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 
151 (T) 158; Ranch International Pipelines (Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v LMG Construction (City) 
(Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 861 (W) 880-881; Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v 
Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 85. See also D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 323. 
207
  See eg Mink v Vryheid Coal & Iron Co (1912) 33 NPD 182 (contract to build a house); 
Industrial & Mercantile Corporation v Anastassiou Brothers 1973 (2) SA 601 (W) (contract 
to install refrigeration equipment); Sandton Town Council v Original Homes (Pty) Ltd 1975 
(4) SA 150 (W) (contract to “form grade and maintain” certain roads). 
208
  See eg Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Northern Transvaal (Messina) Copper 
Exploration Co 1945 AD 529 (restoration of a company’s shares to the official list of 
shares quoted on the stock exchange); Maw v Grant 1966 (4) SA 83 (C) (inscription of an 
architect’s name on a board at a building site). 
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without more, refuse specific performance where there is the prospect of constant 
supervision. 
The Civil Codes of both Germany and the Netherlands, though providing a more 
streamlined regime as far as exclusion of specific performance is concerned, do not 
recognise problems with supervision as a possible ground for such exclusion. It is also 
evident that this regime is broadly consistent with the approaches adopted in the 
international instruments discussed above. As indicated above, the right to specific 
performance is recognised, but restricted by principles of reasonableness. However, 
none of the instruments under review explicitly refer to administrative burdens involved 
in judicial supervision as a possible indication of such unreasonableness.  
English and American law, on the other hand, provide us with more instructive insights. 
The English and American courts have traditionally not ordered specific performance 
where such an order would require constant supervision. However, as we have seen, 
more recently this objection has been rejected by English and American courts; they will 
not be deterred from granting specific performance merely because it will require 
constant supervision. Instead, as Lord Hoffmann has indicated, their decision will 
depend on the “cumulative effect” of this factor together with any other relevant factors 
which favour or militate against specific performance. The courts currently focus on the 
true merits and the equities of the case at hand and not on established principles or pre-
conceived preferences. Although English and American law have rejected the difficulty 
of the courts to supervise the performance of a continuous obligation as a reason for 
refusing specific performance, they will still avoid giving specific performance orders if 
the obligation sought to be enforced is not sufficiently defined to allow a clear order to 
be made.  
Evidently the relevant issue in our law is also not whether the court will be able to 
supervise or enforce its order. It clearly is not a court’s function to supervise the 
execution of the orders it makes. The more relevant objection is the impreciseness of 
these obligations. As in other jurisdictions, our courts will similarly not specifically 
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enforce vague and uncertain terms even if they are not void for vagueness.209 This has 
long been maintained.210 According to Christie, for example, “it is on the ground of 
imprecision that orders of specific performance of contracts to form syndicates or 
companies and contracts to repair or insure buildings have been refused”.211 So in 
Barker v Beckett & Co Ltd212 the court refused to order specific performance of a 
stipulation to insure because it was too indefinite; the amount for which the buildings 
should be insured was not stated in the contract, and hence, if the court ordered the 
defendant to “insure the buildings”, there would be no contempt of court if they were 
insured for a “wholly inadequate amount”.213   
The difficulty with the enforcement of these obligations is that it may lead to further 
disputes to test the defendant’s compliance, which would lead to a waste of judicial time 
and resources.214 Moreover, it is not fair to the defendant that he does not know 
precisely what he has to do to comply with the order to avoid being held in contempt.215 
                                                 
209
  Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 552. 
210
  See eg Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa §§ 3117-3118, and the authority 
cited there. See also n 213 below. 
211
  Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 552. See also Wessels The Law of Contract 
in South Africa §§ 3117 ff. 
212
  1911 TPD 151. 
213
  165 per De Villiers JP (Smith J concurring). Specific performance was also refused on the 
ground of imprecision in Douglas v Baynes 1908 TS 1207 (PC); Ingle Colonial Broom Co 
Ltd v Hocking 1914 CPD 495; Lucerne Asbestos Co Ltd v Becker 1928 WLD 311, and 
Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 238. 
214
  In Christie’s words: “Without necessarily being void for vagueness a contractual obligation 
may be of such a nature that a defendant who has been ordered specifically to perform it 
might genuinely claim to have done so but the plaintiff might equally genuinely claim that 
he has not. The fact that such a dispute could be decided by the court after hearing 
evidence does not necessarily mean that specific performance should be granted, as it is 
obviously undesirable that the court should issue an order the likely result of which will be 
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It is therefore suggested that even though the continuous nature of the obligation and 
the fact that it would require constant judicial supervision is not a bar to specific 
performance in our law, the extent of its definition or rather the lack thereof should 
dissuade our courts to enforce such obligations in specie. In discussing Christie’s 
observation, Lubbe & Murray conclude that 
“Here it is not the question of the ability of the court to supervise work that is important but 
(and this is in essence the same issue approached from a different angle) the question 
whether fair evaluation of the work and, consequently satisfactory fulfilment of the contract, is 
possible. This suggests that if a contract provides for evaluation by an independent party, an 
engineer or architect for example, the problem falls away …”216 
It is submitted that this approach is correct. In the past unduly restrictive statements 
were occasionally made that our courts will not enforce contracts the execution of which 
would require continued supervision by the courts. Accordingly, it was often held that 
the courts will not enforce specific performance of continuous obligations. However, the 
courts have moved away from this unduly inflexible approach and have ordered specific 
performance of such obligations. The issue remaining in our law is whether, taking into 
account the uncertain definition of an obligation, enforcement of the contract is likely to 
place an unreasonable burden on the defendant or the court’s time and resources (as 
some Common and German lawyers have recognised).  
                                                                                                                                                             
to precipitate a lengthy dispute over whether it has been obeyed.” – Christie’s The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 552. 
215
  Again, to quote Christie 547: “The courts in their discretion will naturally not subject a 
defendant to the danger of contempt of court in cases where compliance with the order 
would be impossible, unduly onerous, difficult to enforce or insufficiently clear-cut, so that 
opinions might legitimately differ on whether there had been performance.” This statement 
was quoted with approval by Van Zyl J in Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Bpk v Mapoe 
unreported judgment with case no 4587/2010 delivered on 29 Sep 2010 by the Free State 
Provincial Division of the High Court (see paras [113]-[114]).  
216
  Cf para 4 2 2 n 172 above. 
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The harm the defendant or the court might suffer as a result of enforcing an 
insufficiently defined obligation, and the extent to which this should dissuade a court 
from ordering specific performance, will be discussed in the following chapter, as this is 
rather an issue which merits further investigation under the theme of hardship.217 The 
following chapter and the concluding chapter will explore the most appropriate route for 
South African law to follow in order to address these and related concerns. 
                                                 
217
  See para 6 5 3 (esp n 217) below. 
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CHAPTER 6: UNDUE HARDSHIP 
6 1 Introduction 
Having dealt with the relevance of supervision of performance in awarding specific 
performance in the preceding chapter, we now turn to hardship, which also 
encompasses difficulties with enforcement and supervision, but has a wider application. 
According to the majority of commentators, it is settled law that South African courts will, 
in the exercise of their discretion, refuse to order specific performance if it would cause 
undue hardship to the defaulting party or to third parties.1 According to De Wet, for 
example, 
“[spreek dit] egter vanself dat ‘n onbeperkte aanspraak op reële eksekusie in geen regstelsel 
geduld kan word nie, want gevalle kan voorkom waar die nadele verbonde aan reële 
eksekusie dermate buite verhouding staan met die nadeel wat die skuldeiser gaan ly by 
weiering daarvan, dat dit strydig sou wees met gesonde beleid om die skuldeiser sy sin te 
gee”.2 
                                                 
1
  See J W Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (1951) vol 2 § 3119; D J 
Joubert General Principles of The Law of Contract (1987) 225; A J Kerr The Principles of 
The Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 680; T Naudé “Specific performance against an 
employee: Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund” 2003 SALJ 269 279; S 
Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in H L MacQueen & R Zimmermann 
European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives (2006) 249 257; F du Bois 
(ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 873; R H Christie & G B Bradfield 
Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 547-548; D Hutchison & C 
Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 323; S van der Merwe et 
al Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 330; A D J van Rensburg, J G Lotz & T van 
Rijn (R D Sharrock) “Contract” in W A Joubert & J A Faris (eds) LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed (2010) 
paras 495-496. 
2
  J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 
210 translated: “However, it is obvious that an unlimited claim to specific enforcement 
cannot be tolerated in any legal system, because situations could arise where the 
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The discussion will commence with an introductory overview of South African law in 
order to determine how this position was established in our law and why commentators 
and courts alike in effect came to accept that in the case of undue hardship to the 
defendant or third parties, the the remedy should be denied as a general rule, as 
opposed to merely regarding the existence of hardship as a guiding principle in the 
exercise of the courts’ discretion to refuse specific performance.  
The rest of the chapter deals with the treatment of the hardship issue by different legal 
systems and international instruments with the aim of determining what principles they 
have adopted to address the enforcement of contracts that have become excessively 
burdensome (but not impossible) for the defendant to perform, and what considerations 
underlie these principles. The chapter concludes with an evaluative discussion, which 
takes into account the different approaches revealed by the comparative analysis. 
Finally, some suggestions will be made for the future development of our law.  
6 1 1 The undue hardship principle in South African law: the locus classicus 
of Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 
The familiar case of Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality3 is generally cited as 
authority for the widely-held view that courts will, in the exercise of their discretion, 
refuse to order specific performance where it would cause undue hardship to the 
defaulting party or to third parties.4 This case involved a contract in terms of which the 
municipality agreed to provide 250 000 gallons (almost a million litres) of water per day 
                                                                                                                                                             
disadvantages of specific enforcement are so disproportionate to the disadvantage that 
the creditor will suffer from refusing it, that it would be inconsistent with sound policy to let 
the creditor have his way.” 
3
   1951 (2) SA 371 (A). See also Manasewitz v Oosthuizen 1914 CPD 328; Rex v Milne and 
Erleigh (7) 1951 (1) SA 791 (A) 873-874, and Barclays National Bank Ltd v Natal Fire 
Extinguishers Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 650 (D) 655. 
4
  See eg De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 210; Lubbe & Murray Contract 
542-543, and more recently A Cockrell “Breach of contract” in R Zimmermann & D Visser 
(eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 303 329. 
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to Haynes, who owned certain land situated on the Buffalo River upstream from 
Kingwilliamstown. In a time of severe drought, the defendant refused to comply with its 
obligation under the agreement, claiming that to do so would severely prejudice the 
residents of Kingwilliamstown. The plaintiff consequently sought an order for specific 
performance of the contract, which the court refused on the grounds that it “would have 
worked very great hardship not only to the respondent but to the citizens of 
Kingwilliamstown to whom the respondent owed a public duty to render an adequate 
supply of water”.5 Evidently, the court’s discretion to refuse the remedy in cases of 
hardship was derived from English Equity.6 It emphasised that the discretion afforded to 
our courts is based on equitable considerations.7  
Before we continue with whether an order for specific performance was an appropriate 
remedy based on the municipality’s breach, it is necessary to deal briefly with the 
question whether the municipality was in fact at all in breach. This concerns the 
application of two sets of principles, namely those relating to supervening impossibility 
of performance, and those relating to implied terms. 
According to some commentators, Haynes may actually have been a case of 
supervening impossibility, which extinguished or temporarily suspended this obligation 
because performance was legally impossible, since the interest which would have to be 
sacrificed to bring about performance by far outweighed the interest which the creditor 
had in receiving performance.8  
                                                 
5
   1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 381C. 
6
   See A Beck “The coming of age of specific performance” 1987 CILSA 190 197-198. See 
also G Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance in South African Law” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 99-101.  
7
  1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 377-379. See also Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract 
in South Africa 321. 
8
  See Sharrock “Contract” in Joubert & Faris LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed para 496 n 19. 
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This brings us to the South African law on supervening impossibility or cases in which 
performance has become impossible due to a change of circumstances, as opposed to 
cases in which performance has become excessively onerous due to a change of 
circumstances. Here, performance by the municipality became excessively burdensome 
and fell short of what traditionally is required for avoidance under the doctrine of 
supervening impossibility. It is important to stress at this juncture that supervening 
change of circumstances is a separate problem, which falls beyond the scope of this 
chapter. The present section will consequently only provide a brief outline of the 
applicable law.9  
Our legal system supports the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda;10 accordingly, the 
parties to the contract should honour its terms even if the circumstances that existed 
when they concluded the contract have changed. It is only if the change in 
circumstances amounts to supervening impossibility that parties would be released from 
contractual liability.11 If the circumstances have changed only to the extent that 
performance has become excessively burdensome, but not impossible, the contract is 
considered valid. This means that a party’s failure to perform could amount to breach of 
contract.12 However, the non-performing party could still defeat a claim for specific 
                                                 
9
  For a general comparative account of the effect of supervening events, see See K 
Zweigert & H Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law (tr T Weir) 3 ed (1998) 517-537, and 
H Unberath & E McKendrick “Supervening events” in G Dannemann & S Vogenauer (eds) 
The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English and German Law 
(2013) 562-580. 
10
  See eg Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) paras 
[36] ff. 
11
  See Peters Flamman & Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427. See also para 7 2 2 
below. 
12
  See Hersman v Shapiro & Co 1926 TPD 367. See too in this regard, De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 210 n 61: “Mens het hier natuurlik te doen met gevalle waar 
die skuldenaar in weerwil daarvan dat hy nie kan presteer nie, tog gebonde is. Waar hy 
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performance arising from breach if awarding such a claim would cause undue 
hardship.13 The other party would then have to resort to either cancellation or 
contractual damages or both.  
We can now return to Haynes. Van Rensburg et al have argued that it was perhaps not 
even necessary to resort to remedies for breach in this case, because non-performance 
could have been excused temporarily due to objective impossibility of performance. This 
argument is convincing if a more generous view is adopted of what amounts to 
supervening impossibility. This type of approach is, for example, supported by Van der 
Merwe et al:  
“While an absolute ‘physical’ impossibility will satisfy the test [for objective excusing 
impossibility], a performance that might conceivably be rendered will nevertheless be 
impossible if insistence on its performance would be unreasonable in the circumstances … 
[and while] it is usually said that mere difficulty in performing amounts at most to subjective 
impossibility and not to objective impossibility …, performance may be so difficult and lead to 
                                                                                                                                                             
deur onmoontlikwording van prestasie bevry is, is daar natuurlik glad nie meer ‘n 
verbintenis nie.” 
13
  See G Lubbe “Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: die implikasies van die 
uitoefening van die regterlike diskresie” in J Smits & G Lubbe (eds) Remedies in Zuid-
Afrika en Europa (2003) 52 78: “’n Beslissing soos in die Haynes-saak toon aan dat die 
engheid van die leerstuk ondervang word deur middel van die ontsegging van 
daadwerklike afdwinging van die ooreenkoms in gepaste omstandighede. Daadwerklike 
vervulling sal nie gelas word waar dit gaan om aanvanklike of later ingetrede 
omstandighede wat neerkom op subjektiewe onmoontlikheid van prestasie (difficultas 
praestandi of te wel ‘hardship’), of selfs bloot die verydeling van kontraksoogmerk inhou 
nie.” See also Van Rooyen v Baumer Investments (Pty) Ltd 1947 (1) SA 113 (W) 120-121, 
where Ettlinger AJ expressed the view that “where the ability of the debtor to perform is 
raised [by the debtor] and left in doubt”, specific performance should be refused. 
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such economic or other hardship that it will be regarded as objectively impossible in terms of 
the applicable standard.”14 
However, this approach was not adopted in Haynes. Neither was there support for a 
second potential ground for escaping the finding of breach, namely an implied term 
excusing the Municipality from temporarily not releasing the stipulated amount water, if 
there was not sufficient water in the dam to ensure an adequate supply for the residents 
of Kingwilliamstown.15 This argument was given short shrift by the trial court. It held that 
no term could be implied to the effect that the release of 250,000 gallons water a day 
was conditional on there being sufficient water in the dam for the needs of the residents 
of Kingwilliamstown.16 According to Gardner JP “the parties at the time of the making of 
the contract, never contemplated a shortage of water”.17 The Appellate Division, in 
confirming the trial court’s refusal to order specific performance, unfortunately also did 
                                                 
14
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 162 (see esp n 18: “Factors such as 
practical and economic expediency and fairness play a role. Thus, if an object which must 
be delivered by ship falls into the ocean, it will normally be regarded as objectively (ie for 
all practical and reasonable purposes) impossible of performance, even though it could be 
physically retrieved and delivered, but at unreasonably high cost compared to its 
commercial value.”). 
15
  See heads of argument by Back KC (1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 373-374, especially 373D-F: 
“The fact that the 250,000 gallons of water per diem was to come from a particular dam, 
shows that this supply could never have been contemplated by the parties if the dam was 
empty; cf. Wessels, supra sec. 2693. The agreement comes under the class of agreement 
to which the rule in Taylor v Caldwell, 8 L.T. 356, applies i.e. the law imports an implied 
condition in the agreement to the effect that its performance should be objectively 
possible, i.e. both parties contracted subject to the continued existence in the dam, of 
sufficient water to enable it lawfully to continue the supply of the 250,000 gallons daily; cf. 
Peters Flamman & Co v Kokstad Municipality, 1919 AD 427; Wessels, supra secs. 2712 - 
3. 2639 - 41, 2646, 2648, 2651 - 3, 2656, 2693; Mackeurtan The Law of Sale of Goods in 
South Africa (3rd ed., pp. 389 - 92) …”). 
16
  377F-G. 
17
  378A. 
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not shed light on the reasons for the trial court’s rejection of the respondent’s 
impossibility argument. De Villiers AJA simply concluded that 
“no ground has been shown to justify us in interfering with the discretion exercised by the 
Court a quo. This finding makes it unnecessary to consider whether the Court below was 
correct in rejecting the respondent’s contention that the undertaking to release 250,000 
gallons of water a day was subject to an implied term that there should be sufficient water in 
the dam to ensure an adequate supply for the inhabitants of Kingwilliamstown”.18 
Given that it was accepted that the Municipality was in breach, how then did the court 
deal with the question whether Haynes should be awarded specific performance? The 
Haynes case illustrates that our law had not decisively moved away from the familiar 
categories of English law, despite the Appellate Division’s efforts to remove them.19 De 
Villiers AJA initially pointed out in Haynes that 
“The discretion which a court enjoys although it must be exercised judicially is not confined to 
specific cases, nor is it circumscribed by rigid rules. Each case must be judged in the light of 
its own circumstances.”20  
However, De Villiers AJA then proceeded to list specific examples of grounds on which 
courts have in the past exercised their discretion to refuse specific performance. These 
grounds, which reflect a strong English influence, are: (1) where it would be difficult for 
the court to supervise the execution of its order, (2) where damages would adequately 
compensate the plaintiff, (3) where the performance could readily be obtained 
                                                 
18
  381E-G. 
19
  See eg Shill v Milner 1937 AD 101, which concerned a breach of a contractual obligation 
by the defendant, who purchased maize from the plaintiff, to transfer certain export quota 
certificates (certifying the due export on plaintiff’s behalf of a certain amount of maize) to 
the plaintiff, a maize trader. The AD confirmed the trial court’s decision to order specific 
performance of the obligation despite the defendant’s contention that the court should 
have refused the claim, because it was an obligation to deliver an unspecified and freely 
marketable commodity. 
20
  1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378G. 
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elsewhere, (4) where specific performance would entail rendering personal services, (5) 
where it would cause unreasonable hardship to the defendant, (6) where the agreement 
giving rise to the claim is unreasonable, or (7) where the order would produce injustice, 
or would be inequitable under all the circumstances.21  
De Villiers AJA did emphasise, though, that these were mere examples and not a 
closed list.22 Thus, he did not, as some commentators have suggested, contradict his 
statement that the court’s discretion is not confined to specific cases and each case 
must be decided on its own facts. He merely particularised it by giving some examples 
where courts have exercised, and therefore could exercise, their discretion to refuse the 
remedy.23  
Having said that, the court still clearly relied on English law to give content to its 
discretion, and under the influence of the English approach that an order for specific 
performance is an exceptional remedy, the court nonetheless exercised its discretion in 
such a way that it appeared as if an order for specific performance would always be 
                                                 
21
  1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378H-379A.  
22
   1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 379D-F. See also Barclays National Bank Ltd v Natal Fire 
Extinguishers Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 650 (D) 655B per Didcott J. 
23
  The decision was interpreted correctly by some authors – see eg Lubbe “Daadwerklike 
vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: die implikasies van die uitoefening van die regterlike 
diskresie” in Smits & Lubbe (eds) Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa 56: “In die uitspraak 
in die Haynes beslissing word inderdaad vyf omstandighede vermeld waaronder 
vervullingsbevel denkbaar geweier sou kon word” and shortly thereafter the author adds 
that “[d]ie sinspeling is dan dat die Appèlhof in Benson nie in beginsel gekant was teen die 
identifikasie van normatief relevante faktore nie, maar wou beklemtoon dat daar nie ‘n 
geslote lys van sodanige faktore is nie. Verder blyk dit dat die kardinale vraag juis was 
hoe hierdie en ander relevante oorwegings by die uitoefening van die diskresie gehanteer 
moet word. Hiermee kom die mees problematiese aspek van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
benadering na vore.” See also De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 210-211, 
cited by Foxcroft J in Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 
73 (C) 82F-G: “Some of the textbook writers did not slavishly follow this approach …” 
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refused if the above-listed circumstances were present.24 This had the unfortunate 
consequence that some textbook writers and courts commenting on this case 
suggested unfairly that the court’s treatment of these examples amounted to making 
them circumstances where specific performance should always be denied.25  
According to Van der Merwe et al, for example, “[t]his rigid approach to exercising the 
discretion of the courts tended to elevate the particular circumstances to general rules 
and obscured the fact that, according to South African law, an order for specific 
performance should be refused only in exceptional circumstances”.26 The concern was 
that the Roman-Dutch right to specific performance, affirmed as part of modern South 
African law, was contradicted by the courts’ endorsement of these crystallised 
circumstances in which specific performance should be denied.27  
However, the court in Haynes expressly stated that they are mere examples of grounds 
on which courts have exercised their discretion to refuse the remedy and not 
circumstances in which specific performance should always be denied. From the outset 
the court indicated that there are no “rigid rules” regulating the courts’ discretion to 
refuse specific performance apart from the fact that it must be exercised judicially.28 
                                                 
24
   See De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 210-211; Lubbe & Murray Contract 
542-543; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 330.  
25
  See eg Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 86B per 
Foxcroft J: “The authors [in Wille and Millin’s Mercantile Law of South Africa 18 ed (1984) 
119] state the same view that other textbook writers do, namely that the true position is 
that the Court has to exercise its discretion on the particular facts and will refuse to order 
specific performance in the circumstances set out in Haynes’s case.” See further M A 
Lambiris Orders of Specific performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
(1989) 127 ff. 
26
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 330.  
27
   Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 784C. 
28
  Lambiris (Orders of Specific performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
128) expresses similar views: “Taking advantage of the hindsight provided by Benson v 
SA Mutual Life Assurance Society one can question whether the Appellate Division in 
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There are only, as Christie also subsequently pointed out, certain “guiding principles” 
based on earlier decisions where specific performance is likely to be refused.29 The 
court’s referral in Haynes to examples of grounds on which the courts have exercised 
their discretion in refusing to order specific performance should not be taken to mean 
that they are circumstances where specific performance must be denied. It is submitted 
here that the court by no means attempted to establish a general rule that specific 
performance will be refused if undue hardship to the defendant or to third parties is 
proved. The examples should have been interpreted as practical considerations or 
guidelines for exercising the discretion, not as legal rules.  
Lubbe & Murray correctly point out that certain later cases, such as Isep and Benson 
indicate that the examples of grounds on which courts might refuse to order specific 
performance listed in Haynes were frequently and incorrectly treated as general rules 
on when the remedy should be denied.30 It is to the later case law that we now turn. 
6 1 2  Subsequent developments on the undue hardship principle in South 
African law 
The matter of the exercise of the discretion was only revisited by the Appellate Division 
30 years later in Isep Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration 
Co (Pty) Ltd.31 Here Jansen JA rejected the (supposedly) restrictive approach promoted 
in Haynes and reiterated that every plaintiff is entitled to specific performance subject 
                                                                                                                                                             
Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality ever really intended to lay down this sort of 
approach. The major point in Haynes’ case I suggest, was that the court’s discretion to 
refuse an order of specific performance must be free and unfettered and that each case 
should be judged individually in the light of its own circumstances.” 
29
  See Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 546. See also 
Lambiris Orders of Specific performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
128-134; Sharrock “Contract” in Joubert & Faris (eds) LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed para 496; 
Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 323. 
30
  Lubbe & Murray Contract 542-543.  
31
  1981 (4) SA 1 (A). 
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only to the court’s discretion to refuse the remedy. He did, however, cite with approval 
the passage from Haynes to the effect that in the exercise of its discretion a court will 
refuse an order for specific performance “where it would operate unreasonably hardly 
on the defendant, or where the agreement giving rise to the claim is unreasonable, or 
where the decree would produce injustice, or would be inequitable under all the 
circumstances”.32 In commenting on this decision, Beck concludes that even though 
“this discourse on the nature of specific performance was unnecessary for the decision 
and is therefore obiter, it is nevertheless indicative of the tendency to move away from a 
rigid formulation”.33  
Again, at about the same time Isep was decided, the Appellate Division confirmed the 
court’s discretion in claims for specific performance in Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v BN Aitken 
(Pty) Ltd.34 Here Miller JA agreed with the trial court that hardship to the defendant and 
“the general unfairness of the agreement in regard to its execution and operation” were 
valid factors for the court to take in account in the exercise of this discretion.35  
The Appellate Division in Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society36 restated the law 
in more specific terms.37 As shown earlier, the court reaffirmed that every plaintiff has a 
right according to South African law to demand performance in specie, and that there is 
“neither need nor reason” to continue to follow the English rules of equity as to when 
                                                 
32
  5. 
33
  1987 CILSA 200. The issue in Isep Structural Engineering was whether our law 
recognises a claim for the objective value of the performance as an alternative remedy to 
specific performance, and not whether the case was suitable for specific performance.     
Cf para 1 1 4 above. 
34
  1982 (1) SA 398 (A). 
35
  441A-C.  
36
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
37
  See again paras 1 1 & 3 3 above. 
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specific performance should be denied.38 Despite rejecting the traditional English rules 
to the effect that specific performance should be refused where damages would 
adequately compensate the plaintiff, or where ordinary goods or chattels, or shares 
which are readily available on the open market are sold,39 Hefer JA confirmed that there 
remains an important principle on when specific performance should be refused, namely 
where it would produce an unjust result.40  
The more recent decision in Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund41 is 
important due to its reference to both Haynes and Benson, and its attempt to 
consolidate and apply the two cases. Here the Full Bench, relying on Benson, confirmed 
that every plaintiff has a right to specific performance, subject only to the court’s 
discretion to refuse it.42 It also went on to confirm the principles relevant to the exercise 
of this discretion that were set out in Haynes:43 
“Those principles were that specific performance will be refused only if it will operate 
‘unreasonably hardly on the defendant, or where the agreement giving rise to the claim is 
unreasonable, or where the decree would produce injustice, or would be inequitable under all 
the circumstances’.” 
Accordingly, the court emphasised that “Courts should be slow and cautious in not 
enforcing contracts. They should, in a specific performance situation, only refuse 
performance where a recognised hardship to the defaulting party is proved”.44 On the 
                                                 
38
  785F. See also G Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for 
specific performance” in G Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 77 80 ff 
(reproduced with minor changes in J Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract 
Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 95-120). 
39
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 784B-C. Cf para 1 1 3 1 above. 
40
  783D. 
41
  2003 (5) SA 73 (C). 
42
  80I-81B. 
43
  86B-C. 
44
  86H. 
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facts of the case, the court found that there would not be undue hardship in compelling 
the coach to fulfil his obligations in terms of the contract with his original club, which he 
entered into freely and voluntarily and had repudiated in order to earn more money as a 
coach for another club in the same soccer league.45 But, as indicated above,46 the court 
unfairly suggested that the court in Haynes made it a rule that specific performance 
should always be refused if undue hardship to the defendant is present, whereas the 
court in Haynes actually only listed it as an example where the remedy has been 
refused. 
According to Naudé, the court, in stating that hardship to the defaulting party was the 
only basis on which the remedy could be refused, is not “totally correct”.47 She refers to 
Benson where the court actually held that  
“the basic principle thus is that the order which the Court makes should not produce an 
unjust result which will be the case, eg, if, in the particular circumstances, the order would 
operate unduly harshly on the defendant. Another principle is that the remedy of specific 
performance should always be granted or withheld in accordance with legal and public 
policy”.48  
This indicates that undue hardship to the defaulting party is not the only example or 
manifestation of injustice; courts should also take into account whether ordering specific 
performance would be contrary to public good and exercise their discretion to refuse the 
remedy accordingly, for example, if it would cause undue hardship to third parties (as it 
would have in Haynes).49 Thus, the interests of other parties not specifically involved in 
                                                 
45
  86. 
46
  See n 25 para 6 1 1 above. 
47
  T Naudé “Specific performance against an employee: Santos Professional Football Club 
(Pty) Ltd v Igesund” 2003 SALJ 269 279. 
48
   1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783D. 
49
  Apart from the Haynes case, see Barclays National Bank Ltd v Natal Fire Extinguishers 
Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 650 (D), and International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Affinity (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 79 (C). 
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the litigation are also relevant in deciding whether the order would result in undue 
hardship. 
The court in Santos interpreted the Benson decision too narrowly in stating that the 
remedy should only be refused where a recognised hardship to the defaulting party is 
proved. But it would appear that the discourse on the interests of third parties was not 
necessary for the decision because third-party interests were not in question. Any 
remarks in this regard would therefore in any event have been obiter. What is settled is 
that the courts should not solely consider the effect of such an order on the defendant 
and whether the effort or cost of performance to him considerably exceeds the benefit 
which the innocent party will derive from specific performance; they should also 
consider whether it would endanger or cause undue hardship to third parties. Didcott J 
affirmed this in Barclays National Bank Ltd v Natal Fire Extinguishers Manufacturing Co 
(Pty) Ltd:50 
“The [Haynes] decision … established quite plainly that, in assessing any harm the decree 
might do, the Court could and when appropriate should look beyond its effect on the litigants 
and take account of its impact on outsiders.”  
In this case, a mortgagee claimed specific performance under a clause entitling it to 
demand possession of the mortgaged property in the event that it felt its interests under 
the bond to be imperilled. Didcott J considered the hardship not only to the mortgagor 
but to the mortgagor’s creditors:  
“There is much to be said, I believe, for the view that specific performance would ‘operate 
unreasonably hardly’ on the respondents, that it would be ‘inequitable under all the 
                                                 
50
  1982 (4) SA 650 (D) 655E. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   315 
 
circumstances’ to them and their other creditors, and that a bond authorising it is indeed 
‘unreasonable’, to quote DE VILLIERS AJA on all counts.”51 
Currently (upon the correct interpretation of Haynes) in the exercise of their discretion, 
our courts may consider whether specific performance would cause undue hardship to 
the defendant or to third parties, even based on events that occurred after the contract 
was entered into, and refuse the remedy accordingly.52 Relevant to this exercise is 
whether the benefit which the plaintiff will derive from specific performance is minimal in 
comparison to the disadvantage which the defendant will suffer as a result of having to 
perform in specie.53  
In Industrial & Mercantile Corporation v Anastassiou Brothers54 it was held that 
inconvenience and “some financial loss” on the part of the defendant were not sufficient 
reason for the refusal of an order for specific performance. Here the defendant 
repudiated its contract with the plaintiff whereby the latter would install equipment used 
for food refrigeration on the defendant’s premises. The defendant almost immediately 
                                                 
51
  658G-H. See also International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Affinity (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 79 
(C) 87B-E, on the relevance of third-party interests for the decision whether to enforce a 
similar term of a registered notarial bond. 
52
  This brings us to the matter of when the court should make this assessment. In Haynes 
De Villiers AJA made an important statement regarding when the court should consider 
the result of its order (1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 381A): “I have found no case in our Courts 
where it is even suggested that the time when the contract was entered into is the crucial 
time to take into consideration in determining whether specific performance should be 
decreed or not. Nor can I see any logical reason why the time when performance is 
claimed should not be the time when the judge ex aequo et bono should consider the 
result of such an order and the alternative remedy open to the plaintiff.” (Quoted with 
approval by Hatting J in Klimax Manufacturing Ltd v Van Rensburg 2005 (4) SA 445 (O) 
para [14]). In stating this, De Villiers AJA rightly distanced himself from the English author 
Fry (cf n 87 below). 
53
  Sharrock “Contract” in Joubert & Faris (eds) LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed para 496. 
54
  1973 (2) SA 601 (W) 609. Cf para 3 3 above. 
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thereafter engaged another person to supply the same services for him. The court held 
that although an order of specific performance whereby the defendant would have to 
pay the plaintiff, against performance by the plaintiff of his duties, would cause the 
defendant some hardship in conducting its business,55 courts should “avoid becoming 
supine and spineless in dealing with the offending contract breaker, by giving him the 
benefit of paying damages rather than being compelled to perform that which he had 
undertaken to perform”.56 Clearly, the court rejected any notion of “efficient breach”.57 In 
this case the defendant’s defiant, arrogant attitude in repudiating the contract played a 
significant role in the court’s decision to grant specific performance.58  
The by now familiar case of Ranch International Pipelines (Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v LMG 
Construction (City) (Pty) Ltd,59 is an important decision that also illustrates our courts’ 
discontent with creditors who are under the misconception that they are entitled to 
withdraw unilaterally from a contract, i.e. without having obtained the right to resile.60 
                                                 
55
  There was evidence to the effect that the installation could take a period of a week or 
possibly a month or more to complete, and that the defendant’s shop would have to be 
emptied of its refrigerated goods and that the equipment would have to be removed, 
which would have caused the defendant some considerable loss and discomfort. 
56
  1973 (2) SA 601 (W) 609A. 
57
  See B J Van Heerden “An exploratory introduction to the economic analysis of law” 1981 
Responsa Meridiana 147 156: “Posner would probably regard the decision as giving rise 
to an inefficient allocation of resources.” 
58
  See n 79 below. See also Lubbe “Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: die 
implikasies van die uitoefening van die regterlike diskresie” in Smits & Lubbe (eds) 
Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa 63. 
59
  1984 (3) SA 861 (W) 880-881. 
60
  See esp 881C-G per Coetzee J: “If LMG commits any breach of contract which entitles 
Ranch to resile, it is still free to do so at any time in the future and, thereupon, to take 
appropriate action. The so-called impasse on which Ranch relies is unimpressive. If it 
does not pay LMG, as is threatened, that is the latter’s problem to deal with in its own way. 
If it refuses to give LMG instructions, also as is threatened, without having a locus 
poenitentiae, it will leave itself open to an action for damages by both LMG and Fluor. If it 
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Here the court, in discussing building contracts in general, held that the client (creditor) 
does not have a unilateral right of stoppage of his duty to cooperate with the builder in 
order to enable the latter to fulfil his obligations, i.e. the creditor cannot simply walk 
away from the contract. And if the creditor fails in performing this duty he may be 
compelled in forma specifica to cooperate with the builder. Again, there is no question of 
allowing “efficient breach”. 
A modern illustration of a court considering a defence based on hardship (and the 
concomitant argument that a debtor is entitled to commit “efficient breach” or walk away 
from a so-called “bad bargain”) is provided by the decision of Eksteen J in Edrei 
Investments 9 Ltd (In Liquidation) v Dis-Chem Pharmacies (Pty) Ltd.61 Here, the 
respondent lessee entered into a lease agreement with the applicant lessor, which 
provided that it would trade at full capacity for the full period of lease as one of two 
anchor shops at a shopping centre owned by the applicant lessor. However, when it 
appeared that the lease was not as profitable as the lessee had anticipated, it 
threatened to stop trading unless it was granted a 50% reduction in its rental. It even 
argued that the lessor was not entitled to an order for specific performance, as it would 
force the lessee to trade at a loss, and that the lessor should claim damages instead. 
Eksteen J dealt with this argument in the following way: 
“[T]he right to elect whether to claim performance or damages belonged to Edrei, not Dis-
Chem. If Dis-Chem were to breach the lease by vacating the premises other tenants would 
follow, causing irreparable harm to Edrei’s business, and the fact that it could in due course 
recover damages from Dis-Chem did not detract from this, since Edrei would have great 
                                                                                                                                                             
consciously seeks to achieve this result that is its affair. This kind of dog in the manger 
attitude however strikes me as childish and not worthy of serious consideration as a so-
called impasse. I have therefore come to the conclusion that there is no reason why 
Ranch’s duty to cooperate should not be enforced in forma specifica …” 
61
  2012 (2) SA 553 (ECP). Compare para 5 2 (iv), esp n 123 and its related text above & 
para 5 3 esp treatment of Hamilton West case by Minnesota Court of Appeal in 
Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission v Minnesota Partnership in text to nn 153 ff. 
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difficulty in replacing Dis-Chem with a desirable tenant. It was clear that Edrei had no 
alternative remedy to satisfy its operational requirements other than by interdict. The fact that 
Dis-Chem had concluded a lease that was not as lucrative as anticipated did not entitle it to 
walk away from its obligations, nor did the fact that it was trading at a loss deprive Edrei of its 
right to elect to hold Dis-Chem to its obligations.”62 
In contrast to this rather strict approach, the court in York Timbers Ltd v Minister of 
Water Affairs and Forestry63 exercised its discretion to refuse specific performance by 
applying the undue hardship principle, i.e. on the ground that to grant specific 
performance would have resulted in undue hardship to the defendant. Here the 
applicant claimed specific performance of a contract in terms of which the respondents, 
on behalf of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, undertook to sell softwood 
sawlogs to the applicant. The contract also imposed certain conditions upon the 
Department regarding the management of the plantations. In particular, the Department 
warranted and undertook that the plantations from which the sawlogs were supplied 
would always be exclusively devoted to softwood afforestation. The respondents 
contended that the Department had failed to ensure that the plantations were 
exclusively devoted to softwood afforestation because they no longer conducted normal 
silvicultural operations in the plantations, but had commenced clear felling64 the 
plantations with a view that they become part of a conservation area.   
The court found that precise performance of the obligation to devote the plantations to 
softwood afforestation would cause excessive inconvenience and expense to the 
Department since clear felling has supposedly been carried out for at least a year and 
could not be reversed without enormous inconvenience and expenditure for the 
Department. It held that even though clear felling was not the normal silvicultural 
practice contemplated by the agreement, it appeared to be common cause that the 
plantations had become so run down that the Department could not supply the volume 
                                                 
62
  553F-H. 
63
  2003 (4) SA 477 (T). 
64
  This is the practice of uniformly cutting down all the trees in an area. 
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of sawlogs stipulated by the contract. And by clear felling the plantations the 
Department will be able to deliver the volumes of sawlogs stipulated by the contract, but 
that will mean that the plantations will no longer be exclusively devoted to softwood 
afforestation. So, the court ordered specific performance by the Department to the 
extent of delivering the volume of timber contracted for, but the court refused to order 
compliance with the conditions regarding the management of the plantations. 
Another good example of the exercise of the discretion to refuse specific performance 
by applying the undue hardship principle is Klimax Manufacturing Ltd v Van Rensburg,65 
where Hattingh J refused to order the first respondent to comply with the contractual 
provisions of a tacit franchise agreement and the restraint provisions set out therein on 
the ground that: “To interdict Van Rensburg for a few months for what he has been 
doing, with apparent unconcern on the part of applicants for 16 months, would operate 
unreasonably harshly and inequitable under all the circumstances.”66 The court found 
that because the applicants were well aware of their rights in terms of the clause in 
restraint of trade67 some 16 months before they instituted the proceedings, they cannot 
contend that the respondents were causing them grievous financial harm.68  
The preceding section has indicated that although the courts at times formally only 
regard undue hardship as a relevant factor influencing (or circumstance affecting) the 
exercise of their unfettered discretion, it appears that actual judicial practice is to refuse 
specific performance whenever undue hardship to the defendant or third parties is 
present; this means that the discretion to award specific performance is in effect 
                                                 
65
  2005 (4) SA 445 (O). 
66
  Para [18]. 
67
  The clause provided that the franchisee (represented by Van Rensburg) “shall not for a 
period of two years thereafter and within the territory, directly or indirectly in any capacity 
whatsoever be engaged, concerned or interested in the business which competes, 
indirectly or directly, with or is similar in nature to this business” (para [6]). 
68
  Para [15]. 
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irrelevant. It also seems that commentators have known this for a long time, but the 
consequences have not been fully worked out.  
It therefore appears that our law faces a choice. It could continue with its purportedly 
flexible discretionary approach whereby hardship is a relevant factor in the exercise of 
the court’s discretion, or it could expressly adopt a rule whereby specific performance is 
restricted if it would cause undue hardship to the defendant or to third parties.69 The 
purpose of the following comparative overview is to assist in determining the most 
appropriate option for South African law.  
In the comparative overview we will first turn to Anglo-American law, which initially 
steered our law in the direction of an exception-based approach, and despite the 
rejection of such an approach, significantly and dramatically influenced our courts’ 
approach to specific performance. As noted above, the origin of specific performance in 
the English courts of equity has influenced the factors our courts may take into account 
in exercising their discretion to refuse the remedy.70 This is especially apparent in the 
discretionary power given to our courts to refuse the remedy if it would cause injustice.71 
                                                 
69
  See esp in this regard, statement by Lubbe quoted in text to n 226 below. 
70
  See eg paras 1 1 3, 3 3, 4 2 1 & 6 1 1 above. See also Lubbe “Contractual derogation and 
the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance” in Glover (ed) Essays in Honour 
of AJ Kerr 83. 
71
  Compare, eg, the speech of Sir John Romilly in Haywood v Cope (1858) 25 Beav 
140 151-152, with that of Hefer JA in Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 
(1) SA 776 (A) 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783A-E, to the same effect. See also G H Treitel 
Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (1988) 65-66. For US authority, 
see Knott v Cutler 31 S.E.2d 359, 361 (1944) per Denny J: “It is said in 49 Am.Jur., Sec. 
8, p. 13: ‘Assuming that the contract in question in an action for specific performance is 
one of the class of contracts of which specific performance may be granted because of 
inadequacy of the remedy at law, the granting of the decree of specific performance is not 
a matter of absolute right. As the rule is usually stated, the granting of relief by a decree 
requiring specific performance of a contract rests in the sound discretion of the court 
before whom the application is made, which discretion is to be exercised upon a 
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The common law therefore requires further evaluation, even though its reception has 
proven to be problematic in this area of our law.  
6 2  Undue hardship as a bar to specific performance in common law: England 
and America 
Undue or “severe” hardship (as it is known in England) to the defendant is regarded as 
a ground for refusing specific performance at common law, represented here by 
English72 and American law.73 As indicated from the outset, the starting point of English 
and American contract law is that monetary damages are sufficient and thus the primary 
remedy for breach of contract. Specific performance is only awarded when damages 
are inadequate, and is therefore the secondary remedy for breach of contract.74 But, 
even if damages are inadequate, specific performance will be refused where it would 
cause the defendant severe hardship, far exceeding the loss the plaintiff would suffer as 
                                                                                                                                                             
consideration of all of the circumstances of the case, with a view of subserving ends of 
justice. This discretion of a court of equity to grant or withhold specific performance of a 
contract is not an arbitrary or capricious one, but is a judicial discretion to be exercised in 
accordance with settled rules and principles of equity, and with regard to facts and 
circumstances of the particular case. The remedy of specific performance will be granted 
or withheld by the court according to the equities of the situation as disclosed by a just 
consideration of all the circumstances of the particular case, and no positive rule can be 
laid down by which the action of the court can be determined in all cases.’” 
72
  Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 117; A S Burrows Remedies for Torts and 
Breach of Contract 3 ed (2004) 498; Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies 196; J 
Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 29 ed (2010) 580; Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 
1106-1107; H G Beale et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts I: General Principles 31 ed (2012) 
1926-1927; M Chen-Wishart Contract Law 4 ed (2012) 546; M P Furmston Cheshire, 
Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract 16 ed (2012) 798. 
73
  J M Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts 12: Restitution, Specific Performance and Election of 
Remedies Interim ed (2002) §§ 1162, 1164; J M Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 
6 ed (2009) § 16.14; G Klass Contract Law in the USA (2010) 215.  
74
  Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies 198; para 2 3 2 above. 
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a result of the breach.75 For example, in Patel v Ali76 the plaintiff sought specific 
performance of a sale agreement of a house four years after its conclusion. By that time 
the seller fell seriously ill, had borne two more children, and her husband was declared 
insolvent. The court therefore found that an order forcing her to move would cause a 
“hardship amounting to injustice” as she spoke little English and relied on nearby friends 
and family for support.77 It follows that English law will, as a general rule, restrict the 
availability of specific performance where performance has become onerous due to a 
change of circumstances. As stated by Goulding J: 
“Equitable relief may … be refused because of an unforeseen change of circumstances not 
amounting to legal frustration, just as it may on the ground of mistake insufficient to avoid a 
contract at law.”78 
                                                 
75
  See eg Denne v Light (1857) 8 De GM & G 774 (where the court refused to order specific 
performance against a purchaser of farming land which he would have been unable to 
enjoy because of the absence of any right of access); Haywood v Cope (1858) 25 Beav 
140 145 (n 82 below). This is confirmed in J N Pomeroy Jr Pomeroy’s Equity 
Jurisprudence and Equitable Remedies VI 3 ed (1905) § 796: “Specific performance not 
being an absolute right, the fact that enforcement would be of little or no benefit to the 
complainant, and a burden upon the defendant, is sufficient to constitute performance 
oppressive, and it will not be given. The disproportion between the burden upon the 
defendant and the gain to the plaintiff makes performance inequitable.” 
76
  [1984] Ch 283. See also Gould v Kemp (1834) 39 ER 959 961 per Brougham LC: “any 
circumstance of hardship in the Defendant’s situation will incline the Court not to interfere, 
but to leave the party to his legal remedy in damages”, and Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30, 
where specific performance of a contract for the sale of land was refused because it would 
give rise to uncertain and difficult litigation between members of the defendant’s family 
and a possible consequence of the order would be to split up their family. 
77
   [1984] Ch 283 288, per Goulding J, using a phrase originally employed by James LJ, in 
Tamplin v James (1880) 15 ChD 215 221. For further information see eg E McKendrick 
Contract Law: Text, Cases and Materials 2 ed (2005) 1147. 
78
  [1984] Ch 283 288. 
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However, as in the Anastassiou Brothers case,79 Goulding J, also stressed that “mere 
pecuniary difficulties” are insufficient to offer an excuse from performance of a contract:  
“[O]nly in extraordinary and persuasive circumstances can hardship supply an excuse for 
resisting performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property. A person of full 
capacity who sells or buys a house takes the risk of hardship to himself and his dependants, 
whether arising from existing facts or unexpectedly supervening in the interval before 
completion …”80 
It follows that a contract which was fair at its conclusion may be specifically enforced 
even though subsequent events turned it into a bad bargain.81 And specific performance 
will be ordered even if a purchaser contracted to buy property of a speculative or 
doubtful character and it turns out to be worthless.82 Thus, the court will always balance 
the hardship which the defendant would suffer if ordered to perform against any 
                                                 
79
  1973 (2) SA 601 (W) 609B-C per Davidson J: “That it would be inconvenient [for the 
defendant if he were compelled to accept performance by the plaintiff to install equipment 
in his premises] is likely, that he will suffer some financial loss is likely, but that he has 
brought on himself by an arrogant denial of his commitments and I do not believe he 
should earn particular sympathy for that.” 
80
  [1984] Ch 283 288. See also Francis v Cowcliffe (1977) 33 P & CR 368 (ChD); Jones & 
Goodhart Specific Performance 119; Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 
499; Beatson Anson’s Law of Contract 580; Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts 275-276. 
81
  For American authority in support of this principle, see Simpson v Green 231 S.W. 375, 
380-381 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921); Knott v Cutler 31 S.E.2d 359, 361 (1944); Cities 
Service Oil Co v Viering 89 N.E.2d 392, 401 (1949); De Caro v De Caro 97 A.2d 658, 662 
(1953); Clardy v Bodolosky 679 S.E.2d 527, 531 (Ct. App. 2009). See also Perillo (ed) 
Corbin on Contracts 275-276. 
82
  So, in Haywood v Cope (1858) 25 Beav 140, it was held that the defendant who 
contracted for the lease of a mine could not resist its performance because the collieries 
turned out to be less profitable than he anticipated. See also Northcote A Treatise on the 
Specific Performance of Contracts by Sir Edward Fry § 427. 
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hardship to the plaintiff if the order is refused.83 And the order will only be refused if the 
detriment to the defendant is entirely out of proportion to the benefit which the plaintiff 
will derive from performance. In Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores 
Holdings Ltd,84 Millet LJ (dissenting), concluded that  
“To compel a defendant for an indefinite period to carry on a business which he considers is 
not viable, or which for his own commercial reasons he has decided to close down, is to 
expose him to potentially large, unquantifiable and unlimited losses which may be out of all 
proportion to the loss which his breach of contract has caused to the plaintiff.” 85 
Thus, even though the scope of the hardship restriction is limited and courts should not 
refuse to order specific performance based on mere financial difficulties, the “objection 
may extend to economic considerations on a more objective basis, i.e. independent 
from the particular position of the seller”86 as it did in Argyll Stores, where the remedy 
was refused, inter alia, because it would have forced the defendant to continue trading 
at a loss. 
                                                 
83
  For example, in O’Neill v Ryan (No 3) [1992] 1 IR 166, the plaintiff was granted specific 
performance because the hardship to the defendant was outweighed by the hardship the 
plaintiff would have suffered from the refusal of the order as he would have been left 
holding shares in a company engaged in business in a highly volatile industry. See also 
Watson v Marston (1853) 4 De Gex, M & G 230 238 per Turner LJ. 
84
  [1996] Ch 286, 304-306 (AC). 
85
  The House of Lords, in its refusal of an order of specific performance of a keep-open 
clause, also regarded the loss which the defendant may suffer through having to comply 
with the order by running a business at a loss for an indefinite period as greater than that 
which the plaintiff would suffer from the contract being breached. See para 5 2 (ii) above. 
86
  V Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law (2009) 98: “For 
example, there are circumstances in which the court can presume that performance would 
become too onerous on any party, regardless of the financial position that they find 
themselves in.” 
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In determining whether to grant the discretionary remedy of specific performance the 
courts (of both England and the US) will also consider the effect of such an order87 on 
third parties.88 According to Corbin “[t]he interests of individuals not parties to the 
contract and of the public at large will be considered by the court and in some cases will 
be decisive in determining whether to grant or to refuse a decree for specific 
                                                 
87
  According to Fry “[t]he question of the hardship of a contract is generally to be judged of at 
the time at which it is entered into...” (G R Northcote A Treatise on the Specific 
Performance of Contracts by Sir Edward Fry 6 ed (1921) 199 § 418). Spry, however, 
distanced himself from Fry’s proposition, and stated that the cases Fry relied on did not 
support this view (I C F Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, 
Injunctions, Rectification and Equitable Damages 8 ed (2010) 196-197). Fry’s view is not 
tenable because, as Spry correctly argues, questions of hardship might not arise at the 
stage of contract conclusion but subsequent events might occur that render performance 
more onerous for the defendant. Fry, however, did qualify his statement in a subsequent 
section, by referring to cases in which the courts refused specific performance based on 
events that occurred after the conclusion of the contract (Northcote § 421).  For example, 
in The City of London v Nash (1747) 26 ER 1095, where a party agreed to re-build several 
houses, but eventually only built two new houses and repaired the others, the Court of 
Chancery held that ordering specific performance at that stage would result in too great a 
loss and hardship to the defendant, and would in any event be useless to the plaintiff. 
Jones and Goodhart also confirm that “there is no logical justification for entirely ignoring 
hardship to the defendant which has arisen from events occurring after the date of the 
contract, and in fact in several of the cases in which specific performance has been 
refused on grounds of hardship to the defendant the hardship arose from [subsequent] 
events” (Specific Performance 2 ed (1996) 123). See also E Peel Treitel’s Law of Contract 
13 ed (2011) 1107). 
88
  See J N Pomeroy Jr A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts 3 ed (1926) § 
181a: “Where the rights of innocent third persons, not parties to the contract, will be 
affected, the court may properly consider whether specific performance would be fair and 
just to them, and withhold the remedy accordingly. The court may also consider the public 
inconvenience which would result from the enforcement of a contract.” See more recently, 
Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 121. 
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performance”.89 Analogous to Haynes, a Pennsylvania court accordingly refused to 
order specific performance of an electricity supplier’s obligation to supply a sufficient 
flow of water to a company to generate electricity for manufacturing paper on the 
ground that it “would result in paralysis of the Power Company, and in disabling it, not 
only to furnish water power to the Paper Company, but to furnish electric light and 
power through a wide and thickly settled region of country”.90  
Thus, the discretionary nature of this equitable remedy permits its refusal when a variety 
of factors combine to make the specific enforcement of a contract unfair. This is 
apparent from § 364 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.91 It lists certain circumstances in which a court might consider specific 
performance unfair and for that reason refuse to order specific performance; it also 
envisages a balancing of competing interests in order to determine whether specific 
performance would be fair. One of the grounds for refusal is where “the relief would 
cause unreasonable hardship or loss to the party in breach or to third persons”.92 § 364 
(2), on the other hand, protects the plaintiff’s (and third persons’) interest(s) in 
performance. It provides that specific performance will be granted if its denial would be 
unfair because it would cause unreasonable hardship or loss to the party seeking relief 
or to third persons. Thus, in deciding whether to grant or refuse the remedy, courts 
consider not only the hardship such an order might impose on the parties themselves, 
but also the hardship it might impose on or benefits it might provide third parties or the 
                                                 
89
  Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts § 1169. See also Pomeroy Jr Pomeroy’s Equity 
Jurisprudence and Equitable Remedies §§ 794-795; Klass Contract Law in the USA 215, 
and for English authority, Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies 201-203; Jones & 
Goodhart Specific Performance 121-122. 
90
  York Haven Water & Power Co v York Haven Paper Co 201 F. 270, 279 (C.C.A.3d, 1912). 
91
  Addendum A 384.  
92
  § 364(1)(b). In terms of this section a court may also refuse to order specific performance 
where “the contract was induced by mistake or unfair practices”, or where “the exchange 
is grossly inadequate or the terms of the contract are otherwise unfair” (§§ 364(1)(a) & 
364(1)(c) respectively). 
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public at large. A court may therefore refuse specific performance on the ground that it 
would be unfair considering the hardship it might cause the contractual parties or third 
parties, yet afford the aggrieved party damages or other relief.93  
The comments to § 364 contain examples of its application. The comments suggest that 
the section applies to those situations where impracticability of performance or 
frustration that fall short of what is required for relief under those doctrines, are 
involved.94 The position in South African law is somewhat similar: although specific 
performance is the default remedy for breach of contract, the courts will also consider 
the hardship its order might cause the defendant in the exercise of their discretion, and 
may refuse to order specific performance if performance becomes excessively 
burdensome but falls short of what is required for avoidance under the doctrine of 
supervening impossibility.95 
As is the case with considerations of fairness (recognised in § 364 of the Second 
Restatement), considerations of public policy might also preclude an order for specific 
                                                 
93
  Klass Contract Law in the USA 215. 
94
  See n 123 below. 
95
  See text to nn 10 ff para 6 1 1 above. See also Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance 
Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783E-F per Hefer JA: “Furthermore, the 
Court will not decree specific performance where performance has become impossible. 
Here a distinction must be drawn between the case where impossibility extinguishes the 
obligation and the case where performance is impossible but the debtor is still 
contractually bound. It is only the latter type of case that is relevant in the present context, 
for in the former the creditor clearly has no legal remedy at all.” (The judge relies on De 
Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg (1978) 4 ed 189 n 61 and the cases cited 
there, and also Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v B N Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A) 441-443, 
where Miller JA states that “it may be that in certain cases evidence falling short of proof 
of impossibility might nevertheless justify a Court in refusing to decree specific 
performance” (443B)). 
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performance.96 According to § 365 of the Second Restatement, specific performance 
will not be granted “if the act or forbearance that would be compelled or the use of 
compulsion is contrary to public policy”. Thus, in Rockhill Tennis Club of Kansas City v 
Volker,97 the Supreme Court of Missouri refused to order specific performance of a 
contract for the sale of land located near a public art museum, because the buyer’s 
planned use of the land might “seriously mar and hamper the plan of development of 
this gallery of art as a thing of beauty”.98 Public interest may, however, weigh in favour 
of specific performance. For example, in Wilson v Sandstrom,99 the Supreme Court of 
Florida confirmed a specific performance order requiring the provision of greyhounds to 
a racetrack on the basis of the loss in tax revenue that would follow from the suspension 
of racing.  
These sections might preclude specific performance, but this does not necessarily 
excuse the debtor from liability. Even though specific performance may be refused, a 
judgment for damages may be granted to protect the creditor’s expectation interest.100 
The debtor is thus liable, albeit not to perform in specie. Thus, in Rockhill Tennis Club 
the club was permitted to recover damages.101 This largely corresponds with our law, 
where the basic principle is that courts should refuse to order specific performance if it 
would produce an unjust result, but if a court decides to refuse the remedy on this 
                                                 
96
  In Seaboard Air Line Railway Co v Atlanta B & C R Co 35 F. (2d) 609, 610 (1929) the 
court said: “In the exercise of its discretion, a court of equity may refuse specific 
enforcement of a valid contract where, by granting that relief, a paramount public interest 
will or may be interfered with”. 
97
  56 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1932). 
98
  56 S.W.2d 9, 20 (Mo. 1932). 
99
  317 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1975). 
100
  See § 365, cmt a. 
101
  56 S.W.2d 9, 21 (Mo. 1932). Similarly, in Patel v Ali [1984] Ch 283, the defendant 
remained liable for damages. See further G H Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure 2 ed 
(2004) 301-302. 
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ground, the creditor will still be able to claim his id quod interest, by way of a claim for 
damages.102 
The preceding section has indicated that Anglo-American law recognises severe or 
undue hardship as a ground for refusing specific performance, but the scope of the 
hardship restriction is limited by the fact that it does not extend to subjective economic 
considerations, i.e. the court will not be dissuaded from ordering specific performance 
based on the particular financial interest of the debtor.103  
The aim of the following sections will be to examine the relevance of hardship in certain 
civil-law systems and international instruments. It should be borne in mind that they, in 
contrast to Anglo-American law, recognise specific performance as their primary or 
default remedy for breach of contract and generally do not accord the courts any 
discretion in granting it. Instead, they grant the creditor a right to specific performance, 
subject to certain exceptions.104 
6 3  Unreasonable effort or expense as a bar to specific performance in civil law: 
Germany and the Netherlands  
Hardship is recognised as a bar to specific performance in German law to the extent 
that § 275(2) of the German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)105 
                                                 
102
  See again text to nn 10 ff para 6 1 1 above. 
103
  See eg Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 98: “As to 
economic hardship, the scope appears narrow. Specific performance will not be refused 
simply because the defendant is in financial difficulties.” 
104
  See paras 2 3 1 & 2 3 3 above. 
105
  On a procedural level, § 765a of the ZPO (Addendum A 395) applies to the execution of 
court orders and gives the court (of execution) the power to revoke, prohibit or temporarily 
suspend either completely or in part, a measure of execution, on application of the debtor, 
if, in full consideration of the creditor’s need for protection, the measure would lead to 
hardship that due to very special circumstances is immoral (contra bonos mores). In 
commenting on this section, Beale et al note that it will only prevent execution in “drastic 
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determines that the debtor may refuse to perform insofar as such performance would 
require an effort which would be grossly disproportionate to the interest of the creditor in 
receiving performance, taking into account the content of the obligation and the 
requirements of good faith. Note however, that § 275(2), dealing with hardship (in 
contrast to § 275(1) dealing with impossibility),106 does not exclude the creditor’s right to 
specific performance, but merely gives the debtor the right to refuse to perform if the 
performance would involve unreasonable efforts or expense.107 This provision 
essentially codifies an approach followed by the German Supreme Court, the 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH).108  
In the leading case109 the defendant built flats on a plot of land, part of which was to be 
transferred to the plaintiffs under an agreement of sale. On the remaining land the 
defendant built an underground car park, which, by mistake extended to and covered 
about 20 square meters of land purchased by the plaintiffs. This meant that the 
defendant could not transfer the part of land contracted for. The plaintiffs therefore 
                                                                                                                                                             
and exceptional circumstances”, in absence of which, the creditor’s interest in having the 
judgment enforced will prevail (Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 2 ed (2010) 
882). 
106
  See n 114 below. 
107
  § 275(3) on force majeure, similarly gives the debtor the right to refuse performance, i.e. 
only the duty of performance is excluded and it remains open to the creditor to claim 
performance and the debtor to render performance in spite of the obstacle to his 
performance (Addendum A 389). See R Zimmermann The New German Law of 
Obligations: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (2005) 45 (text to nn 115-116 
below), and C Brunner Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: 
Exemption for Non-performance in International Arbitration (2009) 83 ff. 
108
  Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 100-101. See also 
B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston The German Law of Contract: A Comparative 
Treatise 2 ed (2006) 414: “Paragraph 275 II BGB was not meant to change the law but 
rather to encapsulate the rationes of two decisions of the BGH dealing with the exclusion 
of the main obligation of performance due to disproportionate outlays.” 
109
  BGH, BGHZ 62, 388 (21.6.1974). 
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demanded the removal of the encroachment to achieve specific performance of the 
contract. The BGH refused the plaintiffs’ claim for the removal on the ground that it 
would be unreasonable to order the defendants to reconstruct the car park considering 
the expense involved in such a reconstruction.  
Another relevant authority110 concerned the sale by the defendant of a part of land 
which the defendant held in trust for the plaintiff. The plaintiff demanded that the 
defendant transfer the property back to him, but the third-party purchaser, having 
obtained a stronger proprietary interest, was only willing to renounce his right if the 
defendant bought it back at thirty times its estimated value. The BGH referred to the 
principle of good faith and accordingly held that the defendant could not be reasonably 
expected to buy the land back at thirty times its value; therefore he was released from 
his obligation to transfer the land back to the plaintiff. These decisions also illustrate that 
the provision envisages a balancing exercise, and the duty of performance will only be 
excluded where the disadvantage to the defendant outweighs the plaintiff’s interest in 
performance. According to Zimmermann this provision is designed to take account of 
what was previously termed “practical impossibility” (praktische Unmöglichkeit)111 and 
this is why the effort required to perform is measured against the interest of the creditor 
in receiving performance.112  
Compared to our law,113 it is particularly noteworthy that initial objective impossibility 
does not affect the validity of the contract in modern German contract law.114 However, 
                                                 
110
  BGH, NJW 1988, 799. Referred to by Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 414, and 
Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 101. 
111
  See further, on the nature of this type of impossibility, Ernst W “§ 275” in Krüger W (ed) 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 2 Allgemeiner Teil: §§ 241-432 6 
ed (2012) para 37. 
112
  Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives 45.  
113
  See para 6 1 1 above & para 7 2 2 below. 
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as far as the exclusion of the right to specific performance is concerned, according to 
Zimmermann, § 275(2) BGB necessitates a further distinction because it “provides for a 
different legal consequence from the one concerning factual impossibility: the debtor’s 
obligation does not automatically fall way, but the debtor is merely granted a right to 
refuse performance”. The implication is that the law “wants to leave it open for the 
debtor to render performance in spite of the unreasonable effort which this may 
involve”.115 (While, according to § 275(1) the debtor is released from his obligation of 
performance, as the claim for performance is excluded.) Thus, § 275(2) BGB excludes 
the debtor’s duty of performance but not the creditor’s claim to the performance.116 But if 
the debtor refuses to perform according to § 275(2) BGB, a judgment for damages will 
still be granted to protect the plaintiff’s expectation interest.117 This is stated expressly in 
§ 283 BGB, which determines that a claim for damages (in lieu of performance) is not 
affected where the duty of performance is excluded under § 275. 
Treitel, in his comparative treatise on force majeure and frustration, observes that 
“Recent developments in German law show considerable convergence between civil and 
common law approaches to this topic. Before the coming into force in 2002 of amendments 
                                                                                                                                                             
114
  § 311a(1) BGB;  Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 408; Zimmermann The New 
German Law of Obligations 44: “§ 275 I BGB, as its wording makes it clear, applies to all 
types of impossibility: objective impossibility (nobody can perform) subjective impossibility 
(a specific debtor cannot perform), initial impossibility (performance was already 
impossible when the contract had been concluded), subsequent impossibility 
(performance has become impossible after conclusion of the contract), partial 
impossibility, and total impossibility. Exclusion of the right to specific performance does 
not depend on whether the debtor was responsible for the impossibility or not.” 
115
  Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations 47. See also F Faust & V Wiese 
“Specific performance – a German perspective” in J Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (2008) 47 51. 
116
  See text to n 107 above. 
117
  Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 408-409. See also G H Treitel Frustration and 
Force Majeure 2 ed (2004) 3-4. 
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to the Civil Code (BGB), that Code provided that a contract for an impossible performance 
was null (nichtig).118 This provision has been repealed so that antecedent impossibility is no 
longer a ground for invalidity.119 Instead, impossibility is a bar to a claim for (specific) 
performance120 but not to one for damages …”121  
The convergence he refers to relates to the fact that most common law jurisdictions do 
not follow the impossibilium nulla obligatio est principle.122 As a general rule, the maxim 
pacta sunt servanda commands that contracts should be performed absolutely (albeit 
by means of monetary compensation). US courts have continually repeated this 
theme.123 
                                                 
118
  Referring to former § 306 BGB. 
119
  Referring to § 311a(1) BGB. 
120
  Referring to § 275(1) BGB. 
121
  Frustration and Force Majeure 3-4.  
122
  1 ff. 
123
  See eg Cook v Deltona Corporation 753 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1985); and see P 
Walter “Commercial impracticability in contracts” (1987) 61 St John’s Law Review 225. 
However, in case of frustration of contract – i.e. when the contract is rendered useless by 
the change of circumstances – an exception is granted to this general rule. The modern 
trend in the US is to allow the defence of impossibility when performance is impracticable 
because of excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense. The Second Restatement § 
261 states the general principle under which a party’s duty of performance may be 
discharged due to impracticability: where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance 
is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event, the non-occurrence 
of which was a basic assumption in which the contract was made, his duty to render that 
performance is discharged …”. This means that he may be excused from that duty if 
performance has unexpectedly become impracticable as a result of a supervening event. 
Where contracts for the sale of goods are concerned, UCC § 2-615 contains a similar rule. 
Thus, in the US, the doctrine of changed circumstances is identified as the doctrine of 
commercial impracticability. Similarly, in England, the doctrine of changed circumstances 
was used to explain and develop a doctrine of frustration of purpose, which excuses non-
performance when the purpose or foundation of the contract has disappeared. These 
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The impossibilium nulla obligatio est principle has also been rejected in English law.124 
These systems recognise that parties can effectively enter into a contract requiring one 
of them to do the impossible, because in common law, the primary remedy for breach of 
contract is damages, and performance of an obligation to pay money is never 
considered to be impossible.125 According to Treitel, the recognition of specific 
performance as the primary remedy for breach of contract by civil-law systems explains 
why these systems experience “conceptual difficulty about the actual enforceability of 
the impossible obligation” and instead hold the party responsible for the impossibility 
liable for compensation.126 
A creditor’s right to specific performance under Dutch law is restricted in a similar 
way.127 Article 3:296(1) of the Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) makes it clear that specific 
performance cannot be claimed if the law, the nature of the obligation, or a juridical act, 
determines otherwise.128 It follows that a claim for specific performance may be 
restricted on the basis of (i) legal provisions to be found in the BW itself, (ii) the nature 
                                                                                                                                                             
doctrines excuse performance that fall short of the standard of objective impossibility. See 
further on the legal consequences of these doctrines, E A Farnsworth Contracts 3 ed 
(1999) 637 ff; Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure 546 ff. Cf text to n 94 above. 
124
  See eg Thornborow v Whitacre (1705) 2 Ld Raym 1164 1165 per Holt CJ “where a man 
will for a valuable consideration undertake to do an impossible thing, though it cannot be 
performed, yet he shall answer damages”. See also Jones v St John’s College (1870) LR 
6 QB 115 127; Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp Ltd 
[1942] AC 154 163; Eurico SpA v Philipp Bros (The Epaphus) [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
215 218. See further A Burrows (ed) English Private Law 3 ed (2013) 601-602. 
125
  Evidenced by Holmes’ famous words on contractual liability (see para 3 2 above). See 
also Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 407: “The question as to the extent to which 
impossibility releases the debtor from the obligation of performance does not arise directly 
in Anglo-American law. Since specific performance is the exception, it is not necessary to 
deal with impossibility as a defence to a claim for performance.” 
126
  Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure 2-3. 
127
  See text to n 117 para 2 3 1 2 above. 
128
  Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-II De Verbintenis in het Algemeen (2009) nr 344. 
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of the debtor’s obligation, and (iii) a juridical act, for example where the parties to the 
contract agree that the remedy is not available to either one of them, or even that no 
remedies can be exercised in the case of non-performance.129 And, a debtor would be 
able to raise a defence on the basis of Article 3:13 BW to the effect that the creditor has 
abused his right (contained in Article 3:296(1)) in claiming specific performance. This 
will be the case when it is established that the creditor cannot reasonably resort to his 
right to claim specific performance, having regard to the disproportionality between his 
interest in exercising that right and the interest of the debtor that will be harmed as a 
result of such exercise. It may be concluded then that this defence will be available to 
defendants in hardship cases. Article 3:12 BW also provides that the substantial 
interests of third parties can be taken into account in considering whether such 
disproportionality exists.130  
Apart from these limitations listed in the BW, the availability of specific performance has 
also been limited through developments in the case law. These developments include 
impossibility of performance, and more recently, limitations on grounds of 
reasonableness and equity.131  
Let us first consider the limitation of impossibility (onmogelijkheid), to the extent that it 
relates to the arguments advanced here. Dutch courts will not grant specific 
performance in relation to an obligation which turns out to be impossible to perform.132 
The BW, however, does not define the concept of impossibility,133 and its development 
                                                 
129
  D Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A 
Commentary (2002) 349 (section by M B M Loos). 
130
  See generally D Haas & C Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in J Smits, D Haas 
& G Hesen (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 
(2008) 11 15-20.  
131
  17. 
132
  A S Hartkamp et al Contract Law in the Netherlands 2 rev ed (2011) 145. 
133
  Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law: A Commentary 193 (section 
by M M van Rossum). 
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was therefore also left to the courts. It is of particular relevance that impossibility does 
not only refer to situations where performance has become absolutely impossible (for 
example where the object of a sale agreement is physically destroyed before delivery), 
but also situations where performance is considered relatively impossible, since it would 
cause unreasonable inconvenience to the debtor. The concept of relative impossibility 
includes cases of practical impossibility, i.e. cases where factually performance is still 
possible, but it would be inconceivable to expect the debtor to perform considering the 
circumstances of the case. And if performance has become practically impossible, an 
order for specific performance may not be granted.134 The Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme 
Court) also authoritatively held that courts should not grant specific performance “when 
the debtor would only be able to perform his obligations by making sacrifices that 
cannot be required from him considering all circumstances of the case”.135  
This position clearly corresponds with the German position and the limitation recognised 
in the BGB. In contrast to our law, impossibility (albeit relative or absolute) does not 
affect the validity of the contract in both German and Dutch contract law. These systems 
do, however, recognise that impossibility excludes the remedy of specific performance 
of the obligation.136 Thus, they hold the debtor who cannot perform due to impossibility 
liable for damages. It can be concluded then that the notion of impossibility appears to 
be much wider in German and Dutch contract law, in that it includes the situation where 
performance is possible but it would be unreasonable to expect the debtor to perform. 
                                                 
134
  356 (section by M B M Loos). 
135
  HR 21 May 1976, NJ 1977, 73 (Oosterhuis/Unigro). See also HR 9 May 1969, NJ 1969, 
338 (Van der Pol/De Jong), and HR 27 June 1997, NJ 1997, 641 (Budde/Toa Moa 
Cruising Ltd).  
136
  See G J P de Vries “Are the Principles Of European Contract Law better than Dutch 
contract law?” in M W Hesselink & G J P de Vries Principles of European Contract Law 
(2001) 107 130 346; Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law: A 
Commentary 193 (section by M M van Rossum). See also J du Plessis “Possibility and 
certainty” in D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed 
(2012) 206. 
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The bottom line is that this situation nevertheless constitutes an impediment in claiming 
specific performance in our law. To that extent, the consequences for the debtor’s 
counter-performance if his performance requires unreasonable efforts in these systems 
are the same as the consequences in our law; the contract remains valid but specific 
performance of the obligation is excluded. Whether it is fair to still hold the debtor liable 
for damages is, however, open to doubt.137 
It follows that Dutch courts may also refuse to enforce a contract where the contract will 
be extremely disadvantageous and unreasonable to the debtor. They may deny the 
remedy on the basis of reasonableness and equity, and award damages instead. 
Accordingly, a court has refused to enforce a contract in terms of which a former wife 
and husband agreed on the financial division of the family house, because it would have 
left the woman and her children homeless.138  
It is of note that German law, in contrast to Dutch law, expressly links the 
disproportionality restriction to the general principle of good faith: § 275(2) BGB 
provides that the debtor may refuse performance (Leistung) to the extent that 
“performance requires expense and effort which, taking into account the subject matter 
of the obligation and the requirements of good faith, is grossly disproportionate to the 
                                                 
137
  For discourse on whether there is a more satisfactory solution to the problem of hardship 
(falling short of the impossibility standard) as a result of changed circumstances, see 
Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific 
performance” in Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr 95-98 (consider esp authority 
cited in n 122, regarding the recognition of the doctrine of frustration in our law);               
A Hutchison “Change of circumstances in contract law: the clausula rebus sic 
stantibus” 2009 THRHR 60; “Gap filling to address changed circumstances in contract law 
– when it comes to losses and gains, sharing is the fair solution” 2010 Stell LR 414; “The 
doctrine of frustration: a solution to the problem of changed circumstances in South 
African contract law” 2010 SALJ 84; J Coetzee “The case for economic hardship in South 
Africa: Lessons to be learnt from international practice and economic theory” (2011) 36(2) 
Journal for Juridical Science 8. 
138
  See HR 16 January 1981, NJ 1981, 312 (X/Y). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   338 
 
interest in performance of the creditor”. However, Mak convincingly argues that the 
“disproportionality restriction in Dutch law may be brought under a similar heading of 
good faith” if one considers certain provisions of the BW referring to the requirements of 
reasonableness and fairness.139 First, Article 6:2(2) BW provides that “a rule in force 
between a creditor and his debtor by virtue of law, common practice or a juridical act 
does not apply as far as this would be unacceptable, in the circumstances, by standards 
of reasonableness and fairness”. Secondly, Article 6:248(2) BW similarly provides that 
“a rule, to be observed by parties as a result of their agreement, is not applicable insofar 
this, given the circumstances, would be unacceptable to standards of reasonableness 
and fairness”. 140  
The development of the concepts of reasonableness and equity, even though codified in 
Articles 6:2 and 6:248(2) BW, also depends on the courts, as these concepts 
encompass a rather wide range of possible limitations. And an analysis of Dutch case 
law illustrates that the principle of good faith must be observed by parties and courts in 
maintaining the rights granted to parties in having their contracts specifically performed. 
In this regard the Hoge Raad held in 2001141 that it is in the courts’ discretion to refuse 
specific performance on the basis of reasonableness and equity. This case concerned 
the design and construction of an office building in the centre of Rotterdam. After 
completion and delivery of the building, the aluminum sheets applied to the building’s 
exterior to make it weather-proof started to corrode. The plaintiff claimed replacement of 
all this siding on the basis of non-performance of an obligation arising from a guarantee 
in the contract. However, the defendant argued that such an order should not be made 
because it would be economically severely detrimental to him. He proposed an 
alternative solution that would be less detrimental and maintained that it would be more 
                                                 
139
  Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 99. 
140
  Cf paras 2 3 1 2 & 5 4 above. 
141
   HR 5 January 2001, NJ 2001, 79 (Multi Vastgoed/Nethou). For further discussion, see  
Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 101, and M Smits 
Efficient Breach and the Enforcement of Specific Performance LLM thesis Amsterdam 
Law School (2014) 19 ff. 
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convenient to simply repair the defects by treating the siding of the building with an 
additional chemical substance which would protect it against further corrosion. He also 
contended that this would adequately serve the interests of the plaintiff. Even though 
the Hoge Raad did not accept his arguments, it emphasised that deciding a claim for 
specific performance requires a balancing of the mutual interests of the parties. It 
summarised the position as follows: 
“The general principle is that the creditor may either choose specific performance, to the 
extent that performance is still possible (...), or damages of any kind. When making his 
choice, however, the creditor is not entirely free, given that he will be bound by the 
requirements of reasonableness and equity, taking into consideration the reasonable 
interests of his counterpart as well.”142 
While the Hoge Raad confirmed that the requirements of good faith and fair dealing, 
including the justified interests of the debtor, may stand in the way of an order for 
specific performance, they upheld the order of the Gerechtsof (Court of Appeal) that the 
defendant was bound to effect replacement, on the ground that the balancing of the 
parties’ interests did not reveal disparity between the interests which are served by 
ordering specific performance and the interests which are damaged as a result thereof. 
The scope of the disproportionality restriction in civil-law systems is thus broader than it 
is in Anglo-American law, which, as indicated above, limits the application of the 
restriction in cases of economic hardship to the debtor. However, the principle of good 
faith leaves “some scope” for taking into account economic hardship to the debtor.143 
The cases decided by the German Supreme Court144 lay down limitations to the 
availability of specific performance based on good faith. In both cases the court refused 
to order specific performance based on the reasonable interests of the party against 
                                                 
142
   HR 5 January 2001, NJ 2001, 79 (Multi Vastgoed/Nethou) 505. This quotation appears in 
Haas & Jansen “Specific performance in Dutch law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 20. 
143
  Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 100. 
144
  See text to nn 109-110 above. 
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whom the order was sought. As these cases indicate, the interests are likely to be of an 
economic nature. In Multi Vastgoed/Nethou145 the Dutch Supreme Court similarly took 
into account the possible economic detriment to the debtor if they ordered him to 
perform in specie.146 
What becomes increasingly clear is that the civil-law systems under review recognise 
fewer restrictions to specific performance than the common-law systems do. This can 
be ascribed to the fact that Anglo-American law recognises specific performance as an 
exceptional remedy and courts have a discretion to grant the remedy. Bars to specific 
performance do not arise directly in Anglo-American law, since specific performance is 
the exception.147 However, as indicated above (and throughout this thesis) Anglo-
American law recognises discretionary reasons for refusing specific performance. The 
purpose of recognising these reasons is to circumscribe the discretion the courts have 
to grant the remedy, in order to ensure legal certainty, i.e. to enable practitioners to 
advise their clients on the likely outcome of claims for specific performance. But, to 
ensure that the right to specific performance is not compromised, the duty of 
performance is only excluded in limited circumstances by the civil-law systems.148 The 
question now is how international instruments, which are aimed at harmonising these 
                                                 
145
  HR 5 January 2001, NJ 2001, 79 (discussed above). 
146
  Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 101-102; Smits 
Efficient Breach and the Enforcement of Specific Performance 19, observing that “High 
costs are what brought the Dutch Hoge Raad to introduce guidelines to what extent 
specific performance can be demanded”. 
147
  See n 125 above. 
148
  See in relation to South African law, Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to 
refuse an order for specific performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific 
Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 110: “From this 
perspective the denial of the existence of rules governing the exercise of the discretion in 
Benson v. SA Mutual becomes understandable. It derives from an apprehension that the 
development of a separate system of rules at the remedial level would erode the right of a 
creditor to a performance contracted for according to the rules of substantive law.” 
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traditions, deal with the problem of hardship. It is to these instruments that we will now 
turn. 
6 4  Unreasonable effort or expense as a bar to specific performance in 
international instruments: CISG, PECL, PICC, DCFR, CESL 
As indicated in chapter 2, various international instruments that aim to promote greater 
uniformity in contract law contain provisions granting the creditor a substantive right to 
specific performance, subject to certain exceptions.149 The UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC),150 the Principles of European Contract Law 
(PECL),151 the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),152 the Common European 
Sales Law (CESL),153 and the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG)154 regard specific performance as the primary remedy for breach of 
contract, but restrict the availability of this remedy based on considerations of 
reasonableness and practicability.  
6 4 1  The CISG 
As stated previously, the CISG follows a predominantly civilian approach in that specific 
performance is regarded as the primary remedy and inadequacy of damages is not 
required.155 However, there are indications in the CISG that reasonableness will be 
considered in deciding whether to acknowledge the buyer’s right to specific 
performance. These indications specifically relate to the buyer’s right to require repairs 
under Article 46(3) of delivered but defective goods. According to this provision, the 
buyer will have a general right to require the seller to cure any form of lack of conformity 
                                                 
149
  See para 2 3 3 above. 
150
   Art 7.2.1 & Art 7.2.2 PICC. See also para 2 3 3 2 above. 
151
  Art 9:101 & Art 9:102 PECL. See also para 2 3 3 3 above. 
152
  Art III–3:302. See also para 2 3 3 4 above. 
153
  Art 110 (buyer’s right) & Art 132 (seller’s right). See also para 2 3 3 5 above. 
154
  Art 46 (buyer’s right) & Art 62 (seller’s right). See also para 2 3 3 1 above. 
155
  See para 2 3 3 1 above. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   342 
 
by way of repair “unless this is unreasonable, having regard to all the circumstances”. 
Reasonableness of the buyer’s demand is determined according to the circumstances 
surrounding the contract and the interests of both parties. When determining what is 
unreasonable, both the seller’s and the buyer’s interests must be considered. For 
example, the costs that the seller would have to incur as a result of the repair would be 
taken into account. And if the repair is considered unreasonable in the circumstance, 
the buyer will be entitled to damages or a reduction in price. This reflects the CISG’s 
concern for not causing unreasonable inconvenience or hardship to the contracting 
parties.156 
Article 46(3) must be considered in conjunction with Article 28, which states that a court 
is not bound to make an order for specific performance unless it would do so under its 
own law.157 This means that in many systems a creditor may not be able to claim 
specific performance because the main restrictions on specific performance in sale of 
goods cases, namely impossibility and severe hardship, feature in all of the national 
systems under review.158  
 
 
                                                 
156
  Similarly, in terms of Art 48, the seller may, even after the date of delivery,                
remedy at his own expense any failure to perform its obligations, if it can                          
do so without unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable 
inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses              
advanced by the buyer. See L Chengwei Remedies for Non-performance –      
Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT Principles and PECL (2007) 75. Available online at 
<http://www.jus.uio.no/sisu/remedies_for_non_performance_perspectives_from_cisg_upic
c_and_pecl.chengwei_liu/landscape.a5.pdf>. See also S Eiselen “A comparison of the 
remedies for breach of contract under the CISG and South African law” in J Basedow et al 
(eds) Aufbruch nach Europa – 75 jahre Max-Planck-Institut für Privatrecht (2001). 
157
  See again para 2 3 3 1 above. 
158
  See para 6 5 1 below. 
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6 4 2  The PICC, PECL, DCFR and the CESL 
Despite the fact that these instruments adopted the general principle of specific 
performance, the PICC, the PECL the DCFR, and the CESL also contain certain 
defined exceptions to the principle of specific performance. These include when 
performance is impossible (hereafter the first exception) or unreasonably burdensome 
(hereafter the second exception). For the sake of convenience these instruments will be 
discussed together, since they similarly consider impossibility and impracticability as 
impediments to a creditor’s right to specific performance. 
The PICC, the PECL, the DCFR and the CESL also sought to reach some kind of a 
compromise between civil-law and common-law jurisdictions, since a claim for 
performance is admitted in general but excluded in several situations. It follows that the 
right to specific performance is recognised in accordance with the civil-law tradition, but 
the inclusion of numerous exceptions which effectively limit this right, resembles the 
restrictive approach of the common-law tradition.159 These were designed to 
accommodate the common-law systems.160 Only some of these exceptions are relevant 
for purposes of this chapter.161  
                                                 
159
  See Chengwei Remedies for Non-performance 60; C von Bar & E Clive (eds) Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR) I (2009) 829; S Vogenauer & J Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) (2009) 125 (section 
by Kleinheisterkamp). 
160
  But still (in contrast to South African law) these instruments “do not mix up rights and 
discretion. There is an entitlement to specific performance, subject to defined exceptions. 
A court does not have a general discretion to refuse the remedy”. See E Clive & D 
Hutchison “Breach of contract” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed Legal 
Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South 
Africa (2004) 176 195 (commenting on the PECL in particular). 
161
  Arts 7.2.2(c) PICC; 9: 102(2)(d) PECL; III–3:302(5) DCFR, excluding the remedy where 
performance may reasonably be obtained from another source, is discussed in ch 3. 
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The first relevant exception is impossibility of performance. Specific performance cannot 
be obtained if, according to:  
- PICC 7.2.2(a): “performance is impossible in law or in fact”;                
- PECL 9: 102(2)(a): “performance would be unlawful or impossible”;   
- DCFR III–3:302(3)(a): “performance would be unlawful or impossible”; 
- CESL 110(3)(a): “performance would be impossible or has become unlawful”.  
Thus, according to these rules there is no right to claim performance if it is impossible. 
The concept of impossibility refers to objective and subjective impossibility, and in both 
cases the creditor will have to resort to a claim for either damages or termination or 
both.162 It follows that impossibility does not nullify the contract: these rules only state 
that there can be no specific enforcement of the contract; other remedies are still 
available to the creditor.163 This clearly corresponds with the civil-law concept of 
impossibility.164 If performance is factually impossible, for example, a particular painting 
by Picasso or the entire load of a named ship was destroyed before delivery, ordering 
specific performance would be useless. Similarly, specific performance will not be 
                                                                                                                                                             
Whereas Arts 7.2.2(d) PICC; 9: 102(2)(c) PECL; III–3:302(3)(c) DCFR, excluding the 
remedy where performance is of such a personal character that it would be unreasonable 
to enforce it, is discussed in ch 4.  
162
  See Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A 
Commentary 352 (section by Loos). See also Eiselen “Specific performance and special 
damages” in MacQueen & Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South 
African Perspectives 266. 
163
  See cmt 3(a) on Art 7.2.2 PICC; cmt E on Art 9:102 PECL (reproduced in cmt E on III–
3:302 DCFR). 
164
  See 2 3 1 1 & 6 3 above. However, cases of moral impossibility known in German and 
Dutch law are excluded by these provisions. See R Zimmermann “Remedies for non-
performance: the revised German law of obligations, viewed against the background of 
the Principles of European Contract Law” (2002) 6 Edin LR 271 285; Eiselen “Specific 
performance and special damages” in MacQueen & Zimmermann (eds) European 
Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 266. 
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ordered where the defaulting party has already delivered the goods to a third party, who 
obtains priority over the plaintiff to the subject matter of the contract. Of course, the 
creditor is also not entitled to specific performance where performance is prohibited by 
law, as illegal contracts will never be enforced.165  
The second exception is that specific performance cannot be claimed if performance is 
unreasonably burdensome or expensive. More specifically, specific performance cannot 
be obtained if, according to:  
- PICC 7.2.2(b): “performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably 
burdensome or expensive”;  
- PECL 9:102(2)(b): “performance would cause the debtor unreasonable effort or 
expense”;  
- DCFR III–3:302(3)(b): “performance would be unreasonably burdensome or 
expensive”;  
- CESL 110(3)(b): “the burden or expense of performance would be disproportionate 
to the benefit that the buyer would obtain”.  
This exception covers the wider notion of impracticability (as opposed to impossibility), 
recognised by the civil-law systems, and cases of practical impossibility need to be dealt 
with under this exception.166 Thus, the unreasonable burden of performing an obligation 
                                                 
165
  See cmt 3(a) on Art 7.2.2 PICC; cmt E on Art 9:102 PECL (reproduced in cmt E on Art III–
3:302 DCFR); Chengwei Remedies for Non-performance 97-98; Vogenauer & 
Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (PICC) 788 (section by H Schelhaas). 
166
  See Busch et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A 
Commentary 352 (section by Loos); Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” 
in MacQueen & Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African 
Perspectives 266. Similar to the civil-law systems reviewed above, the instruments 
discussed here do not consider initial impossibility as affecting the validity of the contract. 
It does not exempt the debtor from liability. Specific performance will not be available but 
the debtor will be liable for damages for non-performance. See eg Arts 3.1.3 PICC; 4:102 
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is closely linked to practical impossibility.167 It has been suggested that this second 
exception covers the classic example where the debtor has to deliver goods which have 
not been destroyed, but are inaccessible because the goods sank to the bottom of the 
ocean. To retrieve it would be so costly that the debtor can invoke unreasonable burden 
in order to escape specific performance.168 This exception is of particular importance, as 
it addresses similar concerns to those raised in relation to the South African 
approach.169 
The CESL takes a slightly different approach in terms of wording the limitation, 
specifically by employing the term “disproportionate” as opposed to “unreasonable” but 
it is suggested here that both terms denote excessiveness and can be used 
interchangeably.170 The commentaries on these exceptions suggest that there is no 
stated rule for when effort or expense would be considered “unreasonable” or 
                                                                                                                                                             
PECL; II–7:102 DCFR (not reproduced in the CESL – see J Cartwright & M Schmidt-
Kessel “Defects in consent: mistake, fraud, threats, unfair exploitation” in G Dannemann & 
S Vogenauer (eds) The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with 
English and German Law (2013) 373 416 n 325). 
167
  See A Jakutytė-Sungailienė “The application of specific performance in contractual 
relations” (2010) 2(6) Social Sciences Studies 227 232. Available online at 
<www.mruni.eu/lt/mokslo_darbai/sms/archyvas/dwn.php?id=257440>. 
168
  See Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives 45. 
169
  See para 6 1 1 above. 
170
  See eg Von Bar & Clive (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) I 831 (commenting on III–3:302(3)(b) 
DCFR): “Burdensome does not mean financially burdensome. It is wider than that. It could 
cover something which involved a disproportionate effort or even something which was 
liable to cause great distress, vexation or inconvenience.” 
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“disproportionate”.171 It follows that different factors could indicate such 
unreasonableness/disproportionality.172  
It is certain, however, that considerations as to the reasonableness of the transaction or 
of the appropriateness of the counter-performance will not be taken into account in this 
determination.173 Essentially, this exception of unreasonable effort or expense is aimed 
at addressing those situations where, under the specific circumstances, it would be 
unreasonable to require the debtor to perform. This exception covers situations where 
performance is in itself possible and allowed, but would result in unreasonable effort or 
expense. Practically speaking this would most often occur when there has been a 
drastic change in circumstance after the conclusion of the contract, and performance 
although still possible, may have become so onerous that it would be contrary to the 
general principle of good faith and fair dealing to require it.174 This is interesting from a 
South African perspective, since we do not have judicial consideration of whether 
obligations, in such circumstances, have become frustrated.175 
                                                 
171
  See eg O Lando & H Beale The Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II (2000) 
396; Von Bar & Clive (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) I 831; R Schulze (ed) Common 
European Sales Law (CESL) – Commentary (2012) 506-507 (by Zoll). 
172
  L Meyer Non-Performance and Remedies under International Contract Law Principles and 
Indian Contract Law: A Comparative Survey of the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, the Principles of European Contract Law, and Indian Statutory 
Contract Law (2010) 112. 
173
  See Chengwei Remedies for Non-performance 98; Von Bar & Clive (eds) Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR) I 831, cmt F. 
174
  See cmt 3(b) on Art 7.2.2 PICC; cmt F on Art 9:102 PECL, which also clarifies that 
paragraph (2) sub-paragraph (b) includes but is not limited to supervening event cases 
covered by Art 6:111 PECL.  
175
  See text to nn 10 ff para 6 1 1 above. 
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It follows that this category of exceptions goes hand in hand with the instruments’ rules 
on hardship as a result of a change of circumstances.176 If performance would be so 
onerous or impracticable that compelling the debtor to perform would constitute 
hardship, Articles 6.2.1-6.2.3 PICC; 6:111 PECL; III–1:110 DCFR; 89 CESL177 provide 
for party renegotiation or judicial adaptation of the contract.178 Thus, if the goods 
contracted for sink to the bottom of the ocean before delivery and can only be retrieved 
                                                 
176
  See eg Vogenauer & Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 791 § 30 by H Schelhaas: “The distinction 
between performance which has become unreasonably burdensome or expensive and a 
drastic change of circumstances (hardship, Art 6.2.1) is a delicate one, and the concepts 
usually overlap. If an event fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract (Art 6.2.2), 
either because the cost of performance has increased or the value of the performance a 
party receives has diminished, performance will usually also be considered as 
unreasonably burdensome or expensive.” 
177
  The Art 79 CISG contains a similar provision: “A party is not liable for a failure to perform 
any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his 
control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into 
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or 
its consequences.” See further, for commentary and comparative analysis, I Schwenzer 
“Force majeure and hardship in international sales contracts” (2008) 39 VUWLR 709. 
178
  Thus, in contrast to our law, the examined instruments make specific provision for 
variation or termination by courts in case of a change of circumstances commonly referred 
to as hardship. Note that they do not contain the words “supervening event” but 
“synonyms can be detected and references to ‘supervening events’ appear in some of the 
comments and explanatory notes which accompany these texts” (Unberath & McKendrick 
“Supervening events” in Dannemann & Vogenauer (eds) The Common European Sales 
Law in Context: Interactions with English and German Law 563). In Dutch and German 
law the courts may also refuse specific performance in such cases and grant damages 
instead or change the contents of the contract (Art 6:258 BW; § 313 BGB) – see Mak 
Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 100, and Brunner Force 
Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-performance 
in International Arbitration 405 ff. 
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at a cost that far exceeds the value of the goods, the parties cannot claim specific 
performance of that contract and must either rely on other remedies or renegotiate the 
terms of the contract.179 Other circumstances that could indicate impracticability include, 
for example, whether the defendant’s obligations are stated in general terms leaving 
scope for disagreement, and whether the court will be able to define the contractual 
obligation in its order.180 The relevance of this factor in connection with the supervision 
objection was discussed in the previous chapter.181 The following section explores, inter 
alia, to what extent it182 should dissuade our courts from ordering specific performance. 
6 5  Evaluative remarks and conclusions 
6 5 1  Introduction 
As indicated throughout this chapter, specific performance is a potentially onerous 
remedy. Although this remedy gives effect to or reinforces the sanctity of validly-
concluded contracts, it has the disadvantage of enabling the plaintiff to insist on 
performance even though it might cause undue hardship to the defendant and even the 
public at large. For this reason, all of the legal systems (both common and civilian) and 
                                                 
179
  Meyer Non-Performance and Remedies under International Contract Law Principles 112-
113. According to Schelhaas (Vogenauer & Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 792 § 31): “if the 
provisions for hardship and performance being unreasonably burdensome or expensive 
apply to the same facts, it is not certain which provision takes precedence. Neither the 
PICC nor the Official Comment considers this issue. It might be argued that the doctrine of 
hardship, being the more specific rule, prevails over the doctrine relating to performance 
as ‘unreasonably burdensome’ or expensive (lex specialis derogat legi generali). It is, 
however, preferable to let the aggrieved party choose which of the two provisions it wants 
to rely on.” 
180
   Vogenauer & Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 792 § 32 (by H Schelhaas). 
181
  See para 5 4 above. 
182
  Cf n 217 below. 
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model instruments under consideration restrict the availability of specific performance 
where some form of “severe”, “unreasonable” or “undue” hardship is involved. This then 
forms a second, main restriction on specific performance, apart from impossibility. As 
indicated, this restriction usually relates to undue hardship to the defendant, but undue 
hardship to third parties may also defeat a claim for specific performance.183 While the 
basis for the restriction may take a different form in each system (the civilian systems 
and model instruments184 recognise it under the principle of good faith,185 while the 
common-law systems recognise it based on the requirement of equity),186 the 
underlying rule appears to be the same: the availability of specific performance is 
always restricted if it would cause undue hardship to the defendant or to third parties. 
 
 
                                                 
183
  See eg text to nn 88 ff above. 
184
  Each of the comparator texts contains express reference to the obligation of observing 
good faith: see Articles 1.7 PICC; 1:201 PECL; III–1:103 DCFR; 2 CESL; 7 CISG 
(Addendum A). 
185
  See Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 108. In 
relation to specific performance in English law, Mak says that “the only hint at a principle 
of good faith is given by the requirement of equity that the claimant comes to court ‘with 
clean hands’, which requires among things that he shall have acted in good faith” (107). 
She refers to R Goode The Concept of Good Faith in English Law (1992) 5, as authority 
for this view. 
186
  See eg Gould v Kemp (1834) 39 ER 959 961; Patel v Ali [1984] Ch 283. See also 
Northcote A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts by Sir Edward Fry 199 ff 
§§ 417 ff. For US authority, see De Caro v De Caro, 97 A.2d 658 (1953): “Where 
inadequacy of consideration is so gross as to shock the conscience, court will decline to 
enforce the agreement, and denial of specific performance in such case may be rested 
upon the ground that the remedy is discretionary and that harsh and unfair contracts will 
not be enforced.” 
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6 5 2  The proposal for reform: undue hardship as exception to specific 
performance 
We now turn to the proposed development for South African law. It has already been 
shown above that our law rejects any notion of relief for changed circumstances that do 
not amount to supervening impossibility.187 However, as in Anglo-American law, our law 
restricts the availability of specific performance where performance becomes 
excessively burdensome but falls short of what is required for avoidance under the 
doctrine of supervening impossibility.  
Our courts have often indicated when specific performance would probably be 
refused.188 For instance, as we have seen in Santos, Foxcroft J held that courts should 
“refuse performance where a recognised hardship to the defaulting party is proved”.189 
Apart from the cases discussed in paragraph 6 1 above, the course of recent authority 
also confirms this. For example, the court in Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v 
Mapoe190 dealt with the Benson decision, as well as the Haynes decision, especially 
regarding the matters of undue hardship to the respondent, a rugby player, if he were to 
be compelled to comply with his contractual obligations. It is on the ground of undue 
                                                 
187
  This accords with English law – see Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure 280 ff §§ 6-020 
ff; Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 97; A Hutchison 
“Gap filling to address changed circumstances in contract law – when it comes to losses 
and gains, sharing is the fair solution” 2010 Stell LR 414 420. 
188
  See Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract 225; Sharrock “Contract” in Joubert 
& Faris LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed para 496; Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in 
South Africa 548-549; Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 
323. See eg Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) SA 293 (W) para [17]. 
189
  Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 86H.  
190
  Unreported judgment with case no 4587/2010 delivered on 29 Sep 2010 by the Free State 
Provincial Division of the High Court (copy on file with author). 
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hardship to the defaulting party that Van Zyl J refused to grant the main relief sought,191 
particularly the possibility of him being held in contempt for not playing “good” rugby.192  
Also noteworthy is the recent decision in Botha v Rich NO,193 in which the Constitutional 
Court exercised its discretion to refuse specific performance so as to avoid undue 
hardship to the defendants.194 Here, the plaintiff had concluded an instalment sale 
agreement to buy immovable property from a trust. After she began to default on the 
instalments, the trust cancelled the agreement and successfully sued for eviction in 
accordance with a cancellation clause which stated that breach by the plaintiff would 
entitle the trust to cancel the agreement and retain the payments made in terms of the 
instalment sale. However, having paid three-quarters of the purchase price, the plaintiff 
demanded transfer of the property into her name; relying on section 27(1) of the 
Alienation of Land Act. The court found, that even though she was in principle entitled to 
                                                 
191
  In prayer 3 of the notice of motion: “Dat eerste respondent gelas word om onmiddelik vir 
diens aan te meld ter nakoming van sy kontraktuele verpligtinge uiteengesit in klousule 17 
van sy spelerskontrak met applikant en wel te applikant se besigheidsplek, Vodacompark, 
Bloemfontein …” 
192
  Paras [113]-[115]. However, the judge did grant the alternative relief sought, namely that 
he immediately reports for service (“dat eerste respondent gelas word om onmiddelik by 
applikant te Vodacompark vir diens aan te meld”), but is the necessary implication of an 
order requiring the player to “immediately report for service” not that he has to comply with 
his contractual duties as set out in his player’s contract? Surely the second, alternative, 
prayer is also open to different interpretations which would similarly expose the 
respondent to the danger of being held in contempt for not complying with the specific 
performance order. This should have prevented the court from ordering specific 
performance. See para 4 8 4 above, for further discussion on why the case was not 
suitable for specific performance.  
193
  2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). 
194
  After confirming the principle that where a purchaser has paid more than 50% of the 
purchase price under an instalment sale, he may claim transfer of the immovable property 
as provided for in s 27(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981, by registering a bond in 
favour of the seller for the balance, despite being in arrears with instalment payments. 
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specific performance to compel the trustees to register the property and sign all the 
documents necessary for transferring the property into her name, it would be 
disproportionate and unfair towards the defendant trustees to allow registration of 
transfer if the arrears had still not been paid. Therefore, the court made the registration 
conditional upon payment of the arrears and the amounts she owed in municipal rates, 
taxes and service fees.195 
It is clear that despite our courts’ reluctance to engage in the development of rules 
governing the exercise of the discretion;196 they will refuse specific performance if it 
would cause undue hardship to the defendant or to third parties. It therefore appears 
that Eiselen is correct in his finding that  
“The point of departure is the principle of pacta sunt servanda and courts will only very 
hesitantly use their discretion to refuse the remedy. There are no defined categories of cases 
other than impossibility and insolvency. The English exceptions of imprecision of the 
obligation, obligations for personal services, damages as a sufficient alternative, or the 
inability of the court to enforce its order, all seem largely to have fallen by the wayside. The 
only real exception remaining seems to be undue hardship.”197 
As indicated elsewhere, there are two recognised exceptions where the discretion is 
actually illusory or absent, namely impossibility of performance198 and the debtor’s 
                                                 
195
  See para [49] esp n 70. 
196
  See paras 1 1 3 4 & 4 8 3 above. See also Lubbe “Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg: die implikasies van die uitoefening van die regterlike diskresie” in Smits & 
Lubbe (eds) Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa 51 57 ff. 
197
  “Specific performance and special damages” in MacQueen & Zimmermann European 
Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 260. 
198
  See eg Van Rooyen v Baumer Investments (Pty) Ltd 1947 (1) SA 113 (W) 120, per 
Ettlinger AJ: “It is clear that there can be no order for specific performance of an obligation 
where the debtor cannot perform. That is clearly laid down in the cases of which Farmers’ 
Co-operative Society v Berry (1912. AD 343) and Shill v Milner (1937 AD 101) are 
examples.” 
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insolvency.199 It is proposed here that this list of exceptions be expanded to 
accommodate the reality that the judicial discretion is invariably exercised to refuse 
specific performance in cases where specific performance would cause undue hardship 
to the defendant or to third parties.200  
While such an approach may at first sound rigid, the proposed exception actually, and 
inevitably has a discretionary component built into it. The “undue” element relates to a 
discretion insofar that if specific performance is sought by the plaintiff and this defence 
is raised,201 the court should only refuse the remedy if the hardship to the defendant 
and/or to third parties is excessive or disproportionate, i.e. if there is disparity between 
the advantages to be gained (by the plaintiff or others) and the harm to be suffered from 
ordering specific performance (by the defendant or others).202 In other words, 
the limitation contains and depends on a proportionality assessment.   
6 5 3  The operation of the proposed exception 
In applying the proposed exception, a number of considerations are relevant. 
First, the exception should clearly require taking into account third-party interests. That 
our courts have considered the interests of the defaulting party as well as those of third 
parties in the refusal of the order is beyond doubt.203 For example, the rejection of 
specific performance by the trial court in Haynes was upheld for reasons which included 
the hardship the public would have suffered in the circumstances of the case from the 
                                                 
199
  See para 4 8 3 above & para 7 2 2 below. See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 542, and the 
cases cited there. 
200
  See cases noted in nn 204 & 207 below. 
201
  The onus to raise such an impediment to an order for specific performance rests on the 
defaulting party who wants to avert specific enforcement of the contract (see para 4 8 4 
above). See also Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v B N Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A) 442-443 
(para 7 2 2 below). 
202
  Cf para 6 5 3 below. 
203
  Lubbe & Murray Contract 543. 
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municipality’s obedience to the order, had one been granted.204 This may explain why 
academic commentators merely refer to “undue hardship”, i.e. undue hardship in 
general. Christie, for example, refers to the “undue hardship principle”205 and Eiselen 
concludes that “[t]he only real exception remaining seems to be undue hardship”.206 The 
undue hardship defence usually implies undue hardship to the defendant,207 since it is 
he who raises and argues the defence, but undue hardship to third parties can also 
defeat a claim for specific performance. This was confirmed by decisions such as 
Haynes and Barclays National Bank,208 and also by authors such as Hutchison and Du 
Bois.209 It is accordingly suggested here that the authors who interpreted Haynes as 
                                                 
204
  De Villiers AJA 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 381C-E: “There can to my mind be no doubt that in 
the present case to have ordered the respondent to release 250,000 gallons of water a 
day from their storage dam while the unprecedented drought continued and the water in 
the dam had sunk dangerously low would have worked very great hardship not only to the 
respondent but to the citizens of Kingwilliamstown to whom the respondent owed a public 
duty to render an adequate supply of water. As far as the inhabitants, who already 
suffered under severe water restrictions, were concerned, the order would not only have 
resulted in great hardship, but in positive danger to the health of the community and might 
have disrupted the life of the town. On the other hand, as pointed out above, there is no 
indication on the papers that the appellant suffered any damage. I come to the conclusion, 
therefore, that no ground has been shown to justify us in interfering with the discretion 
exercised by the Court a quo.” See also Barclays National Bank Ltd v Natal Fire 
Extinguishers Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 650 (D) 655 per Didcott J, and 
International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Affinity (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 79 (C) 87B-E per 
Grosskopf J. 
205
  Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 549. 
206
  See text to n 197 above. 
207
  See eg Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe (unreported judgment with case no 
4587/2010 delivered on 29 Sep 2010 by the Free State Provincial Division of the High 
Court), and York Timbers Ltd v Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry 2003 (4) SA 477 (T). 
208
  See also International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Affinity (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 79 (C) 87. 
209
  D Hutchison & F du Bois “Contracts in general” in Du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law 733 873. See also S Eiselen “Remedies for breach” in Hutchison & Pretorius 
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support for a rule that specific performance may never be awarded if it would cause 
undue hardship to the defendant or to third parties (which rule is also followed by the 
systems discussed above), were incorrect in their interpretation, because Haynes does 
not explicitly support such a restrictive approach, but correct in their ultimate position. 
The rule deserves support even though Haynes did not state it as a rule. The right to 
specific performance should be restricted where to enforce it would cause undue 
hardship to the defendant or to third parties.  
Secondly, in deciding whether the interests of  the defendant and/or third parties would 
be unduly affected by ordering specific performance, and hence give rise to undue 
hardship, requires a balancing exercise of competing interests. Thus, the amount of 
effort and/or expense performance would require from the defendant is but one of the 
considerations the court should take into account in its decision to uphold or reject the 
undue hardship defence.210 The interests of the plaintiff or the public in having the 
contract performed in specie may outweigh the harm or disadvantage to the defendant 
and/or third parties in which case their hardship should not be considered to be “undue” 
                                                                                                                                                             
(eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 323: “for the sake of consistency and certainty 
in the law, the courts tend to follow certain guidelines when deciding whether or not to 
order specific performance, and this has resulted in the recognition of a number of 
exceptional circumstances where specific performance is likely to be refused. The 
circumstances affecting the court’s discretion include whether undue hardship and 
personal services are involved … Courts will refuse to order specific performance where 
to do so would cause undue hardship to the defaulting party or to third parties.”  
210
  See Isep Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd 
1981 (4) SA 1 (A) 5E-G: “An example of such a case would be ‘where the cost to the 
defendant in being compelled to perform is out of all proportion to the corresponding 
benefit to the plaintiff and the latter can equally well be compensated by an award of 
damages’ (Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality (supra at 380B)”. 
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and the remedy awarded.211 Lubbe & Murray make an important observation in this 
regard:  
“The fifth example in Haynes – that specific performance will be refused where it will operate 
unreasonably harshly on the defendant or involves unreasonableness or injustice – is an 
example … [which] requires a consideration of the role of contract law and, as we see in the 
Haynes case, might raise questions of asserting one obligation (the obligation to provide 
water to the inhabitants of King William’s Town) over another (the obligation to fulfil the 
contract concluded with Haynes).”212 
Apart from the public service/Haynes example,213 this point can also be illustrated with 
reference to a more common personal service contract. For example, if a builder, who 
contracted to build an olympic-size swimming pool for a university, fails to build a 
swimming pool according to contractual specifications that set out the dimensions of 
olympic pools, for example if it is only 49 m and not 50 m in length, he should not be 
able to raise this defence successfully. If a specific performance order is sought by the 
university, its interests as well as those of the public in having an olympic-size 
swimming pool by far outweighs the burden such an order would place on the 
defendant. The university will not be able to claim that their pool meets olympic 
standards and will not be able to host long course swimming competitions, and the 
students will also not be able to train and prepare properly for long course events. An 
order requiring the builder to remove the current structure and rebuild the swimming 
pool according to the contract’s specifications would be justified/due even though the 
order would naturally require a large amount of effort and expense from the defendant.  
However, if a builder is supposed to build a regular leisure swimming pool which is 2 
metres deep, but builds one which is only 1, 9 metres deep, there may be greater scope 
for successfully raising this defense. An order requiring him to remove the current 
                                                 
211
  See again passage from De Wet & Van Wyk’s Kontraktereg en Handelsreg quoted in n 2 
para 6 1 above.  
212
  Contract 543. 
213
  See also decision by Pennsylvania court discussed in text to n 90 para 6 2 above. 
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structure and dig a deeper hole in order to comply with the contractual specifications, 
could be disproportionally onerous in terms of cost and effort, because the fact that the 
pool is 0,1 metres shallower could potentially have a very limited impact on the client’s 
use and enjoyment thereof.214 This difference in depth (in contrast to the olympic pool 
example) will not make the pool unsuitable for its purpose. In discussing a French 
case,215 Beale et al similarly contend that to order correction of the defect, i.e. specific 
performance of the initial agreement, where the difference/defect is so insignificant 
would be “rather extreme” and “[i]t could be wise to take into account a cost-benefit 
analysis”.216  
                                                 
214
  For discourse on alternative remedies available to the aggrieved party, see J du Plessis 
The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment (2012) 370-371. 
215
  Cass civ 3, 11 May 2005, pourvoi no 03-21136, RTD civ 2005, 596. In this case the 
building was 0, 33 m too low and this did not make the building unsuitable for its purpose, 
and it was also not an “essential or determining element of the contract”. The Cour de 
cassation nevertheless ruled that “a party owned an obligation which has not been 
performed may force the other to perform whenever performance is possible”. Beale et al 
also refer to an unreported French decision, Cass civ, 17 November 1984, where the court 
similarly ordered specific performance of a contract for a swimming pool which required 
that it be fitted with four steps but it was built with only three. The court ordered the 
correction of this defect even though it had not been shown that having only three steps 
would cause the plaintiff any inconvenience. See Cases, Materials and Text on Contract 
Law 856-857. 
216
  The position in French law is thus that specific performance should not be refused simply 
because the inconvenience caused to the creditor by the non-performance is slight. 
French courts will order correction of the defect in spite of the harsh consequences for the 
debtor, and will only refuse to order correction if it is impossible (see eg Y Laithier 
“Comparative reflections on the French law of remedies for breach of contract” in N Cohen 
& E McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (2005) 103). 
However, the cost-benefit analysis (as an expression of the notion of impracticability) 
suggested by Beale et al undoubtedly provides a more equitable and economically 
efficient solution. It is accordingly suggested here that if the defect would cause slight 
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The operation of the exception (or the success of the defence) will thus depend on a 
balancing of interests or advantage and disadvantage.217 Specific performance will only 
be refused if it would cause the defendant or third parties undue hardship. The undue 
criterion also accommodates the interests of the plaintiff and third parties in having the 
contract performed,218 because the order will only be refused if the detriment/hardship 
to the defendant/third parties is entirely out of proportion to the benefit which the plaintiff 
and/or third parties will derive from performance. For example, in Haynes, the plaintiff 
claimed specific performance in spite of a severe drought and a shortage of water, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
inconvenience to the creditor, while correcting it can only be done at an excessive and 
unreasonable cost (which would certainly be the case if corresponding with the contractual 
specifications means rebuilding an entire swimming pool), the creditor should rely on other 
remedies. Refusing specific performance may encourage him to rely on the concomitant 
defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus (if the non-performing party claims counter-
performance) for example. If the pool is used by the owner creditor though, a South 
African court may exercise its discretion to prevent unfairness and relax the principle of 
reciprocity by awarding a reduced contract price to the builder, a result which is mutually 
beneficial and still serves reciprocity. See in this regard G Lubbe & J du Plessis “Law of 
contract” in C G van der Merwe & J E du Plessis (eds) Introduction to the Law of South 
Africa (2004) 243 263-264; Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South 
Africa 316-321; A Hutchison “Reciprocity in contract law” 2013 Stell LR 3; BK Tooling 
(Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A); Botha v 
Rich NO 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) para [43]. 
217
  The extent to which an obligation is defined, and the burden an insufficiently defined 
specific performance order might place on the defendant and the court could thus 
influence a court to refuse the remedy in terms of the proposed exception. Courts may 
refuse to order specific performance on the ground that it would burden itself excessively if 
it ordered specific performance (in view of possible further applications to clarify the 
parties’ obligations or to determine whether imprecisely defined obligations have been 
properly performed) or else that it would burden the defendant excessively if it ordered 
him to perform insufficiently defined obligations in breach of which he might find himself 
liable for contempt (cf text to n 217 para 5 5 above). 
218
  Compare American approach: text to n 93 para 6 2 above. 
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even though she did not need the water.219 The court’s refusal to order specific 
performance was therefore justified, because the hardship the defendant and the town’s 
residents would have suffered if specific performance was ordered outweighed the 
hardship to the plaintiff if the order was refused. 
This corresponds with the disproportionality restriction recognised by the civil-law 
systems and international instruments examined above. The proposed approach also 
reflects the limitations which Articles 7.2.2(b) PICC, 9:102(2)(b) PECL, III–3:302(3)(b) 
DCFR, and 110(3)(b) CESL place on the enforcement of non-monetary obligations. It is 
evident that all of the instruments under review depart from exactly the same position, 
and that specific performance is recognised as the primary remedy for breach of 
contract (both relating to monetary and non-monetary obligations). This point of 
departure clearly resembles the civil-law tradition. However, based on the principle of 
good faith, certain exceptions to the general principle of specific performance have been 
recognised. And in this respect, the instruments resemble both the common- and civil-
law traditions.  
It may then be concluded that, as far as exclusion of specific performance is concerned, 
the approach adopted by the PICC, the PECL, the DCFR, and the CESL, provides a 
more refined solution which is more conducive to legal certainty. It is submitted that this 
approach provides a valuable model for the proposed reform of the South African 
law.220  
                                                 
219
  Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378A, 381D.  
220
  However, the model instruments and the continental legal systems under consideration 
specifically refer to the debtor’s interests, and maintain that the remedy will not be granted 
if it would be unreasonable to require the debtor to perform, i.e. if performance would 
require unreasonable effort and/or expense from the debtor. Since the proposed 
exception also excludes a claim for specific performance if it would cause undue hardship 
to third parties, it corresponds (to a greater degree) with the approach adopted by 
common-law courts, who also consider the effect of a specific performance order on third 
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6 5 4  The basis of the proposed exception 
This brings us to the possible basis for the proposed development for South African law. 
As indicated throughout this chapter, the courts have not explicitly recognised a rule 
whereby specific performance is restricted if it would cause undue hardship to the 
defendant or to third parties.221 However, as pointed out earlier222 analyses of the case 
law show that when undue hardship (to the defendant and/or to third parties) is present, 
there is in effect no discretion; the remedy is invariably refused.  
This proposed exception can thus be inferred from South African judicial practice.223 It is 
also consistent with the views of certain academic commentators.224 For example, as 
mentioned earlier in chapter 4, Lubbe similarly submits that the adoption of a 
Fallgruppen approach, that is the recognition of certain Fallgruppen or case groups in 
which the remedy should be denied, might lead to “the denial of the remedy in cases of 
impossibility falling short of the existing substantive doctrine”.225 Against this 
                                                                                                                                                             
parties, and refuse the remedy if it would cause severe hardship to third parties.  See text 
to nn 88 ff para 6 2 above. 
221
  As indicated from the outset, the court in Haynes did not make it a rule that the remedy 
should always be denied if it would cause undue hardship to the defendant or to third 
parties, they actually only listed it as an example of where specific performance has been 
and may be refused, in the exercise of the courts’ discretion (cf para 6 1 1 above). 
222
  See again nn 204 & 207 above. 
223
  See again Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378H-379A; 
Barclays National Bank Ltd v Natal Fire Extinguishers Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 
1982 (4) SA 650 (D) 658G-H; Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 
776 (A) 783D, and Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 
(C) 86H. 
224
  See esp Naudé (text to nn 47-49 para 6 1 2 above) and Eiselen “Specific performance 
and special damages” in MacQueen & Zimmermann European Contract Law: Scots and 
South African Perspectives 260. See further para 7 3 below. 
225
  See “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance 
in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National 
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background it may be argued that there is some scope for an approach which takes into 
account the harsh effects of specific enforcement. Moreover, Lubbe maintains that  
“[Since] South African law prides itself on its inherent equity and its dynamic and adaptable 
nature which manifests itself primarily in the developmental decisions of its judges …, it 
should be accepted that judicial practice in respect of the specific performance discretion 
may establish guidelines capable of being absorbed into the substantive law as rules 
determining when an agreement gives rise to a duty to perform and when such a duty 
becomes enforceable.”226 
As in English law,227 the role of good faith remains controversial in our law of contract. 
Good faith may, however, be a catalyst for the development of new rules,228 but it is not 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Other Perspectives 111-113, where Lubbe correctly observes that our law “regarding 
impossibility as a substantive doctrine is outmoded, and its development has not kept up 
with developments in other jurisdictions” (111). See also para 4 8 3 above.  
226
  See “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance 
in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National 
and Other Perspectives 115. 
227
  Mak Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law 106-108. 
228
  See eg R Zimmermann “Good faith and equity” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern 
Cross 240-241; Hutchison “Non-variation clauses in contract: any escape from the Shifren 
straitjacket?” 2001 SALJ 720 743-744; Lubbe “Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg: die implikasies van die uitoefening van die regterlike diskresie” in Smits & 
Lubbe (eds) Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa 74-75; “Contractual derogation and the 
discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in South African Law” in Smits et al 
(eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 114 ff; L F 
van Huyssteen & S van der Merwe “Good faith in contract: proper behaviour amidst 
changing circumstances” 1990 Stell LR 244 248-249: “In a system of contracts based on 
bona fides, a contractant should be entitled to proper conduct on the part of his co-
contractant. … A change in circumstances surrounding a contract could then result in a 
refusal to enforce the contract or a specific term if insistence on its enforcement in spite of 
the changed circumstances is objectively not in good faith when the relationship between 
the contractants is considered.” 
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a “free-floating” principle, justifying judicial discretions to refuse to enforce contracts.229 
Although it has been decided that it cannot serve as an independent basis for not 
enforcing contracts, the concept of good faith may inform the development of the 
proposed rule.230 
6 5 5  Conclusion 
This chapter also (as in chapter 4 on personal service contracts) raises issues relating 
to the divergence between the theory and practice of our law governing the availability 
of specific performance. It has been shown that to state that there is an open-ended 
discretion to refuse specific performance is misleading, because our courts inevitably 
and invariably exercise their discretion to refuse specific performance in cases where 
specific performance would cause undue hardship to the defendant or to third parties. It 
may be illogical to maintain this open-ended discretion, while the courts at the same 
time clearly follow this practice. It is suggested that a concrete rule may be preferable to 
reflect this reality, and to ensure that our law on the availability of specific performance 
is more coherent. If specific performance would cause undue hardship to the defendant 
or to third parties, the aggrieved party’s right to specific performance should be 
restricted.231 
                                                 
229
  See eg the statements of the majority of the SCA in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 
paras [22]-[24] (confirmed in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) and 
referred to in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA)), 
to the effect that good faith cannot operate as an open norm on a doctrinal level; rather, it 
constitutes a foundational principle that underlies contract law and finds expression in the 
specific rules and principles thereof. F D J Brand, while not denying that good faith may 
inform the development of new rules; rejects good faith as basis for “free-floating” 
equitable discretions (“The role of good faith, equity and fairness in the South African law 
of contract: the influence of the common law and the constitution” 2009 SALJ 71 89-90). 
230
  See again text to n 136 para 1 1 3 4 above. 
231
  Particularly where damages would place the aggrieved party in as good a position as he 
would have been in had the contract been performed – see paras 3 4 3 & 3 4 4 above. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
7 1  Introduction 
“A potential conflict of principle exists when, on the one hand it is stated that a plaintiff is 
generally entitled to choose his remedy, including an order of specific performance, while on 
the other hand it is said that the courts have a discretion to refuse to issue an order of 
specific performance. Where does the plaintiff’s right to enforce specific performance end 
and the court’s right to refuse an order begin?”1 
“Bear in mind that those modern continental jurisdictions which endorse a right to specific 
performance … admit ‘exceptions’ to specific enforceability, but do not usually retain the sort 
of freewheeling discretion to refuse specific performance which is affirmed in Benson. How is 
one to take seriously the claim that a plaintiff has a right to specific performance, if that right 
can be trumped by competing considerations of social policy within the overriding discretion 
of the court? The underlying difficulty is that the discretion (essentially the English law 
artefact) still seems to cut the ground from beneath the right (which is the Roman-Dutch 
artefact).”2 
As these quotes from Lambiris and Cockrell indicate, the current state of South African 
law regarding the availability of specific performance is not satisfactory.3 This can be 
traced to the fact that our approach to the availability of specific performance is based 
on two divergent approaches: the first approach, that of a judicial discretion (received 
from English law) to refuse specific performance, conflicts with the second approach, 
namely the right to specific performance (received from Roman-Dutch law).4 It was 
                                                 
1
  M A Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African 
Law (1989) 126.  
2
  A Cockrell “Breach of contract” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil 
Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 303 330. See again para 1 1 above. 
3
  See also para 1 1 above. 
4
  330. See also G Lubbe “Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: die 
implikasies van die uitoefening van die regterlike diskresie” in J Smits & G Lubbe (eds) 
Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa (2003) 51 65, 71. 
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indicated at the outset that maintaining a discretion, which was occasioned by a fusion 
of two clearly incompatible approaches, causes unnecessary complications.5  
The central objective of the study was to explore the desirability and possibility of a 
more “concrete” approach, i.e. one which recognises more clearly-defined rules or 
principles with regard to when specific performance should be refused. Such an 
approach could either take the form of (a) the recognition of clearly-identified principles 
to guide courts in the exercise of a discretion to refuse specific performance,6 or (b) the 
complete removal of the discretion and acceptance of certain defined exceptions to a 
general right to claim this remedy.7  
The present chapter will now seek to outline the results achieved. After summarising the 
findings of the research, it will conclude with a consideration of the future of the South 
African approach.  
It was shown that courts continue to express great concern for the preservation of the 
discretion to refuse specific performance;8 they have made it abundantly clear that the 
refusal to order specific performance is a matter for a court’s own discretion and the 
courts will not allow this discretion to be circumscribed by rules.9 
                                                 
5
  See para 1 1 above. 
6
  See para 7 2 1 below. 
7
  See para 7 2 2 below. 
8
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
134; and see paras 1 1 1 (esp n 41) & 4 8 3 (esp n 354) above.  
9
  According to Lambiris at 126: “courts have been consistently anxious to reserve an 
unfettered discretion …, and have often spoken of their refusal to be bound by rigid and 
strictly stated rules” (referring to  Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 
(A) 378G; BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) 
SA 391 (A) 433; Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v BN Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A) 440). In 
addition to the authority cited by the author, see ISEP Structural Engineering and Plating 
(Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd 1981 (4) SA 1 (A); National Union of Textile 
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This is especially apparent from the locus classicus, Benson v SA Mutual Life 
Assurance Society.10 As the extensive discussion in chapter 3 in particular indicates, 
this case evidences an acceptance of the widest possible discretion, restricted only by 
the demands of justice in the particular case – and not by rigid rules.11  
The court, in reasserting the unfettered discretion to refuse the remedy, unambiguously 
rejected English influence, but in doing so, failed to appreciate that there are practical 
and policy considerations which necessarily intrude and make literal enforcement 
undesirable.12 So, authors such as Lubbe convincingly argue that  
“Despite the endeavours of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the need at the level of everyday 
practicalities to reduce the matter of specific performance to ‘rules of thumb’ brings with it the 
risk that the discretionary approach will be reduced to a hollow formalism.” 13 
It was accordingly contended that this discretionary approach does not offer a sound 
solution, at least not in South African contract law. Specific performance is regarded as 
the principal remedy in our remedial scheme, and contracting parties must be able to 
know with some confidence whether and when they are entitled to it.14 It was argued 
                                                                                                                                                             
Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 151 (T), and Lubbe “Daadwerklike 
vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: die implikasies van die uitoefening van die regterlike 
diskresie” in Smits & Lubbe (eds) Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa 57 ff. 
10
  1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
11
  See paras 3 3 & 3 4 3 above. 
12
  See further Lubbe “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for 
specific performance in South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in 
Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 111-112. 
13
  “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in 
South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National 
and Other Perspectives 111. 
14
  See in this regard too C M Venter An Assessment of the South African Law Governing 
Breach of Contract master’s dissertation Stellenbosch University (2004) 2, and S P Stuart-
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that the discretionary approach is to be discouraged because it undermines doctrinal 
certainty and predictability of the law.  
7 2  Recommendations for reform 
7 2 1  A discretion to refuse to order specific performance governed by 
certain principles 
Having considered the inadequacies and limitations of the current approach and having 
established the need for reform, it is now essential to consider the way forward. 
Returning to the hypothesis posed at the beginning of this study (and this chapter), it is 
now possible to state that it may be preferable for South African courts to follow a more 
concrete approach. 
We will first consider the solution15 proposed by Lambiris. He recommends that courts 
should retain a wide discretionary power to refuse specific performance, but that it must 
be exercised in accordance with broad but well recognised principles.16 According to 
Lambiris such an approach would not only preserve the objectives of freedom of 
discretion, but also assure consistency in the decisions of our courts in specific 
performance matters.17 It is doubtful, though, whether this will properly address the 
fundamental tension outlined above.18  
                                                                                                                                                             
Steer “Reconsidering an understanding of damages as a surrogate of specific 
performance in South African law of contract” 2013 Responsa Meridiana 65 96. 
15
  As stated in para 7 1 above. See also para 6 1 2 (esp text to n 69) above.   
16
  He sets out three general principles which he derives from Benson: an order of specific 
performance must not have the effect of producing an injustice or inequity, it must not be 
contrary to legal or public policy, and it must not require the performance of an act which 
is impossible (Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African 
Law 132-133). See also para 3 4 3 (esp text to n 229) above. 
17
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
131-132. 
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First, Lambiris’ suggestion still undermines the South African contract law doctrine that 
the plaintiff has a right to specific performance. And, even if this inconsistency can 
somehow be overlooked, the broad nature of the guiding principles causes concern. 
The availability of the remedy will still be regulated by open-ended norms.19 The 
suggested “guideline approach” though it preserves the courts’ freedom of discretion, is 
still too wide to ensure legal certainty.  
This is evident from the fact that Lambiris also considers “cases which do not fall within 
the general principles”.20 Reference to this separate category (to which the author 
devotes an entire subheading) demonstrates that the outcome in specific performance 
matters will still be unpredictable and inconsistent. He points out that there are certain 
cases “which do not appear to have been decided on the basis of the truly applicable 
principles, and which therefore cannot be explained in terms thereof”.21 In this regard he 
discusses two illustrative cases. The most noteworthy of these is Mohr v Kriek,22 in 
which an undertaking, contained in a deed of dissolution of partnership, to sign and 
                                                                                                                                                             
18
  See the reference to Lambiris & Cockrell in para 7 1 and the related text to nn 1-3 above. 
19
  See reference to Lubbe in para 1 1 1 (n 48) and the related text to n 48. 
20
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
141. 
21
  141. 
22
  1953 (3) SA 600 (SR). The other example he refers to is Coronation Syndicate Ltd v 
Lillienfeld and the New Fortuna Co Ltd 1903 TS 489, where an undertaking by a company 
director to vote in support of a particular resolution at a meeting was held to be 
unenforceable by means of specific performance because performance of this undertaking 
to the third party conflicted with his fiduciary duties to the company. However, the case did 
not warrant reference by Lambiris under the particular subheading, because it could in fact 
be explained in terms of the general principles, as illegal contracts will never be enforced, 
even though the court did not explicitly state that it was the basis for the refusal of the 
order of specific performance. Wessels uses the (now discredited) supervision rationale – 
see The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (1951) vol 2 § 3126: “the court cannot order 
a person in terms of his contract to vote in a certain way at a company meeting, for the 
court has no means to ensure his doing so”. 
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deliver a promisory note and stop order was held to be unenforceable by means of 
specific performance. The reasons provided were that performance of the undertaking 
could not actually be enforced even if ordered, since it consisted of a positive act which 
according to Quènet J “could not, as in the case of a valid negative obligation, be 
enforced”, furthermore the judge reasoned, it consisted of an act which only the 
defendant could carry out and no appropriate official could be authorised to sign the 
document if he refused to comply with the order. 23 
Clearly, this finding was based on two incorrect assumptions of the applicable law, as 
Lambiris also correctly points out. The court drew a distinction between positive and 
negative obligations and took the view that only negative obligations are enforceable by 
means of specific performance. Lambiris, however, strongly disagrees, since “[o]rders 
ad factum praestandum are made all the time”24 and so “there is no substance in a 
distinction between positive and negative obligations in relation to ordering specific 
performance”.25 He also disagrees with the court’s view that the obligation is not 
enforceable as it is incapable of being delegated to a third party. This is obviously not 
an accurate account of our law, since there are cases in which performance by means 
of appointing someone else to act is not possible, i.e. where only the particular debtor 
can perform the stipulated act. In such cases compliance would depend on the threat of 
                                                 
23
  1953 (3) SA 600 (SR) 601C-D. 
24
  Citing Ranch International Pipelines (Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v LMG Construction (City) (Pty) 
Ltd 1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 880I. See also J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (1992) 211 n 75; A D J van Rensburg, J G Lotz & T 
van Rijn (R D Sharrock) “Contract” in W A Joubert & J A Faris (eds) LAWSA 5(1) 2 ed 
(2010) para 495. 
25
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
141-142. See further De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 211: “Hiervoor is in 
ons gemene reg geen steun te vind nie. Ook in ons praktyk is vir hierdie stelling nie 
voldoende steun aan te wys nie. In baie gevalle het ons howe al reële eksekusie 
toegestaan by ‘n verpligting om iets te doen…”, and para 1 1 4 n 145 above. 
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other measures, for example, the prospect of being held in contempt of court if the 
debtor fails to perform the act.26 
Ultimately, Lambiris’ proposals may give rise to only more inconsistencies. His 
overriding discretion, no matter how it is defined, will always compete with the plaintiff’s 
right or general entitlement to specific performance as his remedy, and his broad 
“guiding” principles could inevitably lead to legal uncertainty. We can now proceed to 
the alternative of the complete removal of the discretionary power.  
7 2 2  A general right to specific performance subject to certain exceptions 
Under the second approach, the general starting point in our law remains the same: the 
parties to a contract, as a matter of course, are entitled to demand performance of their 
respective obligations in specie. However, this right to choose specific performance is 
not absolute, but subject to certain exceptions – and it is not subject to a judicial 
discretion that is influenced by certain factors.27 
As noted in earlier chapters, there are already two recognised exceptions where the 
discretion is absent, namely impossibility of performance and the debtor’s insolvency.28 
                                                 
26
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
142. 
27
  See again paras 4 8 2, 6 1 1 & 6 1 2 above. 
28
  See D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 322: 
“The reason for the first exception is that the courts will not order something that cannot 
be done, even if such impossibility is only subjective – that is, only relates to the debtor 
personally. For example, if a party has sold the same thing to two different persons, and 
delivered it to one of them, the courts will not order specific performance … The reason for 
the second exception is to be found in the need to treat all the concurrent creditors of an 
insolvent estate equally. Since there are insufficient assets in an insolvent estate to 
discharge all the liabilities of the insolvent, an order of specific performance in favour of 
one creditor would necessarily result in that creditor’s claim being preferred to that of the 
other creditors.” The second exception is related to the first, according to Lubbe 
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The first obvious exception is (and remains) that a claim for specific performance is 
excluded as far as such performance is objectively or subjectively impossible.29 This 
rule is not unfamiliar to our law: it derives from the Roman principle impossibilium nulla 
obligatio est (“impossibility of performance prevents the creation of obligations”).30 It 
corresponds to the moral principle that “ought implies can”.31 Of course, the debtor 
cannot be compelled to do that which cannot be done.32 According to this principle, a 
contract is void if at the time of its conclusion its performance is objectively impossible; 
so also where a contract has become impossible to perform after it had been entered 
into. Here the general rule is that the position is the same as if it had been impossible 
from the beginning.33 And if the contract is regarded as void ab initio, specific 
performance is naturally precluded, because there is no obligation in respect of that 
performance.34 Thus “refusal to order specific performance is not really the result of an 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: die implikasies van die uitoefening 
van die regterlike diskresie” in J Smits & G Lubbe (eds) Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en 
Europa (2003) 51 54. See further paras 3 2 3 (esp n 139) & 4 8 3 above. 
29
  See generally Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 465: “If performance in 
terms of an existing contractual obligation becomes subjectively or relatively impossible, 
the obligations are not affected … If performance becomes objectively or absolutely 
impossible, the obligation is extinguished and the duty to perform and the corresponding 
right to claim performance fall away …” (citing Unibank Savings and Loans Ltd (formerly 
Community Bank) v Absa Bank Ltd 2000 (4) SA 191 (W)). 
30
  Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 205. 
31
  206.  
32
  See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [75]. 
33
  See Peters Flamman and Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427, 434.  
34
  See De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 210 n 61; “Waar [die skuldenaar] 
deur onmoontlikwording van prestasie bevry is is daar natuurlik glad nie meer ‘n 
verbintenis nie.” See also G Lubbe “Daadwerklike vervulling in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg: 
die implikasies van die uitoefening van die regterlike diskresie” in J Smits & G Lubbe (eds) 
Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa (2003) 51 54, both referring to Benson v SA Mutual 
Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783. 
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exercise of judicial discretion against making the order but a direct consequence of the 
impossibility of performance. If contractual obligations are rendered void by impossibility 
there is obviously no need for a court to rely on its discretionary power to refuse and 
order of specific performance”.35 One could argue that technically it is not really an 
exception to specific performance, because there is no obligation at all, but that it could 
practically be treated as an exception, especially since subjective impossibility “does not 
prevent the creation of an obligation” and hence “if the debtor eventually does not 
perform, he may be liable for breach of contract” though “specific performance would 
not be granted”.36  
This study proposes that the list of exceptions or defences to a claim for specific 
performance be expanded. It will be recalled that chapter 4 on personal service 
contracts and chapter 6 on undue hardship raised issues relating to the divergence 
between the theory and practice of our law governing the availability of specific 
performance. One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study was that to 
pretend that there is an open-ended discretion to refuse specific performance is 
misleading in two circumstances.  
It is undesirable to maintain this open-ended discretion, while the courts at the same 
time clearly follow certain practices. This view is supported by Lubbe, who writes: 
“The Benson judgment itself recognises that factors that in the past have served as reasons 
to deny specific performance remain relevant to the exercise of the discretion. The need to 
preserve legal certainty and the fact that some of these factors may in particular 
circumstances reflect more or less mandatory considerations of public policy, may very well 
result in past patterns regarding the exercise of the discretion being repeated in the future. 
Practitioners who have to advise clients on the likely outcome of claims for specific 
performance will tend to base their opinions on previous decisions, so it is inevitable that 
perceptions about when decrees are likely to be made and when not, will develop. The 
                                                 
35
  Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 
134. 
36
  Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 163, 329-330, 465. 
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concern to treat like cases alike and to differentiate between situations that are different will 
further encourage the development of informal perceptions about when  specific performance 
is appropriate or confirm such perceptions that still exist. Guidelines will once again 
crystallise at a practical level.” 37 
It was accordingly argued that the law could be discredited if this reality is not reflected 
in legal doctrine.38 The study suggests that a limited right to be awarded specific 
performance may be preferable to a right to specific performance which is subject to an 
open-ended discretion to refuse it. Such an approach, it is suggested, is more logical in 
a system which traditionally does not regard specific performance as an exceptional 
remedy.39 Whereas the discretionary approach is more suitable to and appropriate in 
England and America, because they recognise damages as the default remedy for 
breach of contract; only in exceptional circumstances, if damages will not provide 
adequate relief to the aggrieved party, will courts exercise their discretion in favour of 
specific performance.40  
Therefore, the alternative proposal for reform advocated in this thesis is to concretise 
our courts’ approach to the remedy of specific performance by recognising certain 
defined exceptions to the right to specific performance. This proposal requires that our 
courts move away from the wide unrestricted (and historically contentious) discretion 
and engage in the development of concrete rules aimed at narrowing the boundaries of 
the right to specific performance as currently drawn by the law. These 
recommendations therefore advocate the (wider) restriction of the plaintiff’s right to 
                                                 
37
  “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in 
South African Law” in Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National 
and Other Perspectives 110-111. 
38
  See the reference to Lubbe in n 67 below. 
39
  See again Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 84I, 
where Foxcroft J proclaims “[i]n our law, specific performance is a primary remedy and not 
a supplementary remedy”. 
40
  See paras 1 1 2 & 2 3 2 1 above. 
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specific performance. The circumstances under which this right may be limited are 
revealed in certain key chapters.  
The first of these circumstances is contractual obligations for personal services, which 
were considered in chapter 4. There the possibility of adopting a more concrete 
approach to enforcing personal service contracts by way of an order of specific 
performance was considered. It was argued that the personal character of the 
contractual relationship per se does not justify the exclusion of an order for specific 
performance. It was furthermore argued that the classic argument that an order for 
specific performance of a contractual relationship of a personal service would infringe 
upon the personal freedom of the debtor should be nuanced.  
Drawing on certain international instruments and legal systems for inspiration and as a 
frame of reference, it was shown that the right should be limited where performance 
consists of such personal obligations that it would be unreasonable to enforce it. Thus, 
we are not dealing with an exception which is identical to the impossibility and 
insolvency cases; for it cannot be said that specific performance of all types of service 
contracts has to be refused. According to Kerr “[t]he different kinds of contracts of 
service, including contracts of employment, need to be distinguished when orders of 
specific performance are under consideration” and “it is clear that no general rule can 
be made for all contracts of service”.41 This is apparent from our courts’ enforcement of 
employment contracts against employers, in terms of statute and of the hybrid Igesund-
type contract cases.42 It was accordingly argued that we do not have to follow the broad 
approach of some instruments which provide that all personal service contracts are 
unenforceable.43  
                                                 
41
  A J Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 681. 
42
  See text to n 50 para 4 2 1, text to nn 107, 122 & 137 para 4 2 1 2 & compare text to n 
322 para 4 7 above. See also Naudé’s constitutional argument in text to n 133 para 4 2 1 
2 above. 
43
  See paras 4 7 & 4 8 3 & 4 8 4 above. 
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The second of these considerations is undue hardship. In chapter 6 it was proposed 
that courts refuse the remedy if it would cause undue hardship to the defendant or third 
parties (Haynes being the classic example). The research reveals that this is already a 
circumstance affecting the exercise of the courts’ discretion. According to the current 
law (i.e. the discretionary approach) courts should exercise their discretion to refuse the 
order if this will cause undue or disproportionate hardship to the defendant. This is an 
aspect of the equitable nature of the discretion, which requires the court always to have 
in mind the need to avoid injustice. Undue hardship to the defendant, as manifestation 
of an injustice, was specifically mentioned in Benson.44 This study indicates that even 
straightforward financial hardship, if sufficiently severe, may be enough, particularly if 
the plaintiff can equally well be compensated by an award of damages.45  
The third consideration is the need for constant or on-going supervision. Chapter 5 
indicates that this consideration on its own does not provide sufficient justification for 
refusing specific performance, but that it may be a factor to be weighed by the courts 
when deciding whether to refuse specific performance under the exceptions. Thus, as 
informed by experiences in the common law, supervision may be relevant, but not 
conclusive. The relaxation of the traditional restriction of constant supervision on the 
availability of the remedy in common law is apparent from cases and other common-law 
authorities.46 This development has long been favoured by academic commentators. 
For example, in his a comparative study, Dawson examined all the various doctrines of 
the common law which restrict claims for specific performance and concluded that the 
                                                 
44
  See Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783D-F per Hefer 
JA. 
45
  See para 6 5 3 above. See also reference to Lubbe & Murray in text to n 50 below. 
46
  See Posner v Scott-Lewis [1987] Ch 25, where a landlord was compelled to comply with 
an undertaking to employ a resident porter – see further paras 5 2 (iv) & 5 5 above.  In the 
American context, see discussion of Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission v 
Minnesota Twins Partnership in para 5 3 above. 
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wide-ranging discretion the Anglo-American judges exercise is regrettable.47 
Supervision is accordingly rejected as a singular ground upon which courts can refuse 
to order specific performance. Instead, it becomes one of the relevant underlying 
considerations which can lead to the refusal of the remedy in terms of the broader 
exception of hardship.48  
Finally, there is the consideration of adequacy of damages, considered in chapter 3. 
This chapter points out that the right to claim specific performance under our law does 
not and should not depend on whether damages is inadequate as an alternative 
remedy. However, the possibility that the plaintiff would be adequately compensated by 
damages may be a factor to be weighed by the courts when determining whether such 
an order would give rise to injustice or oppression in the form of undue hardship.49 Note 
that in Benson, the court mentions undue hardship to the defendant, as an instance of 
an injustice. Lubbe and Murray, however, rightly question whether “the financial loss 
that the guilty party might suffer” should “be one of the circumstances in which, in the 
words of Hefer JA in the Benson case, ‘the order will operate unduly harshly on the 
defendant’?”50 
The proposal is thus for a simplified yet more refined approach which can be achieved 
by recognising a restricted right to specific performance. In this regard it recommends 
that two exceptions (apart from impossibility and insolvency already recognised) to 
specific performance should be recognised. These are the following: firstly, if the 
contract sought to be enforced is of such a personal character that it would be 
unreasonable to enforce it, and secondly, if specific performance would cause undue 
hardship to the defendant or to third parties. This would be a matter for consideration on 
the facts of each case. The proposed exceptions to the right would operate strictly. This 
                                                 
47
  J P Dawson “Specific performance in France and Germany” (1958) 57 Mich LR 495.533. 
He evidently favoured a more refined approach as exemplified by civil-law systems.  
48
  See para 5 5 above. See also para 6 5 3 (esp n 217) above. 
49
  See paras 3 4 3 & 3 4 4 above. 
50
  Lubbe & Murray Contract 547. 
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means that if none of the exceptions are present, the court would not have a residual 
discretion to refuse the remedy.51 Conversely, if one of the exceptions is present, the 
court must refuse the remedy. The practical effect of the operation of one of these 
exceptions is that the aggrieved party would have to be satisfied with the other 
remedies available for breach of contract, i.e. either cancellation or damages or both.52 
One final aspect relating to the proposal of a more concrete, exception-based approach 
needs to be considered. This is the question of allocating the onus of proof in regard to 
the proposed defences. In this regard the following statement by Kerr is relevant:  
“The discretion to refuse to order specific performance being the court’s, the court is entitled 
to arrive at its decision without being bound by any rules relating to the onus of proof. It 
would be wise, however, for a defendant who wishes to persuade a court not to grant specific 
performance to lead evidence of the relevant circumstances.”53  
                                                 
51
  Much like the PECL, the PICC, the DCFR & the CESL (see paras 2 3 3 2 - 2 3 3 5 above), 
and the civil-law systems under review (see text to n 246 para 3 4 3 above). See also para 
6 4 2 n 160 above. 
52
  Of course, it is advisable for a plaintiff to ask for alternative remedies when he brings his 
first action. The court in any event has the power to grant damages as an alternative for 
specific performance of a contract, even when there is no alternative prayer for damages 
(National Butchery Co v African Merchants Ltd (1907) 21 EDC 57). See further Lambiris 
Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 167 ff; 
Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 333 ff, esp 334 & 347 for a discussion of 
the so-called “double-barrelled procedure”. On the tenability of the view that damages as a 
surrogate for specific performance could be an alternative remedy, see again para 1 1 4 
above; Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 316; Van der 
Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 329, and esp Stuart-Steer 2013 Responsa 
Meridiana 65-97. See also D J Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 
228; Lubbe & Murray Contract 538, and the authority cited there. 
53
  The Principles of the Law of Contract 682. See also Lubbe “Contractual derogation and 
the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in South African Law” in Smits et 
al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 100. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   378 
 
According to the current approach, the defendant does not bear a full onus to prove 
grounds for refusing an order for specific performance, as this would limit the discretion 
of the court.54 This is apparent from the following dictum in Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v BN 
Aitkin (Pty) Ltd per Miller JA:55 
“In a case in which the defendant requires the consent of a third party to enable him to 
perform effectively, and at the end of the case, the defence of impossibility having been 
raised and canvassed, the probabilities in regard to that issue appear to be evenly balanced, 
the Court, it appears to me, might justifiably take the view that refusal of specific performance 
was preferable to the grant of an order which as likely as not would prove to be ineffectual. A 
rule that a defendant pleading impossibility as answer to a claim for specific performance 
must necessarily discharge the onus of proving it if he is to avoid such a decree might 
hamper and inhibit the Court in the exercise of its discretion.” 
Analogously, under the proposed approach, the defendant would not bear a full onus to 
prove circumstances which would justify the limitation of the plaintiff’s right. Instead, the 
defendant would rather bear a burden of rebuttal, of raising or drawing the court’s 
attention to these circumstances. The defendant only has to present evidence of the 
relevant circumstances to prevent the plaintiff from succeeding with his claim, or as Van 
                                                 
54
  See A Beck “The coming of age of specific performance” 1987 CILSA 190 201; S van der 
Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 330 n 25. According to Lambiris 
Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 144, if the 
onus did rest on the defendant “it must follow that, should a defendant fail to raise and 
prove the appropriate circumstances, the court will not be in a position to exercise its 
judicial discretion against issuing an order of specific performance”. 
55
  1982 (1) SA 398 (A) 443C-E. See Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in 
MacQueen & Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African 
Perspectives 256. 
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der Merwe et al state “[a] defendant would probably at least have to adduce some 
evidence which would support his contention that an order should not be granted”.56  
7 3  Concluding remarks 
The proposed development inevitably militates against the decision in Benson, as it 
entails the removal of the discretion of the court in order to achieve greater clarity in the 
law.  
The continued primacy of the remedy, evidenced by each plaintiff’s right to choose this 
remedy, is also strongly recommended for the additional certainty it provides regarding 
the purpose of our contract law and the enforceability of obligations in general. 
A general right to require specific performance of obligations has certain advantages. 
Through specific performance, the creditor obtains as far as possible what is due to him 
and so the binding force of obligations is maintained, which is a principle applied at the 
highest level in our law.57 Furthermore, difficulties in assessing damages are avoided 
and it saves the costs of a judicial assessment of damages.  
The approach confirms that specific performance should remain the ordinary remedy to 
which a party to a contract is entitled. However, a fully contextualised study of the 
research problem and comparative research into different legal systems demonstrates 
that the creditor’s entitlement to require specific performance must not be boundless; it 
should be restricted in terms of defined exceptions.  
It was contended that the practice of the courts provides the basis for such a 
development.58 If one examines the practice rather than the remarks of the courts, a 
                                                 
56
  Contract: General Principles 330 n 25. See also Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance 
and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 145; R H Christie & G B Bradfield 
Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 547. 
57
  See para 4 8 2 n 340 above. 
58
  See paras 4 8 3 & 6 5 4 above.  
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restrictive approach to specific performance emerges from the decisions. It is clear from 
the decided cases that in certain instances, there is in effect no discretion; the remedy is 
invariably refused.59  
Although it has been the practice of the courts, they have hesitated to acknowledge this. 
It also seems that commentators have known this for a long time, but the consequences 
have not been fully worked out. It is suggested that it is time for the courts to bring 
coherence to this unduly complex area of the law by clarifying when the remedy will not 
be available. The proposed new exception-based approach could be developed 
judicially as part of South African common law doctrine. It provides a theoretically sound 
construction or solution,60 based on past practice. The courts therefore have sufficient 
reason to overrule statements on the need for the retention of the widest possible 
discretion. 
The approach can also be related to certain statements made by Lubbe and Cockrell.61 
Lubbe, for example, considers the comparable option of recognising certain Fallgruppen 
or case groups in which the remedy should be denied.62 According to the author, the 
adoption of this methodology might lead to the denial of the remedy in cases of 
hardship.63 He also suggests that “a rule that specific performance generally will not be 
granted as against an employee might develop from the practice of our courts in such 
cases”.64 Lubbe thereby confirms that the practice of the courts in specific performance 
                                                 
59
  See paras 4 8 3 & 6 5 2 above. 
60
  Contract cases like Santos and Nationwide Airlines, that have been notoriously hard to 
defend and explain, as it was indicated, can be explained in terms thereof (see paras 4 2 
1 2 & 4 8 4 above). 
61
  See reference to Cockrell in para 4 8 2 (n 346) above.  
62
  See “Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for specific performance 
in South African Law” Smits et al (eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National 
and Other Perspectives.  
63
  112-113. See also para 6 5 4 above. 
64
  113. See also para 4 8 3 above. 
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matters has possibly opened the way for the development of a more restrictive 
approach in future decisions.65  
Finally, it is accepted that there may be some reluctance on the side of the judiciary66 
and commentators67 to embrace the proposed reform.68 However, the truth of the matter 
is simply that if courts do not engage in reform our law will remain uncertain and 
internally incoherent or contradictory. 
                                                 
65
  See further Eiselen “Specific performance and special damages” in MacQueen & 
Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 257-
260, 266, 269-270. See esp reference to Eiselen in text to n 197 para 6 5 2 above. 
66
  See cases noted in n 9 para 7 1 above; and again paras 1 1 1 (esp n 41) & 4 8 3 (esp n 
354) above. 
67
  See eg Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South 
African Law (1989) 131 n 29: “Whatever arguments have been adduced in the past in 
support of defining specific circumstances or cases in which an order of specific 
performance will be refused, this approach is no longer tenable in the light of Benson’s 
case.” But see valuable statement/s by Lubbe (2008) in text to n 13 para 7 1 & text to n 37 
para 7 2 2 above, which continues as follows: “Questions can therefore be raised about 
the stability of the position adopted in the Benson case. The possibility that the Benson 
decision may suffer the same fate as that of Haynes, and that the case law may oscillate 
between a purely discretionary and a rule based approach cannot be excluded. It is 
submitted that the law will ultimately be discredited if, for instance, a subliminal 
understanding that specific performance will ordinarily not be granted against an 
employee in respect of a contract of service is not reflected in legal doctrine.” 
68
  Lubbe also acknowledges that “[t]here is very little recognition of such a possibility at 
present”, but goes on to say that “[a]n approach which reconsiders the objections to a rule 
based approach to the granting of the remedy is preferable to one which denies the 
substantive implications of the denial of the remedy” (in “Contractual derogation and the 
discretion to refuse an order for specific performance in South African Law” Smits et al 
(eds) Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 114-115). 
See again paras 1 1 1, 4 8 3 & 6 5 4 above.  
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ADDENDUM A 
1. American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
2. United States Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
3. German Civil Code (BGB) 
4. German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) 
5. Dutch Civil Code (BW) 
6. UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
7. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 
8. Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) 
9. Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 
10. Common European Sales Law (CESL) 
1. American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 261 Discharge by supervening impracticability 
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable without 
his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is 
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary. 
§ 357 Availability of specific performance and injunction 
(1) Subject to the rules stated in §§ 359-69, specific performance of a contract duty will 
be granted in the discretion of the court against a party who has committed or is 
threatening to commit a breach of the duty. 
(2) Subject to the rules stated in §§ 359-69, an injunction against breach of a contract 
duty will be granted in the discretion of the court against a party who has committed or 
is threatening to commit a breach of the duty if 
(a) the duty is one of forbearance, or 
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(b) the duty is one to act and specific performance would be denied only for reasons 
that are inapplicable to an injunction. 
§ 358 Form of order and other relief 
(1) An order of specific performance or an injunction will be so drawn as best to 
effectuate the purposes for which the contract was made and on such terms as justice 
requires. It need not be absolute in form and the performance that it requires need not 
be identical with that due under the contract. 
(2) If specific performance or an injunction is denied as to part of the performance that is 
due, it may nevertheless be granted as to the remainder. 
(3) In addition to specific performance or an injunction, damages and other relief may be 
awarded in the same proceeding and an indemnity against future harm may be 
required. 
§ 359 Effect of adequacy of damages 
(1) Specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be 
adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party. 
(2) The adequacy of the damage remedy for failure to render one part of the 
performance due does not preclude specific performance or injunction as to the contract 
as a whole. 
(3) Specific performance or an injunction will not be refused merely because there is a 
remedy for breach other than damages, but such a remedy may be considered in 
exercising discretion under the rule stated in § 357. 
§ 360 Factors affecting adequacy of damages 
In determining whether the remedy in damages would be adequate, the following 
circumstances are significant: 
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(a) the difficulty of proving damages with reasonable certainty, 
(b) the difficulty of procuring a suitable substitute performance by means of money 
awarded as damages, and 
(c) the likelihood that an award of damages could not be collected. 
§ 362 Effect of uncertainty of terms 
Specific performance or an injunction will not be granted unless the terms of the 
contract are sufficiently certain to provide a basis for an appropriate order. 
§ 363 Effect of insecurity as to the agreed exchange 
Specific performance or an injunction may be refused if a substantial part of the agreed 
exchange for the performance to be compelled is unperformed and its performance is 
not secured to the satisfaction of the court. 
§ 364 Effect of unfairness 
(1) Specific performance or an injunction will be refused if such relief would be unfair 
because 
(a) the contract was induced by mistake or by unfair practices, 
(b) the relief would cause unreasonable hardship or loss to the party in breach or to 
third persons, or 
(c) the exchange is grossly inadequate or the terms of the contract are otherwise unfair. 
(2) Specific performance or an injunction will be granted in spite of a term of the 
agreement if denial of such relief would be unfair because it would cause unreasonable 
hardship or loss to the party seeking relief or to third persons. 
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§ 365 Effect of public policy 
Specific performance or an injunction will not be granted if the act or forbearance that 
would be compelled or the use of compulsion is contrary to public policy. 
§ 366 Effect of difficulty in enforcement or supervision 
A promise will not be specifically enforced if the character and magnitude of the 
performance would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or supervision that are 
disproportionate to the advantages to be gained from enforcement and to the harm to 
be suffered from its denial. 
§ 367 Contracts for personal service or supervision 
(1) A promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced. 
(2) A promise to render personal service exclusively for one employer will not be 
enforced by an injunction against serving another if its probable result will be to compel 
a performance involving personal relations the enforced continuance of which is 
undesirable or will be to leave the employee without other reasonable means of making 
a living. 
2. United States Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
Article 2 – Sales (as amended in 2003) 
§ 2-614 Substituted performance 
(1) Where without fault of either party the agreed berthing, loading, or unloading 
facilities fail or an agreed type of carrier becomes unavailable or the agreed manner of 
delivery otherwise becomes commercially impracticable but a commercially reasonable 
substitute is available, such substitute performance must be tendered and accepted. 
(2) If the agreed means or manner of payment fails because of domestic or foreign 
governmental regulation, the seller may withhold or stop delivery unless the buyer 
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provides a means or manner of payment which is commercially a substantial equivalent. 
If delivery has already been taken, payment by the means or in the manner provided by 
the regulation discharges the buyer’s obligation unless the regulation is discriminatory, 
oppressive or predatory. 
§ 2-615 Excuse by failure of presupposed conditions 
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the 
preceding section on substituted performance: 
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with 
paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if 
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a 
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract 
was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic 
governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid. 
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller’s 
capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his customers 
but may at his option include regular customers not then under contract as well as his 
own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner which is 
fair and reasonable. 
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery 
and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made 
available for the buyer. 
§ 2-709 Action for the price 
(1) If the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due, the seller may recover, together 
with any incidental or consequential damages under section 2-710, the price: 
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially 
reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and  
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(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to 
resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such 
effort will be unavailing.  
(2) If the seller sues for the price, the seller must hold for the buyer any goods that have 
been identified to the contract and are still in the seller’s control. However, if resale 
becomes possible, the seller may resell them at any time prior to the collection of the 
judgment. The net proceeds of any such resale must be credited to the buyer, and 
payment of the judgment entitles the buyer to any goods not resold. 
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance of the goods or has 
failed to make a payment due or has repudiated (section 2-610), a seller that is held not 
entitled to the price under this section shall nevertheless be awarded damages for 
nonacceptance under section 2-708. 
§ 2-712 “Cover”; buyer’s procurement of substitute goods 
(1) If the seller wrongfully fails to deliver or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or 
justifiably revokes acceptance, the buyer may “cover” by making in good faith and 
without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods 
in substitution for those due from the seller. 
(2) A buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of 
cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages 
under Section 2-715, but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller’s breach. 
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar the buyer from 
any other remedy. 
§ 2-716 Specific performance; buyer’s right to replevin 
(1) Specific performance may be decreed if the goods are unique or in other proper 
circumstances. In a contract other than a consumer contract, specific performance may 
be decreed if the parties have agreed to that remedy. However, even if the parties 
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agree to specific performance, specific performance may not be decreed if the 
breaching party’s sole remaining contractual obligation is the payment of money. 
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms and conditions as to 
payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may deem just. 
(3) The buyer has a right of replevin or similar remedy for goods identified for the 
contract if after reasonable effort the buyer is unable to effect cover for such goods or 
the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods 
have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them 
has been made or tendered. 
(4) The buyer’s right under subsection (3) vests upon acquisition of a special property, 
even if the seller had not then repudiated or failed to deliver. 
3. German Civil Code (BGB) 
§ 241 Duties arising from an obligation 
(1) By virtue of an obligation an obligee [creditor] is entitled to claim performance from 
the obligor [debtor]. The performance may also consist in forbearance. 
(2) An obligation may also, depending on its contents, oblige each party to take account 
of the rights, legal interests and other interests of the other party. 
§ 249 Nature and extent of damages 
(1) A person who is liable in damages must restore the position that would exist if the 
circumstance obliging him to pay damages had not occurred. 
(2) Where damages are payable for injury to a person or damage to a thing, the obligee 
may demand the required monetary amount in lieu of restoration. When a thing is 
damaged, the monetary amount required under sentence 1 only includes value-added 
tax if and to the extent that it is actually incurred. 
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§ 250 Damages in money after the specification of a period of time 
The obligee may specify a reasonable period of time for the person liable in damages to 
undertake restoration and declare that he will reject restoration after the period of time 
ends. After the end of the period of time the obligee may demand damages in money, if 
restoration does not occur in good time; the claim to restoration is excluded. 
§ 251 Damages in money without the specification of a period of time 
(1) To the extent that restoration is not possible or is not sufficient to compensate the 
obligee, the person liable in damages must compensate the obligee in money. 
(2) The person liable in damages may compensate the obligee in money if restoration is 
only possible with disproportionate expenses. Expenses incurred as a result of the 
curative treatment of an injured animal are not disproportionate merely because they 
significantly exceed the value of the animal. 
§ 275 Exclusion of the duty of performance  
(1) A claim for performance is excluded to the extent that performance is impossible for 
the obligor or for any other person. 
(2) The obligor may refuse performance to the extent that performance requires 
expense and effort which, taking into account the subject matter of the obligation and 
the requirements of good faith, is grossly disproportionate to the interest in performance 
of the obligee. When it is determined what efforts may reasonably be required of the 
obligor, it must also be taken into account whether he is responsible for the obstacle to 
performance. 
(3) In addition, the obligor may refuse performance if he is to render the performance in 
person and, when the obstacle to the performance of the obligor is weighed against the 
interest of the obligee in performance, performance cannot be reasonably required of 
the obligor. 
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(4) The rights of the obligee are governed by sections 280, 283 to 285, 311a and 326. 
§ 280 Damages for breach of duty  
(1) If the obligor breaches a duty arising from the obligation, the obligee may demand 
damages for the damage caused thereby. This does not apply if the obligor is not 
responsible for the breach of duty.  
(2) Damages for delay in performance may be demanded by the obligee only subject to 
the additional requirement of section 286.  
(3) Damages in lieu of performance may be demanded by the obligee only subject to 
the additional requirements of sections 281, 282 or 283.  
§ 281 Damages in lieu of performance for nonperformance or failure to render 
performance as owed 
(1) To the extent that the obligor does not render performance when it is due or does 
not render performance as owed, the obligee may, subject to the requirements of 
section 280 (1), demand damages in lieu of performance, if he has without result set a 
reasonable period for the obligor for performance or cure. If the obligor has performed 
only in part, the obligee may demand damages in lieu of complete performance only if 
he has no interest in the part performance. If the obligor has not rendered performance 
as owed, the obligee may not demand damages in lieu of performance if the breach of 
duty is immaterial. 
(2) Setting a period for performance may be dispensed with if the obligor seriously and 
definitively refuses performance or if there are special circumstances which, after the 
interests of both parties are weighed, justify the immediate assertion of a claim for 
damages. 
(3) If the nature of the breach of duty is such that setting a period of time is out of the 
question, a warning notice is given instead. 
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(4) The claim for performance is excluded as soon as the obligee has demanded 
damages in lieu of performance. 
(5) If the obligee demands damages in lieu of complete performance, the obligor is 
entitled to claim the return of his performance under sections 346 to 348. 
§ 282 Damages in lieu of performance for breach of a duty under section 241 (2)  
If the obligor breaches a duty under section 241 (2), the obligee may, if the 
requirements of section 280 (1) are satisfied, demand damages in lieu of performance, 
if he can no longer reasonably be expected to accept performance by the obligor.  
§ 283 Damages in lieu of performance where the duty of performance is excluded  
If, under section 275 (1) to (3), the obligor is not obliged to perform, the obligee may, if 
the requirements of section 280 (1) are satisfied, demand damages in lieu of 
performance. Section 281 (1) sentences 2 and 3 and (5) apply with the necessary 
modifications.  
§ 284 Reimbursement of futile expenses  
In place of damages in lieu of performance, the obligee may demand reimbursement of 
the expenses which he has made and in all fairness was entitled to make in reliance on 
receiving performance, unless the purpose of the expenses would not have been 
achieved, even if the obligor had not breached his duty.  
§ 285 Return of reimbursement 
(1) If the obligor, as a result of the circumstance by reason of which, under § 275 (1) to 
(3), he has no duty of performance, obtains reimbursement or a claim to reimbursement 
for the object owed, the obligee may demand return of what has been received in 
reimbursement or an assignment of the claim to reimbursement. 
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(2) If the obligee may demand damages in lieu of performance, then, if he exercises the 
right stipulated in (1) above, the damages are reduced by the value of the 
reimbursement or the claim to reimbursement he has obtained. 
§ 311a Obstacle to performance when contract is entered into 
(1) A contract is not prevented from being effective by the fact that under section 275 (1) 
to (3) the obligor does not need to perform and the obstacle to performance already 
exists when the contract is entered into.  
(2) The obligee may, at his option, demand damages in lieu of performance or 
reimbursement of his expenses in the extent specified in section 284. This does not 
apply if the obligor was not aware of the obstacle to performance when entering into the 
contract and is also not responsible for his lack of awareness. Section 281 (1) 
sentences 2 and 3 and (5) apply with the necessary modifications. 
§ 611 Typical contractual duties in a service contract 
(1) By means of a service contract, a person who promises service is obliged to perform 
the services promised, and the other party is obliged to grant the agreed remuneration. 
(2) Services of any type may be the subject matter of service contracts. 
§ 612 Remuneration 
(1) Remuneration is deemed to have been tacitly agreed if in the circumstances it is to 
be expected that the services are rendered only for remuneration. 
(2) If the amount of remuneration is not specified, then if a tariff exists, the tariff 
remuneration is deemed to be agreed; if no tariff exists, the usual remuneration is 
deemed to be agreed. 
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§ 613 Non-transferability 
The party under a duty of service must in case of doubt render the services in person. 
The claim to services is, in case of doubt, not transferable. 
§ 631 Typical contractual duties in a contract to produce a work 
(1) By a contract to produce a work, a contractor is obliged to produce the promised 
work and the customer is obliged to pay the agreed remuneration. 
(2) The subject matter of a contract to produce a work may be either the production or 
alteration of a thing or another result to be achieved by work or by a service. 
§ 632 Remuneration 
(1) Remuneration for work is deemed to be tacitly agreed if the production of the work, 
in the circumstances, is to be expected only in return for remuneration. 
(2) If the amount of remuneration is not specified, then if a tariff exists, the tariff 
remuneration is deemed to be agreed; if no tariff exists, the usual remuneration is 
deemed to be agreed. 
(3) In case of doubt, remuneration is not to be paid for a cost estimate. 
§ 633 Material defects and legal defects 
(1) The contractor must procure the work for the customer free of material defects and 
legal defects. 
(2) The work is free of material defects if it is of the agreed quality. To the extent that the 
quality has not been agreed, the work is free from material defects 
1.  if it is suitable for the use envisaged in the contract, or else 
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2.  if it is suitable for the customary use and is of a quality that is customary in works of 
the same type and that the customer may expect in view of the type of work. 
It is equivalent to a material defect if the contractor produces a work that is different 
from the work ordered or too small an amount of the work. 
(3) The work is free of legal defects if third parties, with regard to the work, either cannot 
assert any rights against the customer or can assert only such rights as are taken over 
under the contract. 
§ 634 Rights of the customer in the case of defects 
If the work is defective, the customer, if the requirements of the following provisions are 
met and to the extent not otherwise specified, may 
1.  under section 635, demand cure, 
2.  under section 637, remedy the defect himself and demand reimbursement for 
required expenses, 
3.  under sections 636, 323 and 326 (5), revoke the contract or under section 638, 
reduce payment, and 
4.  under sections 636, 280, 281, 283 and 311a, demand damages, or under section 
284, demand reimbursement of futile expenditure. 
4. German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) 
§ 510b Judgment requiring a party to take specific action  
Should a party be sentenced to take specific action, the defendant may concurrently be 
sentenced, upon corresponding application being made by the plaintiff, to pay 
compensation for the case that the action is not taken within the period to be 
determined; the court is to assess such compensation at its sole discretion. 
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§ 765 Orders issued by the execution court where performance is to be made 
concurrently  
If the enforcement depends on concurrent performance by the creditor to the debtor, the 
court responsible for execution may only direct enforcement activities if:  
1. Proof is provided, by submitting public records or documents, or records or 
documents that have been publicly certified, and a copy of such records or documents 
has already been served, that the debtor has been satisfied or is defaulting on 
acceptance; no service need be made if the court-appointed enforcement officer had 
already commenced compulsory enforcement pursuant to section 756 (1) and such 
proof is provided by the record prepared by the court-appointed enforcement officer; or  
2. The court-appointed enforcement officer has effected an enforcement measure 
pursuant to section 756 (2) and this is proven by the record prepared by the court-
appointed enforcement officer. 
§ 765a Protection from execution  
(1) Upon a corresponding petition being filed by the debtor, the court responsible for 
execution may reverse a measure of compulsory enforcement in its entirety or in part, 
may prohibit it, or may temporarily stay such measure if, upon comprehensively 
assessing the creditor’s justified interest in protection, the court finds that the measure 
entails a hardship that due to very special circumstances is immoral (contra bonos 
mores). The execution court is authorised to deliver the orders designated in section 
732 (2). Should the measure concern an animal, the execution court is to consider, in 
weighing the matter, the responsibility that the person has for the animal.  
(2) The court-appointed enforcement officer may delay a measure serving to obtain the 
surrender of objects until the court responsible for execution delivers a decision, but 
may not so delay it for longer than one (1) week, if the prerequisites set out in 
subsection (1), first sentence, are demonstrated to his satisfaction and if it was not 
possible for the debtor to refer the matter to the execution court.  
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(3) In matters pertaining to the vacation of premises, the petition pursuant to subsection 
(1) is to be filed at the latest within two (2) weeks prior to the date set for the vacation of 
the premises, unless the grounds on which the petition is based came about only after 
this time or the debtor was prevented from filing the petition in due time through no fault 
of his own.  
(4) The execution court shall reverse its order, upon a corresponding petition being filed, 
or shall modify it, if this is mandated with a view to the change of the overall factual 
situation.  
(5) Enforcement activities may be abrogated in the cases provided for by subsection (1), 
first sentence, and subsection (4) only once the order has become final and binding. 
§ 883 Surrender of specific movable objects 
(1) If the debtor is to surrender a movable asset or a number of specific movable 
objects, the court-appointed enforcement officer is to take them away from the debtor 
and to physically submit them to the creditor. 
(2) Where the object to be surrendered is not found, the debtor is under obligation – 
upon the creditor having filed a corresponding petition – to declare for the records of the 
court, in lieu of an oath, that he is not in possession of the object and that he does not 
know where it is located. The court-appointed enforcement officer competent pursuant 
to section 802e shall summon the debtor to administer the statutory declaration in lieu of 
an oath. The stipulations of sections 478 to 480, of section 483, 802f (4), sections 802g 
through 802i and of section 802j subsections (1) and (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
(3) The court may decide to change the statutory declaration in lieu of an oath to reflect 
the overall factual situation. 
§ 884 Provision of a specific amount of fungible things 
Should the debtor have to provide a specific number or amount of fungible things that in 
business dealings are customarily specified by number, measure, or weight, or should 
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the debtor have to provide securities, the rule set out in section 883 (1) shall apply 
mutatis mutandis.  
§ 885 Surrender of plots of real estate or ships 
(1) Insofar as the debtor is to surrender an immovable property or a ship entered in the 
register of ships, or a ship under construction so entered in the register; or insofar as he 
is to grant permission to use such property, ship, or ship under construction; or insofar 
as he is to vacate them, the court-appointed enforcement officer is to remove the debtor 
from possession and is to put the creditor into possession. The court-appointed 
enforcement officer is to demand that the debtor provide an address at which 
documents may be served, or that he name an authorised recipient. 
(2) The court-appointed enforcement officer shall remove any movable objects that are 
not the subject of compulsory enforcement and shall physically submit them, or make 
them available, to the debtor or, if the debtor is absent, to an attorney-in-fact of the 
debtor, an adult family member, a person employed by the family, or to an adult 
permanent cohabitant. 
(3) Where neither the debtor nor one of the persons designated is present, or where 
acceptance is refused, the court-appointed enforcement officer is to take the objects 
designated in subsection (2) to the storage office for attached objects, or is to ensure 
their safekeeping in another way, doing so at the costs of the debtor. Movable objects in 
the safekeeping of which there is manifestly no interest are to be destroyed without 
undue delay. 
(4) Should the debtor fail to redeem the objects within a period of one (1) month 
following the vacation, the court-appointed enforcement officer shall dispose of them 
and shall lodge the proceeds. The court-appointed enforcement officer shall dispose of 
the objects and lodge the proceeds also in those cases in which the debtor has 
demanded return of the objects within a period of one (1) month without paying for the 
costs within a period of two (2) months following the vacation. Sections 806, 814 and 
817 shall apply mutatis mutandis. Objects that cannot be realised shall be destroyed. 
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(5) Objects exempted from attachment, and those objects for which it is not to be 
expected that their realisation will generate any proceeds, are to be surrendered at any 
time at the demand of the debtor without any further requirements needing to be met.  
§ 885a Limited enforcement instructions 
(1) The enforcement instructions may be limited to the measures pursuant to section 
885 (1). 
(2) The court-appointed enforcement officer is to document in the record (section 762) 
the movable objects that are obviously perceivable when he takes the enforcement 
action. In preparing the documentation, he may create images in electronic format. 
(3) The creditor may at any time remove those of the movable objects that are not the 
subject of compulsory enforcement and is to keep them safe. He may at any time 
destroy movable objects in the safekeeping of which there is manifestly no interest. The 
creditor shall accept responsibility regarding the measures set out in the first and 
second sentences only insofar as wilful misconduct and gross negligence are involved. 
(4) Should the debtor fail to redeem the objects from the creditor within a period of one 
(1) month after the creditor has been put into possession, the creditor may realise the 
objects. Sections 372 through 380, 382, 383 and 385 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch) are to be applied mutatis mutandis. No warning shall be issued that the 
objects may be sold at auction. Objects that cannot be realised may be destroyed. 
(5) Objects exempted from attachment, and those objects for which it is not to be 
expected that their realisation will generate any proceeds, are to be surrendered at any 
time at the demand of the debtor without any further requirements needing to be met. 
(6) Along with giving notice of the date set for the vacation of the premises, the court-
appointed enforcement officer shall indicate to the creditor and to the debtor the 
stipulations made in subsections (2) through (5). 
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(7) The costs pursuant to subsections (3) and (4) shall be deemed costs of the 
compulsory enforcement.  
§ 886 Surrender in the case of a third party having custody and control 
If an object to be surrendered is in the custody and control of a third party, the claim of 
the debtor to surrender of the object is to be transferred to the creditor, upon his having 
filed the corresponding petition, in accordance with the provisions governing the 
attachment and transfer of a monetary claim. 
§ 887 Actions that may be taken by others  
(1) Should the debtor fail to meet his obligation to take an action, where such action can 
be taken by a third party, the creditor is to be authorised by the court of first instance 
hearing the case, upon his having filed a corresponding petition, to have this action 
taken by a third party at the costs of the debtor.  
(2) Concurrently, the creditor may file the petition that the court sentence the debtor to 
make advance payment of the costs that will result from having a third party so take the 
action, notwithstanding the right to any supplementary claim.  
(3) The above rules are not to be applied to any compulsory enforcement serving to 
obtain the surrender or provision of objects. 
§ 888 Actions that may not be taken by others  
(1) Where an action that depends exclusively on the will of the debtor cannot be taken 
by a third party, and where a corresponding petition has been filed, the court of first 
instance hearing the case is to urge the debtor to take the action in its ruling by levying 
a coercive penalty payment and, for the case that such payment cannot be obtained, by 
coercive punitive detention, or by directly sentencing him to coercive punitive detention. 
The individual coercive penalty payment may not be levied in an amount in excess of 
25,000 euros. The stipulations of Chapter 2 regarding detention shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to coercive punitive detention.  
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(2) No warning shall be issued regarding the coercive measures.  
(3) These rules shall not be applied in those cases in which a person is sentenced to 
provide services under a service agreement. 
§ 890 Forcing the debtor to cease and desist from actions, or to tolerate actions 
(1) Should the debtor violate his obligation to cease and desist from actions, or to 
tolerate actions to be taken, the court of first instance hearing the case is to sentence 
him for each count of the violation, upon the creditor filing a corresponding petition, to a 
coercive fine and, for the case that such payment cannot be obtained, to coercive 
detention or coercive detention of up to six (6) months. The individual coercive fine may 
not be levied in an amount in excess of 250,000 euros, and the coercive detention may 
not be longer than a total of two (2) years. 
(2) The sentence must be preceded by a corresponding warning that is to be issued by 
the court of first instance hearing the case, upon corresponding application being made, 
unless it is set out in the judgment providing for the obligation. 
(3) Moreover, upon the creditor having filed a corresponding petition, the debtor may be 
sentenced to creating a security for any damages that may arise as a result of future 
violations, such security being created for a specific period of time. 
§ 893 Action brought for performance of the equivalent in money 
(1) The stipulations of the present Chapter do not affect the right of the creditor to 
demand performance of the equivalent in money. 
(2) The creditor is to enforce his claim to performance of the equivalent in money by 
filing a corresponding court action with the court of first instance hearing the case. 
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§ 894 Fiction of a declaration of intent having been made 
Where the debtor has been sentenced to make a declaration of intent, such declaration 
shall be deemed to have been made as soon as the judgment has attained legal force. 
Where the declaration of intent depends on counter-performance being made, this 
effect shall occur as soon as an enforceable execution copy of the final and binding 
judgment has been issued in accordance with the stipulations of sections 726 and 730. 
5. Dutch Civil Code (BW) 
Article 3:11 Good faith 
A person has not acted in ‘good faith’ as a condition for a certain legal effect if he knew 
or in the circumstances reasonably ought to have known the facts or rights from which 
his good faith depends. The impossibility to conduct an inquiry does not prevent that a 
person, who had good reason to doubt, is regarded as someone who ought to have 
known the relevant facts or rights.  
Article 3:12 The principle of reasonableness and fairness 
At determining what the principle of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ demands in a 
specific situation, one has to take into account the general accepted legal principles, the 
fundamental conceptions of law in the Netherlands and the relevant social and personal 
interests which are involved in the given situation. 
Article 3:13 Abuse of right 
(1) A person to whom a right belongs may not exercise the powers vested in it as far as 
this would mean that he abuses these powers. 
(2) A right may be abused, among others, when it is exercised with no other purpose 
than to damage another person or with another purpose than for which it is granted or 
when the use of it, given the disparity between the interests which are served by its 
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effectuation and the interests which are damaged as a result thereof, in all reason has 
to be stopped or postponed. 
(3) The nature of a right may implicate that it cannot be abused. 
Article 3:296 Legal action to claim specific performance 
(1) Where a person is legally obliged towards another person to give, to do or not to do 
something, the court shall order him, upon a request or claim of the entitled person, to 
carry out this specific performance, unless something else results from law, the nature 
of the obligation or a juridical act. 
(2) Where a person is legally obliged to perform something under an effective date or 
expiration date or under a condition precedent or subsequent, the court may order him 
to do so with observance of that time stipulation or condition. 
Article 3:297 Consequence of a court decision to carry out a specific performance 
If a performance is obtained through the enforcement of a judicial decision or another 
executory title, then this has the same legal effect as that of a voluntary performance of 
the obligation that exists according to that judicial decision or executory title. 
Article 3:299 A specific performance to do or not to do something 
(1) When someone fails do what he is legally obliged to do, the court may, upon a legal 
claim of the person towards whom this obligation exists, authorise this last person to 
effectuate himself what would have resulted from that obligation if it would have been 
performed properly. 
(2) In the same way a person towards whom another person is legally obliged to refrain 
from doing something, may be authorised to undo what is performed in violation of that 
obligation.  
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(3) The costs necessary for the implementation of an authorisation as meant in the 
previous paragraphs, are chargeable to the person who did not observe his obligation. 
The judicial decision in which the authorisation is granted, may order as well the 
payment of these costs at display of certain documents mentioned to this end in the 
decision of the court. 
Article 3:300 A specific performance to complete a juridical act 
(1) Where someone is legally obliged towards another person to perform a juridical act, 
the court may order, upon a legal claim of the entitled person, that its judicial decision 
shall have the same force as a deed that should have been drawn up in accordance 
with all legal formalities by the person who is obliged to perform this juridical act or that 
a representative of this person, appointed by the court, shall perform this juridical act in 
his name, unless this is incompatible with the nature of the to be performed juridical act. 
When the court appoints a representative, it may order as well that the juridical act that 
has to be performed by this representative needs its approval in advance. 
(2) Where the defendant is legally obliged to draw up a deed with the plaintiff, the court 
may order that its judicial decision shall take the place of the deed or of a part of it. 
Article 6:2 Reasonableness and fairness within the relationship between the 
creditor and debtor 
(1) The creditor and debtor must behave themselves towards each other in accordance 
with the standards of reasonableness and fairness. 
(2) A rule in force between a creditor and his debtor by virtue of law, common practice 
or a juridical act does not apply as far as this would be unacceptable, in the 
circumstances, by standards of reasonableness and fairness. 
Article 6:3 Natural obligations 
(1) A natural obligation is a legally not enforceable obligation. 
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(2) A natural obligation exists:  
a. when the law or a juridical act denies its enforceability; 
b. when someone has a pressing moral duty of such nature towards another person that 
compliance with it, although legally not enforceable, has to be regarded by social 
standards (common opinion) as the fulfilment of a performance to which this other 
person is entitled. 
Article 6:74 Requirements for a compensation for damages 
(1) Every imperfection in the compliance with an obligation is a non-performance of the 
debtor and makes him liable for the damage which the creditor suffers as a result, 
unless the non-performance is not attributable to the debtor. 
(2) As far as it is not yet permanently impossible to accomplish the indebted 
performance, paragraph 1 of this Article only applies with due observance of what is 
regulated in Subsection 2 for a debtor who is in default. 
Article 6:75 Legal excuse for a non-performance (force majeure) 
A non-performance cannot be attributed to the debtor if it does not result from his fault 
and if he cannot be held accountable for it by virtue of law, a juridical act or generally 
accepted principles (common opinion).  
Article 6:87 Alternative compensation for damages 
(1) When the debtor is in default and the creditor has notified him in writing that he 
demands the payment of damages instead of the original performance, the non-
performed obligation is converted into an obligation to pay for alternative damages, 
unless it already was (or had become) permanently impossible to accomplish the 
original performance. 
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(2) The original obligation shall not be converted in an obligation to pay for alternative 
damages when this is not justified in view of the fact that the non-performance is of 
minor importance. 
Article 6:248 Legal effects arising from law, usage or the standards of 
reasonableness and fairness 
(1) An agreement not only has the legal effects which parties have agreed upon, but 
also those which, to the nature of the agreement, arise from law, usage (common 
practice) or the standards of reasonableness and fairness.  
(2) A rule, to be observed by parties as a result of their agreement, is not applicable 
insofar this, given the circumstances, would be unacceptable to standards of 
reasonableness and fairness. 
Article 6:265 Rescission of a mutual agreement for a breach of contract  
(1) Every failure of a party in the performance of one of his obligations, gives the 
opposite party the right to rescind the mutual agreement in full or in part, unless the 
failure, given its specific nature or minor importance, does not justify this rescission and 
its legal effects. 
(2) As far as performance is not permanently or temporarily impossible, the right to 
rescind the mutual agreement only arises when the debtor is in default. 
Article 7:21 Non-performance because of a lack of conformity 
(1) If the object is not in conformity with the sale agreement, then the buyer may 
demand that the seller:  
a. supplies what is still missing;  
b. repairs the supplied object, provided that the seller is reasonably able to comply with 
this demand;  
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c. replaces the supplied object, unless the deviation from what has been agreed upon is 
too insignificant to justify such a replacement or unless the object, after the moment on 
which the buyer reasonably should have taken into account that the received 
performance may have to be undone, has been destroyed or damaged because the 
buyer has not ensured its preservation as a prudent debtor should have done. 
(2) The costs of compliance with the obligations referred to in paragraph 1 cannot be 
charged to the buyer.  
(3) The seller must perform the obligations referred to in paragraph 1 within a 
reasonable time and without any significant inconvenience to the buyer, taking into 
account, among other facts, the nature of the object and the particular use that the 
buyer intends to make of it as provided for in the agreement. 
(4) In the event of a consumer sale agreement the buyer may, contrary to paragraph 1, 
only then not demand the repair or the replacement of the supplied object if such a 
repair or replacement is impossible or cannot be expected from the seller. 
(5) In the event of a consumer sale agreement, a repair or replacement of the supplied 
object cannot be expected from the seller if it imposes costs on him which are 
disproportional in comparison with the costs of exercising an alternative legal right 
(action) or legal remedy at the disposal of the buyer, taken into account the value of the 
object if it would be in conformity with the agreement, the significance of the lack of 
conformity and whether the alternative legal right (action) or legal remedy could be 
completed without significant inconvenience to the buyer. 
(6) If, in the event of a consumer sale agreement, the seller has not performed his 
obligation to repair the supplied object within a reasonable time after he has been urged 
to do so by means of a letter of formal notice to perform from the buyer, then the buyer 
is entitled to have the object repaired by a third person and to recover the costs thereof 
from the seller. 
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Article 7:759 Repair of construction defects 
(1) If construction defects, for which the constructor is liable, come to light after the 
delivery of the completed construction, then the principal must give the constructor the 
opportunity to repair these defects within a reasonable period, unless this cannot be 
expected of the principal in view of the circumstances, all without prejudice to the 
constructor’s liability for damages resulting from a poor completion and delivery.  
(2) The principal may claim that the constructor repairs the construction defects within a 
reasonable period, unless the costs of repair would be in no proportion to the 
importance of these repairs for the principal in comparison to his interests in receiving a 
financial compensation for damages. 
6. UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
Article 1 
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places 
of business are in different States: 
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or 
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a 
Contracting State. 
(2) The fact that the parties have their places of business in different States is to be 
disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either from the contract or from any 
dealings between, or from information disclosed by, the parties at any time before or at 
the conclusion of the contract. 
(3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial character of the 
parties or of the contract is to be taken into consideration in determining the application 
of this Convention. 
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Article 6 
The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, 
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. 
Article 7 
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of 
good faith in international trade. 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly 
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is 
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by 
virtue of the rules of private international law. 
Article 28 
If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled to require 
performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a 
judgement for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in 
respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention. 
Article 45 
(1) If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this 
Convention, the buyer may: 
(a) exercise the rights provided in articles 46 to 52; 
(b) claim damages as provided in articles 74 to 77. 
(2) The buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising 
his right to other remedies. 
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(3) No period of grace may be granted to the seller by a court or arbitral tribunal when 
the buyer resorts to a remedy for breach of contract. 
Article 46 
(1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer 
has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement. 
(2) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of 
substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of 
contract and a request for substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice 
given under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(3) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require the seller to 
remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless this is unreasonable having regard to all 
the circumstances. A request for repair must be made either in conjunction with notice 
given under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
Article 61 
(1) If the buyer fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this 
Convention, the seller may: 
(a) exercise the rights provided in articles 62 to 65; 
(b) claim damages as provided in articles 74 to 77. 
(2) The seller is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising 
his right to other remedies. 
Article 62 
The seller may require the buyer to pay the price, take delivery or perform his other 
obligations, unless the seller has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this 
requirement. 
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7. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 
Article 1.1 Freedom of contract 
The parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its content. 
Article 1.2 No form required 
Nothing in these Principles requires a contract, statement or any other act to be made in 
or evidenced by a particular form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses. 
Article 1.3 Binding character of contract 
A contract validly entered into is binding upon the parties. It can only be modified or 
terminated in accordance with its terms or by agreement or as otherwise provided in 
these Principles. 
Article 1.4 Mandatory rules 
Nothing in these Principles shall restrict the application of mandatory rules, whether of 
national, international or supranational origin, which are applicable in accordance with 
the relevant rules of private international law. 
Article 1.5 Exclusion or modification by the parties 
The parties may exclude the application of these Principles or derogate from or vary the 
effect of any of their provisions, except as otherwise provided in the Principles. 
Article 1.6 Interpretation and supplementation of the Principles 
(1) In the interpretation of these Principles, regard is to be had to their international 
character and to their purposes including the need to promote uniformity in their 
application. 
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(2) Issues within the scope of these Principles but not expressly settled by them are as 
far as possible to be settled in accordance with their underlying general principles. 
Article 1.7 Good faith and fair dealing 
(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international 
trade. 
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty. 
Article 1.8 Inconsistent behaviour 
A party cannot act inconsistently with an understanding it has caused the other party to 
have and upon which that other party reasonably has acted in reliance to its detriment. 
Article 1.9 Usages and practices 
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices 
which they have established between themselves. 
(2) The parties are bound by a usage that is widely known to and regularly observed in 
international trade by parties in the particular trade concerned except where the 
application of such a usage would be unreasonable. 
Article 6.2.1 Contract to be observed 
Where the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that 
party is nevertheless bound to perform its obligations subject to the following provisions 
on hardship.  
Article 6.2.2 Definition of hardship 
There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium 
of the contract either because the cost of a party’s performance has increased or 
because the value of the performance a party receives has diminished, and 
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(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion 
of the contract;  
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the disadvantaged 
party at the time of the conclusion of the contract; 
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and 
(d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.  
Article 6.2.3 Effects of hardship 
(1) In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations. The 
request shall be made without undue delay and shall indicate the grounds on which it is 
based. 
(2) The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged party to 
withhold performance.  
(3) Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time either party may resort to 
the court. 
(4) If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable, 
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed, or  
(b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium.  
Article 7.1.1 Non-performance defined 
Non-performance is failure by a party to perform any of its obligations under the 
contract, including defective performance or late performance. 
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Article 7.1.2 Interference by the other party 
A party may not rely on the non-performance of the other party to the extent that such 
non-performance was caused by the first party’s act or omission or by another event for 
which the first party bears the risk. 
Article 7.1.3 Withholding performance 
(1) Where the parties are to perform simultaneously, either party may withhold 
performance until the other party tenders its performance. 
(2) Where the parties are to perform consecutively, the party that is to perform later may 
withhold its performance until the first party has performed.  
Article 7.1.4 Cure by non-performing party 
(1) The non-performing party may, at its own expense, cure any non-performance, 
provided that  
(a) without undue delay, it gives notice indicating the proposed manner and timing of the 
cure;  
(b) cure is appropriate in the circumstances;  
(c) the aggrieved party has no legitimate interest in refusing cure; and  
(d) cure is effected promptly.  
(2) The right to cure is not precluded by notice of termination.  
(3) Upon effective notice of cure, rights of the aggrieved party that are inconsistent with 
the non-performing party’s performance are suspended until the time for cure has 
expired.  
(4) The aggrieved party may withhold performance pending cure.  
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(5) Notwithstanding cure, the aggrieved party retains the right to claim damages for 
delay as well as for any harm caused or not prevented by the cure.  
Article 7.1.5 Additional period for performance 
(1) In a case of non-performance the aggrieved party may by notice to the other party 
allow an additional period of time for performance.  
(2) During the additional period the aggrieved party may withhold performance of its 
own reciprocal obligations and may claim damages but may not resort to any other 
remedy. If it receives notice from the other party that the latter will not perform within 
that period, or if upon expiry of that period due performance has not been made, the 
aggrieved party may resort to any of the remedies that may be available under this 
Chapter.  
(3) Where in a case of delay in performance which is not fundamental the aggrieved 
party has given notice allowing an additional period of time of reasonable length, it may 
terminate the contract at the end of that period. If the additional period allowed is not of 
reasonable length it shall be extended to a reasonable length. The aggrieved party may 
in its notice provide that if the other party fails to perform within the period allowed by 
the notice the contract shall automatically terminate 
(4) Paragraph (3) does not apply where the obligation which has not been performed is 
only a minor part of the contractual obligation of the non-performing party.  
Article 7.1.6 Exemption clauses  
A clause which limits or excludes one party’s liability for non-performance or which 
permits one party to render performance substantially different from what the other party 
reasonably expected may not be invoked if it would be grossly unfair to do so, having 
regard to the purpose of the contract.  
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Article 7.1.7 Force majeure 
(1) Non-performance by a party is excused if that party proves that the non-performance 
was due to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences. 
(2) When the impediment is only temporary, the excuse shall have effect for such period 
as is reasonable having regard to the effect of the impediment on the performance of 
the contract.  
(3) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment 
and its effect on its ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party 
within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have 
known of the impediment, it is liable for damages resulting from such non-receipt. 
(4) Nothing in this Article prevents a party from exercising a right to terminate the 
contract or to withhold performance or request interest on money due.  
Article 7.2.1 Performance of monetary obligation 
Where a party who is obliged to pay money does not do so, the other party may require 
payment. 
Article 7.2.2 Performance of non-monetary obligation 
Where a party who owes an obligation other than one to pay money does not perform, 
the other party may require performance, unless 
(a) performance is impossible in law or in fact; 
(b) performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably burdensome or 
expensive; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
   416 
 
(c) the party entitled to performance may reasonably obtain performance from another 
source; 
(d) performance is of an exclusively personal character; or 
(e) the party entitled to performance does not require performance within a reasonable 
time after it has, or ought to have, become aware of the non-performance. 
Article 7.2.3 Repair and replacement of defective performance 
The right to performance includes in appropriate cases the right to require repair, 
replacement, or other cure of defective performance. The provisions of Articles 7.2.1 
and 7.2.2 apply accordingly. 
Article 7.2.4 Judicial penalty 
(1) Where the court orders a party to perform, it may also direct that this party pay a 
penalty if it does not comply with the order. 
(2) The penalty shall be paid to the aggrieved party unless mandatory provisions of the 
law of the forum provide otherwise. Payment of the penalty to the aggrieved party does 
not exclude any claim for damages. 
Article 7.2.5 Change of remedy 
(1) An aggrieved party who has required performance of a non-monetary obligation and 
who has not received performance within a period fixed or otherwise within a 
reasonable period of time may invoke any other remedy. 
(2) Where the decision of a court for performance of a non-monetary obligation cannot 
be enforced, the aggrieved party may invoke any other remedy. 
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Article 7.3.1 Right to terminate the contract 
(1) A party may terminate the contract where the failure of the other party to perform an 
obligation under the contract amounts to a fundamental non-performance. 
(2) In determining whether a failure to perform an obligation amounts to a fundamental 
non-performance regard shall be had, in particular, to whether 
(a) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what it was 
entitled to expect under the contract unless the other party did not foresee and could not 
reasonably have foreseen such result; 
(b) strict compliance with the obligation which has not been performed is of essence 
under the contract; 
(c) the non-performance is intentional or reckless;  
(d) the non-performance gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it cannot rely 
on the other party’s future performance;  
(e) the non-performing party will suffer disproportionate loss as a result of the  
preparation or performance if the contract is terminated.  
(3) In the case of delay the aggrieved party may also terminate the contract if the other 
party fails to perform before the time allowed it under Article 7.1.5 has expired. 
Article 7.4.1 Right to damages 
Any non-performance gives the aggrieved party a right to damages either exclusively or 
in conjunction with any other remedies except where the nonperformance is excused 
under these Principles. 
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8. Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) 
Article 1:101 Application of the Principles 
(1) These Principles are intended to be applied as general rules of contract law in the 
European Union. 
(2) These Principles will apply when the parties have agreed to incorporate them into 
their contract or that their contract is to be governed by them. 
(3) These Principles may be applied when the parties: 
(a) have agreed that their contract is to be governed by “general principles of law”, the 
“lex mercatoria” or the like; or 
(b) have not chosen any system or rules of law to govern their contract. 
(4) These Principles may provide a solution to the issue raised where the system or 
rules of law applicable do not do so. 
Article 1:102 Freedom of contract 
(1) Parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its contents, subject to the 
requirements of good faith and fair dealing, and the mandatory rules established by 
these Principles.  
(2) The parties may exclude the application of any of the Principles or derogate from or 
vary their effects, except as otherwise provided by these Principles.  
Article 1:201 Good faith and fair dealing  
(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing.  
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty. 
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Article 1:301 Meaning of terms 
In these Principles, except where the context otherwise requires: 
(1) ‘act’ includes omission; 
(2) ‘court’ includes arbitral tribunal; 
(3) an ‘intentional’ act includes an act done recklessly; 
(4) ‘non-performance’ denotes any failure to perform an obligation under the contract, 
whether or not excused, and includes delayed performance, defective performance and 
failure to co-operate in order to give full effect to the contract. 
(5) a matter is ‘material’ if it is one which a reasonable person in the same situation as 
one party ought to have known would influence the other party in its decision whether to 
contract on the proposed terms or to contract at all; 
(6) ‘written’ statements include communications made by telegram, telex, telefax and 
electronic mail and other means of communication capable of providing a readable 
record of the statement on both sides 
Article 1:302 Reasonableness 
Under these Principles reasonableness is to be judged by what persons acting in good 
faith and in the same situation as the parties would consider to be reasonable. In 
particular, in assessing what is reasonable the nature and purpose of the contract, the 
circumstances of the case, and the usages and practices of the trades or professions 
involved should be taken into account. 
Article 6:111 Change of circumstances 
(1) A party is bound to fulfil its obligations even if performance has become more 
onerous, whether because the cost of performance has increased or because the value 
of the performance it receives has diminished. 
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(2) If, however, performance of the contract becomes excessively onerous because of a 
change of circumstances, the parties are bound to enter into negotiations with a view to 
adapting the contract or terminating it, provided that: 
(a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time of conclusion of the contract, 
(b) the possibility of a change of circumstances was not one which could reasonably 
have been taken into account at the time of conclusion of the contract, and 
(c) the risk of the change of circumstances is not one which, according to the contract, 
the party affected should be required to bear. 
(3) If the parties fail to reach agreement within a reasonable period, the court may:  
(a) end the contract at a date and on terms to be determined by the court ; or 
(b) adapt the contract in order to distribute between the parties in a just and equitable 
manner the losses and gains resulting from the change of circumstances. 
In either case, the court may award damages for the loss suffered through a party 
refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing. 
Article 7:102 Time of performance  
A party has to effect its performance:  
(1) if a time is fixed by or determinable from the contract, at that time;  
(2) if a period of time is fixed by or determinable from the contract, at any time within 
that period unless the circumstances of the case indicate that the other party is to 
choose the time; 
(3) in any other case, within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the contract. 
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Article 9:101 Monetary obligations 
(1) The creditor is entitled to recover money which is due.  
(2) Where the creditor has not yet performed its obligation and it is clear that the debtor 
will be unwilling to receive performance, the creditor may nonetheless proceed with its 
performance and may recover any sum due under the contract unless: 
(a) it could have made a reasonable substitute transaction without significant effort or 
expense; or 
(b) performance would be unreasonable in the circumstances.  
Article 9:102 Non-monetary obligations 
(1) The aggrieved party is entitled to specific performance of an obligation other than 
one to pay money, including the remedying of a defective performance. 
(2) Specific performance cannot, however, be obtained where: 
(a) performance would be unlawful or impossible; or  
(b) performance would cause the debtor unreasonable effort or expense; or 
(c) the performance consists in the provision of services or work of a personal character 
or depends upon a personal relationship, or 
(d) the aggrieved party may reasonably obtain performance from another source. 
(3) The aggrieved party will lose the right to specific performance if it fails to seek it 
within a reasonable time after it has or ought to have become aware of the non-
performance.  
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Article 9:103 Damages not precluded 
The fact that a right to performance is excluded under this Section does not preclude a 
claim for damages.  
9. Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 
III. – 1:103: Good faith and fair dealing 
(1) A person has a duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in 
performing an obligation, in exercising a right to performance, in pursuing or defending 
a remedy for non-performance, or in exercising a right to terminate an obligation or 
contractual relationship. 
(2) The duty may not be excluded or limited by contract or other juridical act. 
(3) Breach of the duty does not give rise directly to the remedies for nonperformance of 
an obligation but may preclude the person in breach from exercising or relying on a 
right, remedy or defence which that person would otherwise have. 
III. – 1:110: Variation or termination by court on a change of circumstances 
(1) An obligation must be performed even if performance has become more onerous, 
whether because the cost of performance has increased or because the value of what is 
to be received in return has diminished. 
(2) If, however, performance of a contractual obligation or of an obligation arising from a 
unilateral juridical act becomes so onerous because of an exceptional change of 
circumstances that it would be manifestly unjust to hold the debtor to the obligation a 
court may: 
(a) vary the obligation in order to make it reasonable and equitable in the new 
circumstances; or 
(b) terminate the obligation at a date and on terms to be determined by the court. 
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(3) Paragraph (2) applies only if: 
(a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time when the obligation was 
incurred; 
(b) the debtor did not at that time take into account, and could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken into account, the possibility or scale of that change of 
circumstances; 
(c) the debtor did not assume, and cannot reasonably be regarded as having assumed, 
the risk of that change of circumstances; and 
(d) the debtor has attempted, reasonably and in good faith, to achieve by negotiation a 
reasonable and equitable adjustment of the terms regulating the obligation. 
III. – 3:104: Excuse due to an impediment 
(1) A debtor’s non-performance of an obligation is excused if it is due to an impediment 
beyond the debtor’s control and if the debtor could not reasonably be expected to have 
avoided or overcome the impediment or its consequences. 
(2) Where the obligation arose out of a contract or other juridical act, non-performance 
is not excused if the debtor could reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment 
into account at the time when the obligation was incurred. 
(3) Where the excusing impediment is only temporary the excuse has effect for the 
period during which the impediment exists. However, if the delay amounts to a 
fundamental non-performance, the creditor may treat it as such. 
(4) Where the excusing impediment is permanent the obligation is extinguished. Any 
reciprocal obligation is also extinguished. In the case of contractual obligations any 
restitutionary effects of extinction are regulated by the rules in Chapter 3, Section 5, 
Sub-section 4 (Restitution) with appropriate adaptations. 
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(5) The debtor has a duty to ensure that notice of the impediment and of its effect on the 
ability to perform reaches the creditor within a reasonable time after the debtor knew or 
could reasonably be expected to have known of these circumstances. The creditor is 
entitled to damages for any loss resulting from the non-receipt of such notice. 
III. – 3:301: Enforcement of monetary obligations 
(1) The creditor is entitled to recover money payment of which is due. 
(2) Where the creditor has not yet performed the reciprocal obligation for which payment 
will be due and it is clear that the debtor in the monetary obligation will be unwilling to 
receive performance, the creditor may nonetheless proceed with performance and may 
recover payment unless: 
(a) the creditor could have made a reasonable substitute transaction without significant 
effort or expense; or 
(b) performance would be unreasonable in the circumstances. 
III. – 3:302: Enforcement of non-monetary obligations 
(1) The creditor is entitled to enforce specific performance of an obligation other than 
one to pay money. 
(2) Specific performance includes the remedying free of charge of a performance which 
is not in conformity with the terms regulating the obligation. 
(3) Specific performance cannot, however, be enforced where: 
(a) performance would be unlawful or impossible; 
(b) performance would be unreasonably burdensome or expensive; or 
(c) performance would be of such a personal character that it would be unreasonable to 
enforce it. 
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(4) The creditor loses the right to enforce specific performance if performance is not 
requested within a reasonable time after the creditor has become, or could reasonably 
be expected to have become, aware of the non-performance. 
(5) The creditor cannot recover damages for loss or a stipulated payment for non-
performance to the extent that the creditor has increased the loss or the amount of the 
payment by insisting unreasonably on specific performance in circumstances where the 
creditor could have made a reasonable substitute transaction without significant effort or 
expense. 
III. – 3:303: Damages not precluded 
The fact that a right to enforce specific performance is excluded under the preceding 
Article does not preclude a claim for damages. 
10. Common European Sales Law (CESL) 
Article 1 Freedom of contract 
1. Parties are free to conclude a contract and to determine its contents, subject to any 
applicable mandatory rules. 
2. Parties may exclude the application of any of the provisions of the Common 
European Sales Law, or derogate from or vary their effects, unless otherwise stated in 
those provisions. 
Article 2 Good faith and fair dealing 
1. Each party has a duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing.  
2. Breach of this duty may preclude the party in breach from exercising or relying on a 
right, remedy or defence which that party would otherwise have, or may make the party 
liable for any loss thereby caused to the other party. 
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3. The parties may not exclude the application of this Article or derogate from or vary its 
effects. 
Article 89 Change of circumstances 
1. A party must perform its obligations even if performance has become more onerous, 
whether because the cost of performance has increased or because the value of what is 
to be received in return has diminished. Where performance becomes excessively 
onerous because of an exceptional change of circumstances, the parties have a duty to 
enter into negotiations with a view to adapting or terminating the contract. 
2. If the parties fail to reach an agreement within a reasonable time, then, upon request 
by either party a court may: 
(a) adapt the contract in order to bring it into accordance with what the parties would 
reasonably have agreed at the time of contracting if they had taken the change of 
circumstances into account; or 
(b) terminate the contract within the meaning of Article 8 at a date and on terms to be 
determined by the court. 
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 apply only if: 
(a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time when the contract was 
concluded; 
(b) the party relying on the change of circumstances did not at that time take into 
account, and could not be expected to have taken into account, the possibility or scale 
of that change of circumstances; and 
(c) the aggrieved party did not assume, and cannot reasonably be regarded as having 
assumed, the risk of that change of circumstances. 
4. For the purpose of paragraphs 2 and 3 a ‘court’ includes an arbitral tribunal. 
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Article 106 Overview of buyer’s remedies 
1. In the case of non-performance of an obligation by the seller, the buyer may do any 
of the following: 
(a) require performance, which includes specific performance, repair or replacement of 
the goods or digital content, under Section 3 of this Chapter;  
(b) withhold the buyer’s own performance under Section 4 of this Chapter; 
(c) terminate the contract under Section 5 of this Chapter and claim the return of any 
price already paid, under Chapter 17; 
(d) reduce the price under Section 6 of this Chapter; and 
(e) claim damages under Chapter 16. 
2. If the buyer is a trader: 
(a) the buyer’s rights to exercise any remedy except withholding of performance are 
subject to cure by the seller as set out in Section 2 of this Chapter; and 
(b) the buyer’s rights to rely on lack of conformity are subject to the requirements of 
examination and notification set out in Section 7 of this Chapter. 
3. If the buyer is a consumer: 
(a) the buyer’s rights are not subject to cure by the seller; and 
(b) the requirements of examination and notification set out in Section 7 of this Chapter 
do not apply. 
4. If the seller’s non-performance is excused, the buyer may resort to any of the 
remedies referred to in paragraph 1 except requiring performance and damages. 
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5. The buyer may not resort to any of the remedies referred to in paragraph 1 to the 
extent that the buyer caused the seller’s non-performance. 
6. Remedies which are not incompatible may be cumulated. 
Article 107 Limitation of remedies for digital content not supplied in exchange for 
a price 
Where digital content is not supplied in exchange for the payment of a price, the buyer 
may not resort to the remedies referred to in points (a) to (d) of Article 106(1). The buyer 
may only claim damages under point (c) of Article 106 (1) for loss or damage caused to 
the buyer’s property, including hardware, software and data, by the lack of conformity of 
the supplied digital content, except for any gain of which the buyer has been deprived 
by that damage. 
Article 108 Mandatory nature 
In a contract between a trader and a consumer, the parties may not, to the detriment of 
the consumer, exclude the application of this Chapter, or derogate from or vary its effect 
before the lack of conformity is brought to the trader’s attention by the consumer. 
Article 109 Cure by the seller 
1. A seller who has tendered performance early and who has been notified that the 
performance is not in conformity with the contract may make a new and conforming 
tender if that can be done within the time allowed for performance. 
2. In cases not covered by paragraph 1 a seller who has tendered a performance which 
is not in conformity with the contract may, without undue delay on being notified of the 
lack of conformity, offer to cure it at its own expense. 
3. An offer to cure is not precluded by notice of termination. 
4. The buyer may refuse an offer to cure only if: 
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(a) cure cannot be effected promptly and without significant inconvenience to the buyer; 
(b) the buyer has reason to believe that the seller’s future performance cannot be relied 
on; or 
(c) delay in performance would amount to a fundamental non-performance. 
5. The seller has a reasonable period of time to effect cure. 
6. The buyer may withhold performance pending cure, but the rights of the buyer which 
are inconsistent with allowing the seller a period of time to effect cure are suspended 
until that period has expired. 
7. Notwithstanding cure, the buyer retains the right to claim damages for delay as well 
as for any harm caused or not prevented by the cure. 
Article 110 Requiring performance of seller’s obligations 
1. The buyer is entitled to require performance of the seller’s obligations. 
2. The performance which may be required includes the remedying free of charge of a 
performance which is not in conformity with the contract. 
3. Performance cannot be required where: 
(a) performance would be impossible or has become unlawful; or 
(b) the burden or expense of performance would be disproportionate to the benefit that 
the buyer would obtain. 
Article 111 Consumer’s choice between repair and replacement 
1. Where, in a consumer sales contract, the trader is required to remedy a lack of 
conformity pursuant to Article 110(2) the consumer may choose between repair and 
replacement unless the option chosen would be unlawful or impossible or, compared to 
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the other option available, would impose costs on the seller that would be 
disproportionate taking into account: 
(a) the value the goods would have if there were no lack of conformity; 
(b) the significance of the lack of conformity; and 
(c) whether the alternative remedy could be completed without significant inconvenience 
to the consumer. 
2. If the consumer has required the remedying of the lack of conformity by repair or 
replacement pursuant to paragraph 1, the consumer may resort to other remedies only 
if the trader has not completed repair or replacement within a reasonable time, not 
exceeding 30 days. However, the consumer may withhold performance during that time. 
Article 112 Return of replaced item 
1. Where the seller has remedied the lack of conformity by replacement, the seller has a 
right and an obligation to take back the replaced item at the seller’s expense. 
2. The buyer is not liable to pay for any use made of the replaced item in the period 
prior to the replacement. 
Article 113 Right to withhold performance 
1. A buyer who is to perform at the same time as, or after, the seller performs has a 
right to withhold performance until the seller has tendered performance or has 
performed. 
2. A buyer who is to perform before the seller performs and who reasonably believes 
that there will be non-performance by the seller when the seller’s performance becomes 
due may withhold performance for as long as the reasonable belief continues. 
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3. The performance which may be withheld under this Article is the whole or part of the 
performance to the extent justified by the non-performance. Where the seller’s 
obligations are to be performed in separate parts or are otherwise divisible, the buyer 
may withhold performance only in relation to that part which has not been performed, 
unless the seller’s non-performance is such as to justify withholding the buyer’s 
performance as a whole. 
Article 131 Overview of seller’s remedies 
1. In the case of a non-performance of an obligation by the buyer, the seller may do any 
of the following: 
(a) require performance under Section 2 of this Chapter; 
(b) withhold the seller’s own performance under Section 3 of this Chapter; 
(c) terminate the contract under Section 4 of this Chapter; and 
(d) claim interest on the price or damages under Chapter 16. 
2. If the buyer’s non-performance is excused, the seller may resort to any of the 
remedies referred to in paragraph 1 except requiring performance and damages. 
3. The seller may not resort to any of the remedies referred to in paragraph 1 to the 
extent that the seller caused the buyer’s non-performance. 
4. Remedies which are not incompatible may be cumulated. 
Article 132 Requiring performance of buyer’s obligations 
1. The seller is entitled to recover payment of the price when it is due, and to require 
performance of any other obligation undertaken by the buyer. 
2. Where the buyer has not yet taken over the goods or the digital content and it is clear 
that the buyer will be unwilling to receive performance, the seller may nonetheless 
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require the buyer to take delivery, and may recover the price, unless the seller could 
have made a reasonable substitute transaction without significant effort or expense.
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